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For

Susan F. Haldeman

Presented by her Father

29th October 1842.

THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF

THE EGYPTIANS, CARTHAGINIANS, ASSYRIANS, BABYLONIANS, MEDES AND PERSIANS, GRECIANS AND MACEDONIANS.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY THE REV. R. LYNAM, A. M.

ASSISTANT CHAPLAIN TO THE MAGDALEN HOSPITAL.

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BOOK VI.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER II.

THE HISTORY OF XERXES, CONNECTED WITH THAT OF THE GREEKS.

XERXES's reign lasted but twelve years, but it abounds with great events.

SECTION I.

Xerxes, after having reduced Egypt, makes preparations for carrying the war into Greece. He holds a council. The prudent speech of Artabanus. War is resolved upon.

A. M. 3519. Ant. J. C. 485. Xerxes having ascended the throne,* employed the first year of his reign in carrying on the preparations begun by his father, for the reduction of Egypt. He also confirmed to the Jews at Jerusalem all the privileges granted them by his father, and particularly that which assigned to them the tribute of Samaria, for the supplying them with victims for the service of the temple of God.

A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. In the second year of his reign† he marched against the Egyptians, and having defeated and subdued those rebels, he made the yoke of their subjection more heavy; then giving the government of that province to his brother Achæmenes, he returned about the latter end of the year to Susa.

Herodotus,‡ the famous historian, was born in this same year at Halicarnassus in Caria. For he was fifty-three years old when the Peloponnesian war first began.

A. M. 3521 Ant. J. C. 183. Xerxes,§ puffed up with his success against the Egyptians, determined to make war against the Grecians. (He did not intend,‖ he said, to have the figs of Attica,

* Herod. l. vii. c. 5. Joseph. Antiq. l. xi. c. 5. † Herod. l. vii. c. 7. ‡ Aul. Gel. l. xv. c. 23. § Herod. l. vii. c. 8—18. ‖ Plut. in Apoph. p. 173.

which were very excellent, bought for him any longer, because he would eat no more of them till he was master of the country.) But before he engaged in an enterprise of that importance, he thought proper to assemble his council, and take the advice of all the greatest and most illustrious persons of his court. He laid before them the design he had of making war against Greece, and acquainted them with his motives; which were, the desire of imitating the example of his predecessors, who had all of them distinguished their names and reigns by noble enterprises; the obligation he was under to revenge the insolence of the Athenians, who had presumed to fall upon Sardis, and reduce it to ashes; the necessity he was under to avenge the disgrace his country had received at the battle of Marathon; and the prospect of the great advantages that might be reaped from this war, which would be attended with the conquest of Europe, the most rich and fertile country in the universe. He added farther, that this war had been resolved on by his father Darius, and consequently that he only followed and executed his intentions; he concluded with promising ample rewards to those who should distinguish themselves by their valour in the expedition.

Mardonius, the same person that had been so unsuccessful in Darius's reign, grown neither wiser nor less ambitious by his ill success, and extremely anxious to obtain the command of the army, was the first who gave his opinion. He began by extolling Xerxes above all the kings that had gone before or should succeed him. He endeavoured to show the indispensable necessity of avenging the dishonour done to the Persian name: he disparaged the Grecians, and represented them as a cowardly, timorous people, without courage, without forces, or experience in war. For a proof of what he said, he mentioned his own conquest of Macedonia, which he exaggerated in a very vain and ostentatious manner, as if that people had submitted to him without any resistance. He presumed even to affirm, that not any of the Grecian nation would venture to come out against Xerxes, who would march with all the forces of Asia; and that if they had the temerity to present themselves before him, they would learn to their cost, that the Persians were the bravest and most warlike nation in the world.

The rest of the council, perceiving that this flattering discourse was extremely agreeable to the king, were afraid to contradict it, and all kept silence. This was almost an unavoidable consequence of Xerxes's manner of proceeding. A wise prince, when he proposes an affair in council, and really desires that every one should speak his true sentiments, is extremely careful to conceal his own opinion, that he may put no constraint upon that of others, but leave them entirely at liberty. Xerxes, on the contrary, had openly discovered his own inclination, or rather resolution, to undertake the war. When a prince acts in this manner, he will always find artful flatterers, who, being eager to insinuate themselves into

favour, and to please, and ever ready to comply with his inclinations, will not fail to second his opinion with specious and plausi- reasons, whilst those that would be capable of giving good counsel are restrained by fear; there being very few courtiers who love their prince well enough, and have sufficient courage to venture to displease him by disputing what they know to be his taste or opinion.

The excessive praises given by Mardonius to Xerxes, which is the usual language of flatterers, ought to have made the king distrust him, and apprehend, that under an appearance of zeal for his glory, that nobleman endeavoured to cloak his own ambition, and the violent desire he had to command the army But these sweet and flattering words, which glide like a serpent under flowers, are so far from displeasing princes, that they captivate and charm them. They do not consider that men flatter and praise them, because they believe them weak and vain enough to suffer themselves to be deceived by commendations that bear no proportion to their merit and actions.

This behaviour of the king made the whole council mute. In this general silence, Artabanes, the king's uncle, a prince very venerable for his age and prudence, had the courage to make the following speech: *Permit me, great prince,* says he, addressing himself to Xerxes, *to deliver my sentiments to you on this occasion with a liberty suitable to my age and to your interest. When Darius, your father, and my brother, first thought of making war against the Scythians, I used all my endeavours to divert him from it. I need not tell you what that enterprise cost, or what was the success of it. The people you are going to attack are infinitely more formidable than the Scythians. The Grecians are esteemed the very best troops in the world, either by land or sea. If the Athenians alone were able to defeat the numerous army commanded by Datis and Artaphernes, what ought we to expect from all the states of Greece united together? You design to pass from Asia into Europe, by laying a bridge over the sea. And what will become of us, if the Athenians, proving victorious, should advance to this bridge with their fleet, and break it down? I still tremble when I consider, that in the Scythian expedition, the life of the king your father, and the safety of all his army, were reduced to depend upon the fidelity of one single man; and that if Hystiæus the Milesian had, in compliance with the urgent suggestions made to him, consented to break down the bridge which had been laid over the Danube, the Persian empire had been entirely ruined. Do not expose yourself, sir, to the like danger, especially since you are not obliged to do it. Take time at least to reflect upon it. When we have maturely deliberated upon an affair, whatever happens to be the success of it, we have no blame to impute to ourselves. Precipitation, besides its being imprudent, is almost always unfortunate, and attended with fatal consequences. Above all, do not suffer yourself, great prince, to be dazzled with the*

vain splendour of imaginary glory, or with the pompous appearance of your troops. The highest and most lofty trees have the most reason to dread the thunder. As God alone is truly great, he is an enemy to pride, and takes pleasure in humbling every thing that exalteth itself: and very often the most numerous armies fly before a handful of men, because he inspires the one with courage, and scatters terror among the others.*

Artabanes, after having spoken thus to the king, turned himself towards Mardonius, and reproached him with his want of sincerity or judgment, in giving the king a notion of the Grecians so directly contrary to truth; and showed how extremely he was to blame for desiring rashly to engage the nation in a war, which nothing but his own views of interest and ambition could tempt him to advise. *If a war be resolved upon*, added he, *let the king, whose life is dear to us all, remain in Persia; and do you, since you so ardently desire it, march at the head of the most numerous army that can be assembled. In the mean time, let your children and mine be given up as a pledge, to answer for the success of the war. If the issue of it be favourable, I consent that mine be put to death:† but if it prove otherwise, as I well foresee it will, then I desire that your children, and you yourself, on your return, may be treated in such a manner as you deserve, for the rash counsel you have given your master.*

Xerxes, who was not accustomed to have his sentiments contradicted in this manner, fell into a rage. *Thank the gods*, says he to Artabanes, *that you are my father's brother; were it not for that, you should this moment suffer the just reward of your audacious behaviour. But I will punish you for it in another manner, by leaving you here among the women, whom you too much resemble in your cowardice and fear, whilst I march at the head of my troops, where my duty and glory call me.*

Artabanes had expressed his sentiments in very respectful and moderate terms: Xerxes nevertheless was extremely offended. It is the misfortune of princes,‡ spoiled by flattery, to look upon every thing as dry and austere, that is sincere and ingenuous, and to regard all counsel delivered with a generous and disinterested freedom, as a seditious presumption. They do not consider that even a good man never dares to tell them all he thinks, nor discover the whole truth, especially in things that may be disagreeable to them; and that what they stand most in need of, is a sincere and faithful friend, that will conceal nothing from them. A prince ought to think himself very happy, if in his whole reign he finds but one man born with that degree of generosity, who certainly

* Φιλεῖ ὁ Θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολούειν—οὐ γὰρ ἐα φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ Θεὸς, ἢ ἑωυτόν.

† Why should the children be punished for their father's faults?

‡ Ita formatis principum auribus, ut aspera quæ utilia, nec quicquam nisi jucundum et lætum accipiant.—*Tacit. Hist.* l. iii. c. 56.

ought to be considered as the most valuable treasure of the state, as he is, if the expression may be admitted, both the most necessary, and at the same time the most rare, instrument of government.*

Xerxes himself acknowledged this upon the occasion we are speaking of. When the first emotions of his anger were over, and he had had time to reflect on his pillow upon the different counsels that had been given him, he confessed he had been to blame to give his uncle such harsh language, and was not ashamed to confess his fault the next day in open council; ingenuously owning, that the heat of youth, and his want of experience, had made him negligent in paying the regard due to a prince so worthy of respect as Artabanes, both for his age and wisdom; and declaring, at the same time, that he was come over to his opinion, notwithstanding a dream he had had in the night, wherein a phantom had appeared to him, and warmly exhorted him to undertake that war. All who composed the council were delighted to hear the king speak in this manner; and to testify their joy, they fell prostrate before him, striving who should most extol the glory of such a proceeding; nor could their praises on such an occasion be at all suspected. For it is no hard matter to discern,† whether the praises given to princes proceed from the heart, and are founded upon truth, or whether they drop from the lips only as an effect of mere flattery and deceit. That sincere and humiliating acknowledgment made by the king, far from appearing as a weakness in him, was looked upon by them as the effort of a great soul, which rises above its faults, in bravely confessing them, by way of reparation and atonement. They admired the nobleness of this procedure the more, as they knew that princes educated like Xerxes, in a vain haughtiness and false glory, are never disposed to own themselves in the wrong, and generally make use of their authority to justify, with pride and obstinancy, whatever faults they have committed through ignorance or imprudence. We may venture, I think, to say, that it is more glorious to rise in this manner, than it would be never to have fallen. Certainly there is nothing greater, and at the same time more rare and uncommon, than to see a mighty and powerful prince, and that in the time of his greatest prosperity, acknowledge his faults, when he happens to commit any, without seeking pretexts or excuses to cover them; pay homage to truth, even when it is against him and condemns him; and leave other princes, who have a false delicacy concerning their grandeur, the shame of always abounding with errors and defects, and of never owning that they have any.

The night following, the same phantom, if we may believe

* Nullum majus boni imperii instrumentum quàm bonus amicus. *Tacit. Hist.* l. iv. c. 7.

† Nec occultum est quando ex veritate, quando adumbratâ lætitiâ, facta imperatorum celebrantur. *Tacit. Annal.* l. iv. c. 31

Herodotus, appeared again to the king, and repeated the same solicitations, with new menaces and threatenings. Xerxes communicated what passed to his uncle; and, in order to find out whether this vision proceeded from the gods or not, entreated him to put on the royal robes, to ascend the throne, and afterwards to take his place in his bed for the night. Artabanes hereupon discoursed very sensibly and rationally with the king upon the vanity of dreams; and then coming to what personally regarded him, *I look upon it*,* says he, *almost equally commendable to think well one's self, and to hearken with docility to the good counsels of others. You have both these qualities, great prince; and if you followed the natural bent of your own temper, it would lead you solely to sentiments of wisdom and moderation. You never take any violent measures or resolutions, but when the arts of evil counsellors urge you into them, or the poison of flattery misleads you; in the same manner as the ocean, of itself calm and serene, is never disturbed but by the extraneous impulse of other bodies. What afflicted me in the answer you made me the other day, when I delivered my sentiments freely in council, was not the personal affront to me, but the injury you did yourself, by making so wrong a choice between the different counsels that were offered; rejecting that which led you to sentiments of moderation and equity; and embracing the other, which, on the contrary, tended only to nourish pride, and to inflame ambition.*

Artabanes, through complaisance, passed the night in the king's bed, and had the same vision which Xerxes had before; that is, in his sleep he saw a man, who severely reproached him, and threatened him with the greatest misfortunes, if he continued to oppose the king's intentions. This so much affected him, that he came over to the king's first opinion, believing that there was something divine in these repeated visions; and the war against the Grecians was resolved upon. These circumstances I relate as I find them in Herodotus.

Xerxes, in the sequel, did but ill support this character of moderation. We shall find in him only transient rays of wisdom and reason, which shine forth but for a moment, and then give way to the most culpable and extravagant excesses. We may judge, however, even from thence, that he had very good natural parts and inclinations. But the most excellent qualities are soon spoiled and corrupted by the poison of flattery, and the possession of absolute and unlimited power: *Vi dominationes convulsus.*†

It is a fine sentiment in a minister of state, to be less affected with an affront to himself, than with the wrong done his master by giving him evil and pernicious counsel.

* This thought is in Hesiod. *Opera et dies*, v. 293. Cic. pro Cluent. n. 84. et Tit. Liv. l. xxii. n. 19. *Sæpe ego audivi, milites, eum primum esse virum, qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit; secundum eum, qui bene monenti obediat: qui nec ipse consulere, nec alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse.*

† Tacit.

Mardonius's counsel was pernicious; because, as Artabanes observes, it tended only to nourish and increase that spirit of haughtiness and violence in the prince, which was but too prevalent in him already, ὕβριν αὐξούσης; and* because it disposed and accustomed his mind still to carry his views and desires beyond his present fortune, still to be aiming at something farther, and to set no bounds to his ambition. This† is the predominant passion of those men whom we usually call conquerors, and whom, according to the language of the holy Scripture, we might call with great propriety *robbers of nations.*‡ If you consider and examine the whole succession of Persian kings, says Seneca, will you find any one of them that ever stopped his career of his own accord; that was ever satisfied with his past conquests; or that was not forming some new project or enterprise, when death surprised him? Nor ought we to be astonished at such a disposition, adds the same author; for ambition is a gulf and a bottomless abyss, wherein every thing is lost that is thrown in, and where, though you were to heap province upon province, and kingdom upon kingdom, you would never be able to fill up the mighty void.

SECTION II.

Xerxes begins his march, and passes from Asia into Europe, by crossing the straits of the Hellespont upon a bridge of boats.

A. M. 3523. Ant. J. C. 481. The war being resolved upon, Xerxes, that he might omit nothing which could contribute to the success of his undertaking, entered into a confederacy with the Carthaginians, who were at that time the most potent people of the west, and made an agreement with them, that whilst the Persian forces should attack Greece, the Carthaginians should fall upon the Grecian colonies that were settled in Sicily and Italy, in order to hinder them from coming to the aid of the other Grecians. The Carthaginians made Amilcar their general, who did not content himself with raising as many troops as he could in Africa, but with the money that Xerxes had sent him, engaged a great number of soldiers out of Spain, Gaul, and Italy, in his service; so that he collected an army of 300,000 men, and a proportionate number of ships, in order to execute the projects and stipulations of the league.

Thus Xerxes, agreeably to the prophet Daniel's§ prediction, *waving through his great power and great riches stirred up all* the nations of

* Ὡς κακὸν εἴη διδάσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν πλέον τι δίζεσθαι αἰεὶ ἔχον οὗ παρέοντος.

† Nec hoc Alexandri tantùm vitium fuit, quem per Liberi Herculisque vestigia felix temeritas egit; sed omnium, quos fortuna irritavit implendo. Totum regni Persici stemma percense: quem invenies, cui modum imperii satis fecerit? cui non vitam in aliquâ ulteriùs procedendi cogitatione finierit? Nec id mirum est. Quicquid cupiditati contigit, penitus hauritur et conditur: nec interest quantum eo, quod inexplebile est, congeras. *Senec.* l. vii. *de benef.* c. 3. ‡ Jer. iv. 7. § Dan. xi. 2.

the then known world *against the realm of Greece*, that is to say, of all the west under the command of Amilcar, and of all the east under his own banner, set out from Susa,* in order to enter upon this war, in the fifth year of his reign, which was the tenth after the battle of Marathon, and marched towards Sardis, the place of rendezvous for the whole land army, whilst the fleet advanced along the coasts of Asia Minor towards the Hellespont.

Xerxes† had given orders to have a passage cut through mount Athos. This is a mountain in Macedonia, a province of Turkey in Europe, which extends a great way into the Archipelago, in the form of a peninsula. It is joined to the land only by an isthmus of about half a league over. We have already taken notice, that the sea in this place was very tempestuous, and occasioned frequent shipwrecks. Xerxes made this his pretext for the orders he gave for cutting through the mountain: but the true reason was the vanity of signalizing himself by an extraordinary enterprise, and by doing a thing that was extremely difficult; as Tacitus says of Nero: *Erat incredibilium cupitor.* Accordingly, Herodotus observes, that this undertaking was more vain-glorious than useful, since he might with less trouble and expense have had his vessels carried over the isthmus, as was the practice in those days. The passage he caused to be cut through the mountain was broad enough to let two galleys with three banks of oars each, pass through it abreast. This prince,‡ who was extravagant enough to believe that all nature and the very elements were under his command, in consequence of that opinion, wrote a letter to mount Athos in the following terms: *Athos, thou proud and aspiring mountain, that liftest up thy head unto the heavens, I advise thee not to be so audacious as to put rocks and stones, which cannot be cut, in the way of my workmen. If thou givest them that opposition, I will cut thee entirely down, and throw thee headlong into the sea.* At the same time§ he ordered his labourers to be scourged, in order to make them carry on the work the faster.

A traveller‖ who lived in the time of Francis the First, and who wrote a book in Latin concerning the singular and remarkable things he had seen in his travels, doubts the truth of this fact; and takes notice, that as he passed near mount Athos, he could perceive no traces of the work we have been speaking of.

Xerxes,¶ as we have already related, advanced towards Sardis. Having left Cappadocia, and passed the river Halys, he came to Celæna, a city of Phrygia, near which is the source of the Mæander. Pythius, a Lydian, had his residence in this city, and next to Xerxes was the most opulent prince of those times. He entertained Xerxes and his whole army with an incredible magnificence, and made him an offer of all his wealth towards defraying

* Herod. l. vii. c. 26. † Ibid. c. 21. 24. ‡ Plut. de irâ cohib. p. 455. § Plut. de anim. tranq. p. 470. ‖ Bellon. singul. rer. observ. p. 72. ¶ Herod. l. vii. c. 26. 29.

the expenses of his expedition. Xerxes, surprised and charmed at so generous an offer, had the curiosity to inquire to what sum his riches amounted. Pythius made answer, that with the design of offering them to his service, he had taken an exact account of them, and that the silver he had by him amounted to 2000 talents* (which make 6,000,000 French money;) and the gold to 4,000,000 of daricks,† wanting 7000, (that is to say, to 40,000,000 of livres, wanting 70,000, reckoning ten livres French money to the darick.) All this money he offered him, telling him, that his revenues were sufficient for the support of his household. Xerxes made him very hearty acknowledgments, entered into a particular friendship with him, and, that he might not be outdone in generosity, instead of accepting his offers, obliged him to accept as a present the 7000 daricks, which were wanting to make up his gold a round sum of 4,000,000.

After such a conduct as this, who would not think that Pythius's‡ peculiar characteristic and particular virtue had been generosity, and a noble contempt of riches? And yet he was one of the most penurious princes in the world; and who, besides his sordid avarice with regard to himself, was extremely cruel and inhuman to his subjects, whom he kept continually employed in hard and fruitless labour, always digging in the gold and silver mines, which he had in his territories. When he was absent from home, his subjects went with tears in their eyes to the princess his wife, laid their complaints before her, and implored her assistance. Commiserating their condition, she made use of a very extraordinary method to work upon her husband, and to give him a clear notion and a palpable demonstration of the folly and injustice of his conduct. On his return home, she ordered an entertainment to be prepared for him, very magnificent in appearance, but what in reality was no entertainment. All the courses and services were of gold and silver; and the prince, in the midst of all these rich dishes and splendid rarities, could not satisfy his hunger. He easily divined the meaning of this enigma, and began to consider, that the end of gold and silver was not merely to be looked upon, but to be employed and made use of; and that to neglect, as he had done, the business of husbandry and the tilling of land, by employing all his people in digging and working of mines, was the direct way to bring a famine both upon himself and his country. For the future, therefore, he only reserved a fifth part of his people for the business of mining. Plutarch has preserved this fact, in a treatise wherein he has collected a great many others, to prove the ability and industry of ladies. We have the same disposition of mind noticed in fabulous story, in the example of a prince,§ who reigned in this very country, for whom every thing that he touched was

* About 255,000*l.* sterling. † About 1,700,000*l.* sterling. ‡ Plutarch calls him Pythis. Plut. de virt. mulier. p. 262. § Midas, king of Phrygia.

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immediately turned into gold, according to the request which he himself had made to the gods, and who by that means was in danger of perishing with hunger.

The same prince,* who had made such obliging offers to Xerxes, having desired as a favour of him some time afterwards, that out of his five sons who served in his army, he would be pleased to leave him the eldest, in order to be a support and a comfort to him in his old age; the king was so enraged at the proposal, though so reasonable in itself, that he caused the eldest son to be killed before the eyes of his father, giving him to understand, it was a favour that he spared the lives of him and the rest of his children; and then causing the dead body to be cut in two, and one part to be placed on the right, and the other on the left, he made the whole army pass between them, as if he meant to purge and purify it by such a sacrifice. What a monster in nature is a prince of this kind! How is it possible to have any dependance upon the friendship of the great, or to rely upon their warmest professions and protestations of gratitude and service?

From Phrygia,† Xerxes marched to Sardis, where he spent the winter. From hence he sent heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, to require them to give him earth and water, which, as we have taken notice of before, was the way of exacting and acknowledging submission.

As soon as the spring of the year came on, he left Sardis, and directed his march towards the Hellespont. Being arrived there,‡ he wished to have the pleasure of seeing a naval engagement. A throne was erected for him upon an eminence; and in that situation, seeing all the sea crowded with his vessels, and the land covered with his troops, he at first felt a secret joy diffuse itself through his soul, in surveying with his own eyes the vast extent of his power, and considering himself as the most happy of mortals; but reflecting soon afterwards, that of so many thousands, in a hundred years' time there would not be one living soul remaining, his joy was turned into grief, and he could not forbear weeping at the uncertainty and instability of human things. He might have found another subject of reflection, which would have more justly merited his tears and affliction, had he turned his thoughts upon himself, and considered the reproaches he deserved for being the instrument of shortening that fatal term to millions of people whom his cruel ambition was going to sacrifice in an unjust and unnecessary war.

Artabanes, who neglected no opportunity of making himself useful to the young prince, and of instilling into him sentiments of goodness for his people, took advantage of this moment, in which he found him touched with a sense of tenderness and humanity,

* Herod. l. vii. c. 38, 39. Sen. de irâ, l. iii. c 17
† Herod. l. vii. c. 30—32
‡ Ibid. c. 44, 46.

and led him into farther reflections upon the miseries with which the lives of most men are attended, and which render them so painful and unhappy; endeavouring at the same time to make him sensible of the duty and obligation of princes, who, not being able to prolong the natural life of their subjects, ought at least to do all that lies in their power to alleviate the troubles and allay the bitterness of it.

In the same conversation, Xerxes asked his uncle if he still persisted in his first opinion, and if he would still advise him not to make war against Greece, supposing he had not seen the vision, which occasioned him to change his sentiments. Artabanes owned he still had his fears; and that he was very uneasy concerning two things. What are those two things? replied Xerxes. The land and the sea, says Artabanes: the land, because there is no country that can feed and maintain so numerous an army; the sea, because there are no ports capable of receiving such a multitude of vessels. The king was very sensible of the strength of this reasoning; but as it was now too late to go back, he made answer, that in great undertakings, men ought not so narrowly to examine all the inconveniences that may attend them; that if they did, no signal enterprises would ever be attempted; and that if his predecessors had observed so scrupulous and timorous a rule of policy, the Persian empire would never have attained its present height of greatness and glory.

Artabanes gave the king another piece of very prudent advice, which he no more thought fit to follow than he had the former: this was, not to employ the Ionians in his service against the Grecians, from whom they were originally descended, and on which account he ought to suspect their fidelity. Xerxes, however, after these conversations with his uncle, treated him with great friendship, paid him the highest marks of honour and respect, sent him back to Susa, to take the care and administration of the empire upon him during his own absence, and to that end invested him with his whole authority.

Xerxes,* at a vast expense, had caused a bridge of boats to be built upon the sea, for the passage of his forces from Asia into Europe. The space that separates the two continents, formerly called the Hellespont, and now called the straits of the Dardanelles, or of Gallipoli, is seven stadia in breadth, which is near an English mile. A violent storm arose on a sudden, and broke down the bridge. Xerxes hearing this news on his arrival, fell into a transport of rage; and in order to avenge himself for so cruel an affront, commanded two pair of chains to be thrown into the sea, as if he meant to shackle and confine it, and his men to give it 300 strokes of a whip, addressing it in this manner; *Thou troublesome and unhappy element, thus does thy master chastise thee for having*

* Herod. l. vii. c. 33–36.

affronted him without reason. Know, that Xerxes will easily find means to pass over thy waters, in spite of all thy billows and resistance. The extravagance of this prince did not stop here; but, making the undertakers of the work answerable for events which do not in the least depend upon the power of man, he ordered all those persons to have their heads struck off, that had been charged with the direction and management of that undertaking.

Xerxes* commanded two other bridges to be built, one for the army to pass over, and the other for the baggage and beasts of burden. He appointed workmen more able and expert than the former, who went about it in this manner:—they placed 360 vessels across, some of them having three banks of oars, and others fifty oars a-piece, with their sides turned towards the Euxine sea; and on the side that faced the Ægean sea, they put 314. They then cast large anchors into the water on both sides, in order to fix and secure all these vessels against the violence of the winds, and against the current of the water.† On the east side they left three passages or vacant spaces between the vessels, that there might be room for small boats to go and come easily, as there was occasion, to and from the Euxine sea. After this, upon the land on both sides, they drove large piles into the earth, with huge rings fastened to them, to which were tied six vast cables, which went over each of the two bridges; two of which cables were made of hemp, and four of a sort of reeds called βίβλος, which were made use of in those times for the making of cordage. Those that were made of hemp must have been of an extraordinary strength and thickness, since every cubit of those cables weighed a talent.‡ The cables, laid over the whole extent of the vessels lengthwise, reached from one side to the other of the sea. When this part of the work was finished, quite over the vessels from side to side, and over the cables we have been speaking of, they laid the trunks of trees, cut purposely for that use, and planks again over them, fastened and joined together, to serve as a kind of floor or solid bottom; all which they covered over with earth, and added rails or battlements on each side, that the horses and cattle might not be frightened at seeing the sea in their passage. This was the mode of constructing those famous bridges built by Xerxes.

When the whole work was completed, a day was appointed for their passing over; and as soon as the first rays of the sun began to appear, sweet odours of all kinds were abundantly spread over both of the bridges, and the way was strewed with myrtle. At the same time Xerxes poured out libations into the sea, and turning his face towards the sun, the principal object of the Persian

* Herod. l. vii. c. 36.

† Polybius remarks, that there is a current of water from the lake Mœotis and the Euxine sea into the Ægean sea, occasioned by the rivers which empty themselves into those two seas. *Pol.* l. iv. p. 307, 308.

‡ A talent in weight consisted of 60 minæ, that is to say, of 42 pounds of our weight; and the mina consisted of 100 drachms.

worship, he implored the assistance of that god in the enterprise he had undertaken, and desired the continuance of his protection till he had made the entire conquest of Europe, and had brought it into subjection to his power; this done, he threw the vessel which he had used in making his libations, together with a golden cup and a Persian scimitar, into the sea. The army was seven days and seven nights in passing over these straits; those who were appointed to conduct the march, lashing the poor soldiers all the while with whips, in order to quicken their speed, according to the custom of that nation, which, properly speaking, was only a huge assembly of slaves.

SECTION III.

Enumeration of Xerxes's forces. Demaratus delivers his sentiments freely upon that prince's enterprise.

Xerxes,* directing his march across the Thracian Chersonesus, arrived at Doriscus, a city standing at the mouth of the Hebrus, in Thrace; where, having encamped his army, and given orders for his fleet to follow him along the shore, he reviewed them both.

He found the land army, which he had brought out of Asia, consisted of 1,700,000 foot and 80,000 horse, which, with 20,000 men at least that were absolutely necessary for conducting and taking care of the carriages and the camels, made in all 1,800,000 men. When he had passed the Hellespont, the nations that submitted to him made an addition to his army of 300,000 men, which made all his land forces together amount to 2,100,000 men.

His fleet when it set out from Asia, consisted of 1207 vessels of war, all of three banks of oars. Each vessel carried 200 men, natives of the country that fitted them out, besides thirty more, that were either Persians or Medes, or of the Sacæ; which made in all, 277,610 men. The European nations augmented his fleet with 120 vessels, each of which carried 200 men; in all, 24,000; these, added to the others, amounted together to 301,610 men.

Besides this fleet, which consisted all of large vessels, the small galleys of thirty and fifty oars, the transport ships, the vessels that carried the provisions, and that were employed in other uses, amounted to 3000. If we reckon but eighty men in each of these vessels, one with another, that made in the whole 240,000 men.

Thus, when Xerxes arrived at Thermopylæ, his land and sea forces together made up the number of 2,641,610 men, without including servants, eunuchs, women, suttlers, and other people of that sort, which usually follow an army, and whose number at this time was equal to that of the forces: so that the whole number of those that followed Xerxes in this expedition, amounted to 5,283,220. This is the computation which Herodotus makes of them, and

* Herod. l. vii. c. 56—99. 184—187.

in which Plutarch and Isocrates agree with him. Diodorus Sicu lus, Pliny, Ælian,* and others, fall very short of this number in their calculation; but their accounts of the matter appear to be less authentic than that of Herodotus, who lived in the same age in which this expedition was made, and who repeats the inscription engraved, by the order of the Amphictyons, upon the monument of those Grecians who were killed at Thermopylæ, which expressed that they fought against 3,000,000 of men.

For the sustenance of all these persons,† there must be every day consumed, according to Herodotus's computation, above 110,340 medimni of flour (the medimnus was a measure which, according to Budæus, was equivalent to six of our bushels,) allowing for every head the quantity of a chœnix, which was the daily allowance that masters gave their slaves among the Grecians. We have no account in history of any other army so numerous as this. And amongst all these millions of men, there was not one that could vie with Xerxes in point of beauty, either for the comeliness of his face, or the tallness of his person. But this is poor merit or pre-eminence for a prince, when attended with no other. Accordingly, Justin, after he has mentioned the number of these troops, adds, that this vast body of forces wanted a chief: *Huic tanto agmini dux defuit.*

We should hardly be able to conceive how it was possible to find a sufficient quantity of provisions for such an immense number of persons, if the historian‡ had not informed us, that Xerxes had employed four whole years in making preparations for this expedition. We have seen already how many vessels of burden there were, that coasted along continually to attend upon, and supply, the land army; and doubtless there were fresh ones arriving every day, that furnished the camp with a sufficient plenty of all things necessary.

Herodotus§ acquaints us with the method of which they made use to calculate these forces, which were almost innumerable. They assembled 10,000 men in a particular place, and ranked them as close together as was possible; after which, they described a circle quite round them, and erected a little wall upon that circle, about half the height of a man's body: when this was done, they made the whole army successively pass through this space, and thereby knew to what number it amounted.

Herodotus gives us also a particular account of the different armour of all the nations that constituted this army. Besides the generals of every nation, who each of them commanded the troops of their respective country, the land army was under the command of six Persian generals; *viz.* Mardonius, the son of Gobryas; Tirintatechmes, the son of Artabanes, and Smerdones, son to Otanes,

* Diod. l. xi. p. 3. Plin. l. xxxiii. c. 10. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 3. † Herod. l. vii. c. 187
‡ Ibid. l. vii. c. 20. § Ibid. c. 60.

both near relations to the king; Masistes, son of Darius and Atossa; Gergis, son of Ariazes; and Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus. The 10,000 Persians who were called the Immortal Band, were commanded by Hydarnes. The cavalry had its particular commanders.

There were likewise four Persian generals who commanded the fleet. In Herodotus* we have a particular account of all the nations by which it was fitted out. Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, who since the death of her husband governed the kingdom for her son, that was still a minor, brought but five vessels along with her; but they were the best equipped, and the lightest ships in the whole fleet, next to those of the Sidonians. This princess distinguished herself in this war by her singular courage, and still more by her prudence and conduct. Herodotus observes, that among all the commanders in the army, there was not one who gave Xerxes so good advice and such wise counsel as this queen; but he was not prudent enough to profit by it.

When Xerxes had numbered his whole forces by land and sea, he asked Demaratus if he thought the Grecians would dare to wait for him. I have already taken notice, that this Demaratus was one of the two kings of Sparta, who, being exiled by the faction of his enemies, had taken refuge at the Persian court, where he was entertained with the greatest marks of honour and beneficence. As the courtiers were one day expressing their surprise,† that a king should suffer himself to be banished, and desired him to acquaint them with the reason of it: *It is*, says he, *because at Sparta the law is more powerful than the kings.* This prince was very much esteemed in Persia; but neither the injustice of the Spartan citizens, nor the kind treatment of the Persian king, could make him forget his country.‡ As soon as he knew that Xerxes was making preparations for the war, he found means to give the Grecians secret intelligence of it. And now, being obliged on this occasion to speak his sentiments, he did it with such a noble freedom and dignity, as became a Spartan, and a king of Sparta.

Demaratus,§ before he answered the king's question, desired to know whether it was his pleasure that he should flatter him, or that he should speak his thoughts to him freely and sincerely Xerxes having declared that he desired him to act with the utmost sincerity, *Great prince*, says Demaratus, *since it is agreeable to your pleasure and commands, I shall deliver my sentiments to you with the utmost truth and sincerity. It must be confessed, that from the beginning of time Greece has been trained up and accustomed to poverty: but then she has introduced and established virtue within her territories, which wisdom cultivates, and the vigour of her laws maintains. And it is by the use which Greece knows how to make*

* Herod. l. vii. c. 89. 99. † Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. p. 229.
‡ Amicior patriæ post fugam quàm regi post beneficia. *Justin.*
§ Herod. l. vii. c. 101. 105.

of this virtue, that she defends herself equally against the inconveniences of poverty and the yoke of servitude. But, to speak only of the Lacedæmonians, my particular countrymen, you may assure yourself, that as they are born and bred up in liberty, they will never hearken to any proposals that tend to slavery. Though they were deserted and abandoned by all the other Grecians, and reduced to a band of a thousand men, or even to a more inconsiderable number, they will still come out to meet you, and not refuse to give you battle. Xerxes, upon hearing this discourse, fell a laughing; and as he could not comprehend how men in such a state of liberty and independence as the Lacedæmonians were described to enjoy, who had no master to force and compel them to it, could be capable of exposing themselves in such a manner to danger and death: Demaratus replied, *The Spartans* indeed are free, and under no subjection to the will of any man; but at the same time they have laws, to which they are subject, and of which they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of your majesty. Now by these laws they are forbidden ever to fly in battle, let the number of their enemies be never so superior; and are commanded, by abiding firm in their post, either to conquer or to die.*

Xerxes was not offended at the liberty wherewith Demaratus spoke to him, and continued his march.

SECTION IV.

The Lacedæmonians and Athenians send to their allies to require succours from them, but to no purpose. The command of the fleet given to the Lacedæmonians.

Lacedæmon and Athens,† which were the two most powerful cities of Greece, and those against which Xerxes was most exasperated, were not indolent or asleep whilst so formidable an enemy was approaching. Having received intelligence long before of the designs of this prince, they had sent spies to Sardis, in order to gain more exact information as to the number and quality of his forces. These spies were seized, and as they were just going to be put to death, Xerxes countermanded it, and gave orders that they should be conducted through his army, and then be sent back without any harm being done them. At their return, the Grecians understood what they had to apprehend from so potent an enemy.

They sent deputies at the same time to Argos, into Sicily to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, to the isles of Corcyra and Crete, to desire succours from them, and to form a league against the common enemy.

The people of Argos offered a very considerable succour,‡ on condition that they should have an equal share of the authority and command with the Lacedæmonians. The latter consented, that

* Herod. l. vii. c 104. † Ibid. l. vii. c. 145, 146. ‡ Ibid. l. vii. c. 148. 152

the king of Argos should have the same authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them a great deal: but into what errors and mischiefs are not men led by a mistaken point of honour, and a foolish jealousy of command! The Argives were not contented with this offer, and refused to assist the allied Grecians, without considering, that if they suffered them to be destroyed, their own ruin must inevitably follow that of Greece.

The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily,* and addressed themselves to Gelon, who was the most potent prince at that time among the Greeks. He promised to assist them with 200 vessels of three benches of oars, with an army of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, 2000 light-armed soldiers, and the same number of bowmen and slingers, and to supply the Grecian army with provisions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generalissimo of all the forces both by land and sea. The Lacedæmonians were highly offended at such a proposal. Gelon then abated somewhat in his demands, and promised the same, provided he had at least the command either of the fleet or of the army. This proposal was strenuously opposed by the Athenians, who made answer, that they alone had a right to command the fleet, in case the Lacedæmonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more substantial reason for not leaving Sicily unprovided with troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, that consisted of 300,000 men.

The inhabitants of Corcyra,† now called Corfu, gave the envoys a favourable answer, and immediately put to sea with a fleet of sixty vessels. But they advanced no farther than the coasts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to see the success of an engagement, that they might afterwards range themselves on the side of the conqueror.

The people of Crete,‡ having consulted the Delphic oracle, to know what resolution they were to take on this occasion, absolutely refused to enter into the league.

Thus were the Lacedæmonians and Athenians left almost to themselves,§ all the rest of the cities and nations having submitted to the heralds that Xerxes had sent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Thespia and Platææ. In so pressing a danger,‖ their first care was to put an end to all discord and division among themselves; for which reason the Athenians made peace with the people of Ægina, with whom they were actually at war.

Their next care was to appoint a general:¶ for there never was any occasion wherein it was more necessary to choose one, who was capable of so important a trust, than in the present conjuncture, when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the forces of all Asia. The most able and experienced captains, ter-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 153—161. † Ibid. c. 168. ‡ Ibid. c. 161—171. § Ibid. c. 132. ‖ Ibid. c. 145. ¶ Plut. in Themist. p. 114.

rified at the greatness of the danger, had taken the resolution of not presenting themselves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whose name was Epicydes, that had some eloquence, but in other respects was a person of no merit, was in disreputation for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice. Notwithstanding all which it was apprehended, that in the assembly of the people the votes would run in his favour. Themistocles, who was sensible, that* in calm weather almost any mariner may be capable of conducting a vessel, but that in storms and tempests the most able pilots are at a loss, was convinced, that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicydes was chosen general, whose venal and mercenary soul gave them the justest reason to fear, that he was not proof against the Persian gold. There are occasions, when, in order to act wisely (I had almost said regularly,) it is necessary to dispense with and rise above all rule. Themistocles, who knew very well that in the present state of affairs he was the only person capable of commanding, did for that reason make no scruple of employing bribes and presents to remove his competitor: and† having found means to make the ambition of Epicydes amends, by gratifying his avarice, he got himself elected general in his stead. We may here, I think, very justly apply to Themistocles, what Livy says of Fabius on a like occasion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were going to make a man of no merit consul, employed all his own influence, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the consulship, without being concerned at the clamour that might be raised against him; and he succeeded in the attempt. The historian adds,‡ *The conjuncture of affairs, and the extreme danger to which the commonwealth was exposed, were arguments of such weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct which might appear to be contrary to rule, and removed all suspicion of Fabius's having acted from any motive of interest or ambition. On the contrary, the public admired his generosity and greatness of soul in that, as he knew the commonwealth had occasion for an accomplished general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own singular merit in that respect, he had chosen rather in some sort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expose his character to the reproaches of envious tongues, than to be wanting in any service he could render his country.*

The Athenians also passed a decree to recall home all their peo

* Quilibet nautarum vectorul..que tranquillo mari gubernare potest; ubi orta sæva tempestas est, ac turbato mari rapitur vento navis, tum viro et gubernatore opus est. *Liv.* l. xxiv. n. 8.

† Χρήμασι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐξωνήσατο παρὰ τοῦ Ἐπικύδου.

‡ Tempus ac necessitas belli, ac discrimen summæ rerum, faciebant ne quis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potiùs magnitudinem animi, quòd cum summo imperatore esse opus reip. sciret, seque eum haud dubiè esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re oriretur, quàm utilitatem reip. fecisset. *Liv.* l. xxiv. n. 9.

ple that were in banishment.* They were afraid, lest Aristides should join their enemies, and lest his authority should carry over a great many others to the side of the barbarians. But they were very little acquainted with their citizen, who was infinitely remote from such sentiments. Be that as it may, they thought fit to recall him and Themistocles was so far from opposing the decree for that purpose, that he promoted it with all his influence and authority. The hatred and division of these great men had nothing of that implacable, bitter, and outrageous spirit which prevailed among the Romans in the later times of the republic. The danger of the state was the cause of their reconciliation, and when their services were necessary to the preservation of the public, they laid aside all their jealousy and rancour: and we shall see by the sequel, that Aristides was so far from secretly thwarting his former rival, that he zealously contributed to the success of his enterprises, and to the advancement of his glory.

The alarm increased in Greece, in proportion as they received advice that the Persian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been able to make no other resistance than with their land forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to slavery. This exigence taught them how to set a right value upon the prudent foresight of Themistocles, who upon some other pretext had caused 100 galleys to be built. Instead of judging like the rest of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he on the contrary considered it rather as the beginning, and as the signal of still greater battles, for which it was necessary to prepare the Athenian people: and from that very time he began to think of raising Athens to a superiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the mistress of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to direct all the strength of Athens entirely towards naval affairs, perceiving very plainly that as she was so weak by land, she had no other way to render herself necesssary to her allies or formidable to her enemies. His advice prevailed in spite of the opposition of Miltiades, whose difference of opinion undoubtedly arose from the little probablity there was, that a people entirely unacquainted with fighting at sea, and who were capable of fitting out, and arming only very small vessels, should be able to withstand so formidable a power as that of the Persians who had both a numerous land army, and a fleet of above 1000 ships.

The Athenians had some silver mines in a part of Attica called Laurium,† the whole revenues and product of which used to be distributed among them. Themistocles had the courage to propose to the people that they should abolish these distributions, and employ that money in building vessels with three benches of oars, in order to make war upon the people of Ægina, against whom he

* Plut. in Arist. p. 322, 323. † Plut. in Themist. p. 113.

endeavoured to rekindle their ancient jealousy. No people are ever willing to sacrifice their private interests to the general utility of the public: for they seldom have so much generosity or public spirit, as to purchase the welfare of the state at their own expense. The Athenian people, however, did it upon this occasion; moved by the earnest remonstrances of Themistocles, they consented, that the money which arose from the product of the mines, should be employed in the building of 100 galleys. Against the arrival of Xerxes they doubled the number, and to that fleet Greece owed its preservation.

When they came to the point of naming a general for the command of the navy,* the Athenians, who alone had furnished two-thirds of it, laid claim to that honour as appertaining to them, and their pretensions were certainly just and well grounded. It happened, however, that the suffrages of the allies all concurred in favour of Eurybiades, a Lacedæmonian. Themistocles, though very aspiring after glory, thought it incumbent upon him on this occasion to neglect his own interests for the common good of the nation: and giving the Athenians to understand, that, provided they behaved as valiant men, all the Grecians would quickly desire to confer the command upon them of their own accord, he persuaded them to consent, as he would do himself, to give up that point at present to the Spartans. It may justly be said, that this prudent moderation in Themistocles was another means of saving the state. For the allies threatened to separate themselves from them, if they refused to comply; and if that had happened, Greece must have been inevitably ruined.

SECTION V

The battle of Thermopylæ. The death of Leonidas.

A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 480. The only thing that now remained to be discussed.† was to know in what place they should resolve to meet the Persians, in order to dispute their entrance into Greece. The people of Thessaly represented, that as they were the most exposed, and likely to be first attacked by the enemy, it was but reasonable that their defence and security, on which the safety of all Greece so much depended, should first be provided for; without which they should be obliged to take other measures, that would be contrary to their inclinations, but yet absolutely necessary, in case their country was left unprotected and defenceless. It was hereupon resolved, that 10,000 men should be sent to guard the passage which separates Macedonia from Thessaly near the river Peneus, between the mountains Olympus and Ossa. But Alexander, the son of Amyntas, king of Macedonia, having given them to understand, that if they waited for the Persians in that place they must inevita-

* Herod. l. viii. c. 213 † Herod. l. vii. c. 172, 173.

bly be overpowered by their numbers, they retired to Thermopylæ. The Thessalians finding themselves thus abandoned, without any farther deliberation submitted to the Persians.

Thermopylæ is a strait or narrow pass of mount Œta,* between Thessaly and Phocis, only twenty-five feet broad, which therefore might be defended by a small number of forces, and which was the only way through which the Persian land army could enter Achaia, and advance to besiege Athens. This was the place where the Grecian army thought fit to wait for the enemy: the person who commanded it was Leonidas, one of the two kings of Sparta.

Xerxes in the mean time was upon his march:† he had given orders for his fleet to follow him along the coast, and to regulate their motions according to those of the land army. Wherever he came he found provisions and refreshment prepared beforehand, pursuant to the orders he had sent; and every city he arrived at gave him a magnificent entertainment, which cost immense sums of money. The vast expense of these treats gave occasion to a witty saying of a certain citizen of Abdera, in Thrace, who, when the king was gone, said they ought to thank the gods, that he ate but one meal a day.

In the same country of Thrace,‡ there was a prince who showed an extraordinary greatness of soul on this occasion: it was the king of the Bisaltæ. Whilst all the other princes ran into servitude, and basely submitted to Xerxes, he proudly refused to receive his yoke or to obey him. Not being in a condition to resist him with open force, he retired to the top of the mountain Rhodope, into an inaccessible place, and forbade all his sons, who were six in number, to carry arms against Greece. But they, either through fear of Xerxes, or through a curiosity to see so important a war, followed the Persians, in contradiction to their father's injunction. On their return home, their father, to punish so direct a disobedience, condemned all his sons to have their eyes put out. Xerxes continued his march through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, every thing giving way before him till he came to the strait of Thermopylæ.

One cannot see, without the utmost astonishment,§ what a handful of troops the Grecians opposed to the innumerable army of Xerxes. We find a particular account of their numbers in Pausanias. All their forces joined together, amounted only to 11,200 men; of which number 4000 only were employed at Thermopylæ to defend the pass. But these soldiers, adds the historian, were all determined to a man either to conquer or die. And what is it that such an army cannot effect?

When Xerxes advanced near the straits of Thermopylæ,‖ he was strangely surprised to find that they were prepared to dispute his passage. He had always flattered himself, that on the first

* Herod. l. vii. c. 175, 177. † Ibid. c. 108. 132. ‡ Ibid. l. viii. c. 116.
§ Paus. l. x. p. 645. ‖ Herod. l. vii. c. 207—231. Diod. l. xi. p. 5. 10.

hearing of his arrival, the Grecians would betake themselves to flight; nor could he ever be persuaded to believe, what Demaratus had told him from the beginning of his project, that at the first pass he came to, he would find his whole army stopped by a handful of men. He sent out a spy before him to view the enemy. The spy brought word, that he found the Lacedæmonians out of their intrenchments, and that they were diverting themselves with military exercises, and combing their hair; this was the Spartan manner of preparing themselves for battle.

Xerxes still entertaining some hopes, waited four days on purpose to give them time to retreat. And in this interval of time he used his utmost endeavours to gain Leonidas;* by making him magnificent promises, and assuring him that he would make him master of all Greece, if he would come over to his party. Leonidas rejected his proposal with scorn and indignation. Xerxes having afterwards written to him to deliver up his arms, Leonidas, in a style and spirit truly laconical, answered him in two words; *Come and take them.*† Nothing remained, but to prepare to engage the Lacedæmonians. Xerxes first commanded his Median forces to march against them, with orders to take them all alive and bring them to him. The Medes were not able to stand the charge of the Grecians; and being shamefully put to flight, they showed, says Herodotus,‡ that Xerxes had a great many men, but few soldiers. The next that were sent to face the Spartans, were those Persians called the Immortal Band, which consisted of 10,000 men, and were the best troops in the whole army. But these had no better success than the former.

Xerxes, despairing of being able to force his way through troops so determined to conquer or die, was extremely perplexed, and could not tell what resolution to take; when an inhabitant of the country came to him, and discovered a secret path,§ leading to an eminence, which overlooked and commanded the Spartan forces. He quickly despatched a detachment thither, which, marching all night, arrived there at the break of day, and possessed themselves of that advantageous post.

The Grecks were soon apprised of this misfortune; and Leonidas, seeing that it was now impossible to withstand the enemy, obliged the rest of the allies to retire, but stayed himself with his 300 Lacedæmonians, and resolved to die with their leader, who being told by the oracle, that either Lacedæmon or her king must necessarily perish, determined, without the least hesitation, to sacrifice himself for his country. The Spartans lost all hopes either

* Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225. † Ἀντέγραψε, Μόλων λάβε.

‡ Ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν ἄνθρωποι εἰεν, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄνδρες.
Quòd multi homines essent, pauci autem viri.

§ When the Gauls, 200 years after this, came to invade Greece, they possessed themselves of the straits of Thermopylæ by means of the same by-path, which the Grecians had still neglected to secure. *Pausan.* l. i. p. 7, 8.

of conquering or escaping, and looked upon Thermopylæ as their burying-place. The king, exhorting his men to take some nourishment, and telling them at the same time, that they should sup together with Pluto, they set up a shout of joy as if they had been invited to a banquet, and full of ardour advanced with their king to battle. The shock was exceedingly violent and bloody. Leonidas was one of the first that fell. The endeavours of the Lacedæmonians to defend his dead body were incredible. At length, not vanquished, but oppressed by numbers, they all fell, except one man, who escaped to Sparta, where he was treated as a coward and traitor to his country, and nobody would keep company or converse with him; but soon afterwards he made glorious amends for his fault at the battle of Platææ, where he distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner. Xerxes,* enraged to the last degree against Leonidas for daring to make head against him, caused his dead body to be hung on a gallows; and while he intended dishonour to his enemy covered himself with disgrace.

Some time after these transactions, by order of the Amphictyons, a magnificent monument was erected at Thermopylæ in honour of these brave defenders of Greece: and upon the monument were two inscriptions; one of which was general, and related to all those that died at Thermopylæ, importing, that the Greeks of Peloponnesus, to the number of 4000, had made head against the Persian army, which consisted of 3,000,000 of men: the other related to the Spartans in particular. It was composed by the poet Simonides, and is very remarkable for its simplicity. It is as follows:

Ὦ ξεῖν', ἄγγειλον Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇδε
Κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις.†

That is to say; *Go, passenger, and tell at Lacedæmon, that we died here in obedience to her sacred laws.* Forty years afterwards, Pausanius, who obtained the victory of Platææ, caused the bones of Leonidas to be carried from Thermopylæ to Sparta, and erected a magnificent monument to his memory; near which was likewise another erected for Pausanias. Every year at these tombs was a funeral oration pronounced in honour of these heroes, and public games celebrated, at which none but Lacedæmonians had a right to be present: in order to show, that they alone were concerned in the glory obtained at Thermopylæ.

Xerxes in that affair lost above 20,000‡ men, among whom were two of the king's brothers. He was very sensible that so great a

* Herod. l. vii. c. 238.

† Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt, in quos Simonides:

Dic, hospes, Spartæ nos te hic vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur. *Cic. Tusc Quæst* l. i. n. 101

‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 24, 25.

loss, which was a manifest proof of the courage of their enemies. was capable of alarming and discouraging his soldiers. In order, therefore, to conceal the knowledge of it from them, he caused all his men that were killed in that action, except 1000, whose bodies he ordered to be left upon the field, to be thrown together into large holes, which were secretly made, and covered over afterwards with earth and herbs. This stratagem succeeded very ill: for when the soldiers in his fleet, being curious to see the field of battle, obtained leave to come thither for that purpose, it served rather to discover his own littleness of soul, than to conceal the number of the slain.

Dismayed with a victory that had cost him so dear,* he asked Demaratus, if the Lacedæmonians had yet many such soldiers. That prince told him, that the Spartan republic had a great many cities belonging to it, of which all the inhabitants were exceedingly brave; but that those of Lacedæmon, who were properly called Spartans, and who were about 8000 in number, surpassed all the rest in valour, and were all of them such as those who had fought under Leonidas.

I return for an instant to the battle of Thermopylæ, the issue of which fatal in appearance, might make an impression upon the minds of the readers to the disadvantage of the Lacedæmonians, and occasion their courage to be looked upon as the effect of a presumptuous temerity, or a desperate resolution.

That action of Leonidas, with his 300 Spartans, was not the effect of rashness or despair, but was a wise and noble conduct, as Diodorus Siculus† has taken care to observe, in his magnificent encomium upon that famous engagement, to which he ascribes the success of all the ensuing campaigns. Leonidas knowing that Xerxes was marching at the head of all the forces of the East, in order to overwhelm and crush a little country by the dint of numbers, rightly conceived, from the superiority of his genius and understanding, that if they pretended to make the success of that war consist in opposing force to force, and numbers to numbers, all the Grecian nations together would never be able to equal the Persians, or to dispute the victory with them: that it was therefore necessary to point out to Greece another means of safety and preservation, whilst she was under these alarms; and that they ought to show the whole universe, who had all their eyes upon them, what may be done, when greatness of mind is opposed to force of body, true courage and bravery against blind impetuosity, the love of liberty against tyrannical oppression, and a few disciplined veteran troops against a confused multitude, though never so numerous. These brave Lacedæmonians thought it became them, who were the choicest soldiers of the chief people of Greece, to devote themselves to certain death, in order to make the Persians sensi-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 134. 137. † Lib. xi. p. 9.

ble how difficult it is to reduce free men to slavery, and to teach the rest of Greece, by their example, either to conquer or to perish.

These sentiments do not originate from my own invention, nor do I ascribe them to Leonidas without foundation: they are plainly comprised in that short answer, which that worthy king of Sparta made to a certain Lacedæmonian; who, being astonished at the generous resolution the king had taken, spoke to him in this manner: *Is it possible then, sir,* that you can think of marching with a handful of men against such a mighty and innumerable army?—If we are to reckon upon numbers*, replied Leonidas, *all the people of Greece together would not be sufficient, since a small part of the Persian army is equal to all her inhabitants: but if we are to reckon upon valour, my little troop is more than sufficient.*

The event showed the justness of this prince's sentiments. That illustrious example of courage astonished the Persians, and gave new spirit and vigour to the Greeks. The lives then of this heroic leader and his brave troop were not thrown away, but usefully employed; and their death was attended with a double effect, more great and lasting than they themselves had imagined. On one hand, it was in a manner the seed of their ensuing victories, which made the Persians for ever after lay aside all thoughts of attacking Greece; so that during the seven or eight succeeding reigns, there was neither any prince who durst entertain such a design, nor any flatterer in his court who durst propose the plan to him. On the other hand, such a signal and exemplary instance of intrepidity made an indelible impression upon all the rest of the Grecians, and left a persuasion deeply rooted in their hearts, that they were able to subdue the Persians, and subvert their vast empire. Cimon was the man who made the first attempt of that kind with success. Agesilaus afterwards pushed that design so far, that he made the great king tremble in his palace at Susa. Alexander at last accomplished it with incredible facility. He never had the least doubt, any more than the Macedonians who followed him, or the whole country of Greece that chose him general in that expedition, but that with 30,000 men he could overturn the Persian empire, since 300 Spartans had been sufficient to check the united forces of the whole East.

SECTION VI.

Naval battle near Artemisium.

The very same day on which the glorious action at Thermopylæ took place,† there was also an engagement at sea between the two fleets. That of the Grecians, exclusive of the little galleys and small boats, consisted of 271 vessels. This fleet had lain by near

* Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 227 † Herod. l. viii. c. 1—18. Diod. l. xi. p 10, 11.

Artemisium, a promontory of Eubœa upon the northern coast towards the straits. That of the enemy, which was much more numerous, was near the same place, but had lately suffered in a violent tempest, that had destroyed above 400 of their vessels. Notwithstanding this loss, as it was still vastly superior in number to that of the Grecians, which they were preparing to attack, they detached two hundred of their vessels with orders to wait about Eubœa, to the end that none of the enemy's vessels might be able to escape them. The Grecians having got intelligence of this, immediately set sail in the night, in order to attack that detachment at day-break the next morning. But not meeting with it, they went towards the evening and fell upon the bulk of the enemy's fleet, which they treated very roughly. Night coming on, they were obliged to separate, and both parties retired to their post. But the very night that parted them, proved more pernicious to the Persians than the engagement which preceded, from a violent storm of wind, accompanied with rain and thunder, which distressed and harassed their vessels till break of day: and the 200 ships also, that had been detached from their fleet, were almost all cast away upon the coasts of Eubœa; it being the will of the gods, says Herodotus, that the two fleets should become very near equal.

The Athenians having the same day received a reinforcement of fifty-three vessels, the Grecians, who were apprised of the wreck that had befallen part of the enemy's fleet, fell upon the ships of the Cilicians at the same hour they had attacked the fleet the day before, and sunk a great number of them. The Persians, being ashamed to see themselves thus insulted by an enemy that was so much inferior in number, thought fit the next day to appear first in a disposition to engage. The battle was very obstinate, and the success pretty near equal on both sides, excepting that the Persians, who were incommoded by the largeness and number of their vessels, sustained much the greater loss. Both parties however retired in good order.

All these actions,* which passed near Artemisium, were not absolutely decisive, but contributed very much to animate the Athenians, as they were convinced, by their own experience, that there was nothing really formidable, either in the number and magnificent ornaments of the vessels, or in the barbarians' insolent shouts and songs of victory, to men that know how to come to close engagement, and that have the courage to fight with steadiness and resolution; and that the best way of dealing with such an enemy, is to despise all that vain appearance, to advance boldly up to them, and to charge them briskly and vigorously without ever giving ground.

The Grecian fleet having at this time had intelligence of what had passed at Thermopylæ, resolved upon the course they were to

* Plut. in Themist. p. 115. 117. Herod. l. viii. c. 21, 22.

take without any farther deliberation. They immediately sailed away from Artemisium, and advancing towards the heart of Greece, they stopped at Salamis, a little isle very near, and over-against Attica. Whilst the fleet was retreating, Themistocles passed through all the places where the enemy must necessarily land, in order to take in fresh water or other provisions, and in large characters engraved upon the rocks and the stones the following words, which he addressed to the Ionians; *Be of our side, ye people of Ionia: come over to the party of your fathers, who expose their own lives for no other end than to maintain your liberty; or, if you cannot possibly do that, at least do the Persians all the mischief you can, when we are engaged with them, and put their army into disorder and confusion.* By this means Themistocles hoped either to bring the Ionians really over to their party,* or at least to render them suspected to the barbarians. We see this general had his thoughts always intent upon his business, and neglected nothing that could contribute to the success of his designs.

SECTION VII.

The Athenians abandon their city, which is taken and burnt by Xerxes.

Xerxes in the mean time had entered into the country of Phocis by the upper part of Doris, and was burning and plundering the cities of the Phocians. The inhabitants of Peloponnesus having no thoughts but to save their own country, had resolved to abandon all the rest, and to bring all the Grecian forces together within the isthmus, the entrance of which they intended to secure by a strong wall from one sea to the other, a space of near five miles English. The Athenians were highly provoked at so base a desertion, as they saw themselves ready to fall into the hands of the Persians, and likely to bear the whole weight of their fury and vengeance. Some time before they had consulted the oracle of Delphi, which had given them for answer,† *that there would be no way of saving the city but by wooden walls.* The sentiments of the people were much divided about this ambiguous expression; some thought it was to be understood to mean the citadel, because heretofore it had been surrounded with wooden palisadoes. But Themistocles gave another sense to the words, which was much more natural, understanding it to mean shipping; and demonstrated that the only plan they had to adopt was to leave the city empty, and to embark all the inhabitants. But this was a resolution the people would not at all give ear to, as thinking they thereby relinquished every hope of victory, and seeing no method of saving themselves, when once they had abandoned the temples of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors. Here Themistocles had occasion for all his address and all his eloquence to work upon the people. After he had re-

* Herod. l. viii c. 40, 41. † Ibid l. vii. c. 139—143.

presented to them that Athens did not consist either of its walls, or its houses, but of its citizens, and that the saving of these was the preservation of the city, he endeavoured to persuade them by the argument most capable of making an impression upon them in the unhappy, afflicted, and dangerous condition they were then in, I mean that of the divine authority: giving them to understand, by the very words of the oracle, and by the prodigies which had happened, that their removing for a time from Athens was manifestly the will of the gods.

A decree was therefore passed,* by which, in order to soften what appeared so hard in the resolution of deserting the city, it was ordained, *that Athens should be given up in trust into the hands, and committed to the keeping and protection, of Minerva, patroness of the Athenian people; that all such inhabitants as were able to bear arms, should go on ship-board; and that every citizen should provide, as well as he could, for the safety and security of his wife, children and slaves.*

The extraordinary behaviour of Cimon,† who was at this time very young, was of great weight on this singular occasion. Followed by his companions, with a gay and cheerful countenance, he went publicly along the street of the Ceramicus to the citadel, in order to consecrate a bit of a bridle, which he carried in his hand, in the temple of Minerva, designing to make the people understand by this religious and affecting ceremony, that they had no farther business with land forces, and that it behoved them now to betake themselves entirely to the sea. After he had made an offering of this bit, he took one of the shields that hung upon the wall of the temple, paid his devotions to the goddess, went down to the water-side, and was the first, who by his example inspired the generality of the people with confidence and resolution, and encouraged them to embark.

The greater part of them sent their fathers and mothers, that were old, together with their wives and children, to the city of Trœzene,‡ the inhabitants of which received them with great humanity and generosity. For they made an ordinance, that they should be maintained at the expense of the public, and assigned for each person's subsistence two oboli a day, which were worth about two-pence English money. Besides this, they permitted the children to gather fruit wherever they pleased, or wherever they came, and settled a fund for the payment of the masters, who had the care of their education. How beautiful is it to see a city, exposed as this was to the greatest dangers and calamities, extend her care and generosity, in the very midst of such alarms, even to the education of other people's children!

When the whole city came to embark, so moving and melan-

* Herod. l. viii. c. 51—54. Plut. in Themist. p. 117. † Plut. in Cim. p. 481.
‡ This was a small city situate upon the sea-side, in that part of the Peloponnesus called Argolis.

holy a spectacle drew tears from the eyes of all that were present, and at the same time occasioned great admiration of the steadiness and courage of those men, who sent their fathers and mothers another way and to other places, and who, without being moved either at their grief or lamentations, or at the tender embraces of their wives and children, passed over with so much firmness and resolution to Salamis. But that which extremely raised and augmented the general compassion, was the great number of old men whom they were forced to leave in the city on account of their age and infirmities, and of whom many voluntarily remained there, through religious motives, believing the citadel to be the thing meant by the oracle in the forementioned ambiguous expression of wooden walls. There was no creature (for history has judged this circumstance worthy of being remembered,) there was no creature, I say, even to the very domestic animals, but what took a part in this public mourning; nor was it possible for a man to see these poor creatures run howling and crying after their masters, who were going on board ship, without being touched and affected. Among all the rest of these animals, particular notice is taken of a dog belonging to Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, which, not being able to endure to see himself abandoned by his master, jumped into the sea after him, and continued swimming as near as he could to the vessel his master was on board of, till he landed quite spent at Salamis, and died the moment after upon the shore. In the same place, even in Plutarch's time, they used to show the spot wherein this faithful animal was said to be buried, which was called *the dog's burying-ground.*

Whilst Xerxes was continuing his march,* some deserters from Arcadia came and joined his army. The king having asked them what the Grecians were then doing, was extremely surprised when he was told, that they were employed in seeing the games and combats then celebrating at Olympia: and his surprise was still increased, when he understood that the victor's reward in those engagements was only a crown of olive. What men must they be, cried one of the Persian nobles with great wonder and astonishment, who are influenced only by honour, and not by money!

Xerxes had sent off a considerable detachment of his army to plunder the temple at Delphi,† in which he knew there were immense treasures, being resolved to treat Apollo with no more favour than the other gods, whose temples he had pillaged. If we may believe Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, as soon as ever this detachment advanced near the temple of Minerva, surnamed the Provident, the atmosphere grew dark on a sudden, and a violent tempest arose, accompanied with impetuous winds, thunder, and lightning; and two huge rocks having severed themselves from the mountain, fell upon the Persian troops, and crushed the greatest part of them.

* Herod. l. viii. c 26. † Ibid. c. 35—39. Diod. l. xi. p. 12

The other part of the army marched towards the city of Athens,* which had been deserted by all its inhabitants, except a small number of citizens who had retired into the citadel, where they defended themselves with incredible bravery, till they were killed, and would hearken to no terms of accommodation whatsoever. Xerxes having stormed the citadel, reduced it to ashes. He immediately despatched a courier to Susa, to carry the agreeable news of his success to Artabanes his uncle; and at the same time sent him a great number of pictures and statues. Those of Harmodius and Aristogiton,† the ancient deliverers of Athens, were sent with the rest. One of the Antiochuses, king of Syria (I do not know which of them, nor at what time it was,) returned them to the Athenians being persuaded he could not possibly make them a more acceptable present.

SECTION VIII.

The battle of Salamis. Precipitate return of Xerxes into Asia. Panegyric of Themistocles and Aristides. The defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily.

At this time a division arose among the commanders of the Grecian fleet;‡ and the confederates, in a council of war which was held for that purpose, were of very different sentiments concerning the place for engaging the enemy. Some of them, and indeed the greater part, at the head of whom was Eurybiades, the generalissimo of the fleet, were for having them advance near the Isthmus of Corinth, that they might be nearer the land army, which was posted there to guard that pass under the command of Cleombrotus, Leonidas's brother, and more ready for the defence of Peloponnesus. Others, at the head of whom was Themistocles, alleged, that it would be betraying their country to abandon so advantageous a post as that of Salamis. And as he supported his opinion with abundance of warmth, Eurybiades lifted up his cane in a menacing manner; *Strike*, says the Athenian, unmoved at the insult, *but hear me*; and continuing his discourse, he proceeded to show of what importance it was to the fleet of the Grecians, whose vessels were lighter and much fewer in number than those of the Persians, to engage in such a strait as that of Salamis, which would render the enemy incapable of using a great part of their forces. Eurybiades, who could not help being surprised at the moderation of Themistocles, acquiesced in his reasons, or at least complied with his opinion, for fear the Athenians, whose ships made up above one half of the fleet, should separate themselves from the allies, as their generals had taken occasion to insinuate.

A council of war was also held on the side of the Persians,§ in order to determine whether they should hazard a naval engagement; Xerxes himself was come to the fleet, to take the advice of

* Herod. l. viii. c. 50—54. † Pausan. l. i. p. 14. ‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 55—65 Plut in Themist. p. 117. § Herod. l. viii. c. 67—70.

his captains and officers, who were all unanimous for the battle, because they knew it was agreeable to the king's inclination. Queen Artemisia was the only person who opposed that resolution. She represented the dangerous consequence of coming to blows with people much more conversant and more expert in maritime affairs than the Persians; alleging, that the loss of a battle at sea would be attended with the ruin of their land army; whereas, by protracting the war, and approaching Peloponnesus, they would create jealousies and divisions among their enemies, or rather augment the division which already was very prevalent amongst them; that the confederates in that case would not fail to separate from one another, in order to defend their respective countries; and that then the king, without difficulty, and almost without striking a stroke, might make himself master of all Greece. This wise advice was not followed, and a battle was resolved upon.

Xerxes, imputing the ill success of all his former engagements at sea to his own absence, was resolved to be witness of this from the top of an eminence, where he caused a throne to be erected for that purpose. This might have contributed in some measure to animate the forces; but there is another much more sure and effectual mode of doing it, I mean, the prince's actual presence and example, when he himself shares in the danger, and thereby shows himself worthy of being the soul and head of a brave and numerous body of men ready to die for his service. A prince who has not this sort of fortitude, which nothing can shake, and which even takes new vigour from danger, may nevertheless be endued with other excellent qualities, but is by no means proper to command an army. No qualification whatsoever can supply the want of courage in a general; and the more he labours to show the appearance of it,* when he has not the reality, the more he discovers his cowardice and fear. There is, it must be owned, a vast difference between a general officer and a common soldier. Xerxes ought not to have exposed his person otherwise than became a prince; that is to say, as the head, not as the hand; as he whose business it is to direct and give orders, not as those who are to put them in execution. But to keep himself entirely at a distance from danger, and to act no other part than that of a spectator, was really renouncing the quality and office of a general.

Themistocles,† knowing that some of the commanders in the Grecian fleet still entertained thoughts of sailing towards the Isthmus, contrived to have notice given covertly to Xerxes, that as the Grecian allies were now assembled together in one place, it would be an easy matter for him to subdue and destroy them altogether; whereas, if they once separated from one another, as they were going to do, he might never meet with another opportunity so favourable. The king gave into this opinion; and immediately

* Quantò magis occultare ac abdere pavorem nitebantur, manifestiùs pavidi. *Tacit. Hist.* † Herod. l. viii. 74—78.

commanded a great number of his vessels to surround Salamis by night, in order to make it impracticable for the Greeks to escape from that post.

Nobody among the Grecians perceived that their army was surrounded in this manner.* Aristides came that night from Ægina, where he had some forces under his command, and with very great danger passed through the whole fleet of the enemy. When he came up to Themistocles's tent, he took him aside, and spoke to him in the following manner: *If we are wise, Themistocles, we shall from henceforward lay aside that vain and childish dissension that has hitherto divided us, and strive, with a more noble and useful emulation, which of us shall render the best service to his country, you by commanding and doing the duty of a wise and able captain, and I by obeying your orders, and by assisting you with my person and advice.* He then informed him of the army's being surrounded with the ships of the Persians, and warmly exhorted him to give them battle without delay. Themistocles, extremely astonished at such a greatness of soul, and such a noble and generous frankness, was somewhat ashamed that he had suffered himself to be so much excelled by his rival; but, without being ashamed to own it, he promised Aristides, that he would henceforward imitate his generosity, and even exceed it, if it were possible, in the whole of his future conduct. Then, after having imparted to him the stratagem he had contrived to deceive the barbarian, he desired him to go in person to Eurybiades, in order to convince him that there was no other means of safety for them, than to engage the enemy by sea at Salamis; which commission Aristides executed with pleasure and success, for he possessed much influence over that general.

Both sides, therefore, prepared themselves for the battle.† The Grecian fleet consisted of 380 sail of ships, which in every thing followed the direction and orders of Themistocles. As nothing escaped his vigilance, and as, like an able commander, he knew how to improve every circumstance and incident to advantage, before he would begin the engagement, he waited till a certain wind, which arose regularly every day at a certain hour, and which was entirely contrary to the enemy, began to blow. As soon as this wind rose, the signal was given for battle. The Persians, who knew that their king had his eyes upon them, advanced with such courage and impetuosity, as were capable of striking an enemy with terror. But the heat of the first attack quickly abated when they came to be engaged. Every thing was against them; the wind, which blew directly in their faces; the height and the heaviness of their vessels, which could not move nor turn without great difficulty; and even the number of their ships, which was so far from being of use to them, that it only served to embarrass them in a place so strait and narrow as that in which they fought:

* Plut. in Arist. p. 323. Herod. l. viii. c. 78—82. † Herod. l. viii. c. 84—96

whereas, on the side of the Grecians, every thing was done with good order, and without hurry or confusion; because every thing was directed by one commander. The Ionians, whom Themistocles had warned, by characters engraven upon stones along the coasts of Eubœa, to remember from whom they derived their original, were the first that betook themselves to flight, and were quickly followed by the rest of the fleet. Artemisia distinguished herself by incredible efforts of resolution and courage; so that Xerxes, who saw in what manner she had behaved herself, cried out, that the men had behaved like women in this engagement, and that the women had shown the courage of men * The Athenians, being enraged that a woman had dared to appear in arms against them, had promised a reward of 10,000 drachmas to any one that should be able to take her alive; but she had the good fortune to escape their pursuit. If they had taken her, she could have deserved nothing from them but the highest commendations, and the most honourable and generous treatment.

The manner† in which that queen escaped ought not to be omitted.‡ Seeing herself warmly pursued by an Athenian ship, from which it seemed impossible for her to escape, she hung out Grecian colours, and attacked one of the Persian vessels, on board of which was Damasithymus, king of Calynda,§ with whom she had had some quarrel, and sunk it. This made her pursuers believe that she was one of the Grecian fleet, and they gave over the chase.

Such was the success of the battle of Salamis, one of the most memorable actions related in ancient history, and which has rendered the name and courage of the Grecians famous for ever. A great number of the Persian ships were taken, and a much greater sunk upon this occasion. Many of their allies, who dreaded the king's cruelty no less than the enemy, made the best of their way into their own country.

Themistocles, in a secret conversation with Aristides, proposed to his consideration, in order to sound him and to learn his real sentiments, whether it would not be proper for them to send some vessels to break down the bridge which Xerxes had caused to be built, to the end, says he, that we may take Asia in Europe; but though he made this proposal, he was far from approving it. Aristides, believing him to be in earnest, argued very warmly and strenuously

* Ὁι μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασι μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες, ἄνδρες.
Artemisia inter primos duces bellum acerrimè ciebat. Quippe, ut in viro muliebrem timorem, ita in muliere virilem audaciam cernebat. *Justin.* l. ii. c. 12.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 87, 88. Polyæn. l. viii. c. 53.

‡ It appears that Artemisia valued herself no less upon stratagem than courage, and at the same time was not very delicate in the choice of the measures she used. It is said, that being desirous of seizing Latmus, a small city of Caria, that lay very commodiously for her, she laid her troops in ambush, and under pretence of celebrating the feast of the mother of the gods, in a wood consecrated to her near that city, she repaired thither with a great train of eunuchs, women, drums, and trumpets. The inhabitants ran in throngs to see that religious ceremony; and in the mean time Artemisia's troops took possession of the place. *Polyæn. Stratag.* l. viii. c. 53.

§ A city of Lycia.

against any such project, and represented to him how dangerous it was to reduce so powerful an enemy to despair, from whom it was their business to deliver themselves as soon as possible. Themistocles seemed to acquiesce in his reasons; and in order to hasten the king's departure, contrived to have him secretly informed, that the Grecians designed to break down the bridge. The point Themistocles seems to have had in view by this false confidence, was to strengthen himself with Aristides's opinion, which was of great weight, against that of the other generals, in case they inclined to go and break down the bridge. Perhaps too he might aim at guarding himself by this means against the ill-will of his enemies, who might one day accuse him of treason before the people, if ever they came to know that he had been the author of that secret advice to Xerxes.

This prince,* being frightened at such news, made the best use he could of his time, and set out by night, leaving Mardonius behind him, with an army of 300,000 men, in order to reduce Greece, if he was able. The Grecians, who expected that Xerxes would have come to another engagement the next day, having learnt that he was fled, pursued him as fast as they could, but to no purpose. They had destroyed 200 of the enemy's ships, besides those which they had taken.† The remainder of the Persian fleet, after having suffered extremely by the winds in their passage, retired towards the coast of Asia, and entered into the port of Cumæ, a city of Ætolia, where they passed the winter, without daring afterwards to return into Greece.

Xerxes took the rest of his army along with him, and marched towards the Hellespont. As no provisions had been prepared for them beforehand, they underwent great hardships during their whole march, which lasted five-and-forty days. After having consumed all the fruits they could find, the soldiers were obliged to live upon herbs, and even upon the bark and leaves of trees. This occasioned a great sickness in the army; and great numbers died of fluxes and the plague.

The king, through eagerness and impatience to make his escape, had left his army behind him, and travelled on before with a small retinue, in order to reach the bridge with the greater expedition: but when he arrived at the place, he found the bridge broken down by the violence of the waves, during a great tempest that had happened, and was reduced to the necessity of passing the strait in a fishing-boat. This was a spectacle‡ well calculated to show mankind the mutability of all earthly things, and the instability of human greatness; a prince, whose armies and fleets the land and sea

* Herod. l. viii. c. 115—120. † Ib. c. 130.

‡ Erat res spectaculo digna et æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate mirandâ, in exiguo la entem videre navigio, quem paulò antè vix æquor omne capiebat; carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio, cujus exercitus, propter multitudinem, terris graves erant. *Justin.* l. ii. c. 13.

were scarce able to contain a little while before, now stealing away in a small boat almost without any servants or attendants! Such was the event and success of Xerxes's expedition against Greece.

If we compare Xerxes with himself at different times, and on different occasions, we shall hardly know him for the same man. When affairs were under consideration and debate, no person could show more courage and intrepidity than this prince: he is surprised and even offended if any one foresees the least difficulty in the execution of his projects, or shows any apprehension concerning the issue of them. But when he comes to the point of execution, and to the hour of danger, he flies like a coward, and thinks of nothing but saving his own life and person. Here we have a sensible and evident proof of the difference between true courage, which is never destitute of prudence, and temerity, which is always blind and presumptuous. A wise and prudent prince weighs every thing, and examines all circumstances, before he enters into a war,* of which he is not afraid, but at the same time does not desire; and when the time of action is come, the sight of danger serves only to animate his courage. Presumption inverts this order. When she has introduced assurance and boldness† where wisdom and circumspection ought to preside, she admits fear and despair, where courage and intrepidity ought to be exerted.

The first care of the Grecians,‡ after the battle of Salamis, was to send the first fruits of the rich spoil they had taken to Delphi. Cimon, who was then very young, signalized himself in a particular manner in that engagement, and performed actions of such distinguished valour, as acquired him a great reputation, and made him be considered from henceforth as a citizen that would be capable of rendering the most important services to his country on future occasions.

But Themistocles carried off almost all the honour of this victory,§ which was the most signal that ever the Grecians obtained over the Persians. The force of truth obliged even those who were most envious of his glory to render him this testimony. It was a custom in Greece, that after a battle, the officers should declare who had distinguished themselves most, by writing in a paper the name of the man who had merited the first prize, and of him who had merited the second. On this occasion, by a decision which shows the good opinion it is natural for every man to have of himself, each officer adjudged the first rank to himself, and allowed the second to Themistocles; which was indeed giving him the preference to them all.

The Lacedæmonians having carried him to Sparta, in order to pay him the honours due to his merit, decreed to their general

* Non times bella, non provocas. *Plin. de Traj.*
Fortissimus in ipso discrimine, qui ante discrimen quietissimus. *Tacit. Hist.* l. i. c. 14.
† Ante discrimen feroces, in periculo pavidi. *Ibid.* c. 68. ‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 122. 125.
§ Plut. in Themist. p. 120.

Eurybiades the prize of valour, and to Themistocles that of wisdom, which was a crown of olive for both of them. They also made a present to Themistocles of the finest chariot in the city; and on his departure sent 300 young men of the most considerable families to wait upon him to the frontiers; an honour they had never shown to any person whatsoever before.

But that which gave him a still more sensible pleasure, were the public acclamations he received at the first Olympic games that were celebrated after the battle of Salamis, where all the people of Greece were met together. As soon as he appeared, the whole assembly rose up to do him honour: nobody regarded either the games or the combats; Themistocles was the only spectacle. The eyes of all the company were fixed upon him, and every body was eager to show him and point him out with the hand to the strangers that did not know him. He acknowledged afterwards to his friends, that he looked upon that day as the happiest of his life; that he had never tasted any joy so sweet and so transporting: and that this reward, the genuine fruit of his labours, exceeded all his desires.

The reader has undoubtedly observed in Themistocles two or three principal strokes of his character, which entitle him to be ranked amongst the greatest men. The design which he formed and executed, of making the whole force of Athens maritime, showed him to have a superior genius, capable of the highest views, penetrating into futurity, and judicious in seizing the decisive point in great affairs. As the territory belonging to Athens was barren and of small extent, he rightly conceived, that the only way that city had to enrich and aggrandize herself, was by sea. And indeed that scheme may justly be looked upon as the source and cause of all those great events, which raised the republic of Athens, in the sequel, to so flourishing a condition.

But, in my opinion, this wisdom and foresight is infinitely less meritorious than that uncommon temper and moderation which Themistocles showed on two critical occasions, when Greece had been utterly undone if he had listened to the dictates of an ill-judged ambition, and had piqued himself upon a false point of honour, as is usual among persons of his age and profession. The first of these occasions was, when, notwithstanding the flagrant injustice that was committed, both in reference to the republic of which he was a member, and to his own person, in appointing a Lacedæmonian generalissimo of the fleet, he exhorted and prevailed with the Athenians to desist from their pretensions, though never so justly founded, in order to prevent the fatal effects with which a division among the confederates must have been necessarily attended. And how worthy of admiration was that presence of mind and coolness of temper which he displayed, when the same Eurybiades not only affronted him with harsh and offensive language, but lifted up his cane at him with a menacing gesture!

Let it be remembered, at the same time, that Themistocles was then but young; that he was full of an ardent ambition for glory; that he was commander of a numerous fleet; and that he had right and reason on his side. How would our young officers behave on a similar occasion? Themistocles took all patiently, and the victory of Salamis was the fruit of his patience.

As to Aristides, I shall have occasion in the sequel to speak more extensively upon his character and merit. He was, properly speaking, the man of the commonwealth: provided that was well and faithfully served, he was very little concerned by whom it was done. The merit of others, so far from offending him, became his own by the approbation and encouragement which he gave to it. We have seen him make his way through the enemy's fleet, at the peril of his life, in order to give Themistocles some intelligence and good advice: and Plutarch* takes notice, that during all the time the latter had the command, Aristides assisted him on all occasions with his counsel and credit, notwithstanding he had reason to look upon him not only as his rival, but his enemy. Let us compare this nobleness and greatness of soul with the little-spiritedness and meanness of those men, who are so nice, punctilious, and jealous in whatever respects the subject of command; who are incapable of acting in concert with their colleagues, and solely intent upon engrossing the glory of every thing to themselves; always ready to sacrifice the welfare of the public to their own private interests, or to suffer their rivals to commit blunders, that they themselves may reap advantage from them.

On the very same day that the action of Thermopylæ† happened, the formidable army of Carthaginians, which consisted of 300,000 men, was entirely defeated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. Herodotus places this battle on the same day with that of Salamis. The circumstances of that victory in Sicily I have related in the history of the Carthaginians.

After the battle of Salamis,‡ the Grecians being returned from pursuing the Persians, Themistocles sailed to all the islands that had declared for them, to levy contributions and exact money from them. The first he began with was that of Andros, from whose inhabitants he required a considerable sum, speaking to them in this manner: *I come to you accompanied with two powerful divinities, Persuasion and Force.* The answer they made him was: *We also have two other divinities on our side, no less powerful than yours, and which do not permit us to give the money you demand of us, Poverty and Despair.* Upon this refusal he made a feint of besieging them, and threatened that he would entirely ruin their city. He dealt in the same manner with several other islands, which durst not resist him as Andros had done, and drew great

* Πάντα συνέπραττε καὶ συνεβούλευεν, ἐνδοξότατον ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ κοινῇ ποιῶν τὸν ἔχθιστον. *In vit. Arist.* p. 323.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 165. 167. ‡ Id. l. viii. c. 111, 112 Plut. in Themist. p. 122

sums of money from them without the privity of the other commanders; for he was esteemed a lover of money, and desirous of enriching himself.

SECTION IX.

The battle of Platææ.

A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Mardonius,* who had stayed in Greece with a body of 300,000 men, let his troops pass the winter in Thessaly, and in the spring following led them into Bœotia. There was a very famous oracle in this country, the oracle of Lebadia, which he thought proper to consult, in order to know what would be the success of the war. The priest, in his enthusiastic fit, answered in a language which nobody that was present understood, as much as to insinuate that the oracle would not deign to speak intelligibly to a barbarian. At the same time, Mardonius sent Alexander, king of Macedonia, with several Persian noblemen, to Athens, and by them, in the name of his master, made very advantageous proposals to the Athenian people, to detach them from the rest of their allies. The offers he made them were, to rebuild their city, which had been burnt down, to supply them with a considerable sum of money, to suffer them to live according to their own laws and customs, and to give them the government and command of all Greece. Alexander exhorted them in his own name, as their ancient friend, to lay hold on so favourable an opportunity for re-establishing their affairs, alleging that they were not in a condition to withstand a power so formidable as that of the Persians, and so much superior to Greece. On the first intelligence of this embassy, the Spartans also, on their side, sent deputies to Athens, in order to hinder it from taking effect. These were present when the others had their audience; where, as soon as Alexander had finished his speech, they began, in their turn, to address themselves to the Athenians, and strongly exhorted them not to separate themselves from their allies, nor to desert the common interest of their country; representing to them, at the same time, that union in the present situation of their affairs formed their whole strength, and would render Greece invincible. They added farther, that the Spartan commonwealth was very sensibly moved with the melancholy state which the Athenians were in, who were destitute both of houses and retreat, and who for two years together had lost all their harvests; that in consideration of that calamity, she would engage herself, during the continuance of the war, to maintain and support their wives, their children, and their old men, and to furnish a plentiful supply for all their wants. They concluded by animadverting on the conduct of Alexander, whose discourse, they said,

* Herod. l. viii. c. 113—131. 136—140. 144. Plut. in Arist. p. 324. Diod. l. xi. p. 22, 23. Plut. de Orac. Defec. p. 412.

was such as might be expected from one tyrant who spoke in favour of another; but that he seemed to have forgotten, that the people to whom he addressed himself had showed themselves, on all occasions, the most zealous defenders of the common liberty of their country.

Aristides was at this time in office, that is to say, the principal of the Archons. As it was therefore his business to answer, he said, that as to the barbarians, who made silver and gold the chief objects of their esteem, he forgave them for thinking they could corrupt the fidelity of a nation by large promises; but that he could not help being surprised and affected with some sort of indignation, to see that the Lacedæmonians, regarding only the present distress and necessity of the Athenians, and forgetting their courage and magnanimity, should come to persuade them to persist in fighting nobly for the common safety of Greece from motives of gain, and by proposing to give them victuals and provision; he desired them to acquaint their republic, that all the gold in the world was not capable of tempting the Athenians, or of making them desert the defence of their common liberty; that they were duly sensible of the kind offers which Lacedæmon had made them; but that they would endeavour to manage their affairs so as not to be a burden to any of their allies. Then, turning himself towards the ambassadors of Mardonius, and pointing with his hand to the sun, *Be assured*, says he to them, *that as long as that luminary shall continue his course, the Athenians will be mortal enemies to the Persians, and will not cease to take vengeance of them for ravaging their lands and burning their houses and temples.* After which, he desired the king of Macedonia, if he was inclined to be truly their friend, not to make himself any more the bearer of such proposals to them, which would only serve to reflect dishonour upon him, without ever producing any other effect.

Aristides was not satisfied with having made this plain and peremptory declaration. But that he might excite a still greater horror for such proposals, and for ever prohibit all manner of intercourse with the barbarians through a principle of religion, he ordained, that the priests should denounce curses and execrations upon any person whatsoever, that should presume to propose the making of an alliance with the Persians, or the breaking of their alliance with the rest of the Grecians.

When Mardonius had learned,* by the answer which the Athenians had sent him,† that they were not to be prevailed upon by any proposals or advantages whatsoever to sell their liberty, he marched with his whole army towards Attica, wasting and destroying whatever he found in his way. The Athenians, not being in a condition to withstand such a torrent, had retired to Salamis, and a second time abandoned their city. Mardonius, still entertaining

* Herod. l. ix. c. 1--11. Plut. in Arist. p. 324 Diod. lib. xi. p. 23.
† Posteaquam nullo pretio libertatem his videt venalem, &c. *Justin.* l. ii. c. 14.

hopes of bringing them to some terms of accommodation, sent another deputy to them to make the same proposals as before. A certain Athenian called Lycidas, being of opinion that they should hearken to what he had to offer, was immediately stoned, and the Athenian women running at the same time to his house, did the same execution upon his wife and children; so detestable a crime did it appear to them to propose a peace with the Persians. But notwithstanding this, they paid respect to the character wherewith the deputy was invested, and sent him back without offering him any indignity or ill treatment. Mardonius now found that there was no peace to be expected with them. He therefore entered Athens, and burnt and demolished every thing that had escaped their fury the preceding year.

The Spartans, instead of conducting their troops into Attica, according to their engagement, thought only of keeping themselves shut up within the Peloponnesus for their own security, and with that view had begun to build a wall over the Isthmus, in order to hinder the enemy from entering that way, by which means they reckoned they should be safe themselves, and should have no farther occasion for the assistance of the Athenians. The latter hereupon sent deputies to Sparta, in order to complain of the slowness and neglect of their allies. But the Ephori did not seem to be much moved at their remonstrances; and as that day was the festival of Hyacinthus,* they spent it in feasts and rejoicing, and deferred giving the deputies their answer till the next day. And still procrastinating the affair as much as they could, on various pretexts, they gained ten days' time, during which the building of the wall was completed. They were on the point of dismissing the Athenian envoys in a scandalous manner, when a private citizen expostulated with them, and represented to them, how base it would be to treat the Athenians in such a manner, after all the calamities and voluntary losses they had so generously suffered for the common defence of liberty, and all the important services they had rendered Greece in general. This opened their eyes, and made them ashamed of their perfidious design. The very next night following, they sent off, unknown to the Athenian deputies, 5000 Spartans, who had each of them seven helots or slaves to attend him. On the following morning the deputies renewed their complaints with great warmth and earnestness, and were extremely surprised when they were told that the Spartan succours were on their march, and by this time were not far from Attica.

Mardonius had left Attica at this time,† and was on his return into Bœotia. As the latter was an open and flat country, he

* Amongst the Lacedæmonians the feast of Hyacinthus continued three days; the first and the last of which were days of sorrow and mourning for the death of Hyacinthus; but the second was a day of rejoicing, which was spent in feasting, sports, and spectacles, and all kinds of diversions. This festival was celebrated every year in the month of August, in honour of Apollo and Hyacinthus.

† Herod. l. ix c. 12—76. Plut in Arist. p. 325—330. Diod. l. ix. p 24. 26

thought it would be more convenient for him to fight there than in Attica, which was uneven and rugged, full of hills and narrow passes, and which for that reason would not allow him space enough for drawing up his numerous army in battle array, nor leave room for his cavalry to act. When he came back into Bœotia, he encamped by the river Asopus. The Grecians followed him thither under the command of Pausanias, king of Sparta, and of Aristides, general of the Athenians. The Persian army, according to Herodotus, consisted of 300,000, or, according to Diodorus, of 500,000 men. That of the Grecians did not amount to 70,000; of which there were but 5000 Spartans; but, as these were accompanied by 35,000 helots, *viz.* seven for each Spartan, they made up together 40,000; the latter of these were light-armed troops. The Athenian forces consisted but of 8000, and the troops of the allies made up the remainder. The right wing of the army was commanded by the Spartans, and the left by the Athenians, an honour which the people of Tegæa pretended to, and disputed with them, but in vain.

Whilst all Greece was in suspense,* expecting a battle that should determine their fate, a secret conspiracy, formed in the midst of the Athenian camp by some discontented citizens, who intended either to subvert their popular government, or to deliver up Greece into the hands of the Persians, gave Aristides a great deal of perplexity and trouble. On this emergency he had occasion for all his prudence: not knowing exactly how many might be concerned in this conspiracy, he contented himself with having eight of them taken up; and of those eight, the only two whom he caused to be accused, because they had the most laid to their charge, made their escape out of the camp, while their trial was preparing. There is no doubt but Aristides favoured their escape, lest he should be obliged to punish them, and their punishment might occasion some tumult and disorder. The others that were in custody he released, leaving them room to believe that he had found nothing against them, and telling them, that the battle with the enemy should be the tribunal where they might fully justify their characters, and show the world how unlikely it was that they had ever entertained a thought of betraying their country. This well-timed and wise dissimulation, which opened a door for repentance, and avoided driving the offenders to despair, appeased all the commotion, and quashed the whole affair.

Mardonius, in order to try the Grecians, sent out his cavalry, in which he was strongest, to skirmish with them. The Megarians, who were encamped in the open country, suffered extremely by them; and in spite of all the vigour and resolution with which they defended themselves, they were upon the point of giving way, when a detachment of 300 Athenians, with some troops armed with

* Plut. in Arist. p. 326.

missive weapons, advanced to their succour. Masistius, the general of the Persian horse, and one of the most considerable noblemen of his country, seeing them advance towards him in good order, made his cavalry face about and attack them. The Athenians stood their ground, and waited to receive them. The shock was very fierce and violent, both sides equally endeavouring to show, by the issue of their encounter, what would be the success of the general engagement. The victory was a long time disputed; but at last Masistius's horse, being wounded, threw his master, who was instantly killed; upon which the Persians immediately fled. As soon as the news of his death reached the barbarians, their grief was excessive. They cut off their hair, as also the manes of their horses and mules, filling the camp with their cries and lamentations, having lost, in their opinion, the bravest man of their army.

After this encounter with the Persian cavalry, the two armies were a long time without coming to action; because the soothsayers, upon inspecting the entrails of the victims, foretold equally to both parties, that they should be victorious, provided they acted only upon the defensive; whereas, on the other hand, they threatened them equally with a total overthrow, if they acted offensively, or made the first attack.

They passed ten days in this manner, in view of each other. But Mardonius, who was of a fiery, impatient temper, grew very uneasy at so long a delay. Besides, he had only a few days' provisions left for his army; and the Grecians grew stronger every day by the addition of new troops, that were continually coming to join them. He therefore called a council of war, in order to deliberate whether they should give battle. Artabazus, a nobleman of singular merit and great experience, was of opinion, that they should not hazard a battle, but that they should retire under the walls of Thebes, where they would be in a condition to supply the army with provisions and forage. He alleged, that delays alone would be capable of diminishing the ardour of the allies; that they would thereby have time to tamper with them, and might be able to draw some of them off by gold and silver, which they would take care to distribute among the leaders, and among such as had the greatest sway and authority in their several cities; and that, in short, this would be both the easiest and surest method of subjecting Greece. This opinion was very wise, but was overruled by Mardonius, whom the rest had not courage to contradict. The result, therefore, of their deliberations was, that they should give battle the next day. Alexander, king of Macedonia, who was on the side of the Grecians in his heart, came secretly, about midnight, to their camp, and informed Aristides of all that had passed.

Pausanias forthwith gave orders to the officers to prepare themselves for battle, and imparted to Aristides the design he had formed of changing his order of battle, by placing the Athenians

in the right wing, instead of the left, in order to oppose them to the Persians, with whom they had been accustomed to engage. Whether it was fear or prudence, that induced Pausanias to propose this new disposition, the Athenians accepted it with pleasure. Nothing was heard among them but mutual exhortations to acquit themselves bravely, bidding each other remember, that neither they nor their enemies were changed since the battle of Marathon, unless it were, that victory had increased the courage of the Athenians, and had dispirited the Persians. We do not fight, said they, as they do, for a country only, or a city, but for the trophies erected at Marathon and at Salamis, that they may not appear to be the work only of Miltiades and of Fortune, but the work of the Athenians. Encouraging one another in this manner, they went with all the alacrity imaginable to change their post. But Mardonius, upon the intelligence he received of this movement, having made the like change in his order of battle, both sides ranged their troops again according to their former disposition. The whole day passed in this manner, without their coming to action.

In the evening the Grecians held a council of war, in which it was resolved, that they should decamp from the place they were in, and march to another, more conveniently situated for water. Night being come, and the officers endeavouring, at the head of their companies, to push forward to the camp marked out for them, great confusion arose among the troops, some going one way, and some another, without observing any order or regularity in their march. At last they halted near the little city of Platææ.

On the first news of the Grecians having decamped, Mardonius drew his whole army into order of battle, and pursued them with the hideous shouting and howling of his barbarian forces, who thought they were marching, not so much to fight, as to strip and plunder a flying enemy: and their general, likewise, making himself sure of victory, proudly insulted Artabazus, reproaching him with his fearful and cowardly prudence, and with the false notion he had conceived of the Lacedæmonians, who never fled, as he pretended, before an enemy; whereas here was an instance of the contrary. But the general quickly found this was no false or ill-grounded notion. He happened to fall in with the Lacedæmonians, who were alone, and separated from the body of the Grecian army, to the number of 50,000 men, together with 3000 of the Tegeans. The encounter was exceeding fierce: on both sides the men fought with the courage of lions; and the barbarians perceived that they had to do with soldiers, who were determined to conquer or die in the field. The Athenian troops, to whom Pausanias had sent an officer, were already upon their march to aid them: but the Greeks, who were on the side of the Persians, to the number of 50,000 men, went out to meet them, and hindered them from proceeding any farther. Aristides with his little body of men bore up firmly against them and withstood their attack, letting them

see, how insignificant a superiority of numbers is against true courage and bravery.

The battle being thus divided into two, and fought in two different places, the Spartans were the first who broke in upon the Persian forces and put them into disorder. Mardonius, their general, falling dead of a wound he had received in the engagement, all his army betook themselves to flight; and those Greeks, who were engaged against Aristides, did the same, as soon as they understood the barbarians were defeated. The latter had taken shelter in their former camp, where they had fortified themselves with an inclosure of wood. The Lacedæmonians pursued them thither, and attacked them in their intrenchment: but this they did weakly and irresolutely, like people that were not much accustomed to sieges, and to storm walls. The Athenian troops, having advice of this, left off pursuing their Grecian adversaries, and marched to the camp of the Persians, which after several assaults they carried, and made a horrible slaughter of the enemy.

Artabazus, who from Mardonius's imprudent management had but too well foreseen the misfortune that befel them, after having distinguished himself in the engagement, and given all possible proofs of his courage and intrepidity, made a timely retreat with the 40,000 men he commanded; and preventing his flight from being known by the expedition of his march, arrived safe at Byzantium, and from thence returned into Asia. Of all the rest of the Persian army, not 4000 men escaped that day's slaughter; all were killed and cut to pieces by the Grecians, who by that means delivered themselves at once from all farther invasions from that nation, no Persian army having ever appeared after that time on this side the Hellespont.

A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. This battle was fought on the fourth day of the month Boedromion,* according to the Athenian manner of reckoning. Soon after, the allies, as a testimony of their gratitude to Heaven, caused a statue of Jupiter to be made at their joint and common expense, which they placed in his temple at Olympia. The names of the several nations of Greece,† that were present in the engagement, were engraven on the right side of the pedestal of the statue; the Lacedæmonians first, the Athenians next, and all the rest in order.

One of the principal citizens of Ægina came and addressed himself to Pausanias,‡ exhorting him to revenge the indignity that Mardonius and Xerxes had shown to Leonidas, whose dead body had been hung upon a gallows by their order, and urging him to use Mardonius's body in the same manner. As a farther motive for doing so, he added, that by thus satisfying the manes of those that were killed at Thermopylæ, he would be sure to immortalize his own name throughout all Greece, and make his memory pre-

* This day answers to the nineteenth of our September.

† Pausan. l. v p. 532.

‡ Herod. l. ix. c. 77, 78.

cious to the latest posterity. *Carry thy base counsel elsewhere*, replied Pausanias. *Thou must have a very wrong notion of true glory, to imagine, that the way for me to acquire it is by resembling the barbarians. If the esteem of the people of Ægina is not to be purchased but by such a proceeding, I shall be content with preserving that of the Lacedæmonians alone, amongst whom the base and ungenerous pleasure of revenge is never put in competition with that of showing clemency and moderation to their enemies, and especially after their death. As for the manes of my departed countrymen, they are sufficiently avenged by the death of the many thousand Persians slain upon the spot in the last engagement.*

A dispute,* which arose between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, to ascertain which of the two nations should have the prize of valour adjudged to them, as also which of them should have the privilege of erecting a trophy, had like to have sullied all the glory, and imbittered the joy, of their late victory. They were just on the point of carrying things to the last extremity, and would certainly have decided the dispute with their swords, had not Aristides prevailed upon them, by the strength of his arguments, to refer the determination of the matter to the judgment of the Grecians in general. This proposition being accepted by both parties, and the Greeks being assembled upon the spot to decide the contest, Theogiton of Megara, speaking upon the question, gave it as his opinion, that the prize of valour ought to be adjudged neither to Athens nor to Sparta, but to some other city; unless they desired to kindle a civil war, of more fatal consequences than that to which they had just put an end. After he had finished his speech, Cleocritus of Corinth rising up, nobody doubted but he was going to claim that honour for the city of which he was a member and a native; for Corinth was the chief city of Greece in power and dignity after those of Athens and Sparta. But every body was agreeably deceived when they found, that all his discourse tended to the praise of the Platæans, and that the conclusion he made from the whole was, that in order to extinguish so dangerous a contention, they ought to adjudge the prize to them only, against whom neither of the contending parties could have any grounds of anger or jealousy. This discourse and proposal were received with a general applause by the whole assembly. Aristides immediately assented to it on the part of the Athenians, and Pausanias on the part of the Lacedæmonians.

All parties being thus agreed,† before they began to divide the spoil of the enemy, they put fourscore talents‡ aside for the Platæans, who laid them out in building a temple to Minerva, in erecting a statue to her honour, and in adorning the temple with curious and valuable paintings, which were still in being in Plutarch's time, that is to say, above 600 years afterwards, and which were

* Plut. in Arist. p. 331. † Herod. l. ix. c. 79, 80.
‡ Eighty thousand crowns French, and about 18,000*l.* sterling.

then as fresh as if they had lately come out of the hands of the painters. As for the trophy, which had been another article of the dispute, the Lacedæmonians erected one for themselves in particular, and the Athenians another.

The spoil was immense: in Mardonius's camp they found prodigious sums of gold and silver, besides cups, vessels, beds, tables, necklaces, and bracelets of gold and silver, not to be valued or numbered. It is observed by a certain historian.* that these spoils proved fatal to Greece, by becoming the instruments of introducing the love of riches and luxury among her inhabitants. According to the religious custom of the Grecians, before they divided the treasure, they appropriated the tenth part of the whole to the use of the gods. The rest was distributed equally among the cities and nations that had furnished troops: and the chief officers who had distinguished themselves in the field of battle were likewise distinguished in this distribution. They sent a present of a golden tripod to Delphi. in the inscription upon which Pausanias caused these words to be inserted; *That he had defeated the barbarians at Platææ,*† *and that in acknowledgment of that victory he had made this present to Apollo.*

This arrogant inscription, wherein he ascribed the honour both of the victory and the offering to himself alone, offended the Lacedæmonian people, who, in order to punish his pride in the very point in which he thought to exalt himself, and at the same time to do justice to their confederates, caused his name to be razed out, and that of the cities which had contributed to the victory to be put in the stead of it. Too ardent a thirst after glory on this occasion did not give him leave to consider, that a man loses nothing by a discreet modesty, which forbears the setting too high a value upon one's own services, and which, by screening a man from envy, serves really to enhance his reputation.‡

Pausanias gave a more advantageous specimen of the Spartan temper and disposition, at an entertainment which he gave a few days after the engagement; where one of the tables was costly and magnificent, and displayed all the variety of delicacies and dainties that used to be served at Mardonius's table; and the other was plain and frugal, after the manner of the Spartans. Then comparing the two together, and causing his officers, whom he had invited on purpose, to observe the difference of them; *What madness,* says he, *was it in Mardonius, who was accustomed to such a luxurious diet, to come and attack a people like us, that know how to live without any such superfluities!*

All the Grecians sent to Delphi,§ to consult the oracle, concerning the sacrifice it was proper to offer. The answer they received

* Victo Mardonio, castra referta regalis opulentiæ capta, unde primùm Græcos, diviso inter se auro Persico, divitiarum luxuria cepit. *Justin.* l. ii. c. 14.

† Corn. Nep. in Pausan. c. 1.

‡ Ipsâ dissimulatione famæ famam auxit. *Tacit.*

§ Plut. in Arist. p. 331

from the god was, that they should erect an altar to *Jupiter the Deliverer;* but that they should take care not to offer any sacrifice upon it, before they had extinguished all the fire in the country, because it had been polluted and profaned by the barbarians; and that they should come as far as Delphi to fetch pure fire, which they were to take from the altar, called the Common altar.

This answer being brought to the Grecians from the oracle, the generals immediately dispersed themselves throughout the whole country, and caused all the fires to be extinguished: and Euchidas, a citizen of Platææ, having taken upon himself to go and fetch the sacred fire with all possible expedition, made the best of his way to Delphi. On his arrival he purified himself, sprinkled his body with consecrated water, put on a crown of laurel, and then approached the altar, from whence, with great reverence, he took the holy fire, and carried it with him to Platææ, where he arrived before the setting of the sun, having travelled 1000 stadia (which make 125 miles English) in one day. As soon as he came back, he saluted his fellow-citizens, delivered the fire to them, fell down at their feet, and died in a moment afterwards. His countrymen carried away his body, and buried it in the temple of Diana, surnamed Eucleia, which signifies, *of good renown*, and put the following epitaph upon his tomb, in the compass of one verse: *Here lies Euchidas, who went from hence to Delphi, and returned back the same day.*

In the next general assembly of Greece, which was held not long after this occurrence, Aristides proposed the following decree: That all the cities of Greece should every year send their respective deputies to Platææ, to offer sacrifices to *Jupiter the Deliverer*, and to the gods of the city; (this assembly was still regularly held in the time of Plutarch;) that every five years there should be games celebrated there, which should be called the games of liberty; that the several states of Greece together should raise a body of troops, consisting of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse, and should equip a fleet of 100 ships, which should be constantly maintained for making war against the barbarians; and that the inhabitants of Platææ, solely devoted to the service of the gods, should be looked upon as sacred and inviolable, and be concerned in no other function than that of offering prayers and sacrifices for the general preservation and prosperity of Greece.

All these articles being approved of and passed into a law, the citizens of Platææ took upon them to solemnize, every year, the anniversary festival in honour of those persons that were slain in the battle. The order and manner of performing this sacrifice was as follows: The sixteenth day of the month Maimacterion,* which answers to our month of December, at day-break, they walked in

* Three months after that in which the battle of Platææ was fought. Probably these funeral rites were not at first performed till the enemy were entirely gone, and the country was free.

a solemn procession, which was preceded by a trumpet that sounded to battle. Next to the trumpet marched several chariots, filled with crowns and branches of myrtle. After these chariots was led a black bull, behind which marched a company of young persons, carrying pitchers in their hands full of wine and milk, the ordinary libations offered to the dead, and phials of oil and perfumes. All these young persons were free-men; for no slave was allowed to have any part in this ceremony, which was instituted for men who had lost their lives for liberty. In the rear of this procession followed the archon, or chief magistrate of the Platæans, for whom it was unlawful at any other time even so much as to touch iron, or to wear any other garment than a white one. But upon this occasion, being clad in purple raiment, having a sword by his side, and holding an urn in his hands, which he took from the place where they kept their public records, he marched through the city to the place where the tombs of his countrymen were erected. As soon as he came there, he drew water with his urn from the fountain, washed with his own hands the little columns that belonged to the tombs, rubbed them afterwards with essence, and then killed the bull upon a pile of wood prepared for that purpose. After having offered up prayers to the terrestrial Jupiter* and Mercury, he invited those valiant souls deceased to come to their feast, and to partake of their funeral libations; then taking a cup in his hand, and having filled it with wine, he poured it out on the ground, and said with a loud voice:—*I present this cup to those valiant men, who died for the liberty of the Grecians.* These ceremonies were annually performed even in the time of Plutarch.

Diodorus adds,† that the Athenians, in particular, embellished the monuments of their citizens, who died in the war with the Persians, with magnificent ornaments, instituted funeral games to their honour, and appointed a solemn panegyric to be pronounced over them, which in all probability was repeated every year.

The reader will be sensible, without my observing it, how much these solemn testimonies and perpetual demonstration of honour, esteem, and gratitude for soldiers who had sacrificed their lives in the defence of liberty, conduced to enhance the merit of valour, and of the services they rendered their country, and to inspire the spectators with emulation and courage; and how exceedingly well calculated all this was to cultivate and perpetuate a spirit of bravery in the people, and to make their troops victorious and invincible.

The reader, no doubt, will be as much struck, at seeing how wonderfully careful and exact these people were to acquit themselves on every occasion of the duties of religion. The great event which I have just been relating, *viz.* the battle of Platææ, affords

* The terrestrial Jupiter is no other than Pluto: and the same epithet of terrestrial was also given to Mercury; because it was believed to be his office to conduct departed souls to the infernal regions. † Lib. xi. p. 26.

us very remarkable proofs of this, in the annual and perpetual sacrifice they instituted to *Jupiter the Deliverer*, which was still continued in the time of Plutarch; in the care they took to consecrate the tenth part of all their spoil to the gods; and in the decree proposed by Aristides to establish a solemn festival for ever, as an anniversary commemoration of that success. It is a delightful thing, methinks, to see pagan and idolatrous nations thus publicly confessing and declaring, that all their expectations centre in the Supreme Being; that they think themselves obliged to ascribe the success of all their undertakings to him; that they look upon him as the Author of all their victories and prosperities, as the sovereign ruler and disposer of states and empires, as the source from whence all salutary counsels, wisdom, and courage, are derived; and as entitled, on all these accounts, to the first and best part of their spoils, and to their perpetual acknowledgments and thanksgivings for such distinguished favours and benefits.

SECTION X.

The battle near Mycale. The defeat of the Persians.

On the same day that the Greeks fought the battle of Platææ,* their naval forces obtained a memorable victory in Asia over the remainder of the Persian fleet. For whilst that of the Greeks lay at Ægina, under the command of Leotychides, one of the kings of Sparta, and of Xanthippus the Athenian, ambassadors came to those generals from the Ionians to invite them into Asia to deliver the Grecian cities from their subjection to the barbarians. On this invitation they immediately set sail for Asia, and steered their course by Delos. While they continued there, other ambassadors arrived from Samos, and brought them intelligence that the Persian fleet, which had passed the winter at Cumæ, was then at Samos, where it would be an easy matter to defeat and destroy it; earnestly pressing them at the same time not to neglect so favourable an opportunity. The Greeks hereupon sailed away directly for Samos. But the Persians, receiving intelligence of their approach, retired to Mycale, a promontory of the continent of Asia, where their land army, consisting of 100,000 men, who were the remainder of those that Xerxes had carried back from Greece the year before, was encamped. Here they drew their vessels ashore, which was a common practice among the ancients, and surrounded them with a strong rampart. The Grecians followed them to the very place, and with the help of the Ionians defeated their land army, forced their rampart, and burnt all their vessels.

The battle of Platææ was fought in the morning, and that of Mycale in the afternoon on the same day: and yet all the Greek writers pretend that the victory of Platææ was known at Mycale,

* Herod l. ix. c. 89—105. Diod. l. xi. p 26—28.

before the latter engagement was begun, though the whole Ægean sea, which requires several days sailing to cross it, was between those two places. But Diodorus Siculus explains to us this mystery. He tells us, that Leotychides, observing his soldiers to be much dejected for fear their countrymen at Platææ should sink under the numbers of Mardonius's army, contrived a stratagem to reanimate them; and that, therefore, when he was just upon the point of making the first attack, he caused a rumour to be spread among his troops,* that the Persians were defeated at Platææ, though at that time he had no manner of knowledge of the matter.

Xerxes,† hearing the news of these two great overthrows, left Sardis with as much haste as he had formerly quitted Athens, after the battle of Salamis, and retired with great precipitation into Persia, in order to put himself, as far as he possibly could, out of the reach of his victorious enemies. But before he set out,‡ he gave orders to burn and demolish all the temples belonging to the Grecian cities in Asia: which order was so far executed, that not one escaped, except the temple of Diana at Ephesus. He acted in this manner at the instigation of the Magi,§ who were professed enemies to temples and images. The second Zoroaster had thoroughly instructed him in their religion, and made him a zealous defender of it. Pliny informs us,‖ that Ostanes, the head of the Magi, and the patriarch of that sect, who maintained its maxims and interests with the greatest violence, attended Xerxes upon this expedition into Greece. This prince,¶ as he passed through Babylon on his return to Susa, destroyed also all the temples in that city, as he had done those of Greece and Asia Minor; doubtless, through the same principle, and out of hatred to the sect of the Sabæans, who made use of images in their divine worship, which was a thing utterly detested by the Magi. Perhaps, also, the desire of making himself amends for the expenses incurred in his Grecian expedition by the spoil and plunder of those temples, might be another motive that induced him to destroy them; for it is certain, he found immense riches and treasure in them, which had been amassed through the superstition of princes and people during a long series of ages.

The Grecian fleet, after the battle of Mycale, set sail toward the Hellespont, in order to possess themselves of the bridges which Xerxes had caused to be laid over that narrow passage, and which they supposed were still entire; but finding them broken down by tempestuous weather, Leotychides and his Peloponnesian forces returned towards their own country. As for Xanthippus, he stayed with the Athenians and their Ionian confederates, and they made themselves masters of Sestus and the Thracian Chersonesus, in

* What we are told also of Paulus Æmilius's victory over the Macedonians, which was known at Rome the very day it was obtained, without doubt happened in the same manner. † Diod. l. xi. p. 28. ‡ Strab. l. xiv. p. 634.
§ Cic l. ii. de Leg. n. 92. ‖ Plin. l. xxx c. 1. ¶ Arrian. l. vii.

which places they found great booty, and took a vast number of prisoners. After which, on the approach of winter, they returned to their own cities.

From this time all the cities of Ionia revolted from the Persians, and having entered into a confederacy with the Grecians, most of them preserved their liberty during the time that empire subsisted.

SECTION XI.

The barbarous and inhuman revenge of Amestris, the wife of Xerxes.

A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. During the time that Xerxes resided at Sardis,* he conceived a violent passion for the wife of his brother Masistes, who was a prince of extraordinary merit, had always served the king with great zeal and fidelity, and had never done any thing to disoblige him. The virtue of this lady, and her great affection and fidelity to her husband, made her inexorable to all the king's solicitations. However, he still flattered himself, that by a profusion of favours and liberalities he might possibly gain upon her; and among other favours which he conferred upon her, he married his eldest son Darius, whom he intended for his successor, to Artainta, this princess's daughter, and ordered that the marriage should be consummated as soon as he arrived at Susa. But Xerxes finding the lady still no less impregnable, in spite of all his temptations and attacks, immediately changed his object, and fell passionately in love with her daughter, who did not imitate the glorious example of her mother's constancy and virtue. Whilst this intrigue was carrying on, Amestris, wife to Xerxes, presented him with a rich and magnificent robe of her own making. Xerxes, being extremely pleased with this robe, thought fit to put it on upon the first visit he afterwards made to Artainta; and in conversation pressed her to let him know what she desired he should do for her, assuring her, at the same time, with an oath, that he would grant her whatever she asked of him. Artainta, upon this, desired him to give her the robe he had on. Xerxes, foreseeing the ill consequences that would necessarily ensue upon his making her this present, did all that he could to dissuade her from insisting upon it, and offered her any thing in the world in lieu of it. But not being able to prevail upon her, and thinking himself bound by the imprudent promise and oath he had made to her, he gave her the robe. The lady no sooner received it, than she put it on, and wore it publicly by way of trophy.

Amestris, being confirmed in the suspicions she had entertained by this action, was enraged to the last degree. But instead of letting her vengeance fall upon the daughter, who was the only offender, she resolved to wreak it upon the mother, whom she looked upon as the author of the whole intrigue, though she was entirely innocent of the matter. For the better executing of her

* Herod. l. ix. c. 107—112.

purpose, she waited until the grand feast, which was every year celebrated on the king's birth-day, and which was not far off; on which occasion the king, according to the established custom of the country, granted her whatever she demanded. This day then being come, the thing which she desired of his majesty was, that the wife of Masistis should be delivered into her hands. Xerxes, who apprehended the queen's design, and who was struck with horror at the thoughts of it, as well out of regard to his brother, as on account of the innocence of the lady, against whom he perceived his wife was violently exasperated, at first refused her request, and endeavoured all he could to dissuade her from it. But not being able either to prevail upon her, or to act with steadiness and resolution himself, he at last yielded, and was guilty of complaisance equally weak and cruel; making the inviolable obligations of justice and humanity give way to the arbitrary laws of a custom, that had been established solely to give occasion for the doing of good, and for acts of beneficence and generosity. In consequence then of this compliance, the lady was apprehended by the king's guards, and delivered to Amestris, who caused her breasts, tongue, nose, ears, and lips, to be cut off, ordered them to be cast to the dogs in her own presence, and then sent her home to her husband's house in that mutilated and miserable condition. In the mean time Xerxes had sent for his brother, in order to prepare him for this melancholy and tragical adventure. He first gave him to understand, that he should be glad he would put away his wife; and, to induce him thereto, offered to give him one of his daughters in marriage in her stead. But Masistes, who was passionately fond of his wife, could not prevail upon himself to divorce her: whereupon Xerxes in great wrath told him, that since he refused his daughter he should neither have her nor his wife, and that he would teach him not to reject the offers his master had made him; and with this inhuman reply dismissed him.

This strange proceeding threw Masistes into the greatest anxiety, thinking he had reason to apprehend the worst; he made all the haste he could home to see what had passed there during his absence. On his arrival he found his wife in that deplorable condition we have just been describing. Being enraged thereat to the degree we may naturally imagine, he assembled all his family, his servants and dependants, and set out with all possible expedition for Bactriana, whereof he was governor, determined, as soon as he arrived there, to raise an army and make war against the king, in order to avenge himself for his barbarous treatment. But Xerxes being informed of his hasty departure, and from thence suspecting his design, sent a party of horse to pursue him; which, having overtaken him, cut him in pieces, together with his children and all his retinue. I do not know whether a more tragical example of revenge than that which I have now related, is to be found in history.

There is still another action,* no less cruel nor impious than the former, related of Amestris. She caused fourteen children of the best families in Persia to be burnt alive, as a sacrifice to the infernal gods, out of compliance with a superstitious custom practised by the Persians.

Masistes being dead,† Xerxes gave the government of Bactriana to his second son Hystaspes, who being by that means obliged to live at a distance from the court, gave his youngest brother Artaxerxes the opportunity of ascending the throne to his disadvantage, after the death of their father, as will be seen in the sequel.

Here ends Herodotus's history, *viz.* at the battle of Mycale and the siege of the city of Sestos by the Athenians.

SECTION XII.

The Athenians rebuild the walls of their city, notwithstanding the opposition of the Lacedæmonians.

A. M. 3526. Ant. J. C. 478. The war, commonly called the war of Media,‡ which had lasted but two years, being terminated in the manner we have mentioned, the Athenians, on their return to their own country, sent for their wives and children, whom they had committed to the care of their friends during the war, and began to think of rebuilding the city, which had been almost entirely destroyed by the Persians, and of surrounding it with strong walls, in order to secure it from future violence. The Lacedæmonians having intelligence of this, conceived a jealousy, and began to apprehend, that if Athens, which was already very powerful by sea, should go on to increase her strength by land also, she might take upon her in time to give laws to Sparta, and to deprive the latter of that authority and pre-eminence, which she had hitherto exercised over the rest of Greece. They therefore sent an embassy to the Athenians, the purport of which was to represent to them, that the common interest of Greece required, that there should be no fortified city out of the Peloponnesus, lest, in case of a second irruption, it should serve for a place of arms for the Persians, who would be sure to settle themselves in it, as they had done before at Thebes, and who from thence would be able to infest the whole country, and to make themselves masters of it very speedily. Themistocles, who since the battle of Salamis was greatly considered and respected at Athens, easily penetrated into the real design of the Lacedæmonians, though it was gilded over with the specious pretext of the public good: but, as the latter were able, with the assistance of their allies, to hinder the Athenians, by force, from carrying on the work, in case they should positively and absolutely refuse to comply with their demands, advised the senate to make use of cunning and dissimulation as w

* Herod. l. vii. c. 114. † Diod. l. xi. p. 53. ‡ Thucyd. l. i. p. 59—62. Diod. l. xi p. 30, 31. Just. l. ii. c. 3. 15.

as the Lacedæmonians. The answer therefore they made the envoys was, that they would send an embassy to Sparta, to satisfy the commonwealth with respect to their apprehensions and suspicions. Themistocles caused himself to be nominated one of the ambassadors, and warned the senate not to let his colleagues set out along with him, but to send them one after another, in order to gain time for carrying on the work. The matter was executed pursuant to his advice; and he accordingly went alone to Lacedæmon, where he let a great many days pass without waiting upon the magistrates, or applying to the senate. And, upon their pressing him to do it, and asking him the reason why he deferred it so long, he made answer, that he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, that they might all have their audience of the senate together, and seemed to be very much surprised that they were so long in coming. At length they arrived; but all came singly, and at a good distance of time one from another. During all this interval, the work was carried on at Athens with the utmost industry and vigour. The women, children, strangers, and slaves, were all employed in it; nor was it interrupted night or day. The Spartans were not ignorant of the matter, and made great complaints of it to Themistocles, who positively denied the fact, and pressed them to send other deputies to Athens, in order to inform themselves better on the subject, desiring them not to give credit to vague and flying reports, without foundation. At the same time he secretly advised the Athenians to detain the Spartan envoys as so many hostages, until he and his colleagues were returned from their embassy, fearing, not without good reason, that they themselves might be served in the same manner at Sparta. At last, when all his colleagues were arrived, he desired an audience, and declared, in full senate, that it was really true that the Athenians had resolved to fortify their city with strong walls; that the work was almost completed; that they had judged it to be absolutely necessary for their own security, and for the public good of the allies; telling them, at the same time, that after the great experience they had had of the Athenian people's behaviour, they could not well suspect them of being wanting in zeal for the common interest of their country; that, as the condition and privileges of all the allies ought to be equal, it was just the Athenians should provide for their own safety by all the methods they judged necessary, as well as the other confederates; that they had thought of this expedient, and were in a condition to defend their city against whosoever should presume to attack it; and that as for the Lacedæmonians,* it was not much for their honour that they should desire to establish their power and superiority rather upon the weak and defenceless condition of their allies, than upon their own strength and valour. The Lacedæmonians were extremely dis-

* Graviter castigat eos, quòd non virtute, sed imbecillitate sociorum potentiam quærerent. *Justin.* l. ii. c. 15.

pleased with this discourse; but either out of a sense of gratitude and esteem for the Athenians, who had rendered such important services to the country, or out of a conviction of their inability to oppose their enterprise, they dissembled their resentment: and the ambassadors on both sides, having all suitable honors paid them, returned to their respective cities.

Themistocles,* who had always his thoughts fixed upon raising and augmenting the power and glory of the Athenian commonwealth, did not confine his views to the walls of the city. He went on with the same vigorous application to finish the building and fortifications of the Piræus; for, from the time that he had entered into office, he had begun that great work. Before his time they had no other port at Athens than that of Phalerus, which was neither very large nor commodious, and consequently not capable of answering the great designs of Themistocles. For this reason he had cast his eye upon the Piræus, which seemed to invite him by its advantageous situation, and by the convenience of its three spacious havens, that were capable of containing above 400 vessels. This undertaking was prosecuted with so much diligence and vivacity, that the work was considerably advanced in a very little time. Themistocles likewise obtained a decree, that every year they should build 20 vessels for the augmentation of their fleet; and in order to engage a greater number of workmen and sailors to resort to Athens, he caused particular privileges and immunities to be granted in their favor. His design was, as I have already observed, to make the whole force of Athens maritime; in which he followed a very different scheme from what had been pursued by their ancient kings, who, endeavoring all they could to alienate the minds of the citizens from seafaring business, and from war, and to make them apply themselves wholly to agriculture and to peaceable employments, published this fable: that Minerva, disputing with Neptune, to know which of them should be declared patron of Attica, and give their name to the city, newly built, she gained her cause by showing her judges the branch of an olive-tree, the happy symbol of peace and plenty, which she had planted: whereas Neptune had made a fiery horse, the symbol of war and confusion, rise out of the earth before them.

SECTION XIII.

The black design of Themisticles rejected unanimously by the people of Athens. Aristides' condescension to the people.

Themistocles,† who had conceived in his breast the design of supplanting the Lacedæmonians, and of taking the government of Greece out of their hands, in order to put it into those of the Athe-

* Thucyd. p. 62, 63. Diod. l. xi. p. 32, 33. † Plut. in Themist. p. 121, 122. In Arist. p. 332.

nians, kept his eye and his thoughts continually fixed upon that great project. And he was not very nice or scrupulous in the choice of his measures, whatever tended towards the accomplishing of the end he had in view, he looked upon as just and lawful. On a certain day, then, he declared, in a full assembly of the people, that he had planned a very important design; but that he could not communicate it to the people; because, in order to ensure success, it was necessary that it should be carried on with the greatest secrecy: he therefore desired they would appoint a person to whom he might explain himself upon the matter in question. Aristides was unanimously pitched upon by the whole assembly, and they referred themselves entirely to his opinion of the affair; so great a confidence had they both in his probity and prudence. Themistocles, therefore, having taking him aside, told him, that the design he had conceived was to burn the fleet belonging to the rest of the Grecian states, which then lay in a neighbouring port, and that by this means Athens would certainly become mistress of all Greece. Aristides hereupon returned to the assembly, and only declared to them, that indeed nothing could be more advantageous to the commonwealth than Themistocles' project; but that, at the same time, nothing could be more unjust. All the people unanimously ordained, that Themistocles should entirely desist from his project. We see, in this instance, that it was not without some foundation that the title of *Just* was given to Aristides, even in his lifetime; a title, says Plutarch, infinitely superior to all those which conquerors pursue with so much ardour, and which in some measure approximates a man to the Divinity.

I know not whether all history can afford us a fact more worthy of admiration than this. It is not a company of philosophers (to whom it costs nothing to establish fine maxims and sublime notions of morality in the schools,) who determine on this occasion, that the consideration of profit and advantage ought never to prevail in preference to what is honest and just. It is an entire people, who are highly interested in the proposal made to them, who are convinced that it is of the greatest importance to the welfare of the state, and who, notwithstanding, reject it with unanimous consent and without a moment's hesitation, and that for this only reason, that it is contrary to justice. How black and perfidious, on the other hand, was the design which Themistocles proposed, of burning the fleet of their Grecian confederates, at a time of entire peace, solely to aggrandize the power of the Athenians! Had he a hundred times the merit that is ascribed to him, this single action would be sufficient to sully all the brilliancy of his glory. For it is the heart, that is to say, integrity and probity, that constitute true merit.

I am sorry that Plutarch, who generally judges of things with great justness, does not seem, on this occasion, to condemn Themistocles. After having spoken of the works he had constructed in the Piræeus, he goes on to the fact in question, of which he says,

Themistocles projected something STILL GREATER, *for the augmentation of their maritime power.**

The Lacedæmonians having proposed, in the council of the Amphictyons, that all the cities which had not taken arms against Xerxes should be excluded from that assembly, Themistocles, who was apprehensive that, if the Thessalians, the Argives, and the Thebans were excluded that council, the Spartans would by that means become masters of the suffrages, and consequently determine all affairs according to their pleasure, made a speech in behalf of the cities whose exclusion was proposed, and brought the deputies that composed the assembly over to his sentiments. He represented to them, that the greatest part of the cities that had entered into the confederacy, were but one-and-thirty in the whole, were very small and inconsiderable; that it would therefore be a very strange, as well as a very dangerous proceeding, to deprive all the other cities of Greece of their votes and places in the grand assembly of the nation, and by that means suffer the august council of the Amphictyons to fall under the direction and influence of two or three of the most powerful cities, which for the future would give law to all the rest, and would subvert and abolish that equality of power, which was justly regarded as the basis and soul of all republics. Themistocles, by this plain and open declaration of his opinion, drew upon himself the hatred of the Lacedæmonians, who from that time became his professed enemies. He had also incurred the displeasure of the rest of the allies, by the rigorous and rapacious manner in which he had exacted contributions from them.

When the city of Athens was entirely rebuilt,† the people, finding themselves in a state of peace and tranquillity, endeavoured by every method to get the government into their own hands, and to make the Athenian state an absolute democracy. This design of theirs, though planned with the utmost secrecy, did not escape the vigilance and penetration of Aristides, who saw all the consequences with which such an innovation would be attended. But, as he considered on one hand, that the people were entitled to some regard, on account of the valour they had shown in all the battles which had been lately gained; and, on the other, that it would be no easy matter to curb and restrain a people, who still, in a manner, had their arms in their hands, and who were grown more insolent than ever from their victories; on these considerations, he thought it proper to observe measures with them, and to find out some medium to satisfy and appease them. He therefore passed a decree, by which it was ordained, that the offices of government should be open to all the citizens, and that the archons, who were the chief magistrates of the commonwealth, and who used to be chosen only out of the richest of its members, *viz.* from amongst those only who received at least 500 medimni of grain as the produce of their

* Μεῖζόν τι διανοηθὴν Plut. in Themist. p. 122. † Plut. in Arist. p. 332.

lands, should for the future be elected indifferently from the general body of the Athenians, without distinction. By thus giving up something to the people, he prevented all dissensions and commotions, which might have proved fatal, not only to the Athenian state, but to all Greece.

SECTION XIV.

The Lacedæmonians lose the chief command, through the pride and ignorance of Pausanias.

A. M. 3528. Ant. J. C. 476. The Grecians,* encouraged by the happy success which had every where attended their victorious arms, determined to send a fleet to sea, in order to deliver such of their allies as were still under the yoke of the Persians, out of their hands. Pausanias was the commander of the fleet for the Lacedæmonians; and Aristides, and Cimon, the son of Miltiades, commanded for the Athenians. They first directed their course to the isle of Cyprus, where they restored all the cities to their liberty; then, steering towards the Hellespont, they attacked the city of Byzantium, of which they made themselves masters, and took a vast number of prisoners, a great part of whom were of the richest and most considerable families of Persia.

Pausanias, who from this time conceived thoughts of betraying his country, judged it proper to make use of this opportunity to gain the favour of Xerxes. To this end he caused a report to be spread among his troops, that the Persian noblemen, whom he had committed to the guard and care of one of his officers, had made their escape by night, and were fled; whereas he had set them at liberty himself, and sent a letter by them to Xerxes, wherein he offered to deliver the city of Sparta, and all Greece, into his hands, on condition he would give him his daughter in marriage. The king did not fail to give him a favourable answer, and to send him very large sums of money also, in order to win over as many of the Grecians as he should find disposed to enter into his designs. The person he appointed to manage this intrigue with him was Artabazus; and in order to enable him to transact the matter with the greater ease and security, he made him governor of all the sea coasts of Asia Minor.

Pausanias,† who was already dazzled with the prospect of his future greatness, began from this moment to change his whole conduct and behaviour. The poor, modest, and frugal way of living at Sparta; the subjection to rigid and austere laws, which neither spared nor respected any man, but were altogether as inexorable and inflexible to the greatest as to those of the meanest condition; all this became insupportable to Pausanias. He could not bear the thoughts of going back to Sparta, after having possessed such high commands and employments, to return to a state

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 63. 84. 86. † Plut. in Arist. p. 322 333

of equality, that would confound him with the meanest of the citizens; and this was his inducement to enter into a treaty with the barbarians. He entirely laid aside the manners and behaviour of his country; assumed both the dress and haughtiness of the Persians, and imitated them in all their expensive luxury and magnificence. He treated the allies with insufferable rudeness and insolence; never spoke to the officers but with menaces and arrogance; required extraordinary honours to be paid to him, and by his whole behaviour rendered the Spartan government odious to all the confederates. On the other hand, the courteous, affable, and engaging deportment of Aristides and Cimon; an infinite remoteness from all imperious and haughty airs, which tend only to alienate the affections; a gentle, kind, and beneficent disposition, which showed itself in all their actions, and which served to temper the authority of their commands, and to render it both easy and amiable; the justice and humanity, conspicuous in every thing they did; the great care they took to offend no person whatsoever, and to do kind offices to all about them; all this hurt Pausanias exceedingly, by the contrast of their opposite characters, and increased the general discontent. At last this dissatisfaction publicly broke out; and all the allies deserted him, and put themselves under the command and protection of the Athenians. Thus did Aristides, says Plutarch, by the prevalence of that humanity and gentleness, which he opposed to the arrogance and roughness of Pausanias, and by inspiring Cimon his colleague with the same sentiments, insensibly draw off the minds of the allies from the Lacedæmonians without their perceiving it, and at length deprived them of the command; not by open force, or by sending out armies and fleets against them, and still less by making use of any artifice or perfidious practices; but by the wisdom and moderation of his conduct, and by rendering the government of the Athenians amiable.

It must be confessed, at the same time, that the Spartan people on this occasion showed a greatness of soul, and a spirit of moderation, that can never be sufficiently admired: for when they were convinced, that their commanders grew haughty and insolent from their too great authority, they willingly renounced the superiority which they had hitherto exercised over the rest of the Grecians, and forbore sending any more of their generals to command the Grecian armies; choosing rather, adds the historian, to have their citizens wise, modest, and submissive to the discipline and laws of the commonwealth, than to maintain their pre-eminence and superiority over all the other Grecian states.

SECTION XV.

Pausanias's secret conspiracy with the Persians. His death.

A. M. 3529. Ant. J. C. 475. Upon the repeated complaints which the Spartan commonwealth received on all hands against Pausa-

nias,* they recalled him home to give an account of his conduct But not having sufficient evidence to convict him of having carried on a correspondence with Xerxes, they were obliged to acquit him on his first trial; after which he returned of his own private authority, and without the consent and approbation of the republic, to the city of Byzantium, from whence he continued to carry on his secret practices with Artabazus. But, as he was still guilty of many violent and unjust proceedings whilst he resided there, the Athenians obliged him to leave the place; from whence he retired to Colonæ, a small city of the Troad. There he received an order from the Ephori to return to Sparta, on pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, a public enemy and traitor to his country. He complied with the summons, and went home, hoping he should still be able to bring himself off by dint of money. On his arrival he was committed to prison, and was soon afterwards brought again upon his trial before the judges. The charge brought against him was supported by many suspicious circumstances and strong presumptions. Several of his own slaves confessed that he had promised to give them their liberty, in case they would enter into his designs, and serve him with fidelity and zeal in the execution of his projects. But, as it was the custom for the Ephori never to pronounce sentence of death against a Spartan, without a full and direct proof of the crime laid to his charge, they looked upon the evidence against him as insufficient; and the more so, as he was of the royal family, and was actually invested with the administration of the regal office; for Pausanias exercised the function of king, as being the guardian and nearest relation to Plistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was then in his minority. He was therefore acquitted a second time, and set at liberty.

Whilst the Ephori were thus perplexed for want of clear and plain evidence against the offender, a certain slave, who was called the Argilian, came to them, and brought them a letter, written by Pausanias himself to the king of Persia, which the slave was to have carried to Artabazus. It must be observed, by the way, that this Persian governor and Pausanias had agreed together, immediately to put to death all the couriers they mutually sent to one another, as soon as their packets or messages were delivered, that there might be no possibility left of tracing out or discovering their correspondence. The Argilian, who saw none of his fellow-servants, that had been sent, return back again, had some suspicion; and when it came to his turn to go, he opened the letter he was intrusted with, in which Artabazus was positively desired to kill him as soon as he delivered it. This was the letter the slave put into the hands of the Ephori; who still thought even this proof insufficient in the eye of the law, and therefore endeavoured to corroborate it by the testimony of Pausanias himself. The slave, in con

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 86—89. Diod. l. xi. p. 34—36. Cor. Nep. in Pausan.

cert with them, withdrew to the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, as to a secure asylum. Two small closets had been purposely made there, in which the Ephori and some Spartans hid themselves. The instant Pausanias was informed that the Argilian had fled to this temple, he hasted thither, to inquire the reason. The slave confessed that he had opened the letter; and that finding by the contents of it he was to be put to death, he had fled to that temple to save his life. As Pausanias could not deny the fact, he made the best excuse he could; promised the slave a great reward, and obliged him to engage not to mention what had passed between them to any person whatsoever. Pausanias then left him.

Pausanius's guilt was now but too evident. The moment he was returned to the city, the Ephori were resolved to seize him. From the aspect of one of those magistrates, and from a signal which he made him, he plainly perceived that some evil design was meditated against him, and therefore he ran with the utmost speed to the temple of Pallas, called Chalciæcos, near that place, and got into it before the pursuers could overtake him. The entrance was immediately stopped up with great stones; and history informs us, that the criminal's mother was the first who brought one. They also took off the roof of the chapel, and, as the Ephori did not dare to take him out of it by force, because this would have been a violation of that sacred asylum, they resolved to leave him exposed to the inclemencies of the weather, and accordingly he was starved to death. However, a few minutes before he died, they drew him out of the temple. His corpse was buried not far from that place: but the oracle of Delphi, which they consulted soon after, declared, that to appease the anger of the goddess, who was justly offended on account of the violation of her temple, two statues must be set up there in honour of Pausanias, which was done accordingly.

Such was the end of Pausanias, whose wild ambition had stifled in him all sentiments of probity, honour, love of country, zeal for liberty, and of hatred and aversion for the barbarians; sentiments which, in some measure, were innate in all the Greeks, and particularly in the Lacedæmonians.

SECTION XVI.

Themistocles, being prosecuted by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, as an accomplice in Pausanias's conspiracy, flies for shelter to king Admetus.

A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. Themistocles was also implicated in the charge brought against Pausanias.* He was then in exile. A passionate thirst of glory, and a strong desire of arbitrary power, had made him odious to his fellow-citizens. He had built, very near his house, a temple dedicated to Diana, under the title of *Diana Aristobula*, that is to say, *the giver of good counsel;* as hint-

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 89, 90. Plut. in Themist. 123, 124. Corn. Nep. in Themist. c. viii.

ing to the Athenians, that he had given good counsel to their city and to all Greece; and he also had placed his statue in it, which was standing in Plutarch's time. It appeared, says he, from this statue, that his physiognomy was as heroic as his valour. Finding that men listened with pleasure to all the calumnies which his enemies spread against him, in order to silence them, he was for ever expatiating, in all public assemblies, on the services he had done his country. As they were at last tired with hearing him repeat the same thing so often, *How!* says he to them, *are you weary of having good offices frequently done you by the same persons?* He did not consider, that putting them so often in mind of his services,* was in a manner reproaching them with their having forgotten them, which was not very civil; and he seemed not to know that the surest way to acquire applause, is to leave the bestowing of it to others, and to resolve to do such things only as are praiseworthy; and that a frequent mention of one's own virtue and exalted actions, is so far from appeasing envy, that it only inflames it.

Themistocles,† after having been banished from Athens, by the ostracism, withdrew to Argos. He was there when Pausanias was prosecuted as a traitor who had conspired against his country. He had at first concealed his machinations from Themistocles, though he was one of his best friends; but as soon as he saw that he was expelled his country, and highly resented that injury, he disclosed his projects to him, and pressed him to join in them. To induce him to comply, he showed him the letters which the king of Persia wrote to him; and endeavoured to animate him against the Athenians, by painting their injustice and ingratitude in the strongest colours. However, Themistocles rejected with indignation the proposals of Pausanias, and refused peremptorily to take any part in his schemes: but then he concealed what had passed between them, and did not discover the enterprise he had formed; whether it was that he imagined Pausanias would renounce it of himself, or was persuaded that it would be discovered some other way; it not being possible for so dangerous and ill-concerted an enterprise to be successful.

After Pausanias's death, several letters and other things were found among his papers, which excited violent suspicions of Themistocles. The Lacedæmonians sent deputies to Athens to accuse and have sentence of death passed upon him; and such of the citizens who envied him joined these accusers. Aristides had now a fair opportunity of revenging himself on his rival, for the injurious treatment he had received from him, had his soul been capable of so cruel a satisfaction; but he refused absolutely to join in so horrid a combination; being as little inclined to delight in the misfortunes of his adversary, as he had before been to regret his successes. Themistocles answered by letters all the calumnies with

* Hoc molestum est. Nam isthæc commemoratio quasi exprobratio est immemoris beneficii. *Terent. in Andr.*

† Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

which he was charged, and represented to the Athenians, that as he had ever been fond of ruling, and his temper was such as would not suffer him to be lorded over by others, it was highly improbable that he should have a design to deliver up himself, and all Greece, to enemies and barbarians.

In the mean time, the people wrought upon by his accusers, sent some persons to seize him and bring him home, that he might be tried by the council of Greece. Themistocles, having timely notice of it, went into the island of Corcyra, to whose inhabitants he formerly had done some service: however, not thinking himself safe there, he fled to Epirus; and finding himself still pursued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, in despair he adopted a very dangerous plan, which was, to fly to Admetus, king of the Molossians, for refuge. This prince having formerly desired the aid of the Athenians, and being refused with ignominy by Themistocles, who at that time presided in the government, had retained the deepest resentment on that account, and declared that he would revenge himself, should a favourable opportunity ever occur. But Themistocles, imagining that in the unhappy situation of his affairs, the recent envy of his fellow-citizens was more to be feared than the ancient grudge of that king, was resolved to run the hazard of it. When he came into the palace of that monarch, upon being informed that he was absent, he addressed himself to the queen, who received him very graciously, and instructed him in the manner in which it was proper for him to make his request. Admetus being returned, Themistocles takes the king's son in his arms, seats himself on his hearth amidst his household gods, and there, telling him who he was, and the cause why he fled to him for refuge, he implores his clemency, owns that his life is in his hand, entreats him to forget the past, and represents to him, that no action can be more worthy of a great king than to exercise clemency. Admetus, surprised and moved with compassion in seeing at his feet, in so humble a posture, the greatest man of all Greece, and the conqueror of all Asia, raised him immediately from the ground, and promised to protect him against all his enemies. Accordingly, when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians came to demand him, he refused absolutely to deliver up a person who had taken refuge in his palace, in the firm persuasion that it would be a sacred and inviolable asylum.

Whilst he was at the court of this prince, one of his friends found an opportunity to carry off his wife and children from Athens, and to send them to him; for which that person was some time after seized and condemned to die. With regard to Themistocles's effects, his friends secured the greatest part of them for him, which they afterwards found an opportunity to r[illegible]t to him in his retirement; but all that could be discovered, which amounted to 100 talents,*

* A hundred thousand crowns French, about 22,500l. sterling.

was carried to the public treasury. When he entered upon the administration of the republic, he was not worth three talents. I shall leave this illustrious exile for some time in the court of king Admetus, to resume the sequel of this history.

SECTION XVII.

Aristides's disinterested administration of the public treasure. His death and eulog um.

I have before observed, that the command of Greece had passed from Sparta to the Athenians.* Hitherto the cities and nations of Greece had indeed contributed some sums of money towards carrying on the expense of the war against the barbarians; but this assessment had always occasioned great feuds, because it was not made in a just or equal proportion. It was thought proper, under this new government, to lodge in the island of Delos the common treasure of Greece; to enact new regulations with regard to the public moneys; and to lay such a tax as might be regulated according to the revenue of each city and state; in order that the expenses being equally borne by the several members who composed the body of the allies, no one might have reason to murmur. The great point was, to find a person capable of discharging faithfully an employment of such delicacy, and attended with such danger and difficulty, the due administration of which so nearly concerned the public welfare. All the allies cast their eyes on Aristides; accordingly they invested him with full powers, and appointed him to levy a tax on each of them, relying entirely on his wisdom and justice.

They had no cause to repent of their choice. He presided over the treasury with the fidelity and disinterestedness of a man,† who looks upon it as a capital crime to embezzle the smallest portion of another's property; with the care and activity of a father of a family, who manages his own estate; and with the caution and integrity of a person, who considers the public money as sacred. In fine, he succeeded in what is equally difficult and extraordinary, *viz.* in acquiring the love of all, in an office in which he that escapes the public odium gains a great point. Such is the glorious character which Seneca gives of a person charged with an employment of almost the same kind, and the noblest eulogium that can be given of such as administer the public revenues. It is the exact picture of Aristides. He discovered so much probity and wisdom in the exercise of this office that no man complained; and those times were considered ever after as the golden age, that is, the period in which Greece had attained its highest pitch of virtue and happiness. And, indeed, the tax which he had fixed, in the whole, at 460 ta

* Plut. in Arist. p. 333, 334. Diod. l. xi. p. 36.

† Tu quidem orbis terrarum rationes administras; tam abstinenter quàm alienas, tam diligenter quàm tuas, tam religiosè quàm publicas. In officio amorem consequeris in quo odium vitare difficile est. *Senec lib. de Brevit. Vit.* cap. xviii.

lents,* was raised by Pericles to 600, and soon after to 1300 talents: not that the expenses of the war were increased, but because the treasure was employed to very useless purposes, in manual distributions to the Athenians, in solemnizing of games and festivals, in building of temples and public edifices; not to mention, that the hands of those who superintended the treasury were not always so clean and uncorrupt as those of Aristides. This wise and equitable conduct secured him, to the latest posterity, the glorious surname of *the Just.*

Nevertheless, Plutarch relates an action of Aristides, which shows that the Greeks (and the same may be said of the Romans) had a very narrow and imperfect idea of justice. They confined the exercise of it to the interior, as it were, of civil society; and acknowledged that individuals were bound to observe strictly its several maxims in their intercourse with each other: but with regard to their country, to the republic (their great idol, to which they referred every thing,) they thought in a quite different manner, and imagined themselves obliged to sacrifice to it, through principle, not only their lives and possessions, but even their religion and the most sacred engagements, in contempt of the most solemn oaths. This will appear evidently in what I am now going to relate.

After the assessment of the contributions, of which I have just spoken,† Aristides, having settled the several articles of the alliance, made the confederates take an oath to observe them punctually, and he himself swore in the name of the Athenians; and when denouncing the curses which always accompanied the oaths, he threw into the sea, pursuant to the usual custom, large bars of red-hot iron. But the ill state of the Athenian affairs forcing them afterwards to infringe some of those articles, and to govern a little more arbitrarily, he entreated them to transfer those curses on him, and exonerate themselves thereby of the punishment due to such as had forsworn themselves, and who had been reduced to it by the unhappy situation of their affairs. Theophrastus tells us, that in general (these words are borrowed from Plutarch) Aristides, who, in all matters relating to himself or the public, prided himself upon displaying the most impartial and rigorous justice, used to act, during his administration, in several instances, according as the exigency of affairs and the welfare of his country might require; it being his opinion, that a government, in order to support itself, is, on some occasions, obliged to have recourse to injustice, of which he gives the following example. One day, as the Athenians were debating in their council about bringing to their city, in opposition to the articles of the treaty, the common treasures of Greece which were deposited in Delos, the Samians having opened the debate, when it was Aristides's turn to speak, he said, that the removal of the treasure was an unjust action, but useful; and made this

* The talent is worth a thousand French crowns; or about 225*l.* sterling.
† Plut. in Arist. p. 333, 334

opinion take place. This incident shows, with how great ob scurity and error the pretended wisdom of the heathens was overspread.

It was scarce possible to have a greater contempt for riches than Aristides had. Themistocles, who was not pleased with the encomiums bestowed on other men, hearing Aristides applauded for the noble disinterestedness with which he managed the public treasures, did but laugh at it: and said, that the praises bestowed upon him, showed that he possessed no greater merit than that of a strong box, which faithfully preserves all the moneys that are shut up in it, without retaining any. This low sneer was by way of revenge for a stroke of raillery that had stung him to the quick. Themistocles one day saying, that, in his opinion, the greatest qualification a general could possess, was to be able to foresee the designs of an enemy: *This qualification*, replied Aristides, *is necessary; but there is another no less noble and worthy of a general,—that is, to have clean hands, and a soul superior to venality and views of interest.* Aristides might very justly answer Themistocles in this manner, since he was really very poor, though he had possessed the highest employments in the state. He seemed to have an innate love for poverty; and so far from being ashamed of it, he thought it reflected as much glory on him, as all the trophies and victories he had won. History gives us a shining instance of this.

Callias, who was a near relation of Aristides, and the most wealthy citizen in Athens, was cited to appear before the judges. The accuser, laying very little stress on the cause itself, reproached him especially with permitting Aristides, and his wife and children, to live in poverty, at a time when he himself rolled in riches. Callias, perceiving that these reproaches made a strong impression on the judges, summoned Aristides to declare before them, whether he had not often pressed him to accept of large sums of money, and whether he had not obstinately refused to accept of his offer, giving for answer, that he had more reason to boast of his poverty than Callias of his riches: that many persons were to be found who made a good use of their wealth, but that there were few who bore their poverty with magnanimity and even with joy; and that none had cause to blush at their condition, but such as had reduced themselves to it by their idleness, their intemperance, their profusion or dissolute conduct. Aristides declared that his kinsman had told nothing but truth;* and added, that a man whose frame of mind is such, as to suppress every wish for superfluities, and who confines the wants of life within the narrowest limits, besides its freeing him from a thousand importunate cares, and leaving him so much master of his time, as to devote it entirely to the public, it approximates him, in some measure, to the Deity, who is wholly void of cares or wants. There was no man in the assembly, but, at his

* Plut. in compar. Arist. & Caton. p. 358

leaving it, would have chosen to be Aristides, though so poor, rather than Callias with all his riches.

Plutarch gives us, in a few words, Plato's glorious testimony to Aristides's virtue, for which he looks upon him as infinitely superior to all the illustrious men who were his contemporaries. Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, (says he,) filled indeed their city with splendid edifices, with porticoes, statues, rich ornaments, and other vain superfluities of that kind; but Aristides did all that lay in his power to enrich every part of it with virtue: now to raise a city to true happiness, it must be made virtuous, not rich.

Plutarch takes notice of another circumstance in Aristides's life, which, though of the simplest kind, reflects the greatest honour on him, and may serve as an excellent lesson. It is in that beautiful treatise,* in which he inquires, whether it is proper for old men to concern themselves with affairs of government; and where he points out admirably well, the various services they may do the state, even in an advanced age. We are not to fancy, says he, that in order to render services to one's fellow-citizens, it is necessary to make great exertions, to harangue the people, to preside in the government, or to head armies: an old man, whose mind is informed with wisdom, may, without going from his house, exercise a kind of magistracy in it, which, though secret and obscure, is not therefore the less important, and that is, in training up youth by good counsel, teaching them the various springs of policy, and the path they ought to pursue in the management of public affairs. Aristides, adds Plutarch, was not always in office, but was always of service to his country. His house was a public school of virtue, wisdom, and politics. It was open to all young Athenians who were lovers of virtue, and these used to consult him as an oracle. He gave them the kindest reception, heard them with patience, instructed them with familiarity, and endeavoured, above all things, to animate their courage, and inspire them with confidence. It is observed particularly, that Cimon, afterwards so famous, was obliged to him for this important service.

Plutarch divided the life of statesmen into three ages.† In the first, he would have them learn the principles of government; in the second, reduce them to practice; and in the third, instruct others.

History does not mention the exact time when,‡ nor place where, Aristides died; but then it pays a glorious testimony to his memory, when it assures us, that this great man, who had possessed the highest employments in the republic, and had the absolute disposal of its treasures, died poor and did not leave money enough to de-

* Pag. 795. 797.

† He applies on this occasion the custom used in Rome, where the Vestals spent the first ten years in learning their office, and this was a kind of noviciate; the next ten years they employed in the exercise of their functions; and the last ten in instructing the young novices in them.

‡ Plut. in Arist. p 334, 335.

fray the expenses of his funeral; so that the government was obliged to bear the charge of it, and to maintain his family. His daughters were married, and Lysimachus his son was subsisted at the expense of the Prytaneum; which also gave the daughter of the latter, after his death, the pension with which those were honoured who had been victorious at the Olympic games. Plutarch relates, on this occasion, the liberality of the Athenians in favour of the posterity of Aristogiton, their deliverer, who had fallen to decay; and he adds, that even in his time (almost 600 years after) the same goodness and liberality still subsisted. It is glorious for a city to have preserved for so many centuries its generosity and gratitude; and a strong motive to animate individuals, who were assured that their children would enjoy the rewards which death might prevent themselves from receiving. It was delightful to see the remote posterity of the defenders and deliverers of the commonwealth, who had inherited nothing from their ancestors but the glory of their actions, maintained for so many ages at the expense of the public, in consideration of the services which their families had rendered the state. They lived in this manner with much more honour, and called up the remembrance of their ancestors with much greater splendour, than a multitude of citizens whose fathers had been anxious only to leave them great estates, which generally do not long survive those who raised them, and often leave to their posterity nothing but the odious remembrance of the injustice and oppression by which they were acquired.

The greatest honour which the ancients have done to Aristides is the having bestowed on him the glorious title of *the Just*. He gained it, not by one particular occurrence of his life, but by the whole tenor of his conduct and actions. Plutarch makes a reflection on this occasion, which being very remarkable, I think it incumbent on me not to omit.

Among the several virtues of Aristides, says this judicious author,* that for which he was most renowned was his justice; because this virtue is of most general use; its benefits extend to a greater number of persons; and it is the foundation, and in a manner the soul, of every public office and employment. Hence it was that Aristides, though in low circumstances, and of mean extraction, merited the title of *Just;* a title, says Plutarch, truly royal, or rather truly divine; but one of which princes are seldom ambitious, because they are ignorant of its beauty and excellency. They choose rather to be called the takers of cities,† the thunderbolts of war, victors and conquerors, and sometimes even eagles and lions; preferring the vain honour of pompous titles, which convey no other idea than violence and slaughter, to the solid glory of those expressive of goodness and virtue. They do not know, continues Plutarch, that of the three chief attributes of the Deity, of

* Plut. in vit. Arist. p. 321, 322. † Poliorcetes, Ceraunus, Nicator.

whom kings boast themselves the image, I mean immortality, power, and justice; that of these three attributes, the first of which excites our admiration and desire, the second fills us with dread and terror, and the third inspires us with love and respect; this last is the only one truly and personally communicated to man, and the only one that can conduct him to the other two; it being impossible for man to become truly immortal and powerful, but by being just.

A. M. 3532. A. Rom. 302. Before I resume the sequel of this history, it may not be improper to observe, that it was about this period that the fame of the Greeks, who were still more renowned for the wisdom of their polity than the glory of their victories, induced the Romans to have recourse to their lights and knowledge. Rome, formed under kings, was in want of such laws as were necessary for the good government of a commonwealth. For this purpose the Romans sent deputies to copy the laws of the cities of Greece,* and particularly those of Athens, which were still better adapted to the popular government that had been established after the expulsion of the kings. On this model, the ten magistrates, called *Decemviri*, who were invested with absolute authority, digested the laws of the Twelve Tables, which are the basis of the Roman law.

SECTION XVIII.

Death of Xerxes, who is killed by Artabanus. His character.

A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. The ill success of Xerxes in his expedition against the Greeks, and which continued afterwards, at length discouraged him.† Renouncing all thoughts of war and conquest, he abandoned himself entirely to luxury and ease, and was studious of nothing but his pleasures. Artabanus,‡ a native of Hyrcania, captain of his guards, who had long been one of his chief favourites, found that his dissolute conduct had drawn upon him the contempt of his subjects. He therefore imagined that this would be a favourable opportunity to conspire against his sovereign; and he carried his ambitious views so far as to flatter himself with the hopes of succeeding him in the throne.§ It is very likely, that he was excited to the commission of this crime from another motive. Xerxes had commanded him to murder Darius, his eldest son; but for what cause history is silent. As this order had been given at a banquet, and when the company was heated with wine, he did not doubt but that Xerxes would forget it, and therefore was not in haste to obey it; however, he was mistaken, for the king complained of his dis-

* Missi legati Athenas, jussique inclytas leges Solonis describere, et aliarum Græciæ civitatum instituta, mores, juraque noscere. Decem tabularum leges perlatæ sunt (quibus adjectæ postea duæ) qui nunc quoque in hoc immenso aliarum super alias privatarum legum cumulo, fons omnis publici privatique est juris. *Liv.* l. iii. n. 31 and 34.

† Ctes. c. ii. Diod. l. xi. p. 52. Justin. l. iii. c. 1.

‡ This was not Artabanus the uncle of Xerxes. § Arist. Polit. l. v. c. 10. p. 404.

obedience, which made Artabanus dread his resentment, and therefore he resolved to prevent him. Accordingly he prevailed upon Mithridates, one of the eunuchs of the palace, and high-chamberlain, to engage in his conspiracy; and by his means entered the chamber where the king lay, and murdered him in his sleep. He then went immediately to Artaxerxes, the third son of Xerxes. He informed him of the murder, charging Darius his eldest brother with it; as if impatience to ascend the throne had prompted him to that execrable deed. He added, that to secure the crown to himself, he was resolved to murder him also, for which reason it would be absolutely necessary for him to keep upon his guard. These words having made the impression on Artaxerxes, who was still a youth, which Artabanus desired, he went immediately into his brother's apartment, where, being assisted by Artabanus and his guards, he murdered him. Hystaspes, Xerxes's second son, was next heir to the crown after Darius: but as he was then in Bactriana, of which he was governor, Artabanus seated Artaxerxes on the throne, with the design of suffering him to enjoy it no longer than till he had formed a faction strong enough to drive him from it, and ascend it himself. His great authority had gained him a multitude of dependants; besides this, he had seven sons, who were tall, handsome, strong, courageous, and raised to the highest employments in the empire. The aid he hoped to receive from them, was the chief motive of his raising his views so high. But whilst he was attempting to complete his design, Artaxerxes being informed of this plot by Megabyzus, who had married one of his sisters, endeavoured to anticipate him, and killed him before he had an opportunity of putting his treason in execution. His death established this prince in the possession of the kingdom.

Thus we have seen the end of Xerxes, who was one of the most powerful princes that ever lived. It would be needless for me to anticipate the reader, with respect to the judgment he ought to form of him. We see him surrounded with whatever is greatest and most brilliant in the opinion of mankind; the most extensive empire at that time in the world: immense treasures, and forces both by land and sea, whose number appears incredible. All these things, however, are round him, not in him, and add no lustre to his natural qualities: but, by a blindness too common to princes and great men, born in the midst of abundance, heir to boundless power, and a lustre that had cost him nothing, he had accustomed himself to judge of his own talents and personal merit from the exterior of his exalted station and rank. He disregards the wise councils of Artabanus his uncle, and of Demaratus, who alone had courage enough to speak truth to him; and he abandons himself to courtiers, the adorers of his fortune, whose whole study it was to soothe his passions. He proportions, and pretends to regulate, the success of his enterprises, by the extent of his power. The slavish submission of so many nations no longer soothes his ambition; and,

disgusted with too easy an obedience, he takes pleasure in exercising his power over the elements, in cutting his way through mountains, and making them navigable; in chastising the sea for having broken down his bridge, and in foolishly attempting to shackle the waves, by throwing fetters into them. Puffed up with a childish vanity and ridiculous pride, he looks upon himself as the arbite of nature: he imagines, that not a nation in the world will dare to wait his arriva'; and fondly and presumptuously relies on the millions of men and ships which he drags after him. But when, after the battle of Salamis, he beholds the sad ruins, the shameful remains, of his numberless troops scattered over all Greece;* he then is sensible of the wide difference between an army and a crowd of men. In a word, to form a right judgment of Xerxes, we need but contrast him with a plain citizen of Athens, a Miltiades, Themistocles, or Aristides. In the latter we find all the good sense, prudence, ability in war, valour, and greatness of soul; in the former we see nothing but vanity, pride, obstinacy; the meanest and most grovelling sentiments, and sometimes the most horrid barbarity.

* Stratusque per totam passim Græciam Xerxes intellexit, quantum ab exercitu turba distaret. *Senec. de Benef.* l. vi. c. 32.

BOOK VII.

THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER I.

This chapter includes the history of the Persians and Greeks, from the beginning of the reign of Artaxerxes to the Peloponnesian war, which began in the 42d year of that king's reign.

SECTION I.

Artaxerxes ruins the faction of Artabanus, and that of Hystaspes his elder brother.

A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. The Greek historians give this prince the surname of Longimanus. Strabo says,* it was because his hands were so long, that when he stood upright he could touch his knees with them: but according to Plutarch,† it was because his right hand was longer than his left. Had it not been for this blemish, he would have been the most graceful man of his age. He was still more remarkable for his goodness and generosity. He reigned about forty-nine years.

Although Artaxerxes,‡ by the death of Artabanus, was delivered from a dangerous competitor, there still were two obstacles in his way, before he could establish himself in the quiet possession of his throne; one of which was his brother Hystaspes, governor of Bactriana; and the other, the faction of Artabanus. He began by the latter.

Artabanus had left seven sons, and a great number of partisans, who soon assembled to revenge his death. These and the adherents of Artaxerxes, fought a bloody battle, in which a great number of Persian nobles lost their lives. Artaxerxes having at last

* Lib. xv. p. 735 † In Artax. p. 1011 ‡ Ctes. c. xxx.

entirely defeated his enemies, put to death all who had engaged in this conspiracy. He took an exemplary vengeance of those who were concerned in his father's murder, and particularly of Mithridates the eunuch, who had betrayed him: he made him suffer the punishment of *the Troughs*, which was executed in the following manner. He was laid on his back in a kind of horse-trough, and strongly fastened to the four corners of it.* Every part of him, except his head, his hands, and feet, which came out at holes made for that purpose, was covered with another trough. In this horrid situation victuals were given him from time to time; and in case of his refusal to eat, they were forced down his throat: honey mixed with milk was given him to drink, and all his face was smeared with it, which by that means attracted a numberless multitude of flies, especially as he was perpetually exposed to the scorching rays of the sun. The worms which bred in his excrements preyed upon his bowels. The criminal lived fifteen or twenty days in inexpressible torments.

Artaxerxes having crushed the faction of Artabanus,† was powerful enough to send an army into Bactriana, which had declared in favour of his brother, but he was not equally successful on this occasion. The two armies engaging, Hystaspes stood his ground so well, that if he did not gain the victory, he at least sustained no loss; so that both armies separated with equal success; and each retired to prepare for a second battle. Artaxerxes having raised a greater army than his brother, and having besides the whole empire in his favour, defeated him in a second engagement, and entirely ruined his party. By this victory he secured to himself the quiet possession of the empire.

To maintain himself on the throne,‡ he removed from their employment all such governors of cities and provinces as he suspected of holding a correspondence with either of the factions he had overcome, and substituted others on whom he could rely. He afterwards applied himself to reform the abuses and disorders which had crept into the government. By this wise conduct and zeal for the public good, he soon acquired great reputation and authority, together with the love of his subjects, the strongest support of sovereign power.

SECTION II.

Themistocles takes refuge with Artaxerxes.

A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. According to Thucydides, Themistocles fled to this prince in the beginning of his reign: but other authors, as Strabo, Plutarch, Diodorus, fix this incident under Xerxes his predecessor. Dean Prideaux is of the latter opinion; he likewise thinks, that the Artaxerxes in question is the same who is

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1019. † Ctes. c. xxxi. ‡ Diod. l. xi. p. 54.]

called Ahasuerus in Scripture, and who married Esther: but we suppose, with the learned archbishop Usher, that it was Darius the son of Hystaspes who espoused this illustrious Jewess. I have already declared more than once, that I would not engage in controversies of this kind; and therefore, with regard to this flight of Themistocles into Persia, and the history of Esther, I shall follow the opinion of the learned Usher, my usual guide on these occasions.

We have seen that Themistocles had fled to Admetus,* king of the Molossi, and had met with a gracious reception from him; but the Athenians and Lacedæmonians would not suffer him to remain there in peace, and required that prince to deliver him up; threatening, in case of refusal, to carry their arms into his country. Admetus, who was unwilling to draw such formidable enemies upon himself, and much more to deliver up the man who had fled to him for refuge, informed him of the great danger to which he was exposed, and favoured his flight. Themistocles went as far by land as Pydna, a city of Macedonia, and there embarked on board a merchant-ship which was bound to Ionia. None of the passengers knew him. A storm having carried this vessel near the island of Naxos, then besieged by the Athenians; the imminent danger to which Themistocles was exposed, obliged him to discover himself to the pilot and master of the ship; after which, by entreaties and menaces, he forced them to sail towards Asia.

Themistocles might on this occasion call to mind an expression which his father had made use of,† when he was very young, in order to warn him to lay very little stress on the favour of the common people. They were then walking together in the harbour. His father pointing to some rotten galleys that lay neglected on the strand, *Look there*, says he, *son*, pointing to them, *thus do the people treat their governors, when they can do them no farther service.*

He arrived at Cumæ, a city of Æolia in Asia Minor. The king of Persia had set a price upon his head, and promised 200 talents‡ to any person who should deliver him up. The whole coast was covered with people, who were watching for him. He fled to Ægæ, a little city of Æolia, where no one knew him except Nicogenes, at whose house he lodged. He was the most wealthy man in that country, and very intimate with all the lords of the Persian court. Themistocles was concealed some days in his house, till Nicogenes sent him, under a strong guard, to Susa, in one of those covered chariots in which the Persians, who were extremely jealous, used to carry their wives; those who conducted him telling every body, that they were carrying a young Greek lady to a courtier of great distinction.

Being come to the Persian court, he waited upon the captain of

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 90, 91. Plut. in Themist. p. 125. 127. Diod. l. xi. p. 42. 44. Corn. Nep. in Themist. c. viii. x. † Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

‡ Two hundred thousand crowns, or about 45,000*l.* sterling.

the guards, and told him, that he was a Grecian by birth, and begged the king would admit him to audience, as he had matters of great importance to communicate to him. The officer informed him of a ceremony which he knew was offensive to some Greeks, but without which none were allowed to speak to the king; and this was, to fall prostrate before him. *Our laws*, says he, *command us to honour the king in that manner, and to worship him as the living image of the immortal God, who maintains and preserves all things.* Themistocles promised to comply. Being admitted to audience, he fell on his face before the king, after the Persian manner; and afterwards rising up, *Great king*,* says he by an interpreter, *I am Themistocles the Athenian, who having been banished by the Greeks, am come to your court in hopes of finding an asylum. I have indeed brought many calamities on the Persians; but, on the other side, I have done them no less services, by the salutary advice I have given them more than once; and I am now able to do them more important services than ever. My life is in your hands. You may now exert your clemency, or display your vengeance: by the former you will preserve your suppliant; and by the latter you will destroy the greatest enemy of Greece.*

The king made him no answer at this audience, though he was struck with admiration at his great sense and boldness; but history informs us, that in company of his friends, he congratulated himself upon his good fortune, and considered Themistocles's arrival as a very great happiness; that he implored his god Arimanius always to inspire his enemies with such thoughts, and to prompt them to banish, and thus to deprive themseves of, their most illustrious personages. It is added, that when this king was asleep, he started up three times through excess of joy, and cried, *I have got Themistocles the Athenian!*

The next morning, at day-break, he sent for the greatest lords of his court, and commanded Themistocles to be brought before him, who expected nothing but destruction; especially after what one of his guards, upon hearing his name, had said to him the night before, even in the presence-chamber, just as he had left the king, *Thou serpent of Greece, thou compound of fraud and malice, the good genius of our prince brings thee hither!* However, the serenity which appeared in the king's face seemed to promise him a favourable reception. Themistocles was not mistaken; for the king began by making him a present of 200 talents,† which sum he had promised to any one who should deliver him up, which consequently was his due, as Themistocles had brought him his head, by surrendering himself to him. He afterwards desired him to give an account of the affairs of Greece. But as Themistocles could not express his thoughts to the king without the assistance

* Thucydides attributes to him very near the same words; but as forming a letter which he wrote to the king before he was introduced to him.

† Two hundred thousand French crowns; or, about 45,000*l.* sterling

of an interpreter, he desired time might be allowed him to learn the Persian tongue; hoping he then should be able to explain those things which he was desirous of communicating to him, better than he could by the aid of a third person. It is the same, says he, with the speech of a man, as with a piece of tapestry, which must be spread out and unfolded, to show the figures and beauty of the work. His request being granted, Themistocles, in the space of twelve months, made so great a progress in the Persian language, that he spoke it with greater elegance than the Persians themselves, and consequently could converse with the king without the help of an interpreter. This prince treated him with uncommon marks of friendship and esteem; he made him marry a lady descended from one of the noblest families in Persia; gave him a palace and an equipage suitable to it, and settled a noble pension on him. He used to carry him abroad on his parties of hunting, and invited him to every banquet and entertainment; and sometimes conversed privately with him, so that the lords of the court grew jealous and uneasy upon that account. He even presented him to the princesses, who honoured him with their esteem, and received his visits. It is observed as a proof of the peculiar favour showed him, that by the king's special order, Themistocles was admitted to hear the lectures and discourses of the Magi, and was instructed by them in all the secrets of their philosophy.

Another proof of his great influence is related. Demaratus of Sparta, who was then at court, being commanded by the king to ask any thing of him, he desired that he might be suffered to make his entry on horseback into the city of Sardis, with the royal tiara on his head: a ridiculous vanity! equally unworthy of the Grecian grandeur, and the simplicity of a Lacedæmonian! The king, exasperated at the insolence of his demand, expressed his disgust in the strongest terms, and seemed resolved not to pardon him; but Themistocles having interceded, the king restored him to favour.

In fine, the credit and influence of Themistocles was so great, that under the succeeding reigns, in which the affairs of Persia were still more mixed with those of Greece, whenever the kings were desirous of engaging any Greek in their service, they used to declare expressly in their letters, that he should be in greater favour with them than Themistocles had been with Artaxerxes.

It is said also that Themistocles, when in his most flourishing condition in Persia, honoured and esteemed by all the world, who were emulous of making their court to him, said one day, when his table was covered magnificently: *Children, we should have been ruined, if we had not been ruined.*

But at last, as it was judged necessary for the king's interest that Themistocles should reside in some city of Asia Minor, that he might be ready on any occasion which should present itself, he was accordingly sent to Magnesia, situated on the Meander; and besides the whole revenues of that city (which amounted to fifty

talents,* every year,) he had those of Myus and Lampsacus assigned him for his maintenance. One of the cities was to furnish him with bread, another with wine, and a third with other provisions. Some authors add two more, *viz.* for his furniture and clothes. Such was the custom of the ancient kings of the East: instead of settling pensions on persons whom they rewarded, they gave them cities, and sometimes even provinces, which under the name of bread, wine, &c. were to furnish them abundantly with all things necessary for supporting, in a magnificent manner, their household establishment. Themistocles lived for some years in Magnesia in the utmost splendour, till he came to his end in the manner which will be related hereafter.

SECTION III.

Cimon begins to make a figure at Athens. His first achievements. A double victory gained over the Persians, near the river Eurymedon. Death of Themistocles.

A. M. 3533. Ant. J. C. 471. The Athenians having lost one of their most distinguished citizens,† as well as ablest generals, by the banishment of Themistocles, endeavoured to retrieve that loss, by bestowing the command of the armies on Cimon, who was not inferior to him in merit.

He spent his youth in such excesses as did him no honour, and presaged no good with regard to his future conduct. The example of this illustrious Athenian,‡ who passed his juvenile years in so dissolute a manner, and afterwards rose to so exalted a pitch of glory, shows, that parents must not always despair of a son, when wild and irregular in his youth; especially when nature has endued him with genius, goodness of heart, generous inclinations, and an esteem for persons of merit. Such was the character of Cimon. The ill reputation he had drawn upon himself having prejudiced the people against him, he at first was very ill received by them; when, being discouraged by this repulse, he resolved to lay aside all thoughts of concerning himself with public business. But Aristides perceiving, through all his faults, that he possessed many fine qualities, consoled him, inspired him with hope, pointed out the path he should take, instilled good principles into him, and did not a little contribute, by the excellent instructions he gave him, and the affection he expressed for him on all occasions, to make him the man he afterwards appeared. What more important service could he have done his country?

Plutarch observes,§ that after Cimon had laid aside his juvenile extravagances, his conduct was in every respect great and noble: and that he was not inferior to Miltiades either in courage and intrepidity, nor to Themistocles in prudence and sense; but that he

* Fifty thousand crowns; or, about 11,250*l.* sterling.
† Diod. l. xi. p. 45. Plut. in Cim. p. 482, 483. ‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 480. § Ibid. p. 481.

was more just and virtuous than either of them: and that without being at all inferior to them in military excellence, he far surpassed them in the practice of the moral virtues.

It would be of great advantage to a state, if those who excel in particular professions would take pleasure, and make it their duty to fashion and instruct such youths as are remarkable for the pregnancy of their parts and goodness of disposition. They would thereby have an opportunity of serving their country even after their death, and of perpetuating, in the person of their pupils, a taste and inclination for true merit, and the practice of the wisest maxims.

The Athenians, a little after Themistocles had left his country having put to sea a fleet under the command of Cimon the son of Miltiades, took Eion, on the banks of the Strymon, Amphipolis, and other places of Thrace; and as this was a very fruitful country, Cimon planted a colony in it, and sent 10,000 Athenians thither for that purpose.

The fate of Eion is too singular to be omitted here.* Boges† was governor of it under the king of Persia, and acted with such a zeal and fidelity for his sovereign, as have few examples. When besieged by Cimon and the Athenians, it was in his power to have capitulated upon honourable terms, and to have returned to Asia with his family and all his effects. However, being persuaded he could not do this with honour, he resolved to die rather than surrender. The city was assaulted with the utmost fury, and he defended it with incredible bravery. Being at last in the utmost want of provisions, he threw from the walls into the river Strymon all the gold and silver in the place; then caused fire to be set to a pile, and having killed his wife, his children, and his whole family, he threw them into the midst of the flames, and afterwards rushed into them himself. The king of Persia could not but admire, and at the same time bewail, so surprising an example of generosity. The heathens, indeed, might give this name to what is rather savage ferocity and barbarity.

Cimon made himself master also of the island of Scyros, where he found the bones of Theseus, the son of Ægeus, who had fled from Athens to that city, and there ended his days. An oracle had commanded that search should be made after his bones. Cimon put them on board his galley, adorned them magnificently, and carried them to his native country, near 800 years after Theseus had left it. The people received them with the highest expressions of joy; and, to perpetuate the remembrance of this event, they instituted games in which the tragic poets were to try their skill, which became very famous, and contributed exceedingly to the improvement of the drama, by the wonderful emulation it ex-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 107. Plut. p. 482.

† Plutarch calls him Butis. Herodotus seems to place this history under Xerxes; but it is more probable that it happened under Artaxerxes his successor.

cited among the tragic poets, whose pieces were represented on the stage. For Sophocles, who was then a young man, having brought his first play on the stage, the archon, who presided at these games, observing there was a strong faction among the spectators, prevailed with Cimon and the rest of the generals, his colleagues, (who were ten in number, and chosen one out of each tribe,) to sit as judges The prize was adjudged to Sophocles, which so deeply afflicted Æschylus, who till then had been considered as the greatest dramatic poet, that Athens became insupportable to him, and he withdrew to Sicily, where he died.

The confederates had taken a great number of barbarians prisoners in Sestus and Byzantium;* and, as a proof of the high regard they had for Cimon, entreated him to distribute the booty. Accordingly, Cimon placed all the captives (stark naked) on one side, and on the other all their riches and spoils. The allies complained of this partition as too unequal; but Cimon giving them the choice, they immediately took the riches which belonged to the Persians, and left the prisoners for the Athenians. Cimon therefore set out with his portion, and was considered very little qualified to settle the distribution of prizes: for the allies carried off a great number of chains, necklaces, and bracelets of gold; a large quantity of rich habits, and fine purple cloaks; whilst the Athenians had for their share only a multitude of human creatures, quite naked, and unfit for labour. However, the relations and friends of these captives came soon after from Phrygia and Lydia, and purchased them all at a very high price; so that, with the money arising from their ransom, Cimon had enough to maintain his fleet four months; besides a great sum of money which was put into the public treasury, not to mention what he had himself for his own share. He afterwards used to take exceeding pleasure, in relating this adventure to his friends.

He made the best use of his riches,† as Gorgias the rhetorician has happily expressed it in few, but strong and elegant words. *Cimon*, says he,‡ *amassed riches only to use them; and he employed them so as to acquire esteem and honour.* We may here perceive (by the way) what was the scope and aim of the most exalted actions of the heathens; and with what justice Tertullian denned a Pagan, how perfect soever he might appear, a vain-glorious animal, *animal gloriæ*. The gardens and orchards of Cimon were always open, by his order, to the citizens in general; who were allowed to gather whatever fruits they pleased. His table was daily covered in a frugal but polite manner. It was entirely different from those delicate and sumptuous tables, to which only a few persons of great distinction are admitted; and which are

* Plut. in Cim. p. 484. † Plut in Cim. p. 484. Cornel. Nep. in Cim. c. iv. Athen. l. xii. p. 533

‡ Φησὶ τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῆτο, χαῆσθαι δὲ ὡς σιμῷτο.

covered merely to display a vain magnificence or elegance of taste. That of Cimon was plain, but abundant; and all the poor citizens were received at it without distinction. In thus banishing from his entertainments whatever had the least air of ostentation and luxury, he reserved to himself an inexhaustible fund, not only for the expenses of his house, but for the wants of his friends, his domestics, and a very great number of citizens; demonstrating, by this conduct, that he knew much better than most rich men the true use and value of riches.

He was always followed by some servants, who were ordered to slip privately a piece of money into the hands of such poor as they met, and to give clothes to those who were in want of them. He often buried such persons as had not left money enough behind them to defray the expenses of their funeral: and what is worthy of admiration, and which Plutarch does not fail to observe, he did not act in this manner to gain credit among the people, nor to purchase their voices: since we find him, on all occasions, declaring for the contrary faction, that is, in favour of such citizens as were most considerable for their wealth or authority.

Although he saw all the rest of the governors of his time enrich themselves by the plunder and oppression of the public,* he was always incorruptible, and his hands were never stained with extortion, or the smallest present; and he continued, during his whole life, not only to speak, but to act, gratuitously, and without the least view of interest, whatever he thought might be of advantage to the commonwealth.

To a great number of other excellent qualities, Cimon united sound sense, extraordinary prudence, and a profound knowledge of the genius and characters of men. The allies, besides the sums of money in which each of them was taxed, were to furnish a certain number of men and ships. Several among them, who, ever since the retreat of Xerxes, were studious of nothing but their ease, and applied themselves entirely to the cultivation of their lands, in order to free themselves from the toils and dangers of war, chose to furnish their quota in money rather than in men, and left to the Athenians the care of manning with soldiers and rowers the ships they were obliged to furnish. The other generals who had no forecast and penetration into the future, gave such of the allies as acted in this manner some uneasiness at first, and were for obliging them to observe the treaty literally. But Cimon, when in power, acted in a quite different manner, and suffered them to enjoy the tranquillity they chose; plainly perceiving, that the allies, instead of being, as formerly, warlike in the field, would insensibly lose their martial spirit, and be fit for nothing but husbandry and trade; whilst the Athenians, by exercising the oar, and having arms in their hands perpetually, would be more and more

* Plut. in Cim. p. 485

inured to the fatigues of war, and daily increase in power What Cimon had foreseen, happened; these very people purchased themselves masters at their own expense; so that they who before had been companions and allies, became in some measure the subjects and tributaries of the Athenians.

A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. No Grecian general ever gave so great a blow to the pride and haughtiness of the Persian monarch as Cimon.* After the barbarians had been driven out of Greece, he did not give them time to take breath; but sailed immediately after them with a fleet of upwards of 200 ships, took their strongest cities, and brought over all their allies; so that the king of Persia had not one soldier left in Asia, from Ionia to Pamphylia. Still pursuing his point, he had the boldness to attack the enemy's fleet, though much stronger than his own. It lay near the mouth of the river Eurymedon, and consisted of 350 sail of ships, supported by the land army on the coast. It was soon put to flight, and more than 200 sail were taken, besides those that were sunk. A great number of the Persians had left their ships, and leaped into the sea, in order to join their land army, which lay on the shore. It was very hazardous to attempt a descent in sight of the enemy; and to lead on troops, which were already fatigued by their late battle, against fresh forces much superior in number. However, Cimon, finding that the whole army was eager to engage the barbarians, thought proper to take advantage of the ardour of the soldiers, who were greatly animated with their first success. Accordingly he landed,† and marched them directly against the barbarians, who waited resolutely for their coming up, and sustained the first onset with much valour; however, being at last obliged to give way, they fled. A great slaughter ensued, and an infinite number of prisoners and immensely rich spoils were taken. Cimon having, in one day, gained two victories, which almost equalled those of Salamis and Platææ to crown all, sailed out to meet a reinforcement of eighty-four Phœnician ships, which were coming from Cyprus to join the Persian fleet, and knew nothing of what had passed. They were all either taken or sunk, and most of the soldiers were killed or drowned.

Cimon, after these glorious exploits, returned in triumph to Athens; and employed part of the spoils in fortifying the harbour, and in beautifying the city. The riches which a general amasses in the field, are applied to the noblest uses when they are disposed of in this manner, and reflect infinitely greater honour upon him, than if he expended them in building magnificent palaces for himself, which must one time or other devolve to strangers; whereas works, built for public use, are his property, in some measure, for

* Plut. in Cim. p. 485—487. Thucyd. l. i p. 66. Diod. l. xi. p. 45—47.

† We do not find that the ancients made use of long-boats in making a landing; the reason of which perhaps was, that as their galleys were flat bottomed, they ran in to shore without any difficulty

ever, and transmit his name to the latest posterity. It is well known that such embellishments in a city give infinite pleasure to th people,* who are always struck with works of this kind; and this, as Plutarch observes in the life of Cimon, is one of the surest, and, at the same time, the most lawful, methods of acquiring their friendship and esteem.

A. M. 3535. Ant. J. C. 469. The year following,† this general sailed towards the Hellespont; and having driven the Persians out of the Thracian Chersonesus, of which they had made themselves masters, he conquered it in the name of the Athenians, though he himself had more right to it, as Miltiades his father had been its sovereign. He afterwards attacked the people of the island of Thrasus, who had revolted from the Athenians, and defeated their fleet. They maintained their revolt with an almost unparalleled obstinacy and fury. As if they had been in arms against the most cruel and barbarous enemies,‡ from whom they had the worst of evils to fear, they made a law, that the first man who should only mention the concluding a treaty with the Athenians, should be put to death. The siege was carried on three years, during which the inhabitants suffered all the calamities of war with the same obstinacy. The women were no less inflexible than the men;§ for, when the besieged wanted ropes for their military engines, all the women cut off their hair with the greatest readiness, and applied it to that purpose. The city being reduced to the utmost distress by famine, which daily swept away a great number of the inhabitants, Hegetorides, a Thrasian, deeply affected with seeing such multitudes of his fellow-citizens perish, resolutely determined to sacrifice his life for the preservation of his country. Accordingly, he put a halter round his neck, and presenting himself to the assembly, *Countrymen*, says he, *do with me as you please, and do not spare me, if you judge proper; but let my death save the rest of the people, and prevail with you to abolish the cruel law you have enacted, so contrary to your welfare.* The Thrasians, struck with these words, abolished the law, but would not suffer it to cost so generous a citizen his life. They surrendered themselves to the Athenians, who spared their lives, and only dismantled their city.

After Cimon had landed his troops on the shore opposite to Thrace, he seized on all the gold-mines in that quarter, and subdued every part of that country as far as Macedonia. He might have attempted the conquest of that kingdom; and, in all probability, could have easily possessed himself of part of it, had he thought fit to improve the opportunity. And indeed, for his neglect in this point, on his return to Athens, he was prosecuted, as having been bribed by the money of the Macedonians and of Alexander, their king. But Cimon had a soul superior to all temptations of that kind, and proved his innocence in the clearest light.

* Plut. de gerend. rep. p. 818. † Plut. in Cim. p. 487. Thucyd. l. i. p 66, 67 Diod. l. xi. p. 53. ‡ Polyæn. Str. l. ii. § Ibid l. viii.

A. M. 3538 Ant. J. C. 466. The conquests of Cimon* and the power of the Athenians, which increased every day, gave Artaxerxes great uneasiness. To prevent the consequences, he resolved to send Themistocles into Attica, with a great army, and accordingly proposed it to him.

Themistocles was in great perplexity on this occasion. On one side, the remembrance of the favours which the king had heaped upon him; the positive assurances he had given that monarch to serve him with the utmost zeal on all occasions; the urgency of the king, who claimed his promise; all these considerations would not permit him to refuse the commission. On the other side, the love of his country, which the injustice and ill treatment of his fellow-citizens could not banish from his mind; his strong reluctance to sully the glory of his former laurels and mighty achievements by so ignominious a step; perhaps, too, the fear of being unsuccessful in a war in which he should be opposed by excellent generals, and particularly by Cimon, who hitherto had been as successful as valiant; these different reflections would not suffer him to declare against his country, in an enterprise which, whether successful or not, could not but reflect shame on himself.

To rid himself at once of all these inward struggles, he resolved to put an end to his life,† as the only method he could devise not to be wanting in the duty which he owed his country, nor to the promises he had made the prince. He therefore prepared a solemn sacrifice, to which he invited all his friends; when, after embracing them all, and taking a last farewell of them, he drank bull's blood; or, according to others, swallowed a dose of poison, and died in this manner at Magnesia, aged threescore and five years, the greatest part of which he had spent either in the government of the republic, or the command of the armies. When the king was told the cause and manner of his death,‡ he esteemed and admired him still more, and continued his favour to his friends and domestics. But the unexpected death of Themistocles proved an obstacle to the design that he meditated of attacking the Greeks. The Magnesians erected a splendid monument to the memory of that great general in the public square, and granted peculiar privileges and honours to his descendants. They continued to enjoy them in Plutarch's time, that is, near 600 years after, and his tomb was still standing.

Atticus,§ in the beautiful dialogue of Cicero, entitled Brutus, refutes, in an agreeable and ingenious manner, the tragical end which some writers ascribe to Themistocles, as related above; pretending that the whole is a fiction, invented by rhetoricians, who, on the bare rumour that this great man died by poison, had of themselves added all the other particulars to embellish the story, which otherwise

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 92. Plut. in Themist. p. 127.
† The wisest heathens did not think a man was allowed to lay violent hands on himself ‡ Cic. de Senec. n. 72. § Brut. n. 42, 43.

would have been very dry and uninteresting. He appeals for this to Thucydides, that judicious historian, who was an Athenian, and almost contemporary with Themistocles. This author indeed owns, that a report had prevailed, that this general had poisoned himself: however, his opinion was, that he died a natural death and that his friends conveyed his bones secretly to Athens, where, in Pausanias's time,* his mausoleum was standing near the great harbour. This account seems much more probable than the other.

Themistocles was certainly one of the greatest men that Greece ever produced. He had a great soul, and invincible courage, which was even inflamed by danger; was fired with an incredible thirst for glory, which sometimes his patriotism would temper and allay, but which sometimes carried him too far; his presence of mind was such† that it immediately suggested whatever course it was most necessary to pursue: in fine, he had a sagacity and penetration that revealed to him, in the clearest light, the most secret designs of his enemies: and caused him to adopt long beforehand the several measures which were requisite to disconcert them, and inspire him with great, noble, bold, extensive views with regard to the honour of his country. The most essential qualities of the heart were, however, wanting in him; I mean, probity, sincerity, equity, and good faith; nor was he altogether free from suspicions of avarice, which is a great blemish in the character of a statesman.

Nevertheless,‡ a noble sentiment as well as action is related of him, which speak a great and disinterested soul. His daughter being asked of him in marriage,§ he preferred an honest poor man, to a rich one of an indifferent character; and gave for his reason, *That in the choice of a son-in-law, he would much rather have merit without riches, than riches without merit.*

SECTION IV.

The revolt of the Egyptians against Persia, supported by the Athenians.

A. M. 3544. Ant. J. C. 460. The Egyptians,‖ in the mean time, to free themselves from a foreign yoke which was insupportable to them, revolted from Artaxerxes, and made Inarus, prince of the Libyans, their king. They called in to their assistance the Athenians, who, having at that time a fleet of 200 ships at the island of Cyprus, accepted the invitation with pleasure, and immediately set sail for Egypt; judging this a very favourable opportunity to weaken the power of the Persians, by driving them out of so great a kingdom.

* Lib. i. p. l.

† De instantibus, ut ait Thucydides, verissimè judicabat, et de futuris callidissimè conjiciebat. *Corn. Nep. in Themist.* c. i.

‡ Plut. in Themist. p. 121.

§ Themistocles, cùm consuleretur utrùm bono viro pauperi, an minùs probato diviti filiam collocaret: Ego VERO, inquit, MALO VIRUM QUI PECUNIA EGEAT, QUAM PECUNIAM QUÆ VIRO. *Cic. de Offic.* l. ii. c. 21.

‖ Thucyd. l. i p 68, and 71, 72. Ctes. c. 32—35 Diod l xi. p. 54—59

A. M. 3545. Ant. J. C. 459. Advice being brought Artaxerxes of this revolt, he raised an army of 300,000 men, and resolved to march in person against the rebels. But his friends advising him not to venture himself in that expedition, he gave the command of it to Achæmenes, one of his brothers. The latter being arrived in Egypt, encamped his great army on the banks of the Nile. During this interval, the Athenians having defeated the Persian fleet, and either destroyed or taken fifty of their ships, went up that river landed their forces under the command of Charitimis their general, and having joined Inarus and his Egyptians, they charged Achæmenes, and defeated him in a great battle, in which that Persian general and 100,000 of his soldiers were slain. Those who escaped fled to Memphis, whither the conquerors pursued them, and immediately made themselves masters of two quarters of the city: but the Persians having fortified themselves in the third, called the *white wall*, which was the largest and strongest of the three, they were besieged in it near three years, during which they made a most vigorous defence, till they were at last delivered by the forces sent to their aid.

A. M. 3546. Ant. J. C. 458. Artaxerxes, hearing of the defeat of his army, and how much the Athenians had contributed to it; in order to make a diversion of their forces, and hinder them from acting against him, sent ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, with a large sum of money, to engage them to proclaim war against the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians having rejected the offer,

A. M. 3547. Ant. J. C. 457. their refusal did not abate his ardour, and accordingly he gave Megabyzus and Artabazus the command of the forces destined against Egypt. These generals immediately raised an army of 300,000 men in Cilicia and Phœnicia. They were

A. M. 3548. Ant. J. C. 456. obliged to wait till the fleet was equipped which was not till the next year. Artabazus then took upon him the command of it, and sailed towards the Nile, whilst Megabyzus, at the head of the land army, marched towards Memphis. He raised the siege of that city, and afterwards fought Inarus. All the forces on both sides engaged in this battle, in which Inarus was entirely defeated; but the Egyptians, who had rebelled, suffered most in this slaughter.

After this defeat, Inarus, though wounded by Megabyzus, retreated with the Athenians, and such Egyptians as were willing to follow him; and reached Byblos, a city in the island of Prosopitis, which is surrounded by two arms of the Nile, both of which are navigable. The Athenians ran their fleet into one of these arms, where it was secured from the attacks of the enemy, and held out a siege of a year and a half in this island.

After the battle, all the rest of Egypt submitted to the conqueror, and was reunited to the empire of Artaxerxes, except Amyrteus, who had still a small party in the fens, where he long supported himself, through the difficulty the Persians found in penetrating far enough to reduce him.

A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454. The siege of Prosopitis was still carrying on. The Persians finding that they made no progress by the usual methods of attaek, because they had to deal with persons who were not defieient either in eourage or skill to defend themselves, had reeourse to an extraordinary expedient, whieh soon produeed what foree had not been able to effeet. They turned the course, by different eanals, of that arm of the Nile in which the Athenians lay, and by that means opened themselves a passage for their whole army to enter the island. Inarus, seeing that all was lost, eapitulated with Megabyzus for himself, for all his Egyptians, and about fifty Athenians, and surrendered upon eondition that their lives should be spared. The remainder of the auxiliary forees, whieh formed a body of 6000 men, resolved to hold out longer; and for this purpose they set fire to their ships, and drawing up in order of battle, resolved to die sword in hand, and sell their lives as dear as they eould, in imitation of the Lacedæmonians, who refused to yield, and were all eut to pieces at Thermopylæ. The Persians hearing they had taken so desperate a resolution, did not think it advisable to attaek them. A peace was therefore offered them, with a promise that they should all be permitted to leave Egypt, and have free passage to their native eountry either by sea or land. They aeeepted these eonditions, put the eonquerors in possession of Byblos and of the whole island, and went by land to Cyrene, where they embarked for Greeee: but most of the soldiers who had served in this expedition perished in it.

But this was not the only loss the Athenians sustained on this oeeasion. Another fleet of fifty ships, whieh they sent to the aid of their besieged eountrymen, sailed up one of the arms of the Nile (just after the Athenians had surrendered) to disengage them, not knowing what had happened. But the instant they entered, the Persian eet, which kept out at sea, followed them and attaeked their rear, whilst the army diseharged showers of darts upon them from the banks of the river; only a few ships eseaped, which opened themselves a way through the enemy's fleet, and all the rest were lost. Thus ended the fatal war earried on by the Athenians for six years in Egypt, whieh kingdom was now united again to the Persian empire, and eontinued so during the rest of the reign of Artaxerxes, of whieh this is the twentieth year. But the pri-

A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454. soners who were taken in this war met with the most unhappy fate.

SECTION V.

Inarus is delivered up to the king's mother, contrary to the articles of the treaty. The affliction of Megabyzus, who revolts.

A. M. 3556 Ant. J. C. 448. Artaxerxes,* after having for five years refused to gratify the request of his mother, who daily impor-

* Ctes. c. xxxv—xl.

tuned him to put Inarus and the Athenians who had been taken with him into her hands, in order that she might sacrifice them to the manes of Achæmenes her son, at last yielded to her solicitations. But how blind, how barbarously weak, must this king have been, to break through the most solemn engagements merely through complaisance; who (deaf to remorse) violated the law of nations, solely to avoid offending a most unjust mother. This inhuman princess,* without regard to the faith of the treaty, caused Inarus to be crucified, and beheaded all the rest. Megabyzus was in the deepest affliction on that account; for as he had promised that no injury should be done them, the dishonour reflected principally on him. He therefore left the court, and withdrew to Syria, of which he was governor; and his discontent was so great, that he raised an army and revolted openly.

A. M. 3557. Ant. J. C. 447. The king sent Osiris, who was one of the greatest lords of the court, against him with an army of 200,000 men. Megabyzus engaged Osiris, wounded him, took him prisoner, and put his army to flight. Artaxerxes sending to demand Osiris, Megabyzus generously dismissed him, as soon as his wounds were cured.

A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446. The next year Artaxerxes sent another army against him, the command of which he gave to Menostanes, son to Artarius the king's brother, and governor of Babylon. This general was not more fortunate than the former. He also was defeated and put to flight, and Megabyzus gained as signal a victory as the former.

Artaxerxes, finding he could not reduce him by force of arms, sent his brother Artarius and Amytis his sister, who was the wife of Megabyzus, with several other persons of the first quality, to persuade him to return to his allegiance. They succeeded in their negotiation; the king pardoned him, and he returned to court.

One day as they were hunting, a lion raising himself on his hinder feet, was going to rush upon the king, when Megabyzus seeing the danger he was in, and fired with zeal and affection for his sovereign, hurled a dart at the lion, which killed him. But Artaxerxes, upon pretence that he had affronted him, in darting at the lion first, commanded Megabyzus's head to be struck off. Amytis the king's sister, and Amestris his mother, with the greatest difficulty prevailed upon the king to change his sentence into perpetual banishment. Megabyzus was therefore sent to Cyrta, a city on the Red sea, and condemned to end his days there: however, five years after, disguising himself like a leper, he made his escape and returned to Susa, where, by the assistance of his wife and mother-in-law, he was restored to favour, and continued so till his death, which happened some years after, in the seventy-sixth year of his age. Megabyzus was extremely regretted by the king and the

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 72.

whole court. He was a man of the greatest abilities in the kingdom, and at the same time the best general. Artaxerxes owed both his crown and life to him:* but it is of dangerous consequence for a subject, when his sovereign is under too many obligations to him. This was the cause of all the misfortunes of Megabyzus.

It is surprising that so judicious a prince as Artaxerxes should have been so imprudent, as to be fired with jealousy against a nobleman of his court, merely because, in a party of hunting, he had wounded the beast they were pursuing before him! Can any thing be so weak? And is this placing the point of honour in a manner worthy a king? Nevertheless, history furnishes us with many instances of this kind. I am apt to believe, from some expressions of Plutarch,† that Artaxerxes was ashamed of the wild fury to which this false delicacy had raised him, and that he made some kind of public atonement for it: for, according to this author, he published a decree, importing, that any man who was hunting with the king, should be allowed to throw his javelin first at the beast, if opportunity should offer; and he, according to Plutarch, was the first Persian monarch who granted such a permission.

SECTION VI.

Artaxerxes sends Ezra, and afterwards Nehemiah, to Jerusalem.

Before I proceed in the history of the Persians and Greeks, I shall relate in few words, what events happened among the people of God, during the first twenty years of Artaxerxes, which is an essential part of the history of that prince.

A. M. 3537. Ant. J. C. 467. In the seventh year of the reign of Artaxerxes,‡ Ezra obtained of the king and his seven counsellors, an ample commission, empowering him to return to Jerusalem with all such Jews as would follow him thither, in order to re-establish the Jewish government and religion, and to regulate both agreeably to their own laws. Ezra was descended from Saraia, who was high-priest of Jerusalem, at the time when it was destroyed by Nabuchodonosor, and was put to death by his command. Ezra was a very learned and pious man, and was chiefly distinguished from the rest of the Jews, by his great knowledge in the Scriptures; on account of which it is said of him, *That he was very ready in the law of Moses that was given by the God of Israel.*§ He set out from Babylon with the gifts and offerings which the king, his courtiers, and such Israelites as had stayed in Babylon, had put into his hands for the service of the temple, and which he gave to the priests upon his arrival in Jerusalem. It appears by the commission which Artaxerxes gave him, that this prince had a high veneration for the God of Israel; as, in commanding his officers to furnish the Jews with

* Beneficia eò usque læta sunt, dum videntur exsolvi posse; ubi multùm antevertère, pro gratiâ odium redditur. *Tacit. Annal.* l. iv. c. 18.

† Plut. in Apophthegm. p. 173. ‡ Ezra, vii. &c. § 1 Esdras, viii. 3

all things necessary for their worship, he adds, *Let all things be performed after the law of God diligently, unto the most high God, that wrath come not upon the kingdom of the king and his son.** This commission, as I observed, empowered him to settle the religion and government of the Jews, pursuant to the law of Moses; to appoint magistrates and judges to punish evil-doers, not only by imprisoning their persons and confiscating their possessions, but also by sending them into banishment, and even sentencing them to death, according to the crimes they should commit. Such was the power with which Ezra was invested, and which he exercised faithA. M. 3550. fully during thirteen years, till Nehemiah brought a new Ant. J. C. 454. commission from the Persian court.

Nehemiah was also a Jew,† of distinguished merit and piety, and one of the cup-bearers to king Artaxerxes. This was a very considerable employment in the Persian court, because of the privilege annexed to it, of being often near the king's person, and of being allowed to sp ak to him in the most favourable moments. However, neither this exalted station, nor the settlement of his family in that land of captivity, could obliterate from his mind the country of his ancestors, nor their religion: neither his love for the one, nor his zeal for the other, was abated; and his heart was still in Zion. Some Jews who were come from Jerusalem having informed him of the sad state of that city, that its walls lay in ruin, its gates were burnt down, and the inhabitants thereby exposed to the insults of their enemies and the scorn of their neighbours; the affliction of his brethren, and the dangers with which they were menaced, made such an impression on his mind, as might naturally be expected from one of his piety. One day as he was waiting upon the king, the latter observing an unusual air of melancholy in Nehemiah's countenance, asked him the cause of it; a proof that this monarch had a tenderness of heart rarely found in those of his high rank, which nevertheless is much more valuable than the most shining qualities. Nehemiah took this opportunity to acquaint him with the calamitous state of his country; owned that to be the subject of his grief; and humbly entreated that leave might be given him to go to Jerusalem, in order to repair the fortifications of it. The kings of Persia his predecessors, had permitted the Jews to rebuild the temple, but not the walls of Jerusalem. But Artaxerxes immediately caused a decree to be drawn up, that the walls and gates of Jerusalem should be rebuilt; and Nehemiah, as governor of Judea, was appointed to put this decree into execution. The king, to do him the greater honour, ordered a body of horse, commanded by an officer of distinction, to escort him thither. He likewise writ to all the governors of the provinces on this side the Euphrates, to give him all the assistance possible in forwarding the work for which he was sent. This pious Jew executed every part of his commission with incredible zeal and activity.

* 1 Esdras, viii. 22. † Nehem. i. and ii

It is from this decree,* enacted by Artaxerxes in the twentieth year of his reign, for the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem, that we date the beginning of the seventy weeks mentioned in the famous prophecy of Daniel, after which the Messiah was to appear, and to be put to death. I shall here insert the whole prophecy, but without giving the explication of it, as it may be found in other writers, and is not a part of this history.

Thou art greatly beloved, therefore understand the matter, and consider the vision.† *Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy. Know therefore and understand,* THAT FROM THE GOING FORTH OF THE COMMANDMENT TO RESTORE AND TO BUILD JERUSALEM, *unto the Messiah the Prince, shall be seven weeks, and threescore and two weeks: the street shall be built again, and the wall, even in troublous times. And after threescore and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself: and the people of the prince that shall come, shall destroy the city and the sanctuary, and the end thereof shall be with a flood: and unto the end of the war desolations are determined. And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week; and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease; and for the overspreading of abominations he shall make it desolate, even until the consummation, and that determined shall be poured upon the desolate.*

When Ezra was in power,‡ as his chief view was to restore religion to its ancient purity, he arranged the books of Scripture in their proper order, revised them all very carefully, and collected the ancient documents relating to the people of God, in order to compose out of them the two books of Chronicles, to which he added the history of his own times, which was finished by Nehemiah. With their books ends the long history which Moses had begun, and which the writers who came after him continued in a regular series, till the repairing of Jerusalem. The rest of the sacred history is not written in that uninterrupted order. Whilst Ezra and Nehemiah were compiling the latter part of that great work, Herodotus, whom profane authors call the father of history, began to write. Thus we find that the latest authors of the books of Scripture flourished about the same time with the first author of the Grecian history; and when it began, that of God's people, to compute only from Abraham, included already fifteen centuries. Herodotus made no mention of the Jews in his history; for the Greeks desired to be informed of such nations only as were famous for their wars, their commerce, and grandeur; so that as Judea was then but just rising from its ruins, it did not excite the attention of that people.

* Dan. ix. 23–27. † Ibid. ‡ Bossuet's Universal History.

SECTION VII.

Character of Pericles. The methods employed by him to gain the affection of the people.

I now return to Greece. Since the banishment of Themistocles, and the death of Aristides (the exact time of which is not known,) two citizens, Cimon and Pericles, divided all influence and authority in Athens. Pericles was much younger than Cimon, and of a quite different character. As he will make a very considerable figure in the following history, it is of importance to the reader to know who he was, in what manner he had been educated, and his scheme and method of government.

Pericles descended,* by the mother's as well as father's side, from the greatest and most illustrious families of Athens. His father Xanthippus, who defeated at Mycale the king of Persia's lieutenants, married Agarista, niece to Clistnenes, who expelled the Pisistratidæ, or descendants of Pisistratus the tyrant, and established a popular government in Athens. Pericles had long prepared himself for the design he had formed of engaging in state affairs.

He was brought up under the most learned men of his age, and particularly Anaxagoras of Clazomene, surnamed the *Intelligence*, from his being the first, as we are told, who ascribed human events, as well the formation and government of the universe, not to chance, as some philosophers, nor to a fatal necessity, but to a superior Intelligence, who disposed and governed all things with wisdom. This tenet, or opinion, subsisted long before his time; but he, perhaps, set it in a stronger light than all others had done, and taught it methodically and from principles. Anaxagoras thoroughly instructed his pupil in that part of philosophy which relates to nature, and which is therefore called physics.† This study gave him a strength and greatness of soul, which raised him above an infinite number of vulgar prejudices and vain practices generally observed in his time; which, in affairs of state and military enterprises, often disconcerted the wisest and most necessary measures, or defeated them by scrupulous delays, authorized and covered with the specious veil of religion. These were sometimes dreams or auguries, at other times dreadful phenomena, as eclipses of the sun or moon, or else omens and presages; not to mention the wild chimeras of judiciary astrology. The knowledge of nature, free from the grovelling and weak superstition to which ignorance gives birth, inspired him, says Plutarch, with a well-grounded piety towards the gods, attended with a strength of mind that was im-

* Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 153—156.

† The ancients, under this name, comprehended what we call physics and metaphysics; the latter of which implies the knowledge of spiritual things, as God and spirits; and the former, that of bodies.

moveable, and a calm hope of the blessings to be expected from them. Although he found infinite charms in this study, he did not however devote himself to it as a philosopher, but as a statesman; and he had so much power over himself (a very difficult thing) as to prescribe to himself limits in the pursuit of knowledge.

But the talent which he cultivated with the greatest care, because he looked upon it as the most necessary instrument of all to those who are desirous of conducting and governing the people, was eloquence. And indeed, those who possessed this talent, in a free state like that of Athens, were sure of reigning in the assemblies, engrossing suffrages, determining affairs, and exercising a kind of absolute power over the hearts and minds of the people He therefore made this his chief object, and the mark to which all his other improvements, as well as whatsoever he had learnt from Anaxagoras, were directed;* suffusing, to borrow Plutarch's expression, over the study of philosophy the dye of rhetoric; the meaning of which is, that Pericles, to embellish and adorn his discourse, heightened the strength and solidity of reasoning with the colouring and graces of eloquence.

He had no cause to repent his having bestowed so much time on this study, for his success far exceeded his utmost hopes. The poets,† his contemporaries, used to say, that he lightened, thundered, and agitated all Greece; so powerful was his eloquence. It had those piercing and lively strokes,‡ that reach the inmost soul; and his discourse left always an irresistible incentive, a kind of spur, behind it in the minds of his auditors. He had the art of uniting beauty with strength; and Cicero observes, that at the very time he opposed, with the greatest tenaciousness, the inclinations and desires of the Athenians, he had the art to make even severity itself, and the kind of harshness with which he spoke against the flatterers of the people, popular. There was no resisting the solidity of his arguments, or the sweetness of his words; whence it was said, that the goddess of persuasion, with all her graces, resided on his lips. And indeed, as Thucydides,§ his rival and adversary, was one day asked, whether he or Pericles was the best wrestler: *Whenever*, says he, *I have given him a fall, he affirms the contrary, in such strong and forcible terms, that he persuades all the spectators that I did not throw him, though they themselves saw him on the ground.* Nor was he less prudent and reserved than strong and vehement in his speeches; and it is related, that he never spoke in public, till after he had besought the gods

* Βαφῇ τῇ ῥητορικῇ τὴν φυσιολογίαν ὑποχέαντος.

† Ab Aristophane poetâ fulgurare, tonare, permiscere Græciam dictus est. *Cic. in Orat.* n. 29.

‡ Quid Pericles! De cujus dicendi copiâ sic accepimus, ut, cùm contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriæ, severius tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra populares homines diceret, populare omnibus et jucundum videretur: cujus in labris veteres comici—leporem habitâsse dixerunt, tantamque vim in eo fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret. *Cic.* lib. iii. *de Orat.* n. 138.

§ Not the historian.

not to suffer any expression to drop from him, either incongruous to his subject, or offensive to the people. Whenever he was to appear in the assembly,* before he came out of his house he used to say to himself; *Remember, Pericles, that thou art going to speak to men born in the arms of liberty; to Greeks, to Athenians.*

The uncommon endeavours which Pericles, according to historians used, in order to improve his mind by the study of the sciences, and to attain to a perfection in eloquence, are an excellent lesson to such persons as are one day to fill the important offices of state; and a just censure of those,† who, disregarding whatever is called study and learning, bring into those employments (upon which they enter without knowledge or experience,) nothing but a ridiculous self-sufficiency, and a rash boldness in deciding. Plutarch,‡ in a treatise where he shows, that it is to statesmen that a philosopher ought chiefly to attach himself preferably to any other class of men, (because in instructing them, he at the same time teaches whole cities and republics,) verifies his assertion from the example of the greatest men both of Greece and Italy, who derived this help from philosophy. Pericles, of whom we now write, was taught by Anaxagoras; Dion of Syracuse by Plato; many princes of Italy by Pythagoras; Cato, the famous censor, travelled to the place where Athenodorus lived, for the same purpose; and lastly, the famous Scipio, the destroyer of Carthage, always kept Panætius the philosopher near his person.

One of the chief endeavours of Pericles also was, to study thoroughly the genius and disposition of the Athenians, that he might discover the secret springs which were to be employed in order to set them in motion, and the manner in which it was proper to act for acquiring their confidence; for it was in that principally that the great men among the ancients used to make their skill and politics consist.§ He found by the reflections he had made on the several transactions of his time, that the predominant passions of this people were, a violent aversion to tyranny, and a strong love of liberty, which inspired them with sentiments of fear, jealousy, and suspicion, of all such citizens as were too conspicuous for their birth, their personal merit, their own credit and authority, or that of their friends. He not only was very like Pisistratus, with regard to the sweetness of his voice and fluency of expression, but he also resembled him very much in the features of his face, and his whole air and manner; and he observed, that the oldest of the Athenians who had seen the tyrant, were prodigiously struck at the resemblance. Besides, he was very rich, was

* Plut. in Symp. lib. i. p. 620.

† Nunc contrà plerique ad honores adipiscendos, et ad remp. gerendam, nudi veniunt et inermes, nullâ cognitione rerum, nullâ scientiâ ornati. *Cic.* lib. iii. *de Orat.* n. 136.

‡ Plut. p. 777.

§ Olim noscenda vigi natura, et quibus modis temperanter haberetur: senatusque et optimatium ingenia qui maximè perdidicerant, callidi temporum et sapientes habebantur. *Tacit. Annal.* lib. iv. cap. 33.

descended from an illustrious family, and had very powerful friends To prevent, therefore, his being obnoxious to the suspicion and jealousy of the people, he at first shunned public business, which required a constant attendance in the city; and was solely intent upon distinguishing himself in war and dangers.

But when he saw Aristides dead, Themistocles banished, and Cimon engaged almost continually in foreign wars, and absent from Greece, he began to appear in public with greater confidence than before; and entirely devoted himself to the party of the people; but not out of inclination, for he was far from affecting popular power, but to remove all suspicions of his aspiring to the tyranny, and still more, to raise a strong bulwark against the influence and authority of Cimon, who had joined with the nobles.

At the same time, he quite changed his conduct and way of life; and assumed, in all things, the character of a statesman, wholly busied in affairs of government, and entirely devoted to the service of his country. He was never seen in the streets, except when he was going either to the assembly of the people, or to the council. He on a sudden left off going to banquets, assemblies, and other diversions of that kind, which he had used to frequent; and during the many years that he presided in the administration, he was never seen to go to supper with his friends, except once at the nuptials of a near relation.

He knew that the people,* who are naturally fickle and inconstant,† commonly disregard those who are always in their sight; and that too strong a desire to please them, grows at last tiresome and importunate; and it was observed that such a behaviour was very prejudicial to Themistocles. To avoid this error, he used to go very rarely to the assemblies; and never appeared before the people but at intervals, in order to make himself desired; and to preserve such an ascendant over their minds as might be always new, and not worn and in a manner withered by an over-great assiduity; wisely reserving himself for great and important occasions. Hence it was said that he imitated Jupiter,‡ who, in the government of the world, according to some philosophers, busied himself in great events alone; and left the direction of those of less importance to subaltern deities. And indeed, Pericles used to transact all petty affairs by his friends, and by certain orators that were entirely devoted to him, among whom was Ephialtes.

Pericles employed his whole industry and application to gain the favour and esteem of the people,§ in order to counterbalance the fame and influence of Cimon. However, he could not equal the magnificence and liberality of his rival, whose immense riches gave him an opportunity of bestowing such largesses as appear to

* Plut. de sui laude, p. 441.

† Ista nostra assiduitas, Servi, nescis quantum interdum afferat hominibus tædii quantumque satietatis——Utrique nostrûm desiderium nihil bofuisset. *Cic. pro Mur.* n. 21.

‡ Plut. de ger. rep. p. 811. § Plut. in Pericl. p. 156.

us almost incredible, so much do they differ from our customs in that respect. Finding it impossible for him to rival Cimon in this particular, he had recourse to another expedient (in order to gain the love of the populace,) no less effectual perhaps, but certainly not so legitimate and honourable. He was the first who caused the conquered lands to be divided among the citizens; who distributed among them the public revenues for the expense of their games and shows, and annexed pensions to all public employments; so that certain sums were bestowed on them regularly, as well to procure them a place at the games, as for their attendance in the courts of justice, and the public assemblies. It is impossible to say how fatal this unhappy policy was to the republic, and how many evils it drew after it. For these new regulations, besides draining the public treasury, gave the people a fondness for expense, and a dissolute turn of mind; whereas they before were sober and modest, and contented themselves with getting a livelihood by their sweat and labour.

By such arts as these Pericles had gained so great an ascendant over the minds of the people,* that he may be said to have attained a monarchical power under a republican form of government; moulding the citizens into what shape he pleased, and presiding with unlimited authority in all their assemblies. And indeed, Valerius Maximus makes scarce any other difference between Pisistratus and Pericles, than that the one exercised a tyrannical power by force of arms, and the other by the strength of his eloquence, in which he made a very great progress under Anaxagoras.

This credit and authority, enormous as it was, could not yet restrain the comic writers from throwing out against him very many severe strokes of satire in their theatres; and it does not appear that any of the poets who censured Pericles with so much boldness, were ever punished, or even called to account for it by the people. Perhaps it was through prudence and policy that he did not attempt to curb this licentiousness of the stage, nor to silence the poets; that he might amuse and content the people by this vain shadow of liberty, and prevent their discovering that they really were enslaved.

Pericles,† the more to strengthen his own influence, engaged in a design no less hazardous than bold. He resolved to weaken the authority of the tribunal of the Areopagus, of which he was not a member, because he had never been elected either Archon,‡ Thesmotheta, king of the sacrifices, nor Polemarch. These were dif-

* Pericles felicissimus naturæ incrementis, sub Anaxagorâ præceptore summo studio perpolitus et instructus, uberis Athenarum cervicibus jugum servitutis imposuit: egit enim ille urbem et versavit arbitrio suo—Quid inter Pisistratum et Periclem interfuit, nisi quòd ille armatus hic sine armis tyrannidem exercuit? *Val. Max.* l. viii. c. 9.

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 157. In Cim. p. 488.

‡ After some changes had been made in the form of the Athenian government, the supreme authority was at first invested in nine magistrates, called archons, and lasted but one year. One was called Rex, another Polemarchus, and a third Archon, and this magistrate was properly at the head of the rest, and gave his name to the year; and six Thesmothetæ, who presided immediately over the laws and decrees.

ferent employments in the republic, which from time immemorial had been given by lot; and none but those who had behaved uprightly in them, were allowed a seat in the Areopagus. Pericles, taking advantage of Cimon's absence, set Ephialtes, who was his creature, at work clandestinely; and at last succeeded in lessening the power of that illustrious body, in which the chief strength of the nobility consisted. The people, emboldened and supported by so powerful a faction, subverted all the fundamental laws and ancient customs; took from the senate of the Areopagus the cognizance of the greater part of the causes that used to be brought before it, leaving it very few, and such only as were of little consequence, and made themselves absolute masters of all the tribunals.

Cimon, on his return to Athens, was afflicted to see the dignity of the senate trampled under foot, and therefore set every engine at work to restore it to its pristine authority, and to revive the aristocracy, in the same form as it had been established under Clisthenes. But now his enemies began to exclaim and excite the people against him; reproaching him, among many other things, for his strong attachment to the Lacedæmonians. Cimon had himself given some room for this reproach, by his not paying sufficient regard to the Athenian delicacy: for, in speaking to them, he would for ever extol Lacedæmonia; and whenever he censured their conduct on any occasion, he used to cry, *The Spartans do not act in this manner.* Such expressions as these drew upon him the envy and hatred of his fellow-citizens: but an event, in which he nevertheless had no share, made him the object of their utmost detestation.

SECTION VIII.

An earthquake in Sparta. Insurrection of the Helots. Seeds of division between the Athenians and Spartans. Cimon is sent into banishment.

A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. In the fourth year of the reign of Archidamus,* there happened the most dreadful earthquake in Sparta that had ever been known. In several places the country was entirely swallowed up; Taygetus, and other mountains were shaken to their foundations; many of their summits being torn away, came tumbling down; and the whole city was laid in ruins, five houses only excepted. To heighten the calamity, the Helots, who were slaves to the Lacedæmonians, looking upon this as a favourable opportunity to recover their liberty, flew up and down every part of the city, to murder such as had escaped the earthquake: but finding them under arms, and drawn up in order of battle, by the prudent foresight of Archidamus, who had assembled them round him, they retired into the neighbouring cities, and commenced that very day open war, having entered into alliance with

* Plut. in Cim. p. 488, 489.

several of the neighbouring nations, and being strengthened by the Messenians, who at that time were engaged in a war with the Spartans.

The Lacedæmonians in this extremity sent to Athens to implore succours; but this was opposed by Ephialtes, who declared that it would be no way advisable to assist them, nor to rebuild a city that was the rival of Athens, which, he said, ought to be left in its ruins, and the pride of Sparta thereby humbled for ever. But Cimon being struck with horror at these polities, did not hesitate a moment to prefer the welfare of the Lacedæmonians to the aggrandizing of his country, declaring, in the strongest terms, that it was absolutely improper *to have Greece lame of one of its legs, and Athens without a counterpoise:* the people came into his opinion, and accordingly a succour was voted. Sparta and Athens might indeed be considered as the two limbs on which Greece stood; so that if one of them was destroyed, Greece would inevitably be crippled. It is also certain, that the Athenians were so elate with their grandeur, and were become so proud and enterprising, that they wanted a curb to check their impetuosity; and none was so proper as Sparta, that state being the only one that was capable of being a counterpoise to the headstrong disposition of the Athenians. Cimon therefore marched to the aid of the Lacedæmonians with 4000 men.

We have here an example of the powerful influence which a man of fine talents and abilities has in a state, when a great fund of merit is united in his person with a well-established reputation for probity, disinterestedness, and zeal for the good of his country. Cimon, with very little difficulty, succeeds in inspiring the Athenians with noble and magnanimous sentiments, which in outward appearance interfered with their interest; and this in spite of the suggestions of a secret jealousy, which never fails to show itself in the most sensible manner on these occasions. By the ascendant and authority which his virtue gives him, he raises them above the grovelling and unjust (though too common) political views, that prompt the people to consider the calamities of their neighbours as an advantage, which the interest of their own country permits and even enjoins them to lay hold of. The counsels of Cimon were perfectly wise and equitable; but it is surprising how he could prevail so far as to make a whole people approve them, since this is all that could be expected from an assembly of the wisest and gravest senators.

Some time after,* the Lacedæmonians again implored the aid of the Athenians against the Messenians and Helots, who had seized upon Ithome. But these forces being arrived under the command of Cimon, the Spartans began to dread their intrepidity, their power, and great fame; and affronted them so far, as to send them

* Plut in Cim. Thucyd. l. i. p. 67, 68.

back, upon suspicion of their harbouring ill designs, and of intending to turn their arms against them.

The Athenians being returned full of anger and resentment, they declared themselves, from that very day, enemies to all who should favour the Lacedæmonian interest: for which reason they banished Cimon by the ostracism, on the first opportunity that presented itself for that purpose. This is the first time that the misunderstanding between these two nations, which afterwards increased through mutual discontent, displayed itself in so strong a manner. It was nevertheless suspended for some years, by truces and treaties, which prevented its consequences; but it at last broke out in the most violent manner in the Peloponnesian war.

Those who had shut themselves up in Ithome, after making a ten years' defence in it, surrendered at last to the Lacedæmonians, who gave them their lives upon condition that they should never return to Peloponnesus. The Athenians, to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, received them with their wives and children, and settled them in Naupactus, of which they had just before possessed themselves. The inhabitants of Megara at the same time went over from the Spartans to the Athenians.* In this manner several leagues were concluded on both sides, and many battles were fought; the most famous of which was that of Tanagra in Bœotia, which Diodorus equals with those of Marathon and Platææ, and in which Myronides the Athenian defeated the Spartans, who came to the aid of the Thebans.

A. M. 3518. Ant. J. C 456. It was on this occasion that Cimon,† thinking himself dispensed from his proscription, repaired in arms with some soldiers to his tribe to serve his country, and to fight in the Athenian army against the Lacedæmonians: but his enemies caused him to be ordered to retire. However, before he went away, he exhorted his companions, who were no less suspected than himself of favouring the Lacedæmonians, to exert themselves to the utmost, and fight with the greatest courage, to prove their innocence; and if possible, to efface from the minds of their citizens a suspicion so injurious to them all. Accordingly, those brave soldiers, who were 100 in number, fired by his words, requested him to give them his whole armour, which they placed in the centre of their little battalion, in order to have him in a manner present and before their eyes. They fought with so much valour and fury, that they were all cut to pieces, to the great regret of the Athenians who deeply repented their having accused them so unjustly.

I omit several events of little importance.

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 69. 71. Diod. l. xi. p. 59—65. † Plut. in Cim p. 489

SECTION IX.

Cimon is recalled. He establishes peace between the two cities. He gains several victories, which reduce Artaxerxes to the necessity of concluding a treaty highly honourable to the Greeks. Cimon's death.

The Athenians,* perceiving the great occasion they had for Cimon, recalled him from banishment, in which he had spent five years. It was Pericles himself who proposed and drew up that decree: so moderate in those times, says Plutarch, were feuds and animosities, and so easy to be appeased when the public welfare required it; and so happily did ambition, which is one of the strongest and most lively passions, yield to the necessity of the times, and comply with the occasions of the public.

A. M. 3554. Ant. J. C. 450. The instant Cimon returned,† he stifled the sparks of war which were going to break out among the Greeks, reconciled the two cities, and prevailed with them to conclude a truce for five years. And to prevent the Athenians, who were grown haughty in consequence of the many victories they had gained, from having an opportunity, or harbouring a design, to attack their neighbours or allies, he thought it advisable to lead them at a great distance from home against the common enemy; thus endeavouring, in an honourable way, to inure the citizens to war, and enrich them at the same time. Accordingly, he put to sea with a fleet of 200 sail. He sent sixty of these into Egypt to the aid of Amyrtæus, and himself sailed with the rest against the island of Cyprus. Artabazus was at that time in those seas with a fleet of 300 sail; and Megabyzus, the other general of Artaxerxes, with an army of 300,000 men, on the coast of Cilicia. As soon as the squadron which Cimon had sent into Egypt had joined his fleet, he sailed and attacked Artabazus, and took 100 of his ships. He sunk many of them, and chased the rest as far as the coast of Phœnicia. And as if this victory had been only a prelude to a second, he made a descent on Cilicia in his return, attacked Megabyzus, defeated him, and cut to pieces a prodigious number of his troops. He afterwards returned to Cyprus with this double triumph, and laid siege to Citium, a strong city of very great importance. His design, after he had completed the conquest of that island, was to sail for Egypt, and again embroil the affairs of the barbarians; for he had very extensive views, and meditated no less a project than that of entirely subverting the mighty empire of Persia. The rumours which prevailed, that Themistocles was to command against him, added fresh fire to his courage; and, almost assured of success, he was infinitely pleased with the occasion of trying his strength against that general. But we have already seen that Themistocles laid violent hands on himself about this time.

Artaxerxes,‡ tired with a war in which he had sustained such great

* Plut. in Cim. p. 490. † Plut. ibid. Diod. l. xii. p. 73, 74. ‡ Diod. p. 74, 75

losses, resolved, with the advice of his council, to put an end to it. Accordingly, he sent orders to his generals to conclude a peace with the Athenians, upon the most advantageous conditions they could. Megabyzus and Artabazus sent ambassadors to Athens to propose an accommodation. Plenipotentiaries were chosen on both sides, and Callas was at the head of those of Athens. The conditions of the treaty were as follows: 1. That all the Grecian cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, with such laws and forms of government as they should think fit to choose. 2. That no Persian ship of war should be allowed to enter the seas between the Cyanean and Chelidonian islands, that is, from the Euxine sea to the coasts of Pamphylia. 3. That no Persian general should advance any troops within three days' march of those seas. 4. That the Athenians should not invade any part of the dominions of the king of Persia. These articles being ratified by both parties, peace, was proclaimed.
A. M. 3555. Ant. J. C. 449. Thus ended this war, which, from the burning of Sardis by the Athenians, had lasted fifty-one years complete, and in which infinite numbers of Persians as well as Greeks had perished.

Whilst this treaty was negotiating,* Cimon died, either of sickness, or of a wound he had received at the siege of Citium. When he was near his end, he commanded his officers to sail with the fleet immediately for Athens, and to conceal his death with the utmost care. Accordingly it was executed with so much secrecy, that neither the enemy nor the allies once suspected it; and they returned safe to Athens, still under the conduct and auspices of Cimon, though he had been dead above thirty days.

Cimon was universally regretted;† which is no wonder, since he was possessed of all those qualities that dignify the soul; a most tender son, a faithful friend; a citizen zealous for the good of his country; a great politician, an accomplished general; modest when raised to the highest employments and most distinguished honours; liberal and beneficent almost to profusion; simple and averse to ostentation of every kind, even in the midst of riches and abundance; in fine, so great a lover of the poor citizens, as to share his whole estate with them, without being ashamed of such companions of his fortune. History mentions no statues or monuments erected to his memory, nor any magnificent obsequies celebrated after his death; but the greatest honour that could be paid him was the sighs and tears of the people; these were permanent and lasting statues,‡ which are not obnoxious to the inclemencies of weather, or the injuries of time, and endear the memory of the good and virtuous to the remotest ages. For the most splendid mausoleums, the work of brass and marble, that are raised in honour of wicked

* Plut. in Cim. p 491.

† Sic se gerendo, minimè est mirandum, si et vita ejus fuit secura, et mors acerba. *Corn. Nep. in Cim.* c. iv.

‡ Hæ pulcherrimæ effigies et mansuræ. Nam, quæ saxa struuntur, si judicium posterorum in odium vertit, pro sepulchris spernuntur *Tacit. Annal.* lib. iv. c. 38.

great men, are despised by posterity, as sepulchres which enclose nothing but vile dust and putrefaction.

What followed proved more strongly the loss which Greece had sustained by his death; for Cimon was the last of all the Grecian generals who did any thing considerable or glorious against the barbarians. Excited by the orators, who gained the strongest ascendant over the minds of the people, and sowed the seeds of division in their public assemblies, they turned their animosity against each other, and at last proceeded to open war, the fatal consequences of which no one endeavoured to prevent; a circumstance that was of great advantage to the king of Persia, and of the utmost prejudice to the affairs of Greece.

SECTION X.

Thucydides is opposed to Pericles. The envy raised against the latter. He clears himself, and succeeds in procuring the banishment of Thucydides.

The nobles of Athens seeing Pericles raised to the highest degree of power,* and far above all the rest of the citizens, resolved to oppose to him a man who, in some measure, might make head against him, and prevent his authority from growing up to monarchy. Accordingly, they opposed to him Thucydides, Cimon's brother-in-law, a man who had displayed his wisdom on numberless occasions. He did not indeed possess the military talents of Pericles; but then he had as great influence over the people; shaping their opinions, and directing their assemblies, as he pleased: and as he never stirred out of the city, but continually combated Pericles in all his designs, he soon restored things to an equilibrium. On the other side, Pericles was solicitous of pleasing the people on all occasions, and slackened the rein more than ever; entertaining them as often as possible with shows, festivals, games, and other diversions.

He found means to maintain, during eight months in the year, a great number of poor citizens, by putting them on board a fleet consisting of threescore ships, which he fitted out every year; and thereby did his country an important service, by training up a great number of excellent seamen for its defence. He also planted several colonies in Chersonesus, in Naxos, in Andros, and among the Bisaltæ in Thrace. He sent a very numerous one to Italy, of which we shall soon have occasion to speak, and which built Thurium. Pericles had various views in settling those colonies, besides the particular design he might have of gaining the affections of the people by that means. His chief motives were to clear the city of a great number of idle persons who were ever ready to disturb the government; to relieve the wants of the lowest class of people, who before were unable to maintain themselves; in fine, to awe

* Plut. in Peric. p. 158—161

the allies, by settling native Athenians among them, as so many garrisons, which might prevent their engaging in any measures contrary to the interest of that people. The Romans acted in the same manner; and it may be said, that so wise a policy was one of the most effectual methods used by them to secure the tranquillity of the state.

But the circumstance which did Pericles the greatest honour in the opinion of the people, was his adorning the city with magnificent edifices and other works, which raised the admiration and astonishment of foreigners and gave them a grand idea of the power of the Athenians. It is surprising that in so short a space so many works of architecture, sculpture, engraving, and painting, should be performed, and at the same time be carried to the highest perfection: for it is generally found, that edifices, raised in haste, boast neither a solid and durable grace, nor the regular accuracy of perfect beauty. Commonly, nothing but length of time, joined to assiduous labour, can give them such a strength as may preserve, and make them triumph over ages; and this raises our wonder still more in regard to the works of Pericles, which were finished with so much rapidity, and have nevertheless subsisted through so great a length of time. For each of those works, the very instant it was finished, had the beauty of an antique; and at this very day, says Plutarch, above 500 years after, they retain a freshness and youth as if just come out of the artist's hands; so happily do they preserve the graces and charms of novelty, which will not suffer time to diminish their lustre; as if an ever-blooming spirit, and a soul exempt from age, were diffused into every part of those works.

But that circumstance, which excited the admiration of the whole world, raised the jealousy of the people against Pericles. His enemies were for ever crying aloud in the assemblies, that it was dishonourable to the Athenians, to appropriate to themselves the bank of all Greece, which he had sent for from Delos, where it had been deposited; that the allies must necessarily consider such an attempt as a manifest tyranny, when they found that the sums which had been extorted from them upon pretence of their being employed in the war, were laid out by the Athenians in gilding and embellishing their city, in making magnificent statues, and raising temples that cost millions. They did not exaggerate on these occasions, for the temple of Minerva, called the Parthenon, had alone cost 3,000,000 livres.*

Pericles, on the contrary, remonstrated to the Athenians, that they were obliged to give the allies an account of the moneys they had received from them; that it was enough they defended them from, and repulsed, the barbarians, whilst the allies furnished neither soldiers, horses, nor ships; and were excused for some sums of money, which, from the instant they were paid in, were no

* About 145, 000*l* sterling.

longer the property of the donors, but of those who received them, provided they performed the conditions agreed upon, and in consideration of which they were received. He added, that as the Athenians were sufficiently provided with all things necessary for war, it was but just that they should employ the rest of their riches in edifices and other works, which, when finished, would give immortal glory to the city; and which, during the whole time they were carrying on, diffused a general plenty, and gave bread to an infinite number of citizens; that they themselves had all kinds of materials, as timber, stone, brass, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypress wood; and all sorts of artificers capable of working them, as carpenters, masons, smiths, stone-cutters, dyers, gold-smiths, artificers in ebony, painters, embroiderers, and turners; men fit to convey these materials by sea, as merchants, sailors, and experienced pilots; others, for land carriage, as cartwrights, wagoners, carters, rope-makers, stone-hewers, paviers, and miners. That it was for the advantage of the state to employ these different artificers and workmen, who, as so many separate bodies, formed, when united, a kind of peaceable and domestic army, whose different functions and employments diffused gain and increase throughout all sexes and ages: lastly, that whilst men of robust bodies, and of an age fit to bear arms, whether soldiers or mariners, and those who were in the different garrisons, were supported with the public moneys, it was but just that the rest of the people, who lived in the city, should also be maintained in their way; and that, as all were members of the same republic they all ought to reap the same advantages, by doing it services, which, though of a different kind, did however all contribute either to its security or ornament.

One day, as the debates were growing warm, Pericles offered to defray all the expense of these buildings, provided it should be declared in the public inscriptions, that he alone had been at the charge of them. At these words, the people, either admiring his magnanimity, or fired with emulation, and determined not to let him engross that glory, cried with one voice, that he might take out of the public treasury all the sums necessary for his purpose.

Phidias the celebrated sculptor, presided over all these works as director-general. It was he in particular who formed the statue of Pallas, which was so highly valued by all the judges of antiquity. It was made of gold and ivory,* and was twenty-six cubits, or thirty-nine feet, in height. There arose an incredible ardour and emulation among the several artificers, who all strove to excel each other, and immortalize their names by master-pieces of art.

The Odeon, or music-theatre, which had a great number of rows of seats and columns within it, and whose roof grew narrower by degrees, and terminated in a point, was built, as history informs us,

* Non Minervæ Athenis factæ amplitudine utemur, cùm ea sit cubitorum xxvi. Ebore hæc et auro constat. *Plin.* l. xxxvi. c. 5

after the model of king Xerxes's tent, according to the direction of Pericles. It was at that time he proposed, with great warmth, a decree, by which it was ordained, that musical games should be celebrated on the festival called Panathenæa; and having been chosen the judge and distributor of the prizes, he regulated the manner in which musicians should play on the flute and the lyre, as well as sing. From that time, the musical games were always exhibited in this theatre.

I have already taken notice, that the more the beauty and splendour of these works were admired, the greater envy and clamour were raised against Pericles. The orators of the opposite faction were eternally exclaiming against him; accusing him of squandering the public moneys, and laying out very unseasonably the revenues of the state in edifices, whose magnificence was of no use At last, the rupture between him and Thucydides rose to such a height, that one or other of them must necessarily be banished by the ostracism. He got the better of Thucydides; prevailed to have him banished; crushed by that means the faction which opposed him, and obtained a despotic authority over the city and government of Athens. He now disposed at pleasure of the public moneys, troops, and ships. The islands and sea were subject to him; and he reigned singly and alone in that wide domain, which extended not only over the Greeks, but the barbarians also, and which was cemented and strengthened by the obedience and fidelity of the conquered nations, by the friendship of kings, and treaties concluded with various princes.

Historians highly extol the magnificent edifices and other works with which Pericles adorned Athens, and I have related faithfully their testimony; but I do not know whether the complaints and murmurs raised against him were so very ill grounded. Was it, indeed, just in him to expend, in superfluous buildings and vain decorations, the immense sums intended as a fund for carrying on the war?* and would it not have been better to have eased the allies of part of the contributions, which, in Pericles's administration, were raised to a third part more than before? Cicero† considers only such edifices and other works worthy of admiration, as are of use to the public, as aqueducts, city walls, citadels, arsenals, sea-ports; and among these we must rank the work made by Pericles to join Athens to the port of Piræeus. But Cicero observes, at the same time, that Pericles was blamed for squandering away the public treasure, merely to embellish the city with superfluous ornaments. Plato,‡ who formed a judgment of things, not from their outward splendour, but from truth, observes (after his master Socrates,) that Pericles, with all his grand edifices and other works, had not improved the mind of one of the citizens in virtue, but rather corrupted the purity and simplicity of their ancient manners.

* They amounted to upwards of 10,000,000 French money.
† Lib. ii Offic n. 60. ‡ In Gorg. p. 515. In Alcib. c. i. p. 119.

SECTION XI.

Pericles changes his conduct towards the people. His prodigious authority. His disinterestedness.

When Pericles saw himself thus invested with the whole authority,* he began to change his behaviour. He now was not so mild and affable as before, nor did he submit or abandon himself any longer to the whims and caprice of the people, as to so many winds; but drawing in, says Plutarch, the reins of this too loose, popular government, in the same manner as we screw up the strings of an instrument when too slack, he changed it into an aristocracy, or rather a kind of monarchy, without departing however from the public good. Choosing always what was most expedient, and becoming irreproachable in all things, he gained so mighty an ascendant over the minds of the people, that he turned and directed them at pleasure. Sometimes, by his bare advice, and by persuasive methods, he would win them over gently to his will, and gain their assent spontaneously; at other times, when he found them obstinate, he would in a manner drag them forward against their will, to those measures which were most expedient; imitating in this respect a skilful physician, who, in a tedious and stubborn disease, knows at what time it is proper for him to indulge his patient in innocent things that are pleasing to him; at what time afterwards he must administer medicines of a strong and violent nature, which indeed put him to pain, but are alone capable of restoring his health.

And, indeed, it is manifest that the utmost skill and abilities were required to manage and govern a populace haughty from their power and exceedingly capricious; and in this respect Pericles succeeded wonderfully. He used to employ, according to the different situation of things, sometimes hope and at other times fear, as a double helm, either to check the wild transports and impetuosity of the people, or to raise their spirits when dejected and desponding. By this conduct he showed, that eloquence, as Plato observes, is only the art of directing the minds of the people at will; and that the chief excellency of this art consists in moving, seasonably, the various passions, whether gentle or violent; which being to the soul what strings are to a musical instrument, need only to be touched by an ingenious and skilful hand to produce their effect.

It must nevertheless be confessed, that the circumstance which gave Pericles this great authority, was, not only the force of his eloquence, but, as Thucydides observes, the reputation of his life, and great probity.

Plutarch points out in Pericles one quality which is very essential to statesmen;† a quality well adapted to win the esteem and

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 151. † Plut. in præc. de reip ger. p. 812.

confidence of the public, and which supposes a great superiority of mind; and that is, for a man to be fully persuaded that he wants the counsels of others, and is not able to manage and direct all things alone; to associate with himself in his labours persons of merit, to employ each of these according to his talents; and to leave to them the management of small matters, which only consume time, and deprive him of that liberty of mind which is so necessary in the conduct of important affairs. Such a conduct, says Plutarch, is productive of two great advantages. First, it extinguishes or at least deadens, the force of envy and jealousy, by dividing, in some measure, a power which is grating and offensive to our self-love when we see it united in one single person, as if all merit centred in him alone. Secondly, it forwards and facilitates the execution of affairs, and makes their success more certain. Plutarch, the better to explain his thought, employs a very natural and beautiful comparison. The hand, says he, from its being divided into five fingers, is so far from being weaker, that it is the stronger, the more active, and better adapted to motion, on that very account. It is the same with a statesman, who has the skill to divide his cares and functions in a proper manner, and who by that means makes his authority more active, more extensive and decisive: whereas, the indiscreet eagerness of a narrow-minded man, who takes umbrage at, and wishes to engross every thing, serves to no other purpose but to set his weakness and incapacity in a stronger light, and to disconcert his affairs. But Pericles, says Plutarch, did not act in this manner. Like a skilful pilot, who, though he stand almost motionless himself, however puts every thing in motion, and will sometimes seat subaltern officers at the helm; so Pericles was the soul of the government; and, seeming to do nothing of himself, he actuated and governed all things; employing the eloquence of one man, the credit and interest of another, the prudence of a third, and the bravery and courage of a fourth.

To what has been here related,* we may add another quality, which is no less rare and valuable, I mean, a noble and disinterested soul. Pericles was so averse to the receiving of gifts, had such an utter contempt for riches, and was so far above all rapaciousness and avarice, that though he had raised Athens to the richest and most flourishing state; though his power surpassed that of many tyrants and kings; though he had long disposed in an absolute manner of the treasures of Greece, he did not, however, add a single drachma to the estate he inherited from his father. This was the source, the true cause, of the supreme authority of Pericles in the republic, the just and deserved fruit of his integrity and perfect disinterestedness.

It was not only for a few short moments, nor during the first impressions of rising favour, which are generally short-lived, that he

* Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 161, 162.

preserved this authority. He maintained it forty years, notwithstanding the opposition of Cimon, of Tolmides, of Thucydides, and many others, who had all declared against him; and of these forty years he spent the last fifteen without a rival, from the time of Thucydides's banishment, and disposed of all affairs with absolute power. Nevertheless, in the midst of this supreme authority, which he had rendered perpetual and unlimited in his own person, his soul was always superior to the charms and allurements of wealth, though he never neglected improving his estate to the utmost of his power. For Pericles did not act like those rich men, who, notwithstanding their immense revenues, either through negligence or want of economy, or pompous and absurd expenses, are always poor in the midst of their riches; unable and unwilling to do the least service to their virtuous friends, or their faithful and zealous domestics; and at last die overwhelmed with debts, leaving their name and memory to the detestation of their unfortunate creditors, of whose ruin they have been the cause. I shall not expatiate on another extreme, to which this negligence and want of economy generally lead, I mean rapine, a love of gifts, and exactions; for here, as well as in the management of the public moneys, the maxim of Tacitus holds good,* *viz.* that when a man has squandered away his estate, he then makes it his whole study to retrieve the loss of it by all sorts of methods, not excepting the most criminal.

Pericles knew much better the use which a statesman ought to make of riches. He was sensible that he ought to expend them in the service of the public, in procuring of able men to assist him in the administration; in relieving good officers who too often are destitute of the favours of fortune; in rewarding and encouraging merit of every kind, and a thousand such things; to which doubtless, either on account of the exquisite joy they give, or the solid glory that results from them, no one will be so thoughtless as to compare the expenses lavished away in the entertainments, equipages, or gaming. In this view, Pericles managed his own estate with the utmost economy; having himself taught one of his old servants to take care of his domestic concerns; and he always had the account brought him, at stated times, of all sums that had been received as well as expended; confining himself and his family to a decent subsistence (from which he banished severely all superfluities of a vain and ostentatious kind,) suitable to his estate and condition. This way of life, indeed, did by no means please his children when they were come to years of maturity, and much less his wife. They thought Pericles did not live at a sufficient expense for persons of their rank; and murmured at that low and sordid economy, as they called it, which carried no air of the plenty which generally reigns in houses where riches and authority are

* Si ambitione ærarium exhauserimus, per scelera supplendum erit. *Tacit. Annal.* l. ii. c. 38.

united. However, Pericles paid little regard to these complaints and directed his conduct by far superior views.

I believe we may apply, on this occasion, a very just remark of Plutarch, in his parallel of Aristides and Cato. After saying, that political virtue, or the art of governing cities and kingdoms, is the greatest and most perfect that man can acquire, he adds, that economy is not one of the least considerable branches of this virtue. And indeed, as riches are one of the means which may most contribute to the security or ruin of a state, the art that teaches to dispose and make a good use of them, and which is called economy, is certainly a branch of politics; and not one of the least considerable branches of it, since great wisdom is required, in order to the observing a just medium on these occasions, and to the banishing poverty and too great opulence from a country. It is this art, which, by avoiding industriously all trifling and needless expenses, prevents a magistrate from being forced to overburden a people with taxes; and keeps always in reserve, in the public coffers, moneys sufficient for the supporting a war that may break out, or for providing against an unforeseen emergency. Now what is said of a kingdom or a city, may be said also of individuals. For a city, which is composed of an assemblage of houses, and which forms a whole of several parts united, is either powerful or weak in the aggregate, in proportion as all the members of which it consists are powerful or weak. Pericles certainly acquitted himself well with regard to that part of this science which relates to the government of a family: but I do not know whether the same may be said of his administration of the public revenues.

SECTION XII.

Jealousy and contests arise between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. A treaty of peace is concluded for thirty years.

Such was the conduct of Pericles with respect to his domestic concerns:* and his administration of public affairs is no less worthy of admiration. The Lacedæmonians beginning to grow jealous of the prosperity of the Athenians, and to take umbrage at it, Pericles, to inspire his citizens with greater courage and magnanimity, published a decree, importing, that notice should be sent to all the Greeks inhabiting either Europe or Asia, and to all the cities great or small, to send immediately deputies to Athens, to debate on the means of rebuilding the temples that had been burnt by the barbarians; and of performing the sacrifices which they had engaged themselves to offer up, for the preservation and safety of Greece, when war was carrying on against them; as also, to consider the necessary expedients for establishing such an order and discipline in their navy, that all ships might sail in safety, and the Greeks live in peace one with another.

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

Accordingly, twenty persons were chosen for this embassy, each of whom was upwards of fifty years of age. Five of these were sent to the Ionians and Dorians of Asia, and the inhabitants of the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes; five to the countries of the Hellespont and Thrace, as far as Byzantium. Five were ordered to go to Bœotia, to Phocis, and Peloponnesus; and from thence, by the country of the Locrians, to proceed to the several cities of the upper continent as far as Acarnania and Ambracia. The last five were ordered to cross Eubœa, and to go to the people of mount Œta, and those of the gulf of Malea, and to the inhabitants of Phthiotis, of Achaia, and of Thessaly; to induce the several nations to come to the assembly convened at Athens, and to assist at the debates which should be there carried on concerning peace and the general affairs of Greece. I judged it necessary to enter into this detail, as it shows how far the power of the Greeks extended, and the authority which the Athenians enjoyed among them.

But all these solicitations were in vain; as the cities did not send their deputies, which, according to historians, was owing to the opposition made by the Lacedæmonians, a circumstance we are not to wonder at. They were sensible that Pericles's design was to have Athens acknowledged as mistress and sovereign of all the Grecian cities; and Lacedæmon was far from allowing it that honour. A secret leaven of dissension had, for some years, begun to disturb the tranquillity of Greece; and we shall find by the sequel, that this discord augmented continually.

Pericles had acquired great fame for the wisdom with which he formed and conducted his enterprises. The troops reposed the highest confidence in him, and followed him with full assurance of success. His chief maxim in war was, never to venture a battle unless he were almost certain of victory, and not to lavish the blood of the citizens. He used to say frequently, that were it in his power they should be immortal; that trees when felled shoot to life again in a little time, but when once men die they are lost for ever. A victory that was only the effect of fortunate temerity, appeared to him little worthy of praise, though it often was much admired.

His expedition into the Thracian Chersonesus did him great honour, and was of great advantage to all the Greeks of that country; for he not only strengthened the Grecian cities of that peninsula, by the colonies of Athenians which he carried thither, but also shut up the isthmus with a strong wall, with forts at proper distances, from sea to sea; securing by that means the whole country from the perpetual incursions of the Thracians, who were very near neighbours to it.

He also sailed with 100 ships round Peloponnesus, spreading the terror of the Athenian arms wherever he came, the success of which was not once interrupted on this occasion.

He advanced as far as the kingdom of Pontus with a large, well

manned, and magnificent fleet, and granted the Grecian cities all they thought fit to ask of him. At the same time he displayed to the barbarian nations in that neighbourhood, to their kings and princes, the greatness of the power of the Athenians; and proved to them, by the security with which he sailed to all parts, that they possessed the empire of the seas without a rival.

But so constant and shining a fortune began to dazzle the Athenians.* Intoxicated with the idea of their power and grandeur, they now revolved nothing but the boldest and most lofty projects They were for ever talking of new attempts upon Egypt; of attacking the maritime provinces of the great king; of carrying their arms into Sicily (a fatal and unhappy design, which at that time did not take effect, though it was revived soon after;) and of extending their conquests towards Hetruria on one side, and Carthage on the other. Pericles was far from giving in to such idle views, or supporting them with his credit and approbation. On the contrary, his whole study was to damp that restless ardour, and check an ambition which no longer knew either bounds or measure. It was his opinion, that the Athenians ought to employ their forces for the future, only in securing and preserving their present acquisitions; and he thought he had gained a great point in restraining the power of the Lacedæmonians, the reducing of which he always meditated; and this was particularly seen in the sacred war.

This name was given to the war which was raised on account of Delphi.† The Lacedæmonians having entered armed into the country where that temple is situated, had dispossessed the people of Phocis of the superintendence of that temple, and bestowed it on the Delphians. As soon as they had left it, Pericles went thither with an army and restored the Phocians.

Eubœa having rebelled at the same time, Pericles was obliged to march thither with an army. He was no sooner arrived there, than news was brought that the inhabitants of Megara had taken up arms, and that the Lacedæmonians, heated by Pleistonax their king, were on the frontiers of Attica. This obliged him to quit Eubœa, and to go with all possible expedition to defend his country. The Lacedæmonian army being retired, he returned against the rebels, and again subjected all the cities of Eubœa to the Athenians.

A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446. After this expedition,‡ a truce of thirty years was concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. This treaty restored tranquillity for the present; but as it did not descend to the root of the evil, nor cure the jealousy and enmity of the two nations, this calm was not of long duration.

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 164. † Ib. p. 164. ‡ Thucyd. l. i, p. 75. Diod. p. 87.

SECTION XIII.

New subjects of contention between the two nations, occasioned by the Athenians laying siege to Samos; by their succouring the people of Corcyra, and besieging Potidæa. An open rupture ensues.

A. M. 3564. Ant. J. C. 440. The Athenians,* six years after, took up arms against Samos in favour of Miletus. These two cities were contesting for that of Priene, to which each claimed a right. It is pretended that Pericles kindled this war to please a famous courtesan, of whom he was very fond; her name was Aspasia, a native of Miletus. After several events and battles, Pericles besieged the capital of the island of Samos. It is said, that this was the first time he used military engines as battering rams and tortoises, invented by Artemon the engineer, who was lame, and therefore was always carried in a chair to the batteries, whence he was surnamed Periphoretus. The use of these machines had been long known in the East. The Samians, after sustaining a nine month's siege, surrendered; Pericles razed their walls, dispossessed them of their ships, and demanded immense sums to defray the expenses of the war. Part of these sums they paid down: agreed to disburse the rest at a certain time, and gave hostages by way of security for the payment.

After the reduction of Samos, Pericles, being returned to Athens, in a splendid manner celebrated the obsequies of those who had lost their lives in this war, and pronounced in person the funeral oration over their graves. This custom, which he first introduced, was afterwards regularly observed. The senate of the Areopagus always appointed the orator on these occasions. He was chosen, ten years after, for the like ceremony in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

A. M. 3572. Ant. J. C. 432. Pericles,† who foresaw that a rupture would soon ensue between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, advised the former to send aid to the people of Corcyra, whom the Corinthians had invaded; and to win over to their interest that island, which was so very formidable at sea; foretelling them, that they would shortly be attacked by the nations of the Peloponnesus. The occasion of the quarrel between the people of Corcyra and Corinth, which gave rise to the Peloponnesian war, one of the most considerable events in the Grecian history, was as follows.

Epidamnum,‡ a maritime city of Macedonia among the Taulantii was a colony of Corcyreans, founded by Phalius of Corinth. This city having become in process of time very populous and powerful, divisions arose in it, and the common people expelled the most

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 75, 76. Diod. l. xii. p. 88, 89. Plut. in Pericl. p. 165—167.
† Thucyd. l. i. p. 17—37. Diod. l. xii. p. 90—93. Plut. in Pericl. p. 167.
‡ This city was afterwards called Dyrrachium.

wealthy inhabitants, who went over to the neighbouring nations and infested them greatly by their incursions. In this extremity they first had recourse to the Corcyreans, and being refused by them, they addressed the Corinthians, who took them under their protection, sent succours to them, and settled other inhabitants in their city. But they did not continue long unmolested there, the Corcyreans besieging it with a large fleet. The people of Corinth hastened to its aid, but having been defeated at sea, the city surrendered that very day, upon condition that the foreigners should be slaves, and the Corinthians prisoners till farther orders. The Corcyreans erected a trophy, murdered all their prisoners except the Corinthians, and laid waste the whole country.

The year after the battle, the Corinthians raised a greater army than the former, and fitted out a new fleet. The people of Corcyra, finding it would be impossible for them to make head alone against such powerful enemies, sent to the Athenians to desire their alliance. The treaty of peace concluded between the states of Greece, left such Grecian cities as had not declared themselves on either side, the liberty of joining whom they pleased, or of standing neuter. This the Corcyreans had hitherto done, judging it their interest not to espouse any party; in consequence of which they had hitherto been without allies. They now sent for this purpose to Athens; and the Corinthians hearing of it, sent deputies thither also on their part. The affair was debated with great warmth in the presence of the people, who heard the reasons on both sides, and it was twice discussed in the assembly. The Athenians declared the first time in favour of the Corinthians; but afterwards changing their opinion (doubtless in consequence of the remonstrances of Pericles,) they received the Corcyreans into their alliance. However, they did not go so far as to conclude a league offensive and defensive with them (for they could not declare war against Corinth without breaking at the same time with all Peloponnesus,) but only agreed to succour each other mutually, in case they should be attacked, either in their own person or in that of their allies. Their real design was, to set those two states, which were very powerful by sea, at variance; and after each should have exhausted the other by a tedious war, to triumph over the weakest: for at that time there were but three states in Greece who possessed powerful fleets; and these were Athens, Corinth, and Coreyra. They also had a design on Italy and Sicily, which their taking the island of Corcyra would very much promote.

On this plan they concluded an alliance with the Corcyreans, and accordingly sent them ten galleys, but with an order for them not to engage the Corinthians, unless they should first invade the island of Corcyra, or some other place belonging to their allies; this precaution was used in order that the articles of the truce might not be infringed

But it was very difficult to obey these orders. A battle was fought between the Corcyreans and the Corinthians, near the island of Sybota, opposite to Corcyra: it was one of the most considerable, with regard to the number of ships, that was ever fought between the Greeks. The advantage was nearly equal on both sides. About the end of the battle, as night was drawing on, twenty Athenian galleys came up. The Corcyreans, with this reinforcement, sailed next day by day-break towards the port of Sybota, whither the Corinthians had retired, to see if they would venture a second engagement. However, the latter contented themselves with sailing out in order of battle, without fighting. Both parties erected a trophy in the island of Sybota, each ascribing the victory to themselves.

From this war arose another,* which occasioned an open rupture between the Athenians and Corinthians, and afterwards the war of Peloponnesus. Potidæa, a city of Macedonia, was a colony belonging to the Corinthians, who sent magistrates thither annually; but it was dependant at that time on Athens, and paid tribute to it. The Athenians fearing this city would revolt, and prevail with the rest of the Thracian allies to join them, commanded the inhabitants to demolish their walls on the side next Pallene; to deliver hostages to them as sureties for their fidelity; and to send back the magistrates which Corinth had given them. Demands of so unjust a nature only hastened the revolt. The Potidæans declared against the Athenians,† and several neighbouring cities followed their example. Both Athens and Corinth took up arms and sent forces thither. The two armies engaged near Potidæa, and that of the Athenians had the advantage. Alcibiades, who was then very young, and Socrates his master, signalized themselves on this occasion. It is something very singular, to see a philosopher put on his coat of mail; as well as to consider his behaviour and conduct in a battle. There was not a soldier in the whole army who so resolutely supported all the toils and fatigues of the campaign as Socrates. Hunger, thirst, and cold, were enemies he had long accustomed himself to despise and subdue with ease. Thrace, the scene of this expedition, was a frozen region. Whilst the other soldiers, covered with thick clothes and warm furs, lay close in their tents, and scarce ever dared to stir out of them; Socrates used to come into the open air clad as usual, and bare-footed. His gaiety and wit were the life of the table, and induced others to put the glass round cheerfully, though he himself never drank wine to excess. When the armies engaged, he performed his duty wonderfully well. Alcibiades having been thrown down and wounded, Socrates placed himself before him, defended him valiantly, and, in sight of the whole army, prevented him and his arms from being

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 37–42. Diod. l. xii. p. 93, 94. † Plut. in Conviv. p. 219, 220. Plut. in Alcib. p. 194

taken by the enemy. The prize of valour was justly due to Socrates, but as the generals seemed inclined to decree it to Alcibiades, on account of his illustrious birth, Socrates, who only sought for opportunities to inflame him with desire of true glory, contributed more than any other person, by the noble eulogium he made on his courage, to cause the crown and complete suit of armour (which was the prize of valour) to be adjudged to Alcibiades.

Notwithstanding the loss which the Corinthians had sustained in the battle, the inhabitants of Potidæa did not change their conduct. The city was therefore besieged. The Corinthians,* fearing to lose a place of so much importance, addressed their allies in the strongest terms; who all, in conjunction with them, sent a deputation to Lacedæmon, to complain of the Athenians, as having infringed the articles of peace. The Lacedæmonians admitted them to audience in one of their ordinary assemblies. The people of Ægina, though very much disgusted at the Athenians, did not send a deputation publicly thither, for fear of giving umbrage to a republic to which they were subject, but they acted in secret as strenuously as the rest. The people of Megara complained vehemently against the Athenians, that (contrary to the law of nations, and in prejudice to the treaty concluded between the Greeks) they had prohibited them, by a public decree, from access to their fairs and markets, and excluded them from all the ports dependant on them. By that decree,† according to Plutarch,‡ the Athenians declared an eternal and irreconcileable hatred against Megara; and ordained that all Megarians should be put to death that set foot in Athens; and that all the Athenian generals, when they took the usual oath, should swear expressly, that they would send a body of soldiers twice a year, to lay waste the territories of that hostile city.

The chief complaints were made by the Corinthian ambassador, who spoke with the utmost force and freedom. He represented to the Lacedæmonians, that as they themselves never swerved from the most inviolable integrity, either in public or private transactions, they, for that very reason, were less inclined to suspect the probity of others; and that their own moderation prevented their discovering the ambition of their enemies: that instead of flying, with readiness and activity, to meet dangers and calamities, they never attempted to remedy them, till they were quite crushed by them: that by their indolence and supineness, they had given the

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 43—59. † Plut. in Pericl. p. 168.

‡ According to Plutarch, some persons pretended that Pericles had caused this decree to be enacted, to revenge the private injury done to Aspasia, from whose house the people of Megara had carried off two courtesans; and he cites some verses of Aristophanes, who, in a comedy entitled *the Acharnanians*, reproaches Pericles with this action. But Thucydides, a contemporary author, who was very well acquainted with all the transactions of Athens, does not say a word of this affair; and he is much more worthy of belief than a poet who was a professed slanderer and satirist.

Athenians an opportunity of attaining, by insensible degrees, their present height of grandeur and power: that it was quite different with regard to the Athenians: *that this active, vigilant, and indefatigable people, were never at rest themselves, nor would suffer any other nation to be so. Employed*, says he, *wholly in their projects, and they form none but such as are great and bold, their deliberations are speedy and their execution the same. One enterprise serves only as a step to a second. Whether they are successful or unfortunate, they turn every thing to their advantage; and never stop in their career, nor are discouraged. But you, who are opposed by such formidable enemies, are lulled asleep in a fatal tranquillity; and do not reflect that it is not sufficient for a man who desires to live at ease merely to forbear injuring others, he must also hinder any one from injuring him; and that justice consists, not only in forbearing to commit evil ourselves, but in avenging that done to us by others. Shall I be so free as to say it? Your integrity is of too antique a cast for the present state of affairs. It is necessary for men in politics, as well as in all other things, to conform always to times and circumstances. When a people are at peace, they may follow their ancient maxims; but when they are involved in a variety of difficulties, they must try new expedients, and set every engine at work to extricate themselves. It is by these arts that the Athenians have increased their power so much. Had you imitated their activity, they would not have dispossessed us of Corcyra, and would not now be laying siege to Potidæa. Follow, at least, on this occasion, their example, by succouring the Potidæans and the rest of your allies, as your duty obliges you; and do not force your friends and neighbours, by forsaking them, to have recourse, through despair, to other powers.*

The Athenian ambassador, who was come to Sparta upon other affairs, and was in the assembly, did not think it advisable to let this speech go unanswered. He put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the still recent services that the republic, by which he was sent, had done to all Greece, which (he said) merited some regard; and that therefore it ought not to be envied, much less should endeavours be used to lessen its power: that the Athenians could not be charged with having usurped an empire over Greece; since it was merely at the entreaty of their allies, and in some measure with the consent of Sparta, that they had been forced to take the abandoned helm: that those who murmured, did it without grounds; and only from the aversion which mankind in general have to dependance and subjection, though of the gentlest and most equitable kind: that he exhorted them to employ a sufficient time in deliberating, before they came to a resolution; and not involve themselves and all Greece in a war, which would necessarily be attended with the most fatal consequences: that gentle methods might be found for terminating the differences of the allies, without breaking at once into open violence. However, that the Athenians, in case of an invasion, were able to oppose force with force; and would

prepare for a vigorous defence, after having invoked, against Sparta, the deities who take vengeance of those that forswear themselves, and violate the faith of treaties.

The ambassadors being withdrawn, and the affair debated, the majority were for war. But before the final resolution was passed, Archidamus, king of Sparta, setting himself above those prejudices which so strongly biassed the rest, and directing his views to futurity, made a speech in which he set forth the dreadful consequences of the war in which they were going to embark; showed the strength and resources of the Athenians; exhorted them first to try gentle methods, which they themselves had seemed to approve; but to make, in the mean time, the necessary preparations for carrying on so important an enterprise, and not to be under any apprehensions, that their moderation and delays would be branded with the name of cowardice, since their past actions secured them from any suspicion of that kind.

But, notwithstanding all these wise expostulations, a war was resolved. The people caused the allies to return into the assembly, and declared to them, that in their opinion the Athenians were the aggressors; but that it would be expedient first to assemble all who were in the alliance, in order that peace or war might be agreed upon unanimously. This decree of the Lacedæmonians was made the fourteenth year of the truce; and was not owing so much to the complaint of the allies, as to the jealousy of the Athenian power, which had already subjected a considerable part of Greece.

Accordingly, the allies were convened a second time * They all gave their votes, in their several turns, from the greatest city to the least, and war was resolved by general consent. However, as they had not yet made any preparations, it was judged advisable to begin them immediately; and while this was doing, in order to gain time, and observe the necessary formalities, to send ambassadors to Athens, to complain of the violation of the treaty.

The first who were sent thither, reviving an old complaint, required of the Athenians to expel from their city the descendants of those who had profaned the temple of Minerva in the affair of Cylon.† As Pericles was of that family by the mother's side, the view of the Lacedæmonians, in making this demand, was, either to procure his banishment or lessen his authority. However, it was not complied with. The second ambassadors required, that the siege of Potidæa should be raised, and the liberty of Ægina restored; and above all, that the decree against the Megarians should be repealed; declaring, that otherwise no accommodation could take place.

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 77—84. 93.

† This Cylon had seized on the citadel of Athens above 100 years before. Those who followed him, being besieged in it, and reduced to extreme famine, fled for shelter to the temple of Minerva, from whence they afterwards were taken out by force and cut to pieces. Those who advised this murder were declared guilty of impiety and sacrilege, and as such banished. However, they were recalled some time after.

In one, a third embassy came, who took no notice of any of these particulars, but only said, that the Lacedæmonians were for peace: but that this could never be, except the Athenians should cease to infringe the liberties of Greece.

SECTION XIV.

Troubles excited against Pericles. He determines the Athenians to engage in war against the Lacedæmonians.

Pericles opposed all these demands with great vigour,* and especially that relating to the Megarians. He had great influence at Athens, but at the same time had many enemies. Not daring to attack him at first in person, they cited his most intimate friends, and those for whom he had the greatest esteem, as Phidias, Aspasia, and Anaxagoras, before the people; and their design in this was, to sound how the people stood affected towards Pericles himself.

Phidias was accused of having embezzled considerable sums in the forming the statue of Minerva, which was his master-piece. The prosecution having been carried on with the usual forms, before the assembly of the people, not a single proof of Phidias's pretended embezzlement appeared; for that artist, from the time of his beginning that statue, had, by Pericles's advice, contrived the workmanship of the gold in such a manner, that all of it might be taken off and weighed; which accordingly Pericles bid the informers do in presence of all the spectators. But Phidias had witnesses against him, the truth of whose evidence he could neither dispute nor silence; these were the fame and beauty of his works, the ever-existing causes of the envy which attacked him. The circumstance which they could least forgive in him was, his having represented to the life (in the battle of the Amazons, engraved on the shield of the goddess) his own person, and that of Pericles †; and, by an imperceptible art, he had so blended and incorporated these figures with the whole work, that it was impossible to erase them, without disfiguring and taking to pieces the whole statue. Phidias was therefore dragged to prison, where he came to his end, either by the common course of nature or by poison. Other authors say, that he was only banished, and that after his exile he made the famous statue of Jupiter at Olympia. It is not possible to excuse, in any manner, the ingratitude of the Athenians, in thus making a prison or death the reward of a master-piece of art; nor their excessive rigour, in punishing, as a capital crime, an action that appears innocent in itself; or which, to make the worst of it, was a vanity very pardonable in an artist.

Aspasia, a native of Miletus in Asia, had settled in Athens, where she had become very famous, not so much for the charms of her person, as for her vivacity and the solidity of her wit, and her

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 168, 169. † Aristot. in tractat. de mund. p. 613.

great knowledge. All the illustrious men in the city thought it an honour to frequent her house. Socrates himself used to visit her constantly;* and was not ashamed to pass for her pupil, and to own that he had learnt rhetoric from her. Pericles declared also that he was indebted to Aspasia for his eloquence, which so greatly distinguished him in Athens; and that it was from her conversation he had imbibed the principles of the art of policy, for she was exceedingly well versed in the maxims of government. Their intimacy was owing to still stronger motives. Pericles did not love his wife; he resigned her very freely to another man, and supplied her place with Aspasia, whom he loved passionately, though her reputation was more than suspicious. Aspasia was accused of impiety and a dissolute conduct; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Pericles saved her, by his entreaties, and by the compassion he raised in the judges, by shedding abundance of tears whilst her cause was pleading: a behaviour little consistent with the dignity of his character, and the rank of supreme head of the most powerful state of Greece.

A decree had passed, by which informations were ordered to be laid against all such persons as denied what was ascribed to the ministry of the gods;† or those philosophers and others who gave lessons on the more abstruse points of physics, and the motions of the heavens, topics which were considered injurious to the established religion. The scope and aim of this decree was, to make Pericles suspected with regard to these matters, because Anaxagoras had been his master. This philosopher taught, that one only Intelligence had modified the chaos, and disposed the universe in the beautiful order in which we now see it; which tended directly to depreciate the gods of the pagan system. Pericles thinking it would be impossible for him to save his life, sent him out of the city to a place of safety.

The enemies of Pericles seeing that the people approved and received with pleasure all these accusations, impeached that great man himself, and charged him with embezzling the public moneys during his administration. A decree was made, by which Pericles was obliged to give in immediately his accounts; was to be tried for peculation and rapine; and the cause to be adjudged by 1500 judges. Pericles had no real cause for fear, because in the administration of the public affairs his conduct had always been irreproachable, especially on the side of interest: he could not however but be under some apprehensions from the ill-will of the people, when he considered their great levity and inconstancy. One day when Alcibiades (then very young) went to visit Pericles, he

* Plat. in Menex. p. 235.

† Τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας, ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μετεωρίων διδάσκοντας. Anaxagoras teaching, that the divine Intelligence alone gave a regular motion to all the parts of nature, and presided in the government of the universe; destroyed, by that system, the plurality of gods, their powers, and all the peculiar functions which were ascribed to them.

was told that he was not to be spoken with, because of some affairs of great consequence in which he was then engaged. Alcibiades inquiring what these mighty affairs were, was answered, that Pericles was preparing to give in his accounts. *He ought rather*, says Alcibiades, *to think how he may avoid giving them in:* and indeed this was what Pericles at last resolved. To allay the storm, he made a resolution to oppose the inclination the people discovered for the Peloponnesian war no longer, preparations for which had been long carrying on, firmly persuaded that this would soon silence all complaints against him; that envy would yield to a more powerful motive; and that the citizens, when in such imminent danger, would not fail of throwing themselves into his arms, and submit implicitly to his conduct, from his great power and exalted reputation.

This is what some historians have related;* and the comic poets, in the lifetime, and under the eye, as it were, of Pericles, spread a report in public, to sully, if possible, his reputation and merit, which drew upon him the envy and enmity of many. Plutarch, on this occasion, makes a reflection which may be of great service, not only to those in the administration of public affairs, but to all sorts of persons, as well as of advantage in the ordinary intercourse of life. He thinks it strange, when actions are good in themselves, and as far as can be judged from external appearance, laudable in all respects, that men, purely to discredit illustrious personages, should pretend to dive into their hearts: and from a spirit of the vilest and most abject malignity, should ascribe such views and intentions to them, as they probably never so much as imagined. He, on the contrary, wishes, when the motive is obscure, and the same action may be considered in different lights, that men would always view it in the most favourable, and incline to judge candidly of it. He applies this maxim to the reports which had been spread concerning Pericles, as the fomenter of the Peloponnesian war, merely for private and interested views; whereas, the whole tenor of his past conduct ought to have convinced every body, that it was wholly from reasons of state, and for the good of the public, that he at last acquiesced in an opinion, which he had hitherto thought it incumbent on him to oppose.

Whilst this affair was carrying on at Athens,† the Lacedæmonians sent several embassies thither, one after another, to make the various demands above mentioned. At last the affair was debated in the assembly of the people, and it was resolved they should first deliberate upon all the articles, before they gave a positive answer. Opinions, as is usual in these cases, were divided; and some were for abolishing the decree enacted against Megara, which seemed the chief obstacle to a peace.

Pericles spoke on this occasion with a force of eloquence, which

* Plut. de Herod. malign. p 855, 856. † Thucyd. l. i. p. 93—99. Diod. l. xii p. 95—97.

his view to the public welfare, and the honour of his country, rendered more vehement and triumphant than it had ever appeared before. He showed, in the first place, that the decree relating to Megara, on which the greatest stress was laid, was not of so little consequence as they imagined; that the demand made by the Lacedæmonians on that head was merely to sound the disposition of the Athenians, and to try whether it would be possible to encroach upon them by frightening them: that should they recede on this occasion, it would betray fear and weakness: that the affair was of less importance than the giving up to the Lacedæmonians the empire which the Athenians had possessed during so many years, by their courage and resolution: that should the Athenians give way on this point, the Lacedæmonians would immediately prescribe new laws to them, as to a people seized with dread: whereas, if they made a vigorous resistance, their opponents would be obliged to treat them at least on the foot of equals: that with regard to the present matters in dispute, arbiters might be chosen, in order to adjust them in an amicable way; but that it did not become the Lacedæmonians to command the Athenians with a magisterial air, to quit Potidæa, to free Ægina, and revoke the decree relating to Megara: that such imperious behaviour was directly contrary to the treaty, which declared in express terms, *That should any disputes arise among the allies, they should be decided by pacific methods*, AND WITHOUT ANY PARTY'S BEING OBLIGED TO GIVE UP ANY PART OF WHAT THEY POSSESSED: that the surest way to prevent a government from being eternally contesting about its possessions, is to take up arms, and dispute its rights sword in hand: that the Athenians had just reason to believe they would gain their cause this way; and to give them a stronger idea of this truth, he set before them a most brilliant description of the present state of Athens, giving a very particular account of its treasures, revenues, fleets, land as well as sea forces, and those of its allies: contrasting these several resources with the poverty of the Lacedæmonians, who (he said) had no money, which is the sinews of war, not to mention the poor condition of their navy, on which success in war most depended. And indeed,* there were at that time in the public treasury, which the Athenians had brought from Delos to their city, 9600 talents, which amount to about 1,200,000*l.* sterling. The annual contributions of the allies amounted to 460 talents, that is, to near 1,400,000 French livres. In cases of necessity, the Athenians would find infinite resources in the ornaments of the temples, since those of the statue of Minerva alone amounted to fifty talents of gold, that is, 1,500,000 French livres, which might be taken from the statue without spoiling it, and be afterwards fixed on again in more auspicious times. With regard to the land forces, they amounted to very near 30,000 men, and the

* Diod. l. xii p. 96, 97

fleet consisted of 300 galleys. Above all, he advised them not to venture a battle in their own country against the Peloponnesians, whose troops were superior in number to theirs; not to regard the laying waste of their lands, as they might easily be restored to their former condition; but to consider the loss of their men as highly important, because irretrievable; to make their whole policy consist in defending their city, and preserving the empire of the sea, which would certainly one day give them the superiority over their enemies. He laid down the plan for carrying on the war, not for a single campaign, but during the whole time it might last; and enumerated the evils they had to fear, if they deviated from that system. Pericles, after adding other considerations, taken from the character and internal government of the two republics; the one uncertain and fluctuating in its deliberations, and rendered still slower in the execution, from its being obliged to wait for the consent of its allies; the other speedy, determinate, independent, and mistress of its resolutions, which is no indifferent circumstance with regard to the success of enterprises; Pericles, I say, concluded his speech, and gave his opinion as follows: *We have no more to do but to dismiss the ambassadors, and to give them this answer: That we permit those of Megara to trade with Athens, upon condition that the Lacedæmonians do not prohibit either us, or our allies, to trade with them. With regard to the cities of Greece, we shall leave those free who were so at the time of our agreement, provided they shall do the same with regard to those dependent on them. We do not refuse to submit the decision of our differences to arbitration, and will not commit the first hostilities: however, in case of being attacked, we shall make a vigorous defence.*

The ambassadors were answered as Pericles had dictated. They returned home, and never came again to Athens; soon after which the Peloponnesian war broke out.

CHAPTER II.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN SICILY AND ITALY.

As the Peloponnesian war is a great event, of considerable duration, before I enter upon the history of it, it may be proper to relate in a few words, the most considerable transactions which had happened in Græcia Major, to the time we now speak of, whether in Sicily or Italy.

SECTION I.

The Carthaginians are defeated in Sicily. Theron, tyrant of Agrigentum. Reign of Gelon in Syracuse, and his two brothers. Liberty is restored.

I. *Gelon*

A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. We have seen that Xerxes,* whose project tended to no less than the total extirpation of the Greeks, had prevailed with the Carthaginians to make war against the people of Sicily. They crossed over thither with an army of above 300,000 men, and a fleet of 2000 ships, and upwards of 3000 transports. Hamilcar, the ablest of the Carthaginian generals at that time, was charged with this expedition. However, the success was not answerable to these mighty preparations; the Carthaginians were entirely defeated by Gelon, who at that time had the chief authority in Syracuse.

This Gelon was born in a city of Sicily,† situated on the southern coast between Agrigentum and Camarina, called Gelas, whence perhaps he received his name. He had signalized himself very much in the wars which Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, carried on against the neighbouring powers, most of whom he subdued, and was very near taking Syracuse. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon, upon pretence of defending the rights and succession of the tyrant's children, took up arms against his own citizens, and having overcome them in a battle, possessed himself of the government in his own name. Some time after he made himself master also of Syracuse, by the assistance of some exiles whom he had caused to return into it, and who had engaged the populace to open the gates of that city to him. He then gave Gela to Hiero his brother, and applied himself wholly in extending the limits of the territory of Syracuse, and soon rendered himself very powerful. We may form a judgment of this from the army which he offered the Grecian ambassadors,‡ who came to desire his aid against the king of Persia; and by his demand of being appointed generalissimo of their forces, which, however, they refused. The fear he was in, at that time, of being soon invaded by the Carthaginians, was

* Diod. l. xi. p. 1, and 16—22. † Herod. l. vii. c. 153—167.
‡ He promised to furnish 200 ships, and 30,000 men.

the chief occasion of his not succouring the Greeks. He showed himself to be a crafty politician by his conduct; and when news was brought him of Xerxes's having crossed the Hellespont, he sent a trusty person with rich presents, and ordered him to wait the issue of the first battle, and in case Xerxes should be victorious, to pay homage to him in his name, otherwise to bring back the money. I now return to the Carthaginians.

They had landed in Sicily at the earnest solicitations of Terillus, formerly tyrant of Himera, but dethroned by Theron, another tyrant, who reigned at Agrigentum. The family of the latter was one of the most illustrious of all Greece, as he was descended in a direct line from Cadmus. He married into the family which at that time ruled at Syracuse, and which consisted of four brothers, Gelon, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus. He married his daughter to the first, and himself married the daughter of the third.

Hamilcar having landed at Panormus, began by laying seige to Himera. Gelon hasted with a great army to the succour of his father-in-law; when uniting, they defeated the Carthaginians. This was perhaps the most complete victory ever gained.

The battle was fought the same day with that of Thermopylæ,* the circumstances of which I have related in the history of the Carthaginians.† One remarkable circumstance in the conditions of the peace,‡ which Gelon prescribed to the conquered, was, that they should cease to sacrifice their children to the god Saturn; which shows at the same time, the cruelty of the Carthaginians, and the piety of Gelon.

The spoils won on this occasion were of immense value. Gelon allotted the greatest part of them for the ornament of the temples in Syracuse. They also took an incredible number of prisoners. These he shared, with the utmost equity, with his allies, who employed them, after putting irons on their feet, in cultivating their lands, and in building magnificent edifices, as well for the ornament as the utility of the cities. Several of the citizens of Agrigentum had each 500 for his own share.

A. M. 3525. Ant J. C. 479. Gelon, after so glorious a victory, far from growing more proud and haughty, behaved with greater affability and humanity than ever towards the citizens and his allies Being returned from the campaign, he convened the assembly of the Syracusans, who were ordered to come armed into it. However, he himself came unarmed thither: declared to the assembly every circumstance of his conduct, the uses to which he had applied the several sums with which he had been intrusted, and in what

* Herodotus says, that this battle was fought the same day with that of Salamis, which does not appear so probable. For the Greeks, informed of Gelon's successes, entreated him to succour them against Xerxes, which they would not have done after the battle of Salamis, which exalted their courage so much, that after this battle they imagined themselves strong enough to resist their enemies, and to put an end to the war to their own advantage, without the assistance of any other power

 ‡ Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

manner he had employed his authority; adding, that if they had any complaints to make against him, his person and life were at their disposal. All the people, struck with so unexpected a speech, and still more with the confidence he reposed in them, answered by acclamations of joy, praise, and gratitude; and immediately with one consent, invested him with the supreme authority, and the title of king. And to preserve to the latest posterity the remembrance of Gelon's memorable action,* who had come into the assembly, and put his life into the hands of the Syracusans, they erected a statue in honour of him, wherein he was represented in the ordinary habit of a citizen, ungirded, and unarmed. This statue met afterwards with a very singular fate, and worthy of the motives which had occasioned its being set up. Timoleon, above 130 years after, having restored the Syracusans to their liberty, thought it advisable, in order to erase all traces of tyrannical government, and at the same time to assist the wants of the people, to sell publicly by auction all the statues of those princes and tyrants who had governed it till that time. But first he brought them to a formal trial, as so many criminals; hearing the depositions and witnesses upon each of them. They all were condemned unanimously, the statue of Gelon only excepted, which found an eloquent advocate and defender in the warm and sincere gratitude which the citizens retained for that great man, whose virtue they revered as if he had been still alive.

The Syracusans had no cause to repent their having intrusted Gelon with unlimited power and authority. This made no addition to his known zeal for their interests, but only enabled him to do them more important services. For,† by a change till then unheard of, and of which Tacitus since found no example except in Vespasian,‡ he was the first whom the sovereignty made the better man. He made upwards of 10,000 foreigners, who had served under him, denizens. His views were, to people the capital, to increase the power of the state, to reward the services of these brave and faithful soldiers, and to attach them more strongly to Syracuse, from the sense of the advantageous settlement they had obtained in being incorporated with the citizens.

He prided himself particularly upon his inviolable sincerity,§ truth, and fidelity to his engagements; a quality very essential to a prince, the only one capable of gaining him the love and confidence of his subjects and of foreigners, and which therefore ought to be considered as the basis of all just policy and good government. Having occasion for money to carry on an expedition he meditated (this, very probably, was before he had triumphed over the Carthaginians,) he addressed the people in order to obtain a contribution from them: but finding the Syracusans unwilling to be at that ex

* Plut. in Timol. p. 247. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 37. † Diod. l. xi. p. 55.
‡ Solus omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus est. *Hist.* l. i. c. 50.
§ Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

pense, he told them, that he asked nothing but a loan, and that he would engage to repay it as soon as the war should be over. The money was advanced, and repayed punctually at the promised time. How happy is that government where such justice and equity are exercised; and how mistaken are those ministers and princes, who violate them in the slightest degree!

One of the chief objects of his attention,* in which his successor imitated him, was to make the cultivation of the lands be considered as an honourable employment. It is well known how fruitful Sicily was in corn, and the immense revenues which might be produced from so rich a soil when industriously cultivated. He animated the husbandmen by his presence, and delighted in appearing sometimes at their head, in the same manner as on other occasions he had marched at the head of armies. His intention, says Plutarch, was not merely to make the country rich and fruitful, but also to exercise his subjects, to accustom and inure them to toils, and by that means to preserve them from a thousand disorders which inevitably follow a soft and indolent life. There are few maxims (in point of policy) on which the ancients have insisted more strongly, than on that relating to the cultivation of their lands; a manifest proof of their great wisdom, and the profound knowledge they had of what constitutes the strength and solid support of a state. Xenophon, in a dialogue entitled Hiero,† the subject of which is government, shows the great advantage it would be to a state, were the king studious to reward those who excel in husbandry, and in whatever relates to the cultivation of lands. He says the same of war, of trade, and of all the arts; on which occasion, if honours were paid to all those who should distinguish themselves on them, it would give universal life and motion; would excite a noble and laudable emulation among the citizens, and give rise to a thousand inventions for the improvement and perfection of those arts.

It does not appear that Gelon had been educated in the same manner as the children of the rich among the Greeks, who were taught music, and the art of playing on instruments, with great care. Possibly this was a consequence of his mean birth, or rather was owing to the little value he set on those kind of exercises. One day at an entertainment,‡ when according to the usual custom, a lyre was presented to each of the guests; when it was Gelon's turn, instead of touching the instrument as the rest had done, he caused his horse to be brought, mounted him with wonderful agility and grace, and showed that he had learned a nobler exercise than playing on the lyre.

Since the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily,§ the several cities enjoyed a profound peace, and Syracuse was particularly happy in its tranquillity, under the auspicious government of Gelon.

* Plut. in Apophth. p. 175. † P. 916, 917. ‡ Plut. in Apophthegm. p. 175.
§ Diod. l. xi. p. 29, 30.

He was not born in Syracuse, and yet all the inhabitants of that city, though so extremely jealous of their liberty, had forced him in a manner to be their king. Though an alien, the supreme power went in search of him, not courted on his part with any art or inducement but those of merit. Gelon was thoroughly acquainted with all the duties of the regal office, as well as its great weight; and he accepted it with no other view but the good of his people. He thought himself king only for the defence of the state, to preserve the good order of society, to protect innocence and justice, and to exhibit to all his subjects, in his simple, modest, active, and regular life, a pattern of every civil virtue. The whole of royalty that he assumed was the toils and cares of it, a zeal for the public welfare, and the sweet satisfaction which results from making millions happy by his cares: in a word, he considered the sovereignty as an obligation, and a means to procure the felicity of a greater number of men. He banished from it pomp, ostentation, licentiousness, and impunity for crimes. He did not affect the appearance of reigning, but contented himself with making the laws reign. He never made his inferiors feel that he was their master, but only inculcated into them that both himself and they ought to submit to reason and justice. To induce their obedience, he employed no other methods but persuasion and a good example, which are the weapons of virtue, and alone produce a sincere and uninterrupted obedience.

A revered old age, a name highly dear to all his subjects, a reputation equally diffused within and without his kingdoms; these were the fruits of that wisdom which he retained on the throne to the last gasp. His reign was short, and only just showed him in a manner to Sicily, to exhibit in his person an example of a great, good, and true king. He died, after having reigned only seven years, to the infinite regret of all his subjects. Every family imagined itself deprived of its best friend, its protector and father. The people erected, without the city, in the place where his wife Demarata had been buried, a splendid mausoleum, surrounded with nine towers of surprising height and magnificence; and decreed those honours to him, which were then paid to the demigods or heroes. The Carthaginians afterwards demolished the mausoleum, and Agathocles the towers: but, says the historian, neither violence, envy, nor time, which destroys all grosser things, could destroy the glory of his name, or abolish the memory of his exalted virtues and noble actions, which love and gratitude had engraved in the hearts of the Sicilians.

II. *Hiero.*

A. M. 3532. Ant. J. C. 472. After Gelon's death, the sceptre continued near twelve years in his family. He was succeeded by Hiero, his eldest brother.

It will be necessary for us, in order to reconcile the authors who have written concerning this prince, some of whom represent him as a good king, and others a detestable tyrant; it will be necessary, I say, to distinguish the periods. It is very probable that Hiero, dazzled, in the beginning of his reign, by the glitter of sovereign power, and corrupted by the flattery of his courtiers, studiously endeavoured to deviate from that path which his predecessor had pointed out to him, and in which he had found himself so happy. This young prince was avaricious.* headstrong, unjust, and studious of nothing but the gratification of his passions, without ever endeavouring to acquire the esteem and affection of the people; who, on the other side, had the utmost aversion for a prince, whom they looked upon as a tyrant over them, rather than as a king; and nothing but the veneration they had for Gelon's memory, prevented it from breaking out.

Some time after he had ascended the throne,† he entertained violent suspicions of Polyzelus, his brother, whose great influence among the citizens made him fear that he had a design to depose him. In order to rid himself without noise of an enemy whom he fancied very dangerous, he resolved to put him at the head of some forces he was going to send to the succour of the Sybarites against the Crotoniatæ, hoping that he would perish in the expedition. His brother's refusal to accept this command, made him the more violent against him. Theron, who had married Polyzelus's daughter, joined with his father-in-law. This gave rise to great differences of long duration between the kings of Syracuse and Agrigentum; however, they at last were reconciled by the judicious mediation of Simonides the poet;‡ and to make their reconciliation lasting, they cemented it by a new alliance, Hiero marrying Theron's sister; after which the two kings always lived in good intelligence with each other.

At first,§ an infirm state of health, which was increased by repeated illnesses, gave Hiero an opportunity of thinking seriously; after which he resolved to draw around him men of learning, who might converse agreeably with him, and furnish him with useful instructions. The most famous poets of the age came to his court, as Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Epicharmus; and it is affirmed, that their delightful conversation did not a little contribute to soften the cruel and savage disposition of Hiero.

Plutarch‖ relates a noble saying of his, which shows an excellent disposition in a prince. He declared, that his palace and his ears should be always open to every man who would tell him the truth, and that without disguise or reserve.

The poets above mentioned not only excelled in poetry, but were also possessed of a great fund of learning in other branches, and

* Diod. l. xi. p. 51. † Id. l. xi. p. 36. ‡ Schol. in Pind. § Ælian. l. iv. c. 15. ‖ In Apophth. p. 175.

were respected and consulted as the sages of their times. This is what Cicero* says of Simonides in particular. He had a great ascendant over the king; and the only use he made of it was, to incline him to virtue.

They often used to converse on philosophical subjects.† I observed on another occasion, that Hiero, in one of these conversations, asked Simonides his opinion with regard to the nature and attributes of the Deity. The latter desired one day's time to consider of it; the next day he asked two, and went on increasing in the same proportion. The prince pressing him to give his reasons for these delays, he confessed, that the subject was above his comprehension, and that the more he reflected, the more obscure it appeared to him.

Xenophon has left us an excellent treatise on the art of governing well, entitled Hiero, and written in the form of a dialogue between this prince and Simonides. Hiero undertakes to prove to the poet, that tyrants and kings are not so happy as is generally imagined. Among the great number of proofs alleged by him, he insists chiefly on their unhappiness in being deprived of the greatest comfort and blessing in this life, *viz.* the enjoyment of a true friend, to whose bosom they may safely confide their secrets and afflictions; who may share with them in their joy and sorrow; in a word, a second self, who may form but one heart, one soul with them. Simonides, on the other side, lays down admirable maxims with respect to the duties of a sovereign. He represents to him, that a king is not so for himself, but for others: that his grandeur consists, not in building magnificent palaces for his own residence, but in erecting temples, and fortifying and embellishing his cities: that his glory consists not in his people's fearing him, but in their being afraid for him: that a truly royal care is, not to enter the lists with the first comer at the Olympic games (for the princes of that age were passionately fond of them, and especially Hiero,‡) but to contend with the neighbouring kings who should succeed best in diffusing wealth and abundance throughout his dominions, and in endeavouring to secure the felicity of the people.

Nevertheless, another poet (Pindar) praises this same Hiero for the victory he had won in the horse-race. *This prince*, says he, in his ode, *who governs with equity the inhabitants of opulent Sicily, has gathered the fairest flower of every virtue. He takes a noble delight in the most exquisite performances of poetry and music. He loves melodious airs, such as it is customary for us to play at the banquets given us by our dearest friends. Rouse then thyself, take thy lyre, and raise it to the Doric pitch. If thou feelest thyself animated by a*

* Simonides, non poeta solùm suavis, verùm etiam cæteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur. Lib. i. *de nat. deor.* n. 60.

† Cic. l. i. de nat. deor. n. 60.

‡ It is said that Themistocles, seeing him arrive at the Olympic games with a splendid equipage, would have had him forbidden them, because he had not succoured the Greeks against the common enemy, any more than Gelon his brother; which motion did honour to the Athenian general. *Ælian.* lix. c. 5.

glorious fire in favour of Pisa and Pherenice; if they have waked the sweetest transports in thy breast, when that generous courser (without being quickened by the spur) flew along the banks of the Alpheus, and carried his royal rider to glorious victory: O sing the king of Syracuse, the ornament of the Olympic course!*

The whole ode, translated by the late Mr. Massieu, is in the sixth volume of the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, from which I have made the short extract above. I was very glad to give the reader some idea of Pindar, from this little specimen.

The next ode to this was composed in honour of Theron, king of Agrigentum, victorious in the chariot-race. The diction of it is so sublime, the thought so noble, and the moral so pure, that many look upon it as Pindar's masterpiece.

I cannot say how far we may depend on the rest of the praises which Pindar gives to Hiero, for poets do not always pride themselves upon their sincerity in the eulogiums they bestow on princes; however, it is certain that Hiero had made his court the resort of all persons of wit and genius; and that he had invited them to it by his affability and engaging behaviour, and much more by his liberality, which is a great merit in a king.

We cannot bestow on Hiero's court the eulogium which Horace† gives the house of Mæcenas, in which a character prevailed rarely found among scholars, and nevertheless infinitely preferable to all their erudition. This amiable house, says Horace, was an utter stranger to the mean and grovelling sentiments of envy and jealousy; and men saw, in those who shared in their master's favour, a superior merit or credit, without taking the least umbrage at it. But it was far otherwise in the court of Hiero or of Theron.‡ It is said that Simonides, and Bacchylides his nephew, employed all kinds of criticism to lessen the esteem which those princes had for Pindar's works. The latter, by way of reprisal, ridicules them very strongly in his ode to Theron, in comparing *them to ravens, who croak in vain against the divine bird of Jove.* But modesty was not the virtue which distinguished Pindar.

Hiero,§ having driven the ancient inhabitants of Catana and Naxos from their country, settled a colony of 10,000 men there,

* Pisa was the city, near which the Olympic games were solemnized: and Pherenice was the name of Hiero's courser, signifying, *the gainer of victory.*

† ——————— Non isto vivimus illic,
Quo tu rere, modo. Domus hâc nec purior ulla est,
Nec magis his aliena malis. Nil mi officit unquam,
Ditior hic, aut est quia doctior. Est locus uni
Cuique suus. *Hor.* lib. i. sat. 9.

Sir, you mistake, that's not our course of life,
We know no jealousies, no brawls, no strife:
From all those ills our patron's house is free,
None, 'cause more learned or wealthy, troubles me;
We have our stations, all their own pursue, &c.—*Creech.*

‡ Scholiast. Pind. § Diod. l. xi. p. 37.

half of whom were Syraeusans, and the rest Peloponnesians. This induced the inhabitants of those eities to appoint, after his death the same solemnities in his honour, as were bestowed on heroes or demi-gods, because they considered him as their founder.

He showed great favour to the children of Anaxilaus,* formerly tyrant of Zanele, and a great friend to Gelon his brother. As they were arrived at years of maturity, he exhorted them to take the government into their own hands, after Mieythus, their tutor, should have perfeetly informed them of the state of it, and how he himself had behaved in the administration. The latter, having assembled the nearest relations and most intimate friends of the young princes, gave, in their presence, so good an aecount of his guardianship, that the whole assembly (in perfect admiration) bestowed the highest eneomiums on his prudence, integrity and justiee. Matters were earried so far, that the young prinees were extremely urgent with him to eontinue to preside in the administration, as he had hitherto done. However, the wise tutor preferring the sweets of ease to the splendour of authority, and persuaded, at the same time, that it would be for the interest of the state if the young prinees took the government into their own hands, resolved to retire from business. Hiero died after having reigned eleven years.

III. *Thrasybulus.*

He was sueeeeded by Thrasybulus, hist brother, who, by his evil eonduet, contributed very much to the making him be regretted. Swelled with pride and a brutal haughtiness, he eonsidered men as mere worms; vainly faneying they were ereated for him to trample upon, and that he was of a quite different nature from them. He abandoned himself implicitly to the flattering counsels of the giddy young eourtiers who surrounded him. He treated all his subjeets with the utmost severity; banishing some, eonfiseating the possessions of others, and putting great numbers to death. So severe a slavery soon grew insupportable to the Syracusans, and therefore they implored the suecour of the neighbouring eities, whose interest it was also to throw off the tyrant's yoke. Thrasybulus was besieged even in Syraeuse, the sovereignty of part of which he had reserved to himself, *viz.* Aehradina, and the island which was very well fortified; but the third quarter of the eity, ealled Tyche, was possessed by the enemy. After making a feeble resistance, and demanding to eapitulate, he left the eity, and withdrew into banishment among the Locrians. He had reigned but a year. In this manner the Syraeusans recovered their liberty. They also delivered the rest of the eities of Sicily from tyrants; established a popular government in all places, and maintained that form by

* Diod. l. xi. p. 50. † Ibid. p. 51, 52.

themselves during threescore years, till the reign of Dionysius the tyrant, who again enslaved them.

A. M. 3544. Ant. J. C. 460 After Sicily had been delivered from the government of tyrants,* and all the cities of it were restored to their liberty; as the country was extremely fruitful in itself, and the peace which all places enjoyed gave the inhabitants of this island an opportunity of cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks, the people grew very powerful, and amassed great riches. To perpetuate to the latest posterity the remembrance of the happy day in which they had thrown off the yoke of slavery, by the banishment of Thrasybulus, it was decreed in the general assembly of the nation, that a colossal statue should be set up to Jupiter the Deliverer; that on the anniversary of this day a festival should be solemnized, by way of thanksgiving, for the restoration of their liberty; and that there should be sacrificed in honour of the gods, 450 bulls, with which the people should be entertained at a common feast.

There nevertheless lay concealed in the minds of many, a certain secret leaven of tyranny, which frequently disturbed the harmony of this peace, and occasioned several tumults and commotions in Sicily, the particulars of which I shall omit. To prevent the evil consequences of them,† the Syracusans established the Petalism, which differed very little from the Athenian Ostracism; and was so called from the Greek πέταλον, signifying a leaf, because the votes were then given on an olive-leaf. This judgment was put in force against those citizens whose great power made the people apprehensive that they aspired at the tyranny, and it banished them for ten years; however, it did not long continue in force, and was soon abolished; because the dread of falling under its censure, having prompted the most virtuous men to retire, and renounce the government, the chief employments were now filled by such citizens only as had the least merit.

Deucetius, according to Diodorus,‡ was chief over the people who were properly called Sicilians. Having united them all (the inhabitants of Hybla excepted) into one body, he became very powerful, and formed several great enterprises. It was he who built the city Palica, near the temple of the gods called Palici. This temple was very famous on account of some wonders which are related of it; and still more from the sacred nature of the oaths which were then taken, the violation whereof was said to be always followed by a sudden and exemplary punishment. This was a secure asylum for all persons who were oppressed by superior power; and especially for slaves who were unjustly abused, or too cruelly treated by their masters. They continued in safety in this temple, till certain arbiters and mediators had made their peace; and there was not a single instance of a master's having

* Diod. l. xi. p. 55, &c. † Ibid. p. 65. ‡ Ibid. 67—70.

ever broken the promise he had made of pardoning his slaves; so famous were the gods who presided over this temple, for the severe vengeance they took on those who violated their oaths.

This Deucetius, after having been successful on a great many occasions, and gained several victories, particularly over the Syracusans, saw his fortune change on a sudden by the loss of a battle, and was abandoned by the greatest part of his forces. In the consternation and despondency into which so general and sudden a desertion threw him, he formed such a resolution as despair only could suggest. He withdrew in the night to Syracuse, advanced as far as the great square of the city, and there falling prostrate at the foot of the altar, abandoned his life and dominions to the mercy of the Syracusans, that is, to his professed enemies. The singularity of this spectacle attracted great numbers of people. The magistrates immediately convened the people, and debated on the affair. They first heard the orators, whose business was generally to address the people with great violence; and these animated them against Deucetius, as a public enemy, whom Providence seemed to throw into their way, to revenge and punish, by his death, all the injuries he had done the republic. A speech of this tendency struck all the virtuous part of the assembly with horror. The most ancient and wisest of the senators represented, *That they were not now to consider what punishment Deucetius deserved, but how it behoved the Syracusans to act on that occasion; that they ought not to look upon him any longer as an enemy, but as a suppliant, a character by which his person was become sacred and inviolable. That there was a goddess (Nemesis) who took vengeance of crimes, especially of cruelty and impiety, who doubtless would not suffer that to go unpunished: that besides the baseness and inhumanity there is in insulting the unfortunate, and in crushing those who are already under one's foot; it was worthy the grandeur and good nature of the Syracusans, to exert their clemency even to those who least deserved it.* All the people came into this opinion, and with one consent spared Deucetius's life. He was ordered to reside in Corinth, the mother city and foundress of Syracuse; and the Syracusans engaged to furnish Deucetius with all things necessary for his subsisting honourably there. What reader, who compares these two different opinions, does not perceive which of them was the noblest and most generous?

SECTION II.

Of some famous persons and cities in Græcia Magna. Pythagoras, Charondas, Zaleucus, Milo the Athleta; Crotona, Sybaris, and Thurium.

I. *Pythagoras.*

A. M. 3480. Ant. J. C. 524

In treating of what relates to Græcia Magna, in Italy, I must not omit Pythagoras, who was the glory

of it. He was born in Samos.* After having travelled into a great many regions, and enriched his mind with much uncommon and excellent learning, he returned to his native country, but did not make a long stay in it, because of the tyrannical government which Polycrates had established in it, who, however, had the highest regard for him, and showed him all the esteem due to his rare merit. But the study of the sciences, and particularly of philosophy, is by no means compatible with slavery, though of the mildest and most honourable kind. He therefore went into Italy, and resided usually either at Crotona, Metapontum, Heraclea, or Tarentum. Servius Tullius,† or Tarquinius Superbus, reigned in Rome at that time; which absolutely refutes the opinion of those who imagined that Numa Pompilius, the second king of the Romans, who lived upwards of 100 years before, had been Pythagoras's disciple; an opinion that very probably was grounded on the resemblance of their manners, disposition, and principles.

The whole country soon felt very happy effects from the presence of this excellent philosopher.‡ An inclination for study, and a love of wisdom, diffused themselves almost universally in a very short time. Multitudes flocked from all the neighbouring cities to get a sight of Pythagoras, to hear him, and to profit by his salutary counsels. The several princes of the country took a pleasure in inviting him to their courts, which they thought honoured by his presence; and all were delighted with his conversation, and glad to learn from him the art of governing nations with wisdom. His school became the most famous that had ever been till that age. He had no less than four or five hundred disciples. Before he admitted them in that quality, he kept them in a state of noviciate, as it were, and probation for five years, during which time he obliged them to keep the strictest silence; thinking it proper for them to be instructed, before they should attempt to speak. It is well known that the metempsychosis or transmigration of souls was one of the chief of his tenets. His disciples had the greatest reverence for every word he uttered; and, if he did but barely aver a thing, that alone, without further examination, was sufficient to gain credit to his assertion; and to confirm the truth of any thing, they used to express themselves in this manner, *The master said it.*§ However, the disciples carried their deference and docility too far, in thus waving all inquiry, and in sacrificing implicitly their reason and understanding; a sacrifice that is due only to the divine authority, which is infinitely superior to our reason and all our knowledge; and which, consequently, is authorized to prescribe laws to us, and dictate absolute obedience.

The school of Pythagoras bred a great number of illustrious dis-

* Diog. Laert. in vit. Pythag. † Liv. l. i. n. 18.

‡ Pythagoras, cùm in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Græciam, quæ magna dicta est et privatim et publicè, præstantissimis et institutis, et artibus. Cic. *Tuscul. Quæst.* l. v n. 10.

§ Αὐτὸς ἔφα.

ciples, who did infinite honour to their master; as wise legislators, great politicians, persons skilled in all the sciences, and capable of governing states, and being the ministers of the greatest princes. A long time after his death,* that part of Italy which he had cultivated and improved by his instructions, was still considered as the nursery and seat of men skilled in all kinds of literature, and maintained that glorious character for several ages. The Romans certainly entertained a high opinion of Pythagoras's virtue and merit,† since the oracle of Delphi having commanded that people, during the war with the Samnites, to erect two statues in the most conspicuous part of Rome, the one to the wisest, and the other to the most valiant among the Greeks, they accordingly set up two in the place where the *Comitia* were held, representing Pythagoras and Themistocles. We have no certain information with respect to the time and place of Pythagoras's death.

II. *Crotona. Sybaris. Thurium.*

A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Crotona was founded by Myscellus,‡ chief of the Achæans, the third year of the seventeenth Olympiad. This Myscellus being come to Delphi to consult the oracle of Apollo, about the spot on which he should build his city, met Archias the Corinthian there, who was arrived upon the same account. The god gave them a favourable audience; and after having determined them with regard to the place that would best suit their new settlements, he proposed different advantages to them, and left them, among other particulars, the choice of riches or health. The offer of riches struck Archias, but Myscellus desired health; and, if history is to be credited, Apollo performed his promise faithfully to both. Archias founded Syracuse, which soon became the most opulent city of Greece. Myscellus laid the foundations of Crotona,§ which became so famous for the long life and innate strength of its inhabitants, that its name was used proverbially to signify a very healthy spot, whose air was extremely pure. The natives of this city signalized themselves in a great number of victories in the Grecian games; and Strabo relates that, in one and the same Olympiad, seven Crotonians were crowned in the Olympic games, and carried off all the prizes of the stadium.

Sybaris was ten leagues (200 stadia) from Crotona,‖ and had also been founded by the Achæans, but before the other. This city became afterwards very powerful. Four neighbouring states,

* Pythagoras tenuit magnam illam Græciam cûm honore, et disciplinâ, tum etiam auctoritate, multaque secula postea sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti viderentur. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. i. n. 38.

† Plin. l. xxxiv. c. 6. ‡ Strab. l. vi. p. 262 & 269. Dionys. Halicarn. Antiq. Rom. l. ii. p. 121.

§ Κρότωνος ὑγιέστερος.

‖ Strab. l. vi. p. 263. Athen. l. xii. p. 518—520.

and twenty-five cities, were subject to it, so that it was alone able to raise an army of 300,000 men. The opulence of Sybaris was soon followed by luxury, and such a dissoluteness of manners as is scarcely credible. The citizens employed themselves in nothing but banquets, games, shows, parties of pleasure, and carousals. Public rewards and marks of distinction were bestowed on those who gave the most magnificent entertainments; and even to such cooks as were best skilled in the important art of making new discoveries in dressing dishes, and invented new refinements to please the palate. The Sybarites carried their delicacy and effeminacy to such a height, that they carefully removed from their city all such artificers whose work was noisy; and would not suffer any cocks in it, lest their shrill piercing crow should disturb their balmy slumbers.

A. M. 3484. Ant. J. C. 520. All these evils were heightened by dissension and discord,* which at last proved their ruin. Five hundred of the wealthiest persons in the city having been expelled by the faction of one Telys, fled to Crotona. Telys demanded to have them surrendered to him; and, on the refusal of the Crotonians to deliver them up (who were prompted to this generous resolution by Pythagoras, who then lived among them) war was declared. The Sybarites marched 300,000 men into the field, and the Crotonians only 100,000; but then they were headed by Milo, the famous champion (of whom we shall soon have occasion to speak,) over whose shoulders a lion's skin was thrown, and himself armed with a club, like another Hercules. The latter gained a complete victory, and made a dreadful havoc of those who fled, so that very few escaped, and their city was depopulated. About threescore years after, some Thessalians came and settled in it; however, they did not long enjoy peace, being driven out by the Crotonians. Being thus reduced to the most fatal extremity, they implored the succour of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The latter, moved with compassion at their deplorable condition, after causing proclamation to be made in Peloponnesus, that all who were willing to join that colony were at liberty to do it, sent the Sybarites a fleet of ten ships, under the command of Lampon and Xenocrates.

A. M. 3560. Ant. J. C. 444. They built a city near the ancient Sybaris and called it Thurium.† Two men greatly renowned for their learning, the one an orator, and the other an historian, settled in this colony. The first was Lysias, at that time but fifteen years of age. He lived in Thurium, till the ill fate which befell the Athenians in Sicily, and then went to Athens. The second was Herodotus. Though he was born in Halicarnassus, a city of Caria, he was, however, considered as a native of Thurium, because he settled there with that colony.

Divisions soon broke out in the city, on occasion of the new in-

* Diod. l. xxi. p. 76—95. † Dionys. Halicarn. in vit. Lys. p. 82. Strab. l. xiv p. 656

habitants, whom the rest were desirous to exclude from all public employments and privileges. But as these were much more numerous, they expelled all the ancient Sybarites, and got the sole possession of the city. Being supported by the alliance they made with the people of Crotona, they soon grew vastly powerful; and having settled a popular form of government in their city, they divided the citizens into ten tribes, which they called by the names of the different nations whence they sprung.

III. *Charondas, the legislator.*

They now bent their whole thoughts to the strengthening of their government by wholesome laws, for which purpose they made choice of Charondas, who had been educated in Pythagoras's school, to digest and draw them up. I shall quote some of them in this place.

1. He excluded from the senate, and all public employments, all such as should marry a second wife, in case any children by their first were living: being persuaded, that a man who was so regardless of his children's interest, would be equally so of his country's, and be as worthless a magistrate as he had been a father.

2. He sentenced all false accusers to be carried through every part of the city, crowned with heath or broom, as the vilest of men; an ignominy which most of them were not able to survive. The city, thus delivered from those pests of society, was restored to its former tranquillity. And indeed,* from calumniators generally arise all feuds and contests, whether of a public or private nature; and yet, according to Tacitus's observation, they are too much tolerated in most governments.

3. He enacted a new kind of law against another species of pests, which is generally the first occasion of the depravity of manners in a state, by suffering all those to be prosecuted who should form a correspondence, or contract a friendship, with wicked men; and by laying a heavy fine upon them.

4. He required all children of the citizens to be educated in polite literature; the effect of which is to soften and civilize the minds of men, inspiring them with gentleness of manners, and inclining them to virtue; all which constitute the felicity of a state, and are equally necessary to citizens of all conditions. In this view he appointed salaries (paid by the state) for masters and preceptors; in order that learning, by being communicated gratuitously, might be acquired by all. He considered ignorance as the greatest of evils, and the source whence all vices flowed.

5. He made a law with respect to orphans, which appears sufficiently judicious, by intrusting the care of their education to their relations by the mother's side, as their lives would not be in danger

* Delatores, genus hominum publico exitio repertum, et pœnis quidem nunquam satis coercitum. *Tacit. Annal.* l. iv. c 30

from them; and the management of their estates to their paternal relations, it being the interest of the latter to make the greatest advantage of them, since they would inherit them, in case of the demise of their wards.

6. Instead of putting deserters to death, and those who quitted their ranks and fled in battle, he only sentenced them to make their appearance, during three days, in the city, dressed in the habit of women, imagining, that the dread of so ignominious a punishment would be equally efficacious with putting to death; and being, at the same time, desirous of giving such cowardly citizens an opportunity of atoning for their fault.

7. To prevent his laws from being too rashly or easily abrogated, he imposed a very severe and hazardous condition on all persons who should propose to alter or amend them in any manner. They were to appear in the public assembly with a halter about their necks; and in case the alteration proposed did not pass, they were to be immediately strangled. There were but three amendments ever proposed, and all of them were admitted.

Charondas did not long survive his own laws. Returning one day from pursuing some thieves, and finding a tumult in the city, he came armed into the assembly, though he himself had prohibited this by an express law. A certain person objected to him in severe terms, that he violated his own laws; *I do not violate them*, says he, *but thus seal them with my blood;* saying which, he plunged his sword into his bosom, and expired.

IV. *Zaleucus, another lawgiver.*

At the same time there arose among the Locrians another famous legislator,* Zaleucus by name, who, as well as Charondas, had been Pythagoras's disciple. There is now scarce any thing extant of his, except a kind of preamble to his laws, which gives a most advantageous idea of them. He requires, above all things, of the citizens, to believe and be firmly persuaded, that there are gods; and adds, that the bare casting up our eyes to the heavens, and contemplating their order and beauty, are sufficient to convince us, that it is impossible so wonderful a fabric could have been formed by mere chance or human power. As the natural consequence of this belief, he exhorts men to honour and revere the gods, as the authors of whatever is good and just among mortals; and to honour them, not merely by sacrifices and splendid gifts, but by a circumspect conduct, and by purity and innocence of manners; these being infinitely more grateful to the deities than all the sacrifices that can be offered.

After this exordium, so pregnant with religion and piety, in which he describes the Supreme Being as the primary source

* Diod. l. xii. p. 79—85.

whence all laws flow, as the chief authority which commands obedience to them, as the most powerful motive for our faithful observance of them, and as the perfect model to which mankind ought to conform, he descends to the particulars of those duties which men owe to one another; and lays down a precept which is very well adapted to preserve peace and unity in society, by enjoining the individuals who compose it not to make their hatred and dissensions perpetual, which would evince an unsocial and savage disposition; but to treat their enemies as men who would soon be their friends. This is carrying morality to as great a perfection as could be expected from the heathens.

With regard to the duty of judges and magistrates, after representing to them, that in pronouncing sentence they ought never to suffer themselves to be biassed by friendship, hatred, or any other passion, he only exhorts them to avoid carefully all haughtiness or severity towards the parties engaged in law; since such are but too unhappy in being obliged to undergo all the toils and fatigues inseparable from lawsuits. The office indeed of judges, how laborious soever it may be, is far from giving them a right to vent their ill humour upon the contending parties; the very condition and essence of their employment require them to behave with impartiality, and to do justice on all occasions; and when they distribute this even with mildness and humanity, it is only a debt they pay, and not a favour they grant.

To banish luxury from his republic, which he looked upon as the certain destruction of a government, he did not follow the practice established in some nations, where it is thought sufficient, for the restraining it, to punish, by pecuniary mulcts, such as infringe the laws; but he acted, says the historian, in a more artful and ingenious, and at the same time more effectual, manner. He prohibited women from wearing rich and costly stuffs, embroidered robes, jewels, ear-rings, necklaces, bracelets, gold rings, and such-like ornaments; excepting none from this law but common prostitutes. He enacted a similar law with regard to the men; excepting, in the same manner, from the observance of it, such only as were willing to pass for debauchees and infamous wretches. By these regulations he easily, and without violence, preserved the citizens from the least approaches to luxury and effeminacy.* For no person was so lost to all sense of honour, as to be willing to wear the badges of his shame, under the eye, as it were, of all the citizens; since this would make him the public laughing-stock, and reflect eternal infamy on his family.

V. *Milo, the champion.*

We have seen him at the head of an army obtain a great victory. However, he was still more renowned for his athletic strength than

* More inter veteres recepto, qui satis pœnarum adversùs impudicas in ipsâ professione flagitii credebant. *Tacit. Annal.* l. ii. c. 85.

for his military bravery. He was surnamed the Crotoman, from Crotona, the place of his birth. It was his daughter, whom, as was before related, Democedes the famous physician, and Milo's countryman, married, after he had escaped from Darius's court to Greece, his native country.

Pausanias relates,* that Milo was seven times victorious at the Pythian games, once when a child; that he won six victories (at wrestling) in the Olympic games, one of which was also gained in his childhood; and that challenging a seventh time (in Olympia) any person to wrestle with him, he could not engage for want of an opponent. He would hold a pomegranate in such a manner, that, without breaking it, he would grasp it so fast in his hand, that no one, however strong, could possibly wrest it from him. He would stand so firm on a *discus*,† which had been oiled to make it the more slippery, that it was impossible to push him off. He would bind his head with a cord, after which, holding his breath strongly, the veins of his head would swell so prodigiously as to break the rope. When Milo, fixing his elbow on his side, stretched forth his right hand quite open, with his fingers held close one to the other, his thumb excepted, which he raised, the utmost strength of man could not separate his little finger from the other three.

All this was only a vain and puerile ostentation of his strength. Chance, however, gave him an opportunity of making a much more laudable use of it. One day,‡ as he was attending the lectures of Pythagoras (for he was one of his most constant disciples,) the pillar which supported the ceiling of the school in which the pupils were assembled, being shaken by some accident, Milo supported it by his single strength, gave the auditors time to get away, and having provided for their safety, he afterwards escaped himself.

What is related of the voracious appetite of the athletæ is almost incredible. Milo's appetite was scarce satiated with twenty minæ (pounds) of meat, the same quantity of bread, and three *congii*§ of wine every day.‖ Athenæus relates, that this champion having run the whole length of the stadium, with a bull four years old on his shoulders, he afterwards knocked him down with one stroke of his fist, and ate the whole beast that very day. I will take it for granted, that all the other particulars related of Milo are true; but is it in the slightest degree probable, that one man could devour a whole ox in so short a time?

We are told that Milo,¶ when advanced to a very great age, seeing the rest of the champions wrestling, and gazing upon his own arms, which once were so vigorous and robust, but were then very much enfeebled by time, burst into tears and cried, *Alas! these arms are now dead.*

* Lib. vi. p. 369, 370. † This discus was a kind of quoit, flat and round.
‡ Strab. l. vi. p. 263. § Thirty pounds, or eighteen pints. ‖ Athen. l. x. p. 412. ¶ Cic. de Senect. n. 27.

And yet he either forgot or concealed his weakness from himself:* and the confident persuasion he entertained of his own strength, and which he preserved to the last, proved fatal to him. Happening to meet, as he was travelling, an old oak, which had been opened by some wedges that were forced into it, he undertook to split it in two by his bare strength. But after forcing out the wedges by the exertion he made, his arms were catched in the trunk of the tree, by the violence with which it closed; so that being unable to disengage his hands, he was devoured by wolves.

An author has judiciously observed,† that this surprisingly robust champion, who prided himself so much on his bodily strength, was the weakest of men, with regard to a passion which often subdues and captivates the strongest; a courtesan having gained so great an ascendant over Milo, that she tyrannized over him in the most imperious manner, and made him obey whatever commands she laid upon him.

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR OF PELOPONNESUS.

A. M. 3573. Ant. J. C. 431. The Peloponnesian war, which I am now entering upon, began about the end of the first year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad, and lasted twenty-seven years. Thucydides has written the history of it to the twenty-first year inclusively. He gives us an accurate account of the several transactions of every year, which he divides into campaigns and winter-quarters. However, I shall not be so minute, and shall only extract such parts of it as appear most entertaining and instructive. Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus will also be of great assistance to me on this occasion.

SECTION I.

The siege of Platæa by the Thebans. Alternate ravages of Attica and Peloponnesus. Honours paid to the Athenians who fell in the first campaign.

The first year of the war.

The first act of hostility by which the war begun,‡ was committed by the Thebans, who besieged Platæa, a city of Bœotia, in alliance with Athens. They were introduced into it by treachery; but the citizens falling upon them in the night, killed them all, with the exception of about 200, who were taken prisoners, and who a little after were put to death. The Athenians, as soon as the news

* Pausan. l. vi. p. 370. † Ælian. l. ii. c. 24. ‡ Thucyd. l. ii. p. 99—122. Diod. l. xii. p. 97—100. Plut. in Pericl. p. 170.

was brought of the action at Platææ, sent succours and provisions thither, and cleared the city of all persons who were incapable of bearing arms.

The truce being evidently broken, both sides prepared openly for war; and ambassadors were sent to all places to strengthen themselves by the alliance of the Greeks and barbarians. Every part of Greece was in motion, some few states and cities excepted, which continued neuter, till they should see the event of the war. The majority were for the Lacedæmonians, as being the deliverers of Greece, and espoused their interest very warmly, because the Athenians, forgetting that the moderation and gentleness with which they commanded over others, had procured them many allies, had afterwards alienated the greatest part of them by their pride and the severity of their government, and incurred the hatred, not only of those who were then subject to them, but of all such as were apprehensive of becoming their dependants. In this temper of mind were the Greeks at that time. The confederates of each of those two states were as follow.

All Peloponnesus, Argos excepted, which stood neuter, had declared for Lacedæmonia. The Achæans, the inhabitants of Pellene excepted, were neuter at first, but at length insensibly engaged in the war. Out of Peloponnesus were the people of Megara, Locris, Bœotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactorium, on the side of the Lacedæmonians.

The confederates of the Athenians were, the people of Chios, Lesbos, Platææ, the Messenians of Naupactus; the greatest part of the Acarnanians, Corcyreans, Cephalenians, and Zacynthians, besides the several tributary countries, as maritime Caria, Doria that lies near it, Ionia, the Hellespont; and the cities of Thrace, Chalcis, and Potidæa excepted, all the islands between Crete and Peloponnesus, eastward; and the Cyclades, Melos and Thera excepted.

Immediately after the attempt on Platææ, the Lacedæmonians had ordered forces to be levied both within and without Peloponnesus; and made all the preparations necessary for entering the enemy's country. All things being ready, two-thirds of the troops marched to the isthmus of Corinth, and the rest were left to guard the country. Archidamus, king of Lacedæmonia, who commanded the army, assembled the generals and chief officers, and calling to their remembrance the great actions performed by their ancestors, and those they themselves had done, or been eye-witnesses to, he exhorted them to support, with the utmost efforts of their valour, the pristine glory of their respective cities, as well as their own fame. He represented to them, that the eyes of all Greece were upon them; and that, in expectation of the issue of a war which would determine their fate, they were incessantly addressing heaven in favour of a people, who were as dear to them as the Athenians were become odious; that, however, he could not deny, that they were going to march against an enemy, who, though

greatly inferior to them in numbers and in strength, were nevertheless very powerful, warlike, and daring; and whose courage would doubtless be still more inflamed by the sight of danger, and the laying waste of their territories: that therefore they must exert themselves to the utmost,* to spread an immediate terror in the country they were going to enter, and to inspire the allies with confidence. The whole army answered with the loudest acclamations of joy, and repeated assurances that they would do their duty.

The assembly breaking up, Archidamus, ever zealous for the welfare of Greece, and resolving to neglect no expedient that might prevent a rupture, the dreadful consequences of which he foresaw, sent a Spartan to Athens, to endeavour, before they should come to hostilities, to prevail, if possible, with the Athenians to lay aside their designs; now that they saw an army ready to march into Attica. But the Athenians, so far from admitting him to audience, or hearing his reasons, would not so much as suffer him to come into their city: Pericles having prevailed with the people to make an order, that no herald or ambassador should be received from the Lacedæmonians till they had first laid down their arms. In consequence of this, the Spartan was commanded to leave the country that very day; and an escort was sent to guard him to the frontiers, and to prevent his speaking to any person by the way. At his taking leave of the Athenians, he told them, that day would be the beginning of the great calamities that would ensue to all Greece. Archidamus, seeing no hopes of a reconciliation, marched for Attica, at the head of 60,000 chosen troops.

Pericles, before the Lacedæmonians had entered the country, declared to the Athenians, that should Archidamus, when he was laying waste their territories, spare his (Pericle's) lands, either on account of the rights of hospitality which subsisted between them, or to furnish his enemies, and those who envied him, with a handle to slander him, as holding intelligence with him, he, from that day, made over all his lands and houses to the city of Athens. He demonstrated to the Athenians, that the welfare of the state depended upon consuming the enemy's troops, by protracting the war; and that for this purpose they must immediately remove all their effects out of the country, retire to the city, and shut themselves up in it without ever hazarding a battle. The Athenians, indeed, had not forces enough to take the field and oppose the enemy. Their troops, exclusive of those in garrison, amounted but to 13,000 heavy-armed soldiers; and 16,000 inhabitants, including the young and old, the citizens as well as others, who were appointed to defend Athens: and besides these, 1200 troopers, including the archers who rode on horseback, and 1600 foot archers. This was the whole army of the Athenians. But

* Gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni. *Tacit. Annal.* l. xiii. c. 31.

their chief strength consisted in a fleet of 300 galleys, part of which were ordered to lay waste the enemy's country, and the rest to awe the allies, on whom contributions were levied, without which the Athenians could not lay the expenses of the war.

The Athenians, animated by the ardent exhortations of Pericles, brought from the country their wives, their children, their furniture, and all their effects, after which they pulled down their houses, and even carried off the timber. With regard to the cattle of all kinds, they conveyed them into the island of Eubœa and the neighbouring isles. However, they were deeply afflicted at this sad and precipitate migration, and it drew plentiful tears from their eyes. From the time that the Persians had left their country, that is, for near fifty years, they had enjoyed the sweets of peace, wholly employed in cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks. But now they were obliged to abandon every thing. They took up their habitations in the city, as conveniently as they could, in the midst of such confusion; retiring either to their relations or friends; and some withdrew even to the temples and other public places.

In the mean time, the Lacedæmonians, being set out upon their march, entered the country, and encamped at Œnoe, which is the first fortress towards Bœotia. They employed a long time in preparing for the attack, and raising the batteries; for which reason complaints were made against Archidamus, as if he carried on the war indolently, because he had not approved of it. He was accused of being too slow in his marches, and of encamping too long near Corinth. He was also charged with having been too dilatory in raising the army, as if he had desired to give the Athenians opportunity to carry off all their effects out of the country; whereas had he marched speedily into it, all they had might have been plundered and destroyed. His design, however, was to engage the Athenians, by these delays, to agree to an accommodation, and to prevent a rupture, the consequences of which he foresaw would be pernicious to all Greece. Finding, after making several assaults, that it would be impossible for him to take the city, he raised the siege, and entered Attica in the midst of the harvest. Having laid waste the whole country, he advanced as far as Acharnæ, one of the greatest towns near Athens, and but 1500 paces from the city. He there pitched his camp, in hopes that the Athenians, exasperated to see him advanced so near, would sally out to defend their country, and give him an opportunity of coming to a battle.

It indeed was not without much difficulty that the Athenians (haughty and imperious as they were) could endure to be braved and insulted in this manner by an enemy, whom they did not think superior to themselves in courage. They were eye-witnesses of the dreadful havoc made of their lands, and saw all their houses and farms in a blaze. They could no longer bear this sad spectacle,

and therefore demanded fiercely to be led out against the Lacedæmonians, be the consequence what it would. Pericles saw plainly that the Athenians would thereby hazard every thing, and expose their city to certain destruction should they march out to engage, under the walls of their city, an army of 60.000 fighting men, composed of the choicest troops at that time in Bœotia and Peleponnesus. Besides, he had made it his chief maxim to spare the blood of the citizens, since that was an irreparable loss. Pursuing inflexibly, therefore, the plan he had laid down, and studious of nothing but how he might check the impatience and ardour of the Athenians, he was particularly careful not to assemble either the senate or the people, lest they should form some fatal resolution, in spite of all the opposition in his power. His friends used every effort imaginable to make him change his conduct. His enemies, on the other side, endeavoured to stagger him by their menances and slanderous discourses. They strove to sting him by songs and satires, in which they aspersed him as a man of a cowardly, unfeeling, disposition, who basely gave up his country to the sword of the enemy. But no man showed so much rancour against Pericles as Cleon.* He was the son of a currier, and also followed that trade himself. He had raised himself by faction, and probably by a species of merit which those must possess who would rise in popular governments. He had a thundering and overbearing voice; and possessed besides, in a wonderful manner, the art of gaining the people, and engaging them in his interest. It was he who enacted a law, that three *oboli* (not two as before) should be given to each of the 6000 judges. The characteristics which more immediately distinguished him were, an unbounded self-conceit, a ridiculous arrogance of his uncommon merit, and a boldness of speech, which he carried to the highest pitch of insolence and effrontery, and spared no man. But none of these things could move Pericles.† His invincible strength of mind raised him above low, vulgar clamours. Like a good pilot in a raging storm, who, after he has given out the proper orders, and taken all the precautions necessary, is studious of nothing but how to make the best use of his art, without suffering himself to be moved by the tears or entreaties of those whom fear has distracted; Pericles, in like manner, after having put the city in a good posture of defence, and posted guards in all places to prevent a surprise, followed those counsels which his prudence suggested, entirely regardless of the complaints, the taunts, and licentious invectives, of the citizens; from a firm persuasion, that he knew much better than they in what manner they were to be governed. It then appeared evidently, says Plutarch,‡ that Pericles was absolute master of the minds of the Athenians, since he prevailed so far (at such a juncture as this) as to keep them from

* It is he whom Aristophanes has inveighed so much against in several of his comedies. † Spernendis rumoribus validus. *Tacit.* ‡ Plut. An. Seni ger sit. resp. p. 764.

sallying out of the city;* as if he had kept the keys of the city in his own possession, and fixed on their arms the seal of his authority, to forbid their making use of them. Things happened exactly as Pericles had foretold; for the enemy, finding the Athenians were determined not to stir out of their city, and having advice that the enemy's fleet were carrying fire and sword into their territories, they raised their camp, and after making dreadful havoc in the whole country through which they marched, they returned to Peloponnesus, and retired to their several homes.

It might here be asked, why Pericles acted, on this occasion, in a quite different manner from what Themistocles had done about fifty years before, when, at Xerxes's approach, he made the Athenians march out of their city, and abandon it to the enemy. But a little reflection will show, that the circumstances differed widely. Themistocles, being invaded by all the forces of the East, justly concluded that it would be impossible for him to withstand, in a single city, those millions of barbarians who would have poured upon it like a deluge, and deprived him of all hopes of being succoured by his allies. This is the reason given by Cicero. *Fluctum enim totius Barbariæ ferre urbs una non poterat.* It was therefore prudent in him to retire for some time, and to let the confused multitude of barbarians consume and destroy one another. But Pericles was not engaged in so formidable and oppressive a war. The odds were not very great, and he foresaw it would allow him intervals in which he might breathe. Thus, like a judicious man and an able politician, he kept close in Athens, and could not be moved either by the remonstrances or murmurs of the citizens. Cicero, writing to his friend Atticus,† condemns absolutely the resolution which Pompey formed and executed, of abandoning Rome to Cæsar; whereas he ought, in imitation of Pericles, to have shut himself up in it with the senate, the magistrates, and the flower of the citizens who had declared in his favour.

After the Lacedæmonians were retired, the Athenians put troops into all the important posts both by sea and land, pursuant to the plan they intended to follow, as long as the war continued. They also came to a resolution to keep always 1000 talents in reserve,‡ and 100 galleys; and never to use them, except the enemy should invade Attica by sea; at the same time making it death for any man to propose the employing them any other way.

The galleys which had been sent into Peloponnesus made dreadful havoc there, which consoled the Athenians, in some measure, for the losses they had sustained. One day, as the forces were going on board, and Pericles was entering his own ship, a sudden and total eclipse of the sun ensued, and the earth was overspread with the deepest gloom. This phenomenon filled the minds

* Διεκώλυσε, μόνος τὰ ὅπλα τοῦ δήμου καὶ τὰς κλεῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἀποσφραγισάμενος. † Lib. vii. Epist. 11 ‡ About 140,000*l*

of the Athenians with the utmost terror; who were wont, through superstition, and the ignorance of natural causes, to consider such events as fatal omens. Pericles seeing the pilot who was on board his ship astonished, and incapable of managing the helm, threw his cloak over his face, and asked him whether he saw: the pilot answering, that the cloak hindered him, Pericles then gave him to understand, that a like cause, *viz.* the interposition of the vast body of the moon between his eyes and the sun, prevented his seeing its splendour.

The first year of the war of Peloponnesus being now elapsed,* the Athenians, during the winter, solemnized public funerals, according to ancient custom (a custom conformable to the dictates of humanity and gratitude,) in honour of those who had lost their lives in that campaign, a ceremony which they constantly observed, during the whole course of that war. For this purpose, they set up, three days before, a tent, in which the bones of the deceased citizens were exposed, and every person strewed flowers, incense, perfumes, and other things of the same kind, upon those remains. They afterwards were put on carriages, in coffins made of cypress-wood, every tribe having its particular coffin and carriage; but in one of the latter a large empty coffin† was carried in honour of those whose bodies had not been found. The procession marched with a grave, majestic, and religious pomp; a great number of inhabitants, both citizens and foreigners, assisted at this mournful solemnity. The relations of the deceased officers and soldiers stood weeping at the sepulchre. These bones were carried to a public monument, in the finest suburb of the city, called the Ceramicus, where were buried, in all ages, those who lost their lives in the field, except the warriors of Marathon, who, to immortalize their rare valour, were interred in the field of battle. Earth was afterwards laid over them, and then one of the citizens of the greatest distinction pronounced their funeral oration. Pericles was now appointed to exercise this honourable office. When the ceremony was ended, he went from the sepulchre to the tribunal, in order to be the better heard, and spoke the oration, the whole of which Thucydides has transmitted to us. Whether it was really composed by Pericles, or by the historian, we may affirm that it is truly worthy the reputation of both those great men, as well for the noble simplicity of the style, as for the just beauty of the thoughts, and the grandeur of the sentiments which pervade every part of it. After having paid,‡ in so solemn a manner, this double tribute of tears and applauses, to the memory of those brave soldiers who had sacrificed their lives to defend the liberties of their country: the public, who did not confine their gratitude to empty ceremonies and tears, maintained their widows, and all their infant orphans. This was

* Thucyd. l. ii. p. 122—130. † Those are called Cenotaphia. ‡ Thucyd. l. ii. p. 130.

a powerful incentive to animate the courage of the citizens;* for great men are formed where merit is best rewarded.

About the close of the same campaign, the Athenians concluded an alliance with Sitacles, king of the Odrysians in Thrace; and, in consequence of this treaty, his son was admitted a citizen of Athens. They also came to an accommodation with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, by restoring to him the city of Thermæ, after which they joined their forces, in order to carry on the war in Chalcis.

SECTION II.

The plague makes dreadful havoc in Attica. Pericles is divested of the command. The Lacedæmonians have recourse to the Persians for aid. Potidæa is taken by the Athenians. Pericles is restored to his employments. His death, and that of Anaxagoras.

Second and third years of the War.

A. M. 3574. Ant. J. C. 430. In the beginning of the second campaign,† the enemy made an incursion into the country as before, and laid it waste. But the plague made a much greater devastation in Athens; the like having never been known. It is related, that it began in Ethiopia, whence it descended into Egypt, from thence spread over Libya, and a great part of Persia; and at last broke at once, like a flood, upon Athens. Thucydides, who himself was seized with that distemper, has described very minutely the several circumstances and symptoms of it, in order, says he, that a faithful and exact relation of this calamity may serve as an instruction to posterity, in case the like should ever again happen. Hippocrates,‡ who was employed to visit the sick, has also described it as a physician, and Lucretius§ as a poet. This pestilence baffled the utmost efforts of art; the most robust constitutions were unable to withstand its attacks; and the greatest care and skill of the physicians were a feeble help to those who were infected. The instant a person was seized, he was struck with despair, which quite disabled him from attempting a cure. The assistance that was given them was ineffectual, and proved mortal to all such of their relations or friends as had the courage to approach them. The quantity of baggage, which had been removed out of the country into the city, proved very noxious. Most of the inhabitants, for want of lodging, lived in little cottages, in which they could scarce breathe, during the raging heat of the summer, so that they were seen either piled one upon the other (the dead as well as those who were dying,) or else crawling through the

* Ἆθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες ἄριστοι πολιτεύουσι.

† Thucyd. l. ii. p. 130—147. Diod. p. 101, 102. Plut. in Pericl. p. 171 ‡ Epidem. iii. § 3. § Lib. vi

streets; or lying along by the side of fountains, to which they had dragged themselves, to quench the raging thirst which consumed them. The very temples were filled with dead bodies, and every part of the city exhibited a dreadful image of death; without the least remedy for the present, or the least hopes with regard to the time to come.

The plague,* before it spread into Attica, had made great ravages in Persia. Artaxerxes, who had been informed of the high reputation of Hippocrates of Cos, the greatest physician of that or any other age, caused his governors to write to him, to invite him into his dominions, in order that he might prescribe to those who were infected. The king made him the most advantageous offers; setting no bounds to his rewards on the side of interest, and, with regard to honours, promising to make him equal with the most considerable persons in his court. The reader has already been told the prodigious regard which was shown to the Grecian physicians in Persia; and, indeed, can services of such importance be too well rewarded? However, all the glitter of the Persian riches and dignities was not able to tempt Hippocrates, nor stifle the hatred and aversion which was become natural to the Greeks for the Persians, ever since the latter had invaded them. This great physician therefore sent no other answer than this,—That he was free from either wants or desires; that all his cares were due to his fellow-citizens and countrymen; and that he was under no obligation to barbarians, the declared enemies of Greece. Kings are not used to denials. Artaxerxes, therefore, in the highest transports of rage, sent to the city of Cos, the native place of Hippocrates, and where he was at that time; commanding them to deliver up to him that insolent wretch, in order that he might be brought to condign punishment; and threatening, in case they refused, to lay waste their city and island in such a manner, that not the least footsteps of it should remain. However, the inhabitants of Cos were not under the least terror. They made answer, that the menaces of Darius and Xerxes had not been able in former times to prevail with them to give them earth and water, or to obey their orders; that Artaxerxes's threats would be equally impotent: that, let what would be the consequence, they would never give up their fellow-citizen; and that they depended on the protection of the gods.

Hippocrates had said in one of his letters, that his services were due entirely to his countrymen. And, indeed, the instant he was sent for to Athens, he went thither, and did not once stir out of the city till the plague was quite ceased. He devoted himself entirely to the service of the sick; and to multiply himself, as it were, he sent several of his disciples into all parts of the country, after having instructed them in what manner to treat their patients.

* Hippocrat. in Epist.

The Athenians were struck with the deepest sense of gratitude for this generous care of Hippocrates. They therefore ordained, by a public decree, that Hippocrates should be initiated in the greater mysteries, in the same manner as Hercules the son of Jupiter; that a crown of gold should be presented him, of the value of 1000 staters,* amounting to 500 pistoles French money; and that the decree by which it was granted him, should be read aloud by a herald in the public games, on the solemn festival of Panathenæa: that the freedom of the city should be given him and himself be maintained, at the public charge, in the Prytaneum, all his lifetime, in case he thought proper: in fine, that the children of all the people of Cos, whose city had given birth to so great a man, might be maintained and brought up in Athens, in the same manner as if they had been born there.

In the mean time the enemy having marched into Attica, came down towards the coast, and advancing still forward, laid waste the whole country. Pericles resolutely adhering to the maxim he had established, not to expose the safety of the state to the hazard of a battle, would not suffer his troops to sally out of the city; however, before the enemy left the open country, he sailed to Peloponnesus with 100 galleys, in order to hasten their retreat by so powerful a diversion; and after having made a dreadful havoc (as he had done the first year) he returned into the city. The plague was still there as well as in the fleet, and it spread to those troops that were besieging Potidæa.

The campaign being thus ended, the Athenians, who saw their country depopulated by two great scourges, war and pestilence, began to despond, and to murmur against Pericles; considering him as the author of all their calamities, as he had involved them in that fatal war. They therefore sent a deputation to Lacedæmonia, to obtain, if possible, an accommodation by some means or other, firmly resolved to make whatever concessions should be demanded of them: however, the ambassadors returned back without being able to obtain any terms. Complaints and murmurs now broke out afresh; and the whole city was in such a trouble and confusion, as seemed to prognosticate the worst of evils. Pericles, in the midst of this universal consternation, could not forbear assembling the people; and endeavoured to soften, and at the same time to encourage them, by justifying himself. *The reasons*, says he, *which induced you to undertake this war, and which you all approved at that time, are still the same; and are not changed by the alteration of circumstances, which neither you nor myself could foresee. Had it been left to your option to make choice of peace or war, the former would certainly have been the most eligible but as there was no other means for preserving your liberty but by drawing the sword,*

* The Attic stater was a gold coin weighing two drachms. It is in the original χρυσῶν χιλίων.

was it possible for you to hesitate? If we are citizens who truly love our country, ought our private misfortunes to make us neglect the common welfare of the state? Every man feels the evil which afflicts himself, because it is present; but no one is sensible of the good which will result from it, because it is not come. Have you forgotten the strength and grandeur of your empire? Of the two parts which form this globe of ours, viz. the land and sea, you have absolute possession of the latter; and no king, nor any other power, is able to oppose your fleets. The question now is, whether you will preserve this glory and this empire, or resign it for ever. Be not therefore grieved because you are deprived of a few country-houses and gardens, which ought to be considered no otherwise than as the frame of the picture, though you would seem to make them the picture itself. Consider, that if you do but preserve your liberty, you will easily recover them; but that should you suffer yourselves to be deprived of this blessing, you will lose every valuable possession with it. Do not show less generosity than your ancestors, who, for the sake of preserving it, abandoned even their city; and who, though they had not inherited such a glory from their ancestors, yet suffered the worst of evils, and engaged in the most perilous enterprises, to transmit it to you. I confess that your present calamities are exceedingly grievous, and I myself am duly sensible and deeply afflicted for them. But is it just in you to exclaim against your general, for an accident that was not to be diverted by all the prudence of man; and to make him responsible for an event in which he has not the least concern? We must submit patiently to those evils which Heaven inflicts upon us, and vigorously oppose such as arise from our fellow-creatures. As to the hatred and jealousy which attend on your prosperity, they are the usual lot of all who believe themselves worthy of commanding. However, hatred and envy are not long-lived, but the glory that accompanies exalted actions is immortal. Revolve, therefore, perpetually in your minds, how shameful and ignominious it is for men to bow the neck to their enemies, and how glorious it is to triumph over them; and then animated by this double reflection, march on to danger with joy and intrepidity, and do not crouch so tamely in vain to the Lacedæmonians; and call to mind, that those who display the greatest bravery and resolution in dangers, acquire the most esteem and applause.

The motives of honour and fame, the remembrance of the great actions of their ancestors, the grateful title of sovereigns of Greece, and above all, jealousy against Sparta, the ancient perpetual rival of Athens, were the usual motives which Pericles employed to influence and animate the Athenians, and they had hitherto never failed of success. But on this occasion, the sense of present evils prevailed over every other consideration, and stifled all other thoughts. The Athenians indeed did not design to sue to the Lacedæmonians any more for peace, but the mere sight and presence of Pericles was insupportable to them. They therefore deprived him of the command of the army, and sentenced him to pay a fine,

which, according to some historians, amounted to fifteen talents, and, according to others, fifty.*

However, this public disgrace of Pericles was not to be very lasting. The anger of the people was appeased by this first effort, and had spent itself in this injurious treatment of him, as the bee leaves its sting in the wound. But he was not now so happy with regard to his domestic evils; for, besides his having lost a great number of his friends and relations by the pestilence, feuds and divisions had long reigned in his family. Xanthippus, his eldest son, who himself was extremely profuse, and had married a young wife no less extravagant, could not bear his father's exact economy, who allowed him but a very small sum for his pleasures. This made him borrow money in his father's name. When the lender demanded his debt of Pericles, he not only refused to pay, but even prosecuted him for it. Xanthippus was so enraged, that he inveighed in the strongest terms against his father, exclaiming against him in all places, and ridiculing openly the assemblies he held at his house, and his conferences with the Sophists. He did not know that a son, though treated unjustly (which was far otherwise in his case,) ought to submit patiently to the injustice of his father, as a citizen is obliged to suffer that of his country

The plague carried off Xanthippus. At the same time Pericles lost his sister, with many of his relations and best friends, whose assistance he most wanted in the administration. But he did not sink under these losses; his strength of mind was not shaken by them: and he was not seen to weep or show the usual marks of sorrow at the grave of any of his relations, till the death of Paralus, the last of his legitimate children. Stunned by this violent blow, he did his utmost to preserve his usual tranquillity, and not show any outward symptoms of sorrow. But when he was to put the crown of flowers upon the head of his dead son, he could not support the cruel spectacle, nor stifle the transports of his grief, which forced its way in cries, in sobs, and a flood of tears. —

Pericles, misled by the principles of a false philosophy, imagined, that bewailing the death of his relations and children, would betray a weakness inconsistent with that greatness of soul which he had ever shown: and that on this occasion, the sensibility of the father would sully the glory of the conqueror. How gross an error! how childish an illusion! which either makes heroism consists in wild and savage cruelty; or, leaving the same grief and confusion in the mind, assumes a vain outside of constancy and resolution, merely to be admired. But does martial bravery extinguish nature? Is a man dead to all feeling, because he makes a considerable figure in the state? The emperor Antonius had a much juster way of thinking, when, on occasion of Marcus Aurelius's lamenting the death of the person who had brought him up, he said; *Suffer him*

* Fifteen or fifty thousand French crowns

*to be a man, for neither philosophy nor sovereignty renders us insensible.**

Fickleness and inconstancy were the prevailing characteristics of the Athenians; and as these carried them on a sudden to the greatest excesses, they soon brought them back again within the bounds of moderation and gentleness. It was not long before they repented the injury they had done Pericles, and earnestly wished to see him again in their assemblies. By dint of suffering, they began to be in some measure inured to their domestic misfortunes, and to be fired more and more with a zeal for their country's glory; and in their ardour for reinstating its affairs, they did not know any person more capable of effecting it than Pericles. He, [illegible] time, never stirred out of his house, and was in the utmost grief for the loss he had sustained. However, Alcibiades and the rest of his friends entreated him to go abroad and show himself in public. The people asked him pardon for their ungrateful usage to him; and Pericles, moved with their entreaties, and persuaded that it did not become a good citizen to harbour the least resentment against his country, resumed the government.

About the end of the second campaign, some ambassadors had set out from Lacedæmon, commissioned to solicit the king of Persia's alliance, and engage him to furnish a sum of money for maintaining the fleet: this step was most disgraceful to the Lacedæmonians, who called themselves the deliverers of Greece, since they thereby retracted or sullied the glorious actions they had formerly achieved in her defence against Persia. They went by way of Thrace, in order to disengage Sitalces from the alliance of the Athenians, and prevail with him to succour Potidæa. But they here met with some Athenian ambassadors, who caused them to be arrested as disturbers of the public peace, and afterwards to be sent to Athens, where, without suffering them to be heard, they were put to death the same day, and their bodies thrown on a dunghill, by way of reprisal on the Lacedæmonians, who treated all who were not of their party in the same manner. It is scarce possible to conceive how two cities, which, a little before, were so strongly united, and ought to have prided themselves upon showing a mutual civility and forbearance towards each other, could contract so inveterate a hatred, and break into such cruel acts of violence, as infringed all the laws of war, humanity, and nations; and prompt them to exercise greater cruelties upon one another, than if they had been at war with barbarians.

Potidæa had now been besieged almost three years; when the inhabitants, reduced to extremity, and in such want of provisions that some fed on human flesh, and not expecting any succours from the Peloponnesians, whose attempts in Attica had all proved abortive, surrendered on conditions. The circumstances which made

* Permitte illi, ut homo sit; neque enim vel philosophia vel imperium tollit affectus. *Jul. Capitol. in vit. Antonini Pii.*

the Athenians treat them with lenity, were, the severity of the weather, which exceedingly annoyed the besiegers; and the prodigious expense of the siege,* which had already cost 2000 talents.† They therefore came out of the city with their wives and children, as well citizens as foreigners, with each but one suit of clothes, and the women two, and carried off nothing but a little money to procure them a settlement. The Athenians blamed their generals for granting this capitulation without their order; because otherwise, as the citizens were reduced to the utmost extremities, they would have surrendered at discretion. They sent a colony thither.

A. M. 3575. Ant. J. C. 429. The first thing Pericles did after his being re-elected generalissimo, was to propose the abrogating of that law which he himself had caused to be enacted against bastards, when he had some legitimate children. It declared, that such only should be considered as native and legitimate Athenians, whose fathers and mothers were both natives of Athens; and it had been executed just before with the utmost rigour. For the king of Egypt‡ having sent to Athens a present of 40 000 measures of corn to be distributed among the people, the bastards, on account of this new law, were involved in a thousand law-suits and difficulties, till then unpractised, and which had not been so much as thought of. Near 5000 of them were condemned and sold as slaves, whilst 14,040 citizens were confirmed in their privileges, and recognized as true Athenians. It was thought very strange, that the author and promoter of this law should himself desire to have it repealed. But the Athenians were moved to compassion at the domestic calamities of Pericles; so that they permitted him to enrol his bastard in the register of the citizens of his tribe, and to let him bear his own name.

A. M. 3576. Ant. J. C. 428. A little after, he himself was infected with the pestilence. Being extremely ill, and ready to breathe his last, the principal citizens, and such of his friends as had not forsaken him, discoursing together in his bed-chamber about his rare merit, they ran over his exploits, and computed the number of his victories; for whilst he was generalissimo of the Athenians, he had erected for the glory of their city nine trophies, in memory of as many battles gained by him. They did not imagine that Pericles heard what they were saying, because he seemed to have lost his senses; but it was far otherwise, for not a single word of their discourse had escaped him; when, breaking suddenly from his silence, *I am surprised*, says he, *that you should treasure up so well in your memo-*

* The army which besieged Potidæa consisted of 3000 men, exclusive of the 1600 who had been sent under the command of Phormio. Every soldier received (daily) two drachms, or twenty pence (French,) for master and man; and those of the galleys had the same pay. *Thucyd.* l. iii. p. 182. † About 2·0,000*l.*

‡ Plutarch does not name this king. Perhaps it was Inarus, son to Psammetichus king of Libya, who had caused part of the Egyptians to take up arms against Artaxerxes, and to whom the Athenians, above thirty years before, had sent succours against the Persians. *Thucyd.* l. i. p. 68.

ries, and extol so highly, a series of actions in which fortune had so great a share, and which are common to me with so many other generals; and at the same time should forget the most glorious circumstances in my life,—I mean, my never having caused a single citizen to put on mourning. A fine saying! which very few in high stations can declare with truth. The Athenians were deeply afflicted at his death.

The reader has doubtless observed, from what has been said of Pericles, that in him were united most qualities which constitute the great man; as those of the admiral, by his skill in naval affairs; of the great captain, by his conquests and victories; of the financier, by his excellent regulations of the public revenue; of the great politician, by the extent and justness of his views, by his eloquence in public deliberations, and by the dexterity and address with which he transacted affairs; of a minister of state, by the methods he employed to increase trade and promote the arts in general; in fine, of father of his country, by the happiness he procured to every individual, and which he always had in view, as the true scope and end of his administration.

But I must not omit another characteristic which was peculiar to him. He acted with so much wisdom, moderation, disinterestedness, and zeal, for the public good; he discovered, in all things, so great a superiority of talents, and gave so exalted an idea of his experience, capacity, and integrity, that he acquired the confidence of all the Athenians; and fixed (in his own favour,) during forty years that he governed the Athenians, their natural fickleness and inconstancy. He suppressed that jealousy, which an extreme fondness for liberty had made them entertain against all citizens distinguished by their merit and great authority. But the most surprising circumstance is, he gained this great ascendant merely by persuasion, without employing force, mean artifices, or any of those arts which a common politician excuses in himself, upon the specious pretence, that the necessity of the public affairs, and the interests of the state, require them.

Anaxagoras died the same year as Pericles.* Plutarch relates a circumstance concerning him, that happened some time before, which must not be omitted. He says that this philosopher, who had voluntarily reduced himself to excessive poverty, in order that he might have the greater leisure to pursue his studies; finding himself neglected in his old age by Pericles, who, in the multiplicity of the public affairs, had not always time to think of him; wrapped his cloak about his head,† and threw himself on the ground, in the fixed resolution to starve himself. Pericles hearing of this accidentally, ran with the utmost haste to the philosopher's house, in the deepest affliction. He conjured him, in the strongest and

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

† It was the custom for those to cover their heads with their cloaks who were reduced to despair, and resolved to die

most moving terms, not to throw his life away; adding, that it was not Anaxagoras but himself that was to be lamented, if he was so unfortunate as to lose so wise and faithful a friend; one who was so capable of giving him wholesome counsels, in the pressing emergencies of the state. Anaxagoras then, uncovering a little his head, spoke thus to him: *Pericles, those who need the light of a lamp take care to feed it with oil.* This was a gentle, and at the same time a keen and piercing reproach. Pericles ought to have supplied his wants unasked. Many lamps are extinguished in this manner in a country, by the criminal negligence of those who ought to supply them.

SECTION III.

The Lacedæmonians besiege Platæa. Mitylene is taken by the Athenians. Platæa surrenders. The plague breaks out again in Athens.

Fourth and fifth years of the War.

A. M. 3576. Ant. J. C. 428. The most memorable transaction of the following years,* was the siege of Platæa by the Lacedæmonians. This was one of the most famous sieges of antiquity, on account of the vigorous efforts of both parties; but especially for the glorious resistance made by the besieged, and their bold and industrious stratagem, by which several of them got out of the city, and by that means escaped the fury of the enemy. The Lacedæmonians besieged this place in the beginning of the third campaign. As soon as they had pitched their camp round the city, in order to lay waste the surrounding country, the Platæans sent deputies to Archidamus, who commanded on that occasion, to represent that he could not attack them with the least shadow of justice, because that, after the famous battle of Platæa, Pausanias, the Grecian general, offering up a sacrifice in their city to Jupiter the Deliverer, in presence of all the allies, had given them their freedom, to reward their valour and zeal; and therefore, that they ought not to be disturbed in the enjoyment of their liberties, since it had been granted them by a Lacedæmonian. Archidamus answered, that their demand would be very reasonable, had they not joined with the Athenians, the professed enemies to the liberty of Greece; but that, if they would disengage themselves from their present alliance, or at least remain neuter, they then should be left in the full enjoyment of their privileges. The deputies replied, that they could not possibly come to any agreement, without the cognizance of Athens, whither their wives and their children were retired. The Lacedæmonians permitted them to send thither; when the Athenians promising solemnly to succour them to the utmost of their power, the Platæans resolved to suffer the last extremities rather than surrender; and accordingly they informed the Lacedæ-

* Thucyd. l. ii. p. 147—151. Diod. l. xii. p. 102—109.

monians, from their walls, that they could not comply with what was desired.

Archidamus then, after calling upon the gods to witness that he did not first infringe the alliance, and was not the cause of the calamities which might befal the Platæans, for having refused the just and reasonable conditions offered them, prepared for the siege. He surrounded the city with a circumvallation of trees, which were laid long-ways, very close together, with their boughs interwoven, and turned towards the city, to prevent any person from going out of it. He afterwards threw up a platform to set the batteries on; in hopes that, as so many hands were employed, they should soon take the city. He therefore caused trees to be felled on mount Cithæron, and interwove them with fascines, in order to support the terrace on all sides; he then threw into it wood, earth, and stones; in a word, whatever could help to fill it up The whole army worked night and day, without the least intermission, during seventy days; one half of the soldiers reposing themselves, whilst the rest were at work.

The besieged observing that the work began to rise, threw up a wooden wall upon the walls of the city, opposite to the platform, in order that they might always out-top the besiegers: and filled the hollow of this wooden wall with the bricks they took from the rubbish of the neighbouring houses; so that the beams of timber served in a manner as a defence to keep the wall from falling, as it was carrying up. It was covered, on the outside, with hides, both raw and dry, in order to shelter the works and the workmen from the fires discharged against it. In proportion as it rose, the platform was raised also, which in this manner was carried to a great height. But the besieged made a hole in the opposite wall, in order to carry off the earth that sustained the platform; which the besiegers perceiving, they put baskets of reeds filled with mortar in the place of the earth which had been removed, because these could not be so easily carried off. The besieged, therefore, finding their first stratagem defeated, made a mine under ground as far as the platform, in order to work under cover, and to remove from it the earth and other materials of which it was composed, and which they gave from hand to hand, as far as the city. The besiegers were a considerable time without perceiving this, till at last they found that their work did not go forward, and that the more earth they laid on, the lower it sunk. But the besieged judging that the superiority of numbers would at length prevail; without wasting their time any longer on this work, or carrying the wall higher on the side towards the battery, contented themselves with building another within, in the form of a half-moon, both ends of which joined to the wall; in order that they might retire behind it when the first wall should be forced; and so oblige the enemy to make fresh works.

In the mean time the besiegers having set up their machines

(doubtless after they had filled up the ditch, though Thucydides does not say this,) shook the city wall in a very terrible manner which, though it alarmed the citizens very much, did not however discourage them. They employed every art that their imagination could suggest against the enemy's batteries. They prevented the effect of the battering-rams, by ropes* which turned aside their strokes. They also employed another artifice: the two ends of a great beam were made fast, by long iron chains, to two large pieces of timber, supported at due distance upon the wall in the nature of a balance; so that whenever the enemy played their machine, the besieged lifted up this beam, and let it fall on the head of the battering-ram, which quite deadened its force, and consequently made it of no effect.

The besiegers finding the attack did not go on successfully, and that a new wall was raised against their platform, despaired of being able to storm the place, and therefore changed the siege into a blockade. However, they first endeavoured to set fire to it, imagining that the town might easily be burnt down, as it was so small, whenever a strong wind should rise; for they employed all the artifice imaginable, to make themselves masters of it as soon as possible, and with little expense. They therefore threw fascines into the intervals between the walls of the city and the intrenchment with which they had surrounded them, and filled these intervals in a very little time, because of the multitude of hands employed by them, in order to set fire, at the same time, to different parts of the city. They then lighted the fire with pitch and sulphur, which in a moment made such a prodigious blaze, that the like was never seen. This invention was very near carrying the city, which had baffled all others; for the besieged could not make head at once against the fire and the enemy in several parts of the town; and had the weather favoured the besiegers, as they flattered themselves it would, it had certainly been taken: but history informs us, that an exceeding heavy rain fell, which extinguished the fire.

This last effort of the besiegers having been defeated as successfully as all the rest, they now turned the siege into a blockade, and surrounded the city with a brick wall, strengthened on each side with a deep ditch. The whole army was engaged successively in this work, and when it was finished they left a guard over half of it, the Bœotians offering to guard the rest; upon which the Lacedæmonians returned to Sparta, about the month of October. There were now in Platææ but 400 inhabitants, and fourscore Athenians, with 110 women to dress their victuals, and no other person, whether freeman or slave; all the rest having been sent to Athens before the siege.

* The lower end of these ropes formed a variety of slip-knots, with which they catched the head of the battering ram, which they raised up by the help of the machine.

During the campaign, some engagements were fought both by sea and land, which I omit as being of no importance.

The next summer,* which was the fourth year of the war, the people of Lesbos, the citizens of Methymna excepted, resolved to break their alliance with the Athenians. They had designed to rebel before the war was declared, but the Lacedæmonians would not receive them at that time. The citizens of Methymna sent advice of this to the Athenians, assuring them, that if immediate succour was not sent, the island would be inevitably lost. The dejection of the Athenians, who had sustained great losses by the war and the plague, was greatly increased, when news was brought of the revolt of so considerable an island, whose forces, which were hitherto unimpaired, would now join the enemy, and reinforce them on a sudden by the addition of a powerful fleet. The Athenians therefore immediately sent forty galleys designed for Peloponnesus, which accordingly sailed for Mitylene. The inhabitants, though in great consternation, because they were quite unprepared, yet put on the appearance of bravery, and sailed out of the port with their ships: however, being repulsed, they proposed an accommodation, which the Athenians listened to, from an apprehension that they were not strong enough to reduce the island to their allegiance. A suspension of arms was therefore agreed upon, during which the Mityleneans sent ambassadors to Athens. The fear of not obtaining their demands, made them send others to Lacedæmonia, to desire succours. This was not ill-judged, the Athenians sending them an answer which they had no reason to interpret in their favour.

The ambassadors of Mitylene, after a dangerous voyage, being arrived in Lacedæmonia, the Spartans deferred giving them an audience till the solemnization of the Olympic games, in order that the allies might hear the complaints they had to make. I shall repeat their whole speech on that occasion, as it may serve, at once, to give a just idea of Thucydides's style, and of the disposition of the several states towards the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. *We are sensible*, said the ambassadors, *that it is usual to treat deserters well at first, because of the services they do those whom they fly to; but to despise them afterwards as traitors to their country and friends. This is far from being unjust, when they have no inducement to such a change; when the same union subsists, and the same aids are reciprocally granted. But it is far otherwise between us and the Athenians: and we entreat you not to be prejudiced against us, because, after having been treated mildly by the Athenians during the peace, we now renounce their alliance when they are unfortunate. For, since we are come hither to demand admittance into the number of your friends and allies, we ought to begin our own justification by showing the justice and necessity of our procedure; it being impos*

* Thucyd. l. iii. p. 171—207 Diod l. xii. p. 108. 109.

sible for a true friendship to be established between individuals, or a solid alliance between cities, unless both are founded on virtue, and uniformity of principles and sentiments.

To come to the point: The treaty we concluded with the Athenians, was not to enslave Greece, but to free it from the yoke of the barbarians: and it was concluded from the retreat of the Persians, when you renounced the command. We adhered to it with pleasure, so long as the Athenians continued to entertain just designs; but when we saw that they discontinued the war which they were carrying on against the enemy, merely to oppress the allies, we could not but suspect their conduct. And as it was extremely difficult, in so great a diversity of interests and opinions, for all to continue in strict union; and still harder to make head against them, when alone and separated; they have subjected, by insensible degrees, all the allies, except the inhabitants of Chios, and our people; and used our own forces for this end. For, at the same time that they left us seemingly at our liberty, they obliged us to follow them; though we could no longer rely on their word, and had the strongest reason to fear the like treatment. And, indeed, what probability is there, after their enslaving all the other states, that they should show a regard to us only, and admit us upon the foot of equals, if they may become our masters whenever they please; especially as their power increases daily, in proportion as ours lessens? A mutual fear between confederates is a strong motive to make an alliance lasting, and to prevent unjust and violent attempts, by keeping all things in an equilibrium. If they left us the enjoyment of our liberties, it was merely because they could not intrench upon them by open force, but only by that equity and specious moderation they have shown us. First, they pretended to prove, from their moderate conduct in regard to us, that as we are free, we should not have marched in conjunction with them against the other allies, had they not given them just grounds for complaint. Secondly, by attacking the weakest first, and subduing them one after another, they enabled themselves, by their ruin, to subject the most powerful without difficulty, who at last would be left alone, and without support: whereas, had they begun by invading us, at the time that the allies were possessed of all their strength, and were able to make some stand, they could not so easily have completed their design. Besides, as we had a large fleet, which would strengthen considerably whatever party we should declare for, this was a check upon them. Add to this, that the high regard we have always shown for their republic, and the endeavours we have used to gain the favour of those who commanded it, have suspended our ruin. But we had been undone had not this war broken out; and of this the fate of others leaves us no room to doubt.

What friendship, then, what lasting alliance, can be concluded with those who never are friends and allies, but when force is employed to make them continue such? For, as they were obliged to pay court to us during the war to prevent our joining with the enemy,

we were constrained to treat them with the same regard in time of peace, to prevent their falling upon us. That which love produces in other places, was with us the effect of fear. It was this circumstance that made an alliance subsist some time, which both parties were determined to break upon the very first favourable occasion; let therefore no one accuse us for the advantage we now take. We had not always the same opportunity to save ourselves, as they had to ruin us; but were under a necessity of waiting a favourable juncture, before we could venture to declare ourselves.

Such are the motives which now oblige us to solicit your alliance: motives, the equity and justice of which appear very strong to us, and consequently call upon us to provide for our safety: we should have claimed your protection before, had you been sooner inclined to afford it us; for we offered ourselves to you, even before the war broke out: we are now come, at the persuasion of the Bœotians, your allies, to disengage ourselves from the oppressors of Greece, and join our arms with those of its defenders; and to provide for the security of our state, which is now in imminent danger. If any thing can be objected to our conduct, it is, our declaring so precipitately, with more generosity than prudence, and without having made the least preparations. But this also ought to engage you to be the more ready in succouring us; that you may not lose the opportunity of protecting the oppressed, and avenging yourselves on your enemies. There never was a more favourable conjuncture than that which now offers itself; a conjuncture, when war and pestilence have consumed their forces, and exhausted their treasure: not to mention that their fleet is divided, by which means they will not be in a condition to resist you, should you invade them at the same time by sea and land For, they either will leave us to attack you, and give us an opportunity of succouring you; or they will oppose us all together, and then you will have but half their forces to deal with.

As to what remains, let no one imagine that you will expose yourselves to dangers for a people incapable of doing you service. Our country indeed lies at a considerable distance from you, but our aid is near at hand. For the war will be carried on, not in Attica, as is supposed, but in that country whose revenues are the support of Attica, and we are not far from it. Consider, also, that in abandoning us, you will increase the power of the Athenians by the addition of ours; and that no state will then dare to revolt against them. But in succouring us, you will strengthen yourselves with a fleet which you so much want; you will induce many other people, after our example, to join you; and you will take off the reproach cast upon you, of abandoning those who have recourse to your protection, which will be no inconsiderable advantage to you during the course of the war.

We therefore implore you, in the name of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple we now are, not to frustrate the hopes of the Greeks, nor reject suppliants, whose preservation may be highly advantageous, and whose ruin may be infinitely pernicious to you. Show

yourselves such now, as the idea entertained of your generosity, and the extreme danger to which we are reduced, demand; that is, the protectors of the afflicted, the deliverers of Greece.

The allies, struck with these reasons, admitted them into the alliance of Peloponnesus. An immediate incursion into the enemy's country was resolved, and that the allies should rendezvous at Corinth with two-thirds of their forces. The Lacedæmonians arrived first, and prepared engines for transporting the ships from the gulf of Corinth into the sea of Athens, in order to invade Attica both by sea and land. The Athenians were no less active on their side; but the allies, being employed in their harvest, and beginning to grow weary of the war, were a long time before they met.

During this interval, the Athenians, who perceived that all these preparations were made against them, from a supposition that they were weak; in order to undeceive the world, and show that they were able to furnish a fleet without calling in any of their ships from before Lesbos, put to sea a fleet of 100 sail, which they manned with citizens as well as foreigners; not exempting a single citizen, except such only as were obliged to serve on horse-back, or whose revenue amounted to 500 measures of corn. After having showed themselves before the isthmus of Corinth, to make a display of their power, they made descents into whatever parts of Peloponnesus they pleased.

They never had had a finer fleet. They guarded their own country, and the coasts of Eubœa and Salamis with a fleet of 100 ships: they cruised round Peloponnesus with another fleet of the like number of vessels, without including their fleet before Lesbos and other places. The whole amounted to upwards of 250 galleys. The expenses of this powerful armament entirely exhausted their treasure, which had been very much drained before by those incurred by the siege of Potidæa.

The Lacedæmonians, greatly surprised at so formidable a fleet, which they no ways expected, returned with the utmost expedition to their own country, and only ordered forty galleys to be fitted out for the succour of Mitylene. The Athenians had sent a reinforcement thither, consisting of 1000 heavy-armed troops, by whose assistance they made a contravallation, with forts in the most commodious places; so that it was blocked up both by sea and land, in the beginning of winter. The Athenians were in such great want of money for carrying on this siege, that they were reduced to assess themselves, which they had never before, and by this means 200 talents* were sent to it.

A. M. 3577 Ant. J. C. 427. The people of Mitylene being in want of all things, and having waited to no purpose for the succours which the Lacedæmonians had promised them, surrendered, upon condition that no person should be put to death or imprisoned, till

* Two hundred thousand crowns, about 45,000*l* sterling.

the ambassadors, whom they should send to Athens, were returned; and that, in the mean time, the troops should be admitted into the city. As soon as the Athenians had got possession of the city, such of the factious Mityleneans as had fled to the altar for refuge, were conveyed to Tenedos, and afterwards to Athens. There the affair of the Mitylenеans was debated. As the revolt had greatly exasperated the people, because it had not been preceded by any ill treatment, and seemed a mere effect of their hatred for the Athenians, in the first transports of their rage they resolved to put all the citizens to death indiscriminately, and to make all the women and children slaves; and immediately they sent a galley to put the decree in execution.

But night gave them leisure to reflect. This severity was judged too cruel, and carried beyond its due bounds. They imagined to themselves the fate of that unhappy city, entirely abandoned to slaughter, and repented their having involved the innocent with the guilty. This sudden change of the Athenians gave the Mitylenean ambassadors some little glimmerings of hope; and they prevailed so far with the magistrates, as to have the affair debated a second time. Cleon, who had suggested the first decree, a man of a fiery temper, and who had great influence over the people, maintained his opinion with much vehemence and heat. He represented, that it was unworthy a wise government to change with every wind, and to annul in the morning what they had decreed the night before; and that it was highly important to take an exemplary vengeance on the Mityleneans, in order to awe the rest of their allies, who were every where ready to revolt.

Diodorus, who had contradicted Cleon in the first assembly, now opposed his arguments more strongly than before. After describing, in a tender and pathetic manner, the deplorable condition of the Mitylenеans, whose minds (he said) must necessarily be tortured with anxiety and suspense, whilst they were expecting a sentence that was to determine their fate; he represented to the Athenians, that the fame of their mildness and clemency had always reflected the highest honour on them, and distinguished them gloriously from all other nations. He observed, that the citizens of Mitylene had been drawn involuntarily into the rebellion; a proof of which was, their surrendering the city to them the instant it was in their power to do it: they, therefore, by this decree, would murder their benefactors, and consequently be both unjust and ungrateful, as they would punish the innocent with the guilty. He observed further, that supposing the Mitylenеans in general were guilty, it would however be for the interest of the Athenians to dissemble, in order that the rigorous punishment they had decreed might not exasperate the rest of the allies; and that the best way to put a stop to the evil, would be, to leave room for repentance, and not plunge people into despair, by the absolute and irrevocable refusal of a pardon. His opinion therefore was, that they should

examine very deliberately the cause of those factious Mityleneans who had been brought to Athens, and pardon all the rest.

The assembly was much divided, so that Diodorus carried it only by a few votes. A second galley was therefore immediately fitted out. It was furnished with every thing that might accelerate its course, and the ambassadors of Mitylene promised a great reward to the crew, provided they arrived in time. They therefore made extraordinary exertions, and did not quit their oars even when they took sustenance, but ate and drank as they rowed, and took their rest alternately; and very happily for them the wind was favourable. The first galley had got a day and night's sail before them; but as those on board carried ill news, they did not make great haste. Its arrival before the city had spread the utmost consternation in every part of it: but this consternation was increased infinitely, when the decree, by which all the citizens were sentenced to die, was read in a full assembly. Nothing now was heard in all places but cries and loud laments. The moment that the sentence was going to be put in execution, advice came that a second galley was arrived. Immediately the cruel massacre was suspended. The assembly was again convened; and the decree which granted a pardon was listened to with such silence and joy, as is much easier conceived than expressed.

All the factious Mityleneans who had been taken, though upwards of 1000, were put to death. The city was afterwards dismantled, the ships delivered up, and the whole island, the city of Methymna excepted, was divided into 3000 parts, 300 of which were consecrated to the service of the gods; and the rest divided by lot among such Athenians as were sent thither, to whom the natives of the country gave a revenue of two minæ* for every portion; on which condition they were permitted to keep possession of the island, but not as proprietors. The cities which belonged to the Mityleneans on the coast of Asia, were all subjected by the Athenians.

During the winter of the preceding campaign,† the inhabitants of Platææ, having lost all hopes of succour, and being in the utmost want of provisions, formed a resolution to escape through the enemy: but half of them, struck with the greatness of the danger and the boldness of the enterprise, entirely lost their courage when they came to the execution; but the rest (who were about 220 soldiers) persisted in the resolution, and escaped in the following manner.

Before I begin the description of their escape, it will be proper to inform my readers, in what sense I use certain expressions which I shall employ in it. In strictness of speech, the line of fortification which is made round a city when besieged, to prevent sallies, is called *contravallation;* and that which is made to prevent any succours from without, is named *circumvallation.* Both these

* The Attic mina was worth 100 drachmas, that is, fifty French livres.
† Thucyd. l. iii. p. 185—188.

fortifications were used in this siege; however, for brevity's sake, I shall use only the former term.

The contravallation consisted of two walls, at sixteen feet distance one from the other. The space between the two walls being a kind of platform or terrace, seemed to be but one single building, and composed a range of cazerns or barracks, where the soldiers had their lodgings. Lofty towers were built around it at proper distances, extending from one wall to the other, in order that they might be able to defend themselves at the same time against any attack from within and without. There was no going from one cazern to another without crossing those towers; and on the top of the wall was a parapet on both sides, where a guard was commonly kept; but in rainy weather, the soldiers used to shelter themselves in the towers, which served as guard-houses. Such was the contravallation, on both sides of which was a ditch, the earth of which had been employed in making the bricks of the wall

The besieged first ascertained the height of the wall, by counting the rows of bricks which composed it; and this they did at different times, and employed several men for that purpose, in order that they might not mistake in the calculation. This was the easier, because, as the wall stood at a small distance, every part of it was very visible They then made ladders of a proper length.

All things being now ready for executing the design, the besieged left the city one night when there was no moon, in the midst of a storm of wind and rain. After crossing the first ditch, they drew near to the wall undiscovered, through the darkness of the night; not to mention that the noise made by the rain and wind prevented their being heard. They marched at some distance from one another, to prevent the clashing of their arms, which were light, in order that those who carried them might be the more active; and one of their legs was naked, to keep them from sliding so easily in the mire. Those who carried the ladders laid them in the space between the towers, where they knew no guard was posted, because it rained. That instant twelve men mounted the ladders, armed with only a coat of mail and a dagger, and marched directly to the towers, six on each side. They were followed by soldiers armed only with javelins, that they might mount the easier; and the shields were carried after them to be used in the conflict.

When most of them got to the top of the wall, they were discovered by the falling of a tile, which one of their comrades, in taking hold of the parapet to keep himself steady, had thrown down. The alarm was immediately given from the towers, and the whole camp approached the wall without discovering the occasion of the outcry, from the gloom of the night and the violence of the storm. Besides which, those who had stayed behind in the city beat an alarm at the same time in another quarter, to make a diversion: so that the enemy did not know which way to turn

themselves, and were afraid to quit their posts. But a body of reserve of 300 men, who were kept for any unforescen accident that might happen, quitted the contravallation, and ran to that part where they heard the noise; and torches were held up towards Thebes, to show that they must run that way. But those in the city, to render that signal of no use, held up others at the same time in different quarters, having prepared them on the wall for that purpose.

In the mean time, those who had mounted first, having possessed themselves of the two towers which flanked the interval where the ladders were set, and having killed those who guarded them, posted themselves there to defend the passage, and keep off the besiegers. Then setting ladders from the top of the wall against the two towers, they caused a good number of their comrades to mount, in order to keep off, by the discharge of their arrows, as well those who were advancing to the foot of the wall, as others who were hastening from the neighbouring towers. Whilst this was doing, they had time to set up several ladders, and to throw down the parapet, that the rest might come up with greater ease. As fast as they came up, they went down on the other side, and drew up near the ditch on the outside, to shoot at those who appeared. After they were passed over, the men who were in the towers came down last, and made to the ditch to follow after the rest.

That instant the guard of 300, with torches, came up. However, as the Platæans saw their enemies by this light better than they were seen by them, they took a surer aim, by which means the last crossed the ditch without being attacked in their passage: but this was not done without difficulty, because the ditch was frozen over, and the ice would not bear, on account of the thaw and heavy rains. The violence of the storm was of great advantage to them.

After all were passed over, they took the road towards Thebes, the better to conceal their retreat; because it was not likely that they would flee towards a city of the enemy's. And accordingly, they perceived the besiegers, with torches in their hands, pursuing them in the road that led to Athens. After keeping that towards Thebes about six or seven stadia,* they turned short towards the mountain, and resumed the road towards Athens, whither 212 arrived, out of 220 who had quitted the place; the rest having returned back through fear, one archer excepted, who was taken on the side of the ditch of contravallation. The besiegers, after having pursued them to no purpose, returned to their camp.

In the mean time, the Platæans who remained in the city supposing that all their companions had been killed (because those who returned, to justify themselves, affirmed they were,) sent a herald to demand the dead bodies; but being told the true state of the affair, he withdrew.

* Upwards of a quarter of a league.

About the end of the following campaign,* which is that wherein Mitylene was taken, the Platæans being in absolute want of provisions, and unable to make the least defence, surrendered, upon condition that they should not be punished till they had been tried by the due forms of justice. Five commissioners came for this purpose from Lacedæmon; and these, without charging them with any crime, barely asked them, whether they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians and the allies in this war? The Platæans were much surprised, as well as embarrassed, by this question; and were sensible, that it had been suggested by the Thebans, their professed enemies, who had vowed their destruction. They therefore put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the services they had done to Greece in general, both at the battle of Artemisium, and that of Platææ: and particularly in Lacedæmonia, at the time of the earthquake, which was followed by the revolt of their slaves. The only reason (they declared) of their having joined the Athenians afterwards, was, to defend themselves from the hostilities of the Thebans, against whom they had implored the assistance of the Lacedæmonians to no purpose: that if it was imputed to them for a crime, which was only their misfortune, it ought not however entirely to obliterate the remembrance of their former services. *Cast your eyes*, said they, *on the monuments of your ancestors which you see here, to whom we annually pay all the honours which can be rendered to the manes of the dead. You thought fit to intrust their bodies with us, as we were eye-witnesses of their bravery: and yet you will now give up their ashes to their murderers, in abandoning us to the Thebans, who fought against them at the battle of Platææ. Will you enslave a province where Greece recovered its liberty? Will you destroy the temples of those gods, to whom you are indebted for victory? Will you abolish the memory of their founders, who contributed so greatly to your safety? On this occasion, we may venture to say, our interest is inseparable from your glory: and you cannot deliver up your ancient friends and benefactors to the unjust hatred of the Thebans, without overwhelming yourselves with eternal infamy.*

One would conclude, that these just remonstrances should have made some impression on the Lacedæmonians; but they were biassed more by the answer the Thebans made, which was expressed in the most haughty and bitter terms against the Platæans and besides, they had brought their instructions from Lacedæmon. They adhered therefore to their first question, *Whether the Platæans had done them any service since the war?* and making them pass one after another, as they severally answered *No*, they were immediately butchered, and not one escaped. About 200 were killed in this manner; and twenty-five Athenians, who were among them met with the same unhappy fate. Their wives, who had been

* Thucyd. l. iii. p. 203—220. Diod. l. xii. p. 109.

taken prisoners, were reduced to slavery The Thebans afterwards peopled their city with exiles from Megara and Platææ; but the year after they demolished it entirely. It was in this manner that the Lacedæmonians, in the hopes of reaping great advantages from the Thebans, sacrificed the Platæans to their animosity, ninety-three years after their first alliance with the Athenians.

A. M. 3578. Ant. J. C. 426. In the sixth year of the war of Peloponnesus the plague broke out anew in Athens,* and again swept away great numbers.

SECTION IV.

The Athenians possess themselves of Pylus, and are afterwards besieged in it. The Spartans are shut up in the little island of Sphacteria. Cleon makes himself master of it. Artaxerxes dies.

The sixth and seventh years of the war.

I pass over several particular incidents of the succeeding campaigns, which differ very little from one another; the Lacedæmonians making regularly every year incursions into Attica, and the Athenians into Peloponnesus: I likewise omit some sieges in different places: that of Pylus,† a little city of Messenia, only 400 furlongs‡ from Lacedæmon, was one of the most considerable. The Athenians, headed by Demosthenes, had taken that city, and fortified themselves very strongly in it; this was the seventh year of the war. The Lacedæmonians left Attica immediately, in order to go and recover that place, and accordingly they attacked it both by sea and land. Brasidas, one of their leaders, signalized himself here by the most extraordinary acts of bravery. Opposite to the city was a little island called Sphacteria, from whence the besieged might be greatly annoyed, and the entrance of the harbour shut up. They therefore threw a chosen body of Lacedæmonians into it; making, in all, 420, exclusive of the Helots. A battle was fought at sea, in which the Athenians were victorious, and accordingly erected a trophy. They surrounded the island, and set a guard over every part of it, to prevent any of the inhabitants from going out, or any provisions being brought in to them.

A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425.

The news of the defeat being come to Sparta, the magistrate thought the affair of the utmost importance, and therefore came himself upon the spot, in order that he might be better able to take proper measures; when, concluding that it would be impossible for him to save those who were in the island, and that they at last must necessarily be starved out, or be taken by some other means, he proposed an accommodation. A suspension of arms was concluded, in order to give the Lacedæmonians time to send to Athens.

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 232.
† Ibid. l. iv. p. 253—280. Diod. l. xii. p. 112—114.
‡ Twenty French leagues.

but upon condition that in the mean time they should surrender up all their galleys, and not attack the place either by sea or land, till the return of the ambassadors: that if they complied with these conditions, the Athenians would permit them to carry provisions to those who were in the island, at the rate of so much for the master,* and half for the servant; and that the whole should be done publicly, and in sight of both armies: that, on the other side, the Athenians should be allowed to keep guard round the island, to prevent any thing from going in or out of it, but should not attack it in any manner: that in case this agreement should be infringed in the least, the truce would be broken; otherwise, that it should continue in full force till the return of the ambassadors, whom the Athenians obliged themselves, by the articles, to convey and bring back; and that then the Lacedæmonians should have their ships restored, in the same condition in which they had been delivered up. Such were the articles of the treaty. The Lacedæmonians began to put it in execution, by surrendering about threescore ships; after which they sent ambassadors to Athens.

Being admitted to audience before the people, they began by saying, that they were come to the Athenians to sue for that peace which they themselves were, a little before, in a condition to grant: that it depended only upon them to acquire the glory of having restored the tranquillity of all Greece, as the Lacedæmonians consented to their being arbitrators in this treaty: that the danger to which their citizens were exposed in the island, had determined them to take such a step as could not but be very grating to Lacedæmonians: however, that their affairs were far from being desperate, and therefore, that now was the time to establish, between the two republics, a firm and solid friendship; because the affairs of both were still fluctuating, and fortune had not yet declared absolutely in favour of either: that the gods frequently abandoned those whom success makes proud, by shifting the scene, and rendering them as unfortunate as they before had been happy; that they ought to consider, that the fate of arms is very uncertain; and that the means to establish a lasting peace, is not to triumph over an enemy by oppressing him, but to agree to a reconciliation on just and reasonable terms: for then, conquered by generosity and not by violence, his future thoughts being all employed, not on revenge, but on gratitude, he makes it both his pleasure and his duty to observe his engagements with inviolable fidelity.

The Athenians had now a happy opportunity for terminating the war, by a peace which would have been no less glorious to them than advantageous to all Greece. But Cleon, who had a great ascendant over the people, prevented so important a benefit. They, therefore, answered, by his advice, that those who were in the

* For the masters, two Attic chœnices of flour, making about four pounds and a half, two cotyles, or half pints, of wine, and a piece of meat; with half this quantity for the servants.

island should first surrender at discretion; and afterwards be carried to Athens, on the condition of being sent back from it, as soon as the Lacedæmonians should have restored the cities which the Athenians had been forced to give up by the last treaty; and that these things being done, a firm and lasting peace should be concluded. The Lacedæmonians demanded that deputies should be appointed, and that the Athenians should engage to ratify what they should conclude. But Cleon exclaimed against this proposal, and said, it was plain they did not deal fairly, since they would not negotiate with the people, but with individuals, whom they might easily bribe; and that, if they had any thing to offer, they should do it immediately. The Lacedæmonians, finding there was no possibility for them to treat with the people without advising with their allies, and that if any thing were to be granted by them to their prejudice they must be responsible for it, went away without concluding any thing; fully persuaded that they must not expect equitable treatment from the Athenians, in the present state of their affairs and disposition occasioned by their prosperity.

As soon as they were returned to Pylus, the suspension ceased; but when the Lacedæmonians came to demand back their ships, the Athenians refused to give them up, upon pretence that the treaty had been infringed in some particulars of little consequence. The Lacedæmonians inveighed strongly against this refusal, as being a manifest perfidy; and immediately prepared for war with greater vigour and animosity than before. A haughty carriage in success, and want of faith in the observance of treaties, never fail, at last, to involve a people in great calamities. This will appear by the sequel.

The Athenians continued to keep a strict guard round the island, to prevent any provisions from being brought into it, and hoped that they should soon be able to starve out the enemy. But the Lacedæmonians engaged the whole country in their interest by the views of gain, by affixing a high price upon provisions, and giving such slaves their freedom as should convey any into it. Provisions were therefore now brought (at the hazard of men's lives) from all parts of Peloponnesus. There were even divers who swam from the coast to the island, opposite to the harbour, and drew after them goat-skins filled with pounded linseed, and poppy-seed mixed with honey.

Those who were besieged in Pylus were reduced to almost the like extremities, being in want both of water and provisions. When advice was brought to Athens, that their countrymen, so far from reducing the enemy by famine, were themselves almost starved; it was feared, that as it would not be possible for the fleet to subsist during the winter on a desert coast which belonged to the enemy, nor to lie at anchor in so dangerous a road, the island must by that means be less securely guarded, which would give the prisoners an opportunity of escaping. But the circumstance they

chiefly dreaded was, lest the Lacedæmonians, after their countrymen were once extricated from their danger, should refuse to hearken to any conditions of peace; so that they now repented their having refused it when offered them.

Cleon saw plainly that these complaints would all fall upon him. He therefore began by asserting, that the report of the extreme want of provisions, to which the Athenians both within and without Pylus were said to be reduced, was absolutely false. He next exclaimed, in presence of the people, against the supineness and inactivity of the leaders who besieged the island, pretending, that were they to exert the least vigour and bravery, they might soon make themselves masters of it; and that had he the command, he would soon take it. Upon this he was immediately appointed to command the expedition; Nicias, who was before elected, resigning voluntarily that honour to him, either through weakness, for he was naturally timid, or out of a political view, in order that the ill success, which it was generally believed Cleon would meet with in this enterprise, might lose him the favour of the people. Cleon was greatly surprised as well as embarrassed; for he did not expect that the Athenians would take him at his word, he being a finer talker than soldier, and much more able with his tongue than his sword. He for some time desired leave to waive the honour they offered him, for which he alleged several excuses; but finding that the more he declined the command the more they pressed him to accept it, he changed his note; and supplying his want of courage with rodomontade, he declared before the whole assembly, with a firm and resolute air, that he would bring, in twenty days, those of the island prisoners, or lose his life. The whole assembly, on hearing these words set up a laugh; for they knew the man.

Cleon, however, contrary to the expectation of every body, made good his words. He and Demosthenes (the other chief) landed in the island, attacked the enemy with great vigour, drove them from post to post, and gaining ground perpetually, at last forced them to the extremity of the island. The Lacedæmonians had gained a fort that was thought inaccessible. There they drew up in battle-array, faced about to that side where alone they could be attacked, and defended themselves like so many lions. As the engagement had lasted the greatest part of the day, and the soldiers were oppressed with heat and weariness, and parched with thirst, the general of the Messenians, directing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, said, that all their efforts would be to no purpose, unless they charged the enemy's rear; and promised, if they would give him but some troops armed with missive weapons, that he would by some means or other find a passage. Accordingly, he and his followers climbed up certain steep and craggy places which were not guarded, when coming down unperceived into the fort, he appeared on a sudden at the backs of the Lacedæmonians, which en-

tirely damped their courage, and afterwards completed their overthrow. They now made but a very feeble resistance; and being oppressed with numbers, attacked on all sides, and dejected through fatigue and despair, they began to give way; but the Athenians seized on all the passes to cut off their retreat. Cleon and Demosthenes, finding that should the battle continue not a man of them would escape, and being desirous of carrying them alive to Athens, they commanded their soldiers to desist; and caused proclamation to be made by a herald, for them to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion. At these words, the greatest part lowered their shields, and clapped their hands in token of approbation. A kind of suspension of arms was agreed upon; and their commander desired leave might be granted him to despatch a messenger to the camp, to know the resolution of the generals. This was not allowed, but they called heralds from the coast; and after several messages, a Lacedæmonian advanced forward, and cried aloud, that they were permitted to treat with the enemy, provided they did not submit to dishonourable terms. Upon this they held a conference; after which they surrendered at discretion, and were kept till the next day. The Athenians then raising a trophy, and restoring the Lacedæmonians their dead, embarked for their own country, after distributing their prisoners among the several ships, and committing the guard of them to the captain of the galleys.

In this battle 128 Lacedæmonians fell, out of 420, which was their number at first; so that there survived not quite 300, 120 of whom were Spartans, that is, inhabitants of the city of Sparta. The siege of the island (computing from the beginning of it, and including the time employed in the truce) had lasted threescore and twelve days. They all now left Pylus; and Cleon's promise, though so vain and rash, was found literally fulfilled. But the most surprising circumstance was, the capitulation that had been made; for it was believed the Lacedæmonians, so far from surrendering their arms, would die sword in hand.

Being come to Athens, it was decreed that they should remain prisoners till a peace was concluded, provided the Lacedæmonians did not make any incursions into their country, for that then they should all be put to death. They left a garrison in Pylus. The Messenians of Naupactus, who had formerly possessed it, sent thither the flower of their youth, who very much infested the Lacedæmonians by their incursions; and as these Messenians spoke the language of the country, they prevailed with a great number of slaves to join them. The Lacedæmonians, dreading a greater evil, sent several deputations to Athens, but to no purpose; the Athenians being too much elated with their prosperity, and especially their late success, to listen to any terms.

In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war,* Artaxerxes sent

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 235, 236.

to the Lacedæmonians an ambassador named Artaphernes, with a letter written in the Assyrian language, in which he said, that he had received many embassies from them, but the purport of them all differed so widely, that he could not comprehend what it was they requested: that in this uncertainty, he had thought proper to send a Persian to acquaint them, that if they had any proposals to make, they had only to send a person in whom they could confide along with him, from whom he might be exactly informed of what they desired. This ambassador, arriving at Eion, on the river Strymon, in Thrace, was there taken prisoner, about the close of this year, by one of the admirals of the Athenian fleet, who sent him to Athens. He was treated with the utmost civility and respect; the Athenians being extremely desirous of recovering the favour of the king his master.

The year following, as soon as the season would permit the Athenians to put to sea, they sent the ambassador back in one of their ships at the public expense; and appointed some of their citizens to wait upon him to the court of Persia, in quality of ambassadors. Upon landing at Ephesus, they were informed that Artaxerxes was dead; whereupon the Athenian ambassadors, thinking it not advisable to proceed farther after this news, took leave of Artaphernes, and returned to their own country.

BOOK VIII.

THE

ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the history of thirteen years of the Peloponnesian war, to the nineteenth inclusively.

SECTION I.

The very short reigns of Xerxes II. and Sogdianus. They are succeeded by Darius Nothus. He puts a stop to the insurrection of Egypt, and that of Media. He bestows on Cyrus, his youngest son, the supreme command of all Asia Minor.

A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Artaxerxes died about the beginning of the forty-ninth year of his reign.* Xerxes, who succeeded him, was the only son which the queen his wife brought him: but he had seventeen others by his concubines, among whom was Sogdianus (who is called Secondianus by Ctesias,) Ochus, and Arsites.

A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424. Sogdianus, in concert with Pharnacias one of Xerxes's eunuchs, came insidiously, one festival day, to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, was retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drunk time to evaporate; where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but forty-five days; and was declared king in his stead.

He was scarce on the throne, when he put to death Bagorazus, the most faithful of all his father's eunuchs. It was he who had been appointed to superintend the funeral obsequies of Artaxerxes, and of the queen, Xerxes's mother, who died the same day as her husband. After having deposited the two bodies in the mausoleum where the kings of Persia were interred, he found, at his return, Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favourably, upon

* Ctes. c. xlvii.—li. Diod. l. xii. p. 115.

account of some difference with him during the lifetime of his father. But the new king did not stop here: not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him, on some trifling circumstance relating to the obsequies of his father, and caused him to be stoned.

By these two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, so that he did not think himself safe on a throne to which he had forced his way by such enormous crimes. He suspected that his brothers harboured the like design; and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his suspicion. Accordingly he sent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered as soon as he arrived. However, Ochus, who saw through his design, delayed coming upon various pretences; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a strong army, which he openly declared he would employ, to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and several governors of the provinces, who were justly dissatisfied at Sogdianus's cruelty and ill conduct. They put the tiara, which was the mark of regal dignity, on Ochus's head, and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus, seeing himself abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the slight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had before been unjust and barbarous in usurping it. Contrary to the advice of his best friends, and the wisest of those who still adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who, getting him into his hands, caused him to be thrown into ashes, where he died a cruel death. This was a kind of punishment peculiar to the Persians, and exercised only on great criminals.* One of the largest towers was filled to a certain height with ashes. The criminal then was thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them; after which, the ashes were by a wheel turned perpetually round him, till he was suffocated. Thus this wicked prince lost his life and empire, which he enjoyed only six months and fifteen days.

A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423. Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now saw himself possessed of the empire. As soon as he was well settled in it, he changed his name from Ochus to that of Darius. To distinguish him, historians add the epithet Νόθος, signifying bastard. He reigned nineteen years.

Arsites, seeing in what manner Sogdianus had supplanted Xerxes, and had himself been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to serve the latter in the same manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as the mother's side, he openly revolted against him, and was assisted in it by Artyphius, son of Megabyzus. Ochus, whom hereafter we shall always call Darius, sent

* Val. Max. l. ix. c. 2. 2 Maccab. c. xiii.

Artasyras, one of his generals, against Artyphius; and himself, at the head of another army, marched against Arsites. Artyphius, with the Grecian troops in his pay, twice defeated the general sent against him. But engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himself was beaten, and forced to surrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have had him put to death, but was diverted from that resolution by queen Parysatis, Darius's sister and queen. She was also the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the same mother as Darius. She was an intriguing, artful woman; and the king her husband was governed by her on most occasions. The counsel she now gave was perfidious to the last degree. She advised him to exercise his clemency towards Artyphius, and show him kind usage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious servant with so much generosity, that he himself should meet at least with as mild treatment, and thereby be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he should have seized that prince, he might dispose of him and Artyphius as he pleased. Darius followed her counsel, which proved successful. Arsites being informed of the gentle usage which Artyphius met with, concluded that, as he was the king's brother, he should consequently meet with still more indulgent treatment; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and surrendered himself. Darius was very much inclined to save his life: but Parysatis, by inculcating to him, that it was necessary to punish this rebel in order to secure himself, at last prevailed with him to put his brother to death, and accordingly he was suffocated in ashes with Artyphius. However, Darius had a violent struggle with himself before he could consent to this sacrifice, having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put some other persons to death, which executions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them; for his reign was afterwards disturbed with such violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repose.

A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414. One of the most dangerous was occasioned by the rebellion of Pisuthnes,* who, being governor of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Persian empire, and make himself king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of succeeding in this attempt was, his having a considerable body of Grecian troops, which he had raised and enlisted in his service, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius sent Tissaphernes against this rebel, and gave him, with a considerable army, the commission of governor of Lydia, of which he was to dispossess Pisuthnes. Tissaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found means of tampering with the Greeks under Pisuthnes; and by dint of presents and promises,

* Ctes. c. 11.

brought over the troops with their general to his party. Pisuthnes, who was too much weakened by this desertion to carry on his designs, surrendered, upon his being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon; but the instant he was brought before the king, he was sentenced to be suffocated in ashes, and met with the same fate as the rest of the rebels who had preceded him. But his death did not entirely put an end to all trouble; for Amorges his son,* with the remainder of his army, still made head against Tissaphernes, and for two years laid waste the maritime provinces of Asia Minor, till he at last was taken by the Greeks of Peloponnesus, in Iasus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by them to Tissaphernes, who put him to death.

Darius was involved in fresh troubles by one of his eunuchs.† This kind of officers had, for many years, acquired considerable power in the court of Persia; and we shall find, by the sequel of this history, that they always governed absolutely in it. We may form an idea of their character,‡ and the danger to which they expose princes, by the picture which Dioclesian, after he had resigned the empire, and reduced himself to a private station of life, drew of freedmen, who had gained a like ascendant over the Roman emperors. *Four or five persons*, says he, *who are closely united, and resolutely determined to impose on a prince, may do it very easily. They never show things to him but in such a light as they are sure will please. They conceal whatever would contribute to enlighten him; and as they alone beset him continually, he cannot be informed of any thing but through their channel, and knows nothing but what they think fit to suggest to him. Hence it is, that he bestows employments on those whom he ought to exclude from them; and, on the other side, removes from offices such persons as are most worthy of filling them In a word, the best prince is often sold by these men, though he be ever so vigilant, and in despite of his distrust and suspicion of them.* Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipse dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur imperator.

In this manner was Darius's court governed. Three eunuchs had usurped all power in it;§ an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit. But one of those three eunuchs, whose name was Artoxares, presided over and governed the rest. He had found Darius's weak side, by which he insinuated himself into his confidence. He had studied all his passions, in order to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleasures and amusements, to engross his whole authority to himself. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Parysatis, to whose will and pleasure he was the most devoted of slaves, he disposed of all the affairs of the empire, and nothing was transacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the supreme

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 554—568. † Ctes. c. lii. ‡ Vopis. in vit Aurelian. Imper.
§ Scis præcipuum esse indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos. *Plin. ad Trajan*

authority which the favour of his sovereign gave him, he resolved to make himself king, instead of being prime minister; and accordingly formed a design to rid himself of Darius, and afterwards ascend the throne. However, his plot being discovered, he was seized and delivered up to Parysatis, who put him to a most ignominious and cruel death.

But the greatest misfortune which happened to Darius during the whole course of his reign, was the revolt of the Egyptians.* This terrible blow fell out the same year with Pisuthnes's rebellion. But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. The Egyptians,† weary of the Persian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrtæus of Sais, who at last was come out of the fens, where he had defended himself since the suppression of the revolt of Inarus. The Persians were driven out, and Amyrtæus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned six years.

After having established himself securely on the throne, and entirely expelled the Persians out of Egypt, he prepared to pursue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted measures with the Arabians to attack them in that country. News of this being brought the king of Persia, he recalled the fleet which he had promised the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

Whilst Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however, they were defeated, and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To punish them for this revolt, their yoke (till then easy enough) was made heavier: a fate that rebellious subjects always experience, when the government which they endeavoured to throw off gains the upper hand.

Darius's arms seem to have had the like success against the Egyptians.‡ Amyrtæus dying after he had reigned six years (he probably was killed in a battle,) Herodotus observes, it was by the permission of the Persians that Pausirus his son succeeded him in the throne. To effect this, they must either have been masters of Egypt, or their party the strongest in that kingdom.

A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407. After having crushed the rebels in Media, and restored the affairs of Egypt to their former situation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngest of his sons, the supreme command of all the provinces of Asia Minor; an important commission, by which he made all the provincial governors in that part of the empire dependant upon him.

I thought it necessary to anticipate events, and draw together the facts which related to the kings of Persia: to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the history of the Greeks, to which I now return.

* Euseb. in Chron. † Thucyd. l. i. p. 72, 73. ‡ Herod. l. iii. c. 15.

SECTION II.

The Athenians make themselves masters of the island of Cythera. Expeditions of Brasidas into Thrace. He takes Amphipolis. Thucydides the historian is banished. A battle is fought near Delium, where the Athenians are defeated.

The eighth year of the War.

The three or four campaigns which followed the reduction of the small island of Sphacteria, were distinguished by very few considerable events.

A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424. The Athenians under Nicias took the island of Cythera,* situated on the coast of Lacedæmonia, near cape Malea, and from thence they infested the whole country.

Brasidas, on the other side, marched towards Thrace.† The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake this expedition; imagining they should oblige the Athenians who had fallen upon them in their country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity to rid themselves of the Helots, whom they expected to rise in rebellion, since the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with 2000 of them in a most horrid manner. Upon the specious pretence of rewarding merit even in slaves, but in reality to get rid of a body of men whose courage they dreaded, they caused proclamation to be made, that such of the Helots as had done the greatest service to the state in the last campaign, should enter their names in the public registers, in order to their being made free. Accordingly 2000 gave in their names. They were carried in procession through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be set at liberty. After this ceremony they all disappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an instance, in what manner a suspicious policy and power when filled with jealousy and distrust, excite men to the blackest crimes, without scrupling to make even religion itself, and the authority of the gods, subservient to their dark designs.

They therefore sent 700 Helots with Brasidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterprise. This general brought over several cities, either by force or secret understanding, and still more by his wisdom and moderation. The chief of these were Acanthus and Stagyra, which were two colonies from Andros. He also marched afterwards towards Amphipolis,‡ an Athenian colony, on the river Strymon. The inhabitants immediately despatched a message to Thucydides§ the Athenian general, who was then in Thrasus, a little island of the Ægean sea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He instantly set sail with seven ships that were near him, to secure the

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 286. † Ibid. p. 304—311. Diod. l. xii. p. 117, 118. ‡ Thucyd. l. iv. p. 320—324. § The same who wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war.

place before Brasidas could seize it; or, at worst, to get into Eion, which lay very near Amphipolis. Brasidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great influence in all that country, where he was possessed of some gold mines, made all the despatch imaginable, to get thither before him; and offered such advantageous conditions to the besieged, who did not expect succours so soon, that they surrendered. Thucydides arrived the same evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Brasidas would have taken possession of it the next morning by day-break. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable despatch, the Athenians however charged him with being the cause of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly banished him.

The Athenians were greatly afflicted at the loss of that city, as well because they drew great revenues from it, and timber to build their ships, as because it was a door for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighbourhood would revolt; especially as Brasidas discovered great moderation and justice, and continually gave out that he came with no other view than to free the country. He declared to the several nations, that at his leaving Sparta, he had taken an oath, in the presence of the magistrates, to leave to all those the enjoyment of their liberties, who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be considered as the most abandoned of men, should he employ oaths to ensnare their credulity. *For*, in his opinion, *a fraud cloaked with a specious pretence, reflects infinitely greater dishonour on persons in high stations, than open violence: because the latter is the effect of the power which fortune has put into our hands, and the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is the pest of society. Now I*, said he, *should do a great disservice to my country, besides dishonouring it entirely, if, by procuring it some slight advantages, I should ruin the reputation it enjoys of being just and faithful to its promises; which renders it much more powerful than all its forces united together, because this acquires it the esteem and confidence of other states.* Upon such noble and equitable principles as these Brasidas always regulated his conduct; believing, that the strongest bulwark of a state is justice, moderation, integrity, and the firm persuasion which their neighbours and allies entertain, that they are incapable of harbouring a design to usurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemy's allies.

The Athenians,* under the command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that several cities would join them the moment they should appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A considerable engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight. Socrates was in this battle;† and Laches, who accompanied that great

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 311—319. † Plut. in Lach. p 181. In Conviv. p. 221. Iut. in Alcib. p. 195.

man in it, gives the following testimony of him in Plato; that had the rest of the army behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have sustained that loss before Delium. He was borne away by the crowds who fled, and was on foot: Alcibiades, who was on horse-back, when he saw him, rode up to him, and did not stir from him, but defended him with the utmost bravery from the enemy who were pursuing him.

After the battle, the victors besieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they used one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber, cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again, so that its shape resembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, to which a caldron was hung; so that by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube, lighted a great fire, with pitch and brimstone, that lay in the caldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as the rampart, to that part where it was lined with stakes and fences, threw out so great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned, and the palisades burnt, the city was easily taken.

SECTION III.

A twelve-months' truce is agreed upon between the two states. Death of Cleon and Brasidas. A treaty of peace for fifty years concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.

Ninth, tenth, and eleventh years of the War.

A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423. The losses and advantages on both sides had hitherto been pretty equal;* and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expense, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce, for a year, was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The former resolved on it, in order to check the progress of Brasidas's conquests; to secure their cities and fortresses; and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in case they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that, by the sweets of repose, peace might become desirable to their enemy; and to get out of their hands such of their citizens as the Athenians had taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria; and which they could never expect to do, if Brasidas extended his conquests farther. The news of their accommodation sensibly afflicted Brasidas, as it stopped him in the midst of his career, and disconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himself to abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days after the truce, but without knowing that it had been concluded. He went still far

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 328—333. Diod. l. xii. p. 120.

ther, and did not scruple to take Menda, a little city not far from Scione, that surrendered to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty: but Brasidas pretended he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be supposed that the latter did not patiently endure this conduct of Brasidas. Cleon, in all public assemblies, was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. His great success in the expedition against Sphacteria had infinitely raised his credit with the people:* he now was grown insupportably proud, and his audaciousness was not to be restrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not so much by the strength of his arguments, as by the boldness and fire of his style and declamation. It was Cleon who first set the example of bawling in assemblies, where the greatest decorum and moderation had till then been observed; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to display his arms; of striking his thigh; and of running up and down the hustings while he was making his speech. In a word, he first introduced among the orators, and all those who interfered in affairs of state, an ungovernable licentiousness, and a contempt of decency; a licentiousness and contempt, which soon introduced terrible irregularities and confusion in public affairs

Thus two men,† each on his own side, opposed the tranquillity of Greece, and raised, but in a very different way, an invincible obstacle to its peace. These were Cleon and Brasidas; the former, because the war screened his vices and malversations; and the latter, because it added new lustre to his virtue. And, indeed, it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppressions, and Brasidas of performing great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the same time, made way for a new accommodation.

A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422. The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the troops which were to oppose Brasidas,‡ and reduce those cities that had revolted from their allegiance. They were solicitous for none of them so much as Amphipolis; and Brasidas threw himself into that city, in order to defend it. Cleon had written to Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, and to the king of the Odomantes, to furnish him with as many troops as possible, and with the utmost expedition. He waited for them, and had resolved not to march immediately towards the enemy: but finding his soldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing so long inactive, and began to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valour of Brasidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs; and imagining himself a great captain by his capture of Sphacteria, he now fancied the

* Plut. in vit. Niciæ, p. 528. † Ibid. ‡ Thucyd. l. iii. p. 342—351. Diod. l. xii. p. 121, 122.

same good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, merely, as he said, to take a view of the place, and till such time as all his forces should be come up; not that he thought he wanted them for carrying that city, or that he entertained any doubt of his success (for he was persuaded that no one would dare to oppose him,) but only to enable him to invest the place on all sides, and afterwards to take it by storm. Accordingly, he encamped before Amphipolis; viewing very leisurely its situation, and fondly supposing that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleased, without drawing the sword; for not a man came out or appeared on the walls, and all the gates of the city were kept shut; so that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only these to make himself master of the city. Brasidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's disposition and character, studiously affected an air of fear and reserve, as a bait to his temerity, and to increase the good opinion he had of himself: besides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces, and the choicest troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly, Cleon, despising an enemy that did not dare to appear before him, but shut himself up in a cowardly manner in the city, went boldly from place to place, without precaution or observing any discipline among his soldiers. Brasidas, whose intention was to attack him on a sudden before all his forces should be come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper measures, and given the orders necessary. Accordingly, he made a sudden sally on the Athenians, which surprised and disconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately he left the main body and fled. Brasidas then turned the whole force of his arms against the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded and disabled, upon which his soldiers carried him off, unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having resolved to fight, he fled, and was killed by a soldier who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themselves for some time, and sustained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at last they were universally broken and routed. Brasidas was then carried into the city, where he survived his victory but a few moments.

The whole army being returned from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and afterwards set up a trophy. After which, all the allies under arms solemnized the funeral obsequies of Brasidas in a public manner; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honours every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats, and sacrifices. They considered him as their founder; and to secure this title the better to him, they demolished all the monuments of him who had really been so;* in order that they might not appear to owe their establishment to an Athenian, and at the same

* Agnon the Athenian.

time make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their security. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the consent of the victors, their dead, returned to Athens, during which the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Amphipolis.

A saying is ascribed to the mother of Brasidas,* which strongly marks the Spartan character. As some persons were applauding in her presence the fine qualities and exalted actions of her son, and declaring him superior to all other generals: *You are mistaken*, says she; *my son was a valiant man, but Sparta has many citizens braver than he.* A mother's generosity, in thus preferring the glory of the state to that of her son, was admired, and did not go unrewarded; for the Ephori paid her public honours.

After this last engagement,† in which the two persons who were the greatest obstacles to peace lost their lives, both nations seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was suspended in a manner on both sides. The Athenians, since the loss of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtiness, were undeceived with regard to the high opinion they had hitherto entertained of their own strength, that had made them refuse the advantageous offers of their enemies. Besides, they were apprehensive of the revolt of their allies, who, being discouraged by their losses, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as several had already done. These reflections made them strongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, no longer flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to ruin the Athenians by laying waste their country; and were besides dejected and terrified by their loss in the island, the greatest they had hitherto ever sustained. They also considered that their country was ravaged by the garrison of Pylus and Cythera; that their slaves deserted; that they had reason to dread a more considerable revolt; and that as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had reason to be apprehensive of being abandoned by some of their allies of Peloponnesus, as in fact they were. These several motives, enforced by the desire they had of recovering their prisoners, the greatest part of whom were the most considerable citizens of Sparta, made them desire a peace.

Those who were most solicitous for having it concluded, and whose interest it was chiefly to wish it, were the chiefs of the two states, *viz.* Plistonax, king of Lacedæmonia, and Nicias, general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned from banishment, to which he had been sentenced on account of his being suspected to have received a bribe, in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories; and to this precipitate retreat were ascribed

* Diod. l. xii. p. 122. † Thucyd. l. v. p. 351—354.

several misfortunes which followed after it. He also was charged with having corrupted by gifts the priestess of Delphi, who had commanded the Spartans, in the name of the god, to recall him from his exile. Pbistonax was therefore desirous of peace, in order to put an end to these reproaches, which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the most fortunate general of his age, he was afraid lest some unhappy accident should sully his glory; and he wished to enjoy the fruits of peace in ease and tranquillity, and to ensure the same happiness to his country.

Both states began by agreeing to a suspension of arms for twelve months,* during which, being every day together, and tasting the sweets of security and repose, and the pleasure of corresponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew passionately desirous of leading an easy, undisturbed life, remote from the alarms of war and the horrors of blood and slaughter. They heard with the utmost demonstrations of joy the choruses of their tragedies sing, *May spiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and shields!* And they remembered with pleasure him who said, *Those who sleep in the arms of peace, do not start from them at the sound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their slumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock.*

The whole winter was spent in conferences and interviews, in which each party proposed their claims and pretensions.† At last, A. M. 3583. a peace was concluded and ratified for fifty years; one Ant. J. C. 421. of the chief articles of which was, that they should reciprocally restore the prisoners on each side. This treaty was concluded ten years and some days from the first declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were exceedingly disgusted at it, and for that reason used their utmost endeavours to excite fresh troubles. But Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give the last hand to this peace,‡ by concluding an alliance offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to those who should desire to break with them, and more assured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in consequence of this treaty, at last restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria.

SECTION IV.

Alcibiades begins to appear in public, His character. He opposes Nicias in every thing, and breaks the treaty he had concluded. The banishment of Hyperbolus puts an end to the Ostracism.

Twelfth year of the War.

Alcibiades now began to advance himself in the state,§ and appear in public assemblies. Socrates had attached himself to him

* Thucyd. l. v. p. 354. Plut. in Nic p. 528, 529. † Diod. l. xii. p. 122.
‡ Thucyd l. v. p. 358, 359. § Plut. in Alcib. p. 192. 194.

for many years, and adorned his mind with a great variety of the noblest erudition.

The strict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the most remarkable circumstances in his life. This philosopher observing excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightened by the beauty of his person, bestowed incredible pains in cultivating so valuable a plant, lest, being neglected, it should wither as it grew, and absolutely degenerate. And, indeed, Alcibiades was exposed to numberless dangers; the nobility of his birth, his vast riches, the authority of his family, the influence of his guardians, his personal talents, his exquisite beauty, and, still more than these, the flattery and complaisance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, says Plutarch, that fortune had surrounded and invested him with all these pretended advantages, as with so many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inaccessible and invulnerable to all the darts of philosophy; those salutary darts which strike to the very heart, and leave in it the strongest enticements to virtue and solid glory. But those very obstacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithstanding the endeavours that were used to divert this young Athenian from an intercourse which alone was capable of securing him from so many snares, he devoted himself entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully sensible of Socrates's merit, and could not resist the charms of his sweet and insinuating eloquence, which at that time had a greater ascendant over him than the allurements of pleasure. He was so zealous a disciple of that great master, that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmost delight in his conversation, was extremely well pleased with his principles, received his instructions and even his reprimands with wonderful docility, and would be so moved with his discourses, as even to shed tears and abhor himself; so weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in so glaring a light did he expose the hideousness and deformity of the vices to which Alcibiades abandoned himself.

Alcibiades, in those moments when he listened to Socrates, differed so much from himself, that he appeared quite another man. However, his headstrong, fiery temper, and his natural fondness for pleasure, which was heightened and inflamed by the conversation of young people, soon plunged him into his former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his master; who was obliged to run after him as after a runaway slave. This vicissitude of flights and returns, of virtuous resolutions and relapses into vice, continued a long time; but still Socrates was not disheartened by his levity, and always flattered himself with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly arose the strong mixture of good and evil that always appeared in his conduct; the instructions which his master had given him sometimes prevailing; and at other times, the impetuosity of his passions hurrying him, in a

manner against his own will, into actions of a quite opposite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did not pass uncensured. But some persons* of great learning pretend, that these censures and suspicions, when duly examined, quite disappear; and that they ought to be considered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both. Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, well calculated to display the genius and character of the latter, who henceforward will have a very great share and play a conspicuous part in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I shall make a very short extract from it in this place, which I hope will not displease my readers.

In this dialogue Socrates is introduced conversing with Alcibiades,† who at that time was under the guardianship of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the rest of the Athenians; that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on instruments, and had practised wrestling and other bodily exercises. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in Alcibiades's education (a fault too common in the greatest men,) since he had put him under the tuition of Zopyrus, a Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Pericles's slaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the least qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades, that should he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmonia, who displayed a spirit of valour, a greatness of soul, a strong desire of glory, a love of labour, attended with gentleness, modesty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and discipline of Sparta, he would seem a mere child to them. Nevertheless, his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian; all these things had conspired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of esteem for himself, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the administration of public affairs, and, from his conversation, it might be presumed, that he promised himself no less than to eclipse entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne. Socrates seeing him going to mount the tribunal, in order to give the people some advice relating to the public affairs, demonstrates to him, by various questions, and by Alcibiades's answers, that he is quite ignorant of the affairs about which he is going to speak, as he had never studied them himself, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades himself confess this, he paints, in the strongest colours, the absurdity of his conduct, and makes him fully sensible of it.—What says Socrates, would Amestris (the mother of Artaxerxes, who then reigned in Persia) say, were she to hear, that there is a man now in Athens who is meditating war against her son, and even intends

* Abbé Fraguier justifies Socrates in one of his dissertations. *Mem. of the Academy of Belles Letters*, tom. iv. p. 372. † Plut. in Alcib. I.

to dethrone him? She doubtless would suppose him to be some veteran general, a man of intrepid courage, of great wisdom, and consummate experience; that he is able to raise a mighty army and march it wherever he pleases; and at the same time, that he has long before taken the proper measures for putting so vast a design in execution. But were she to hear that this is by no means the case, and that the person in question is not twenty years old; that he is utterly ignorant of public affairs; has not the least knowledge of war, nor any authority among the citizens, or influence over the allies, would it be possible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of such an enterprise? This, nevertheless, says Socrates, (directing himself to Alcibiades,) is your picture; and unhappily resembles most of those who thrust themselves into the public employment. Socrates, however, excepts Pericles on this occasion; his solid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his close study, during a long course of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and of qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his case; he was ashamed of his conduct, and blushing to see himself so void of merit, he asks how he must act in order to attain it. Socrates being unwilling to discourage his pupil, tells him, that as he is so young, these evils might be remedied, and afterwards continually gave him the wisest counsels. He had full leisure to profit by them; as upwards of twenty years passed between this conversation and his engaging in public affairs.

Alcibiades was of a pliant and flexible disposition, that would take any impression which the difference of times and circumstances might require, still veering either to good or evil with the same facility and ardour; and shifting almost in an instant from one extreme to its opposite; so that the people applied to him what Homer observes of the land of Egypt, *That it produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, and at the same time as many poisons.* It might be said of Alcibiades,* that he was not one single man, but (if so bold an expression might be used) a compound of several men; either serious or gay; austere or affable; an imperious master, or a grovelling slave; a friend to virtue and the virtuous, or abandoned to vice and vicious men; capable of supporting the most painful fatigues and toils, or insatiably desirous of voluptuous delights.

His irregularities and dissolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city;† and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a stop to these reports, but without changing his course of life, as appears from a saying of his. He had a very handsome dog, of an uncommon size, which had cost him threescore and ten minæ,‡ or 3500 French livres. By this we find that a fondness for dogs is

* Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos. *Juvenal.* † Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.
‡ About 160*l.* sterling. The Attic mina was worth 100 drachmas, and the drachma ten-pence, French money

of great antiquity. Alcibiades caused his tail, which was the greatest beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends censured him very much on that account, and said, that the whole city blamed him very much for spoiling the beauty of so handsome a creature. *This is the very thing I want*, replied Alcibiades with a smile: *I would have the Athenians converse about what I have done to my dog, that they may not entertain themselves with saying worse things of me.*

Among the various passions that were discovered in him,* the strongest and most prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to submit to it, and could not bear a superior or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents smoothed the way to his attaining the highest employments in the republic, there was nothing however to which he was so fond of owing the influence and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the persuasive grace of his orations. To this his intimacy with Socrates might have greatly conduced.

A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 420. Alcibiades,† with the disposition we have here described, was not born for repose, and had set every engine at work to thwart the treaty lately concluded between the two states; but not succeeding in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent its taking effect. He was disgusted at the Lacedæmonians, because they directed themselves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion; and on the contrary seemed to take no manner of notice of him, though the rights of hospitality had subsisted between his ancestors and them.

The first thing he did to infringe the peace was this. Having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared, he flattered them secretly with the hopes that the Athenians would succour them, by suggesting to them that they were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to observe the several conditions of it religiously, having concluded an alliance with the Bœotians, in direct opposition to the design and tenor of the treaty; and having surrendered up the fort of Panactus to the Athenians, not fortified, and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had stipulated to do, but quite dismantled. Alcibiades observing the Athenians to be extremely exasperated at this breach of faith, did his utmost to increase their disgust; and taking this opportunity to embarrass Nicias, he made him odious to the people, by causing them to entertain a suspicion of his being too strongly attached to the Lacedæmonians; and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were absolutely false.

* Τὸ φιλόνεικον, καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195, 196. † Thucyd. l. v. p. 368—378. Plut in Alcib. p. 197, 198.

This new attack quite disconcerted Nicias; but happily for him, there arrived, at that very instant, ambassadors from Lacedæmonia, who were invested with full powers to put an end to all the disputes. Being introduced into the council, or senate, they set forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very just and reasonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would succeed with them, used his utmost endeavours to engage the ambassadors in a conference with him. He represented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmost moderation and humanity towards those who addressed them, but the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretensions; that should the ambassadors mention full powers, the people would not fail to take advantage of this circumstance, and oblige them to agree to whatever they should take it into their heads to ask. He concluded with assuring them, that he would assist them with all his credit, in order to get Pylus restored to them; to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed: and he confirmed all these promises with an oath. The ambassadors were extremely well pleased with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy and vast abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man; and, indeed, they were not mistaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being assembled, the ambassadors were introduced. Alcibiades asked them, in the mildest terms, the subject of their embassy, and the purport of the powers with which they were invested. They immediately answered, that they were come to propose an accommodation, but were not empowered to conclude any thing. These words were no sooner spoken, than Alcibiades exclaims against them; declares them to be treacherous knaves; calls upon the council as witness to the speech they had made the night before; and desires the people not to believe or hear men who so impudently advanced falsehoods, and spoke and prevaricated so unaccountably, as to say one thing one day, and the very reverse on the next.

Words could never express the surprise and confusion with which the ambassadors were siezed, who, gazing at one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous stratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpose to find out the reason of it. The people were at that moment going to send for the ambassadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them; when a great earthquake came to the assistance of Nicias, and broke up the assembly. It was with the utmost difficulty he prevailed so far in that which was held next day, as to have a stop put to the proceedings, till such time as ambassadors should be sent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them, but returned without having done the least good. The

Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up, at his persuasion, the prisoners they had taken in the island, and who were related to the greatest families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exasperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any excesses against him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general; made a league with the inhabitants of Mantinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives were included, and sent troops to Pylus, to lay waste Laconia. In this manner they again involved themselves in the war which they were so lately desirous of avoiding.

Plutarch,* after relating the intrigue of Alcibiades, adds: *No one can approve the methods he employed to succeed in his design; however, it was a master-stroke to disunite and shake almost every part of Peloponnesus in this manner, and raise up, in one day, so many enemies against the Lacedæmonians.* In my opinion, this is too mild a censure of so knavish and perfidious an action, which how successful soever it might have been, was notwithstanding horrid in itself, and of a nature never to be sufficiently detested.

There was in Athens a citizen,† named Hyperbolus, a very wicked man, whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardened in evil, and become insensible to infamy, by renouncing all sentiments of honour, which could only be the effect of a soul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one; and yet the people made use of him to humble those in high stations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engrossed at that time all the authority in Athens. The dissolute life of the latter shocked the Athenians, who besides dreaded his audacity and haughtiness. On the other side, Nicias, by always opposing, without the least reserve, their unjust desires, and by obliging them to take the most useful measures, was become very odious to them. It might be expected, that as the people were thus alienated from both, they could not fail to put the ostracism in force against one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one, consisted of the young men who were eager for war, the other of the old men who were desirous of peace; the former endeavoured to procure the banishment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whose only merit was his impudence, in hopes of succeeding whichsoever of them should be removed, declared openly against them, and was eternally exasperating the people against both. However, the two factions uniting, he himself was banished, and by that put an end to the ostracism, which seemed to have been demeaned, in being employed against a man of so base a character; for hitherto there was a kind of honour and dignity annexed to this punishment. Hyperbolus was therefore the last who was sentenced by the ostracism; as Hipparchus, a near relation of Pisistratus the tyrant, had been the first.

* In Alcib. p. 198. † Plut. in Alcib. p. 196, 197. In Nic. p. 530, 531.

SECTION V.

Alcibiades engages the Athenians in the war of Sicily.

Sixteenth and seventeenth years of the War.

A. M. 3588. Ant J. C. 416. I pass over several inconsiderable events,* to hasten to the relation of that of the greatest importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were excited by Alcibiades especially. This is the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war.

Alcibiades† had gained a surprising ascendant over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character. For his great qualities were united with still greater vices, which he did not take the least pains to conceal. He passed his life in such an excess of luxury and voluptuousness, as was a scandal to the city. Nothing was seen in his house but festivals, rejoicings, and parties of pleasure and debauchery. He showed very little regard to the customs of his country, and still less to religion and the gods. All persons of sense and judgment, besides the strong aversion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the consequences of his audacity, profusion, and utter contempt of the laws, which they considered as so many steps by which Alcibiades would rise to tyrannical power.

Aristophanes, in one of his comedies,‡ shows admirably well, in a single verse, the disposition of the people towards him: *They hate Alcibiades*, says he, *and yet cannot do without him.* And, indeed, the prodigious sums he squandered on the people; the pompous games and shows he exhibited to please them; the magnificent and almost incredible presents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his person; his eloquence, his bodily strength, joined to his courage and his experience; in a word, this assemblage of great qualities made the Athenians wink at his faults, and bear them patiently, always endeavouring to lessen and screen them under soft and favourable names; for they called them frolics and polite pastimes, and indications of his humanity and good-nature.

Timon the man-hater, morose and savage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the assembly, vastly pleased at his having been gratified in all his demands, and at seeing the greatest honours paid him by the people in general, who were attending him in crowds to his house; so far from shunning him as he did all other men, on the contrary ran to meet him, and stretching out his hand to him in a friendly way; *Courage, my son*, says he, *thou doest right in pushing thy fortune, for thy advancement will be the ruin of all*

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 350—409.
† Plut. in Alcib. p. 193—200. In Nic. p. 531.
‡ The Frogs. Act v. scene 4.

these people. The war of Sicily will show that Timon was not mistaken.

The Athenians, ever since the time of Pericles, had meditated the conquest of Sicily. However, that wise guide had always endeavoured to check this ambitious and wild project. He used frequently to inculcate to them, that by living in peace, by directing their attention to naval affairs, by contenting themselves with preserving the conquests they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprises, they would raise their city to a flourishing condition, and be always superior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, kept them from invading Sicily, though it could not surmount the desire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that island. Some time after Pericles's death,* the Leontines being attacked by the Syracusans, had sent a deputation to Athens, to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgias, a famous rhetorician, who was reputed the most eloquent man of his time. His elegant and florid diction, heightened by shining figures, which he first employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiously affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they sent ships to Rhegium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they sent a greater number. Two years after they sent a new fleet, something stronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their divisions, by the advice of Hermocrates, the fleet was sent back; and the Athenians, not being able to prevail with themselves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, sent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, into banishment; and sentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay a heavy fine; their prosperity having blinded them to so prodigious a degree, that they were persuaded no power was able to resist them. They made several attempts afterwards, and upon pretence of sending from time to time arms and soldiers to such cities as were unjustly treated or oppressed by the Syracusans, they by that means were preparing to invade them with a greater force.

But the person who most inflamed this ardour was Alcibiades, by feeding the people with splendid hopes, with which he himself was for ever filled, or rather intoxicated. He was every night, in his dreams, taking Carthage, subduing Africa, crossing from thence into Italy, and possessing himself of all Peloponnesus; looking upon Sicily not as the aim and the end of this war, but as the beginning and the first step of the exploits which he was revolving in his mind. All the citizens favoured his views, and, without inquiring seriously into matters, were enchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of all

* Diod. l. xii. p. 99.

conversations. The young men, in the places where the public exercises were performed, and the old men in their shops and elsewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily; in discoursing on the nature and quality of the sea with which it is surrounded; on its good harbours, and flat shores towards Africa: for these people, infatuated by the speeches of Alcibiades, were (like him) persuaded that they should make Sicily only their place of arms and their arsenal, from whence they should set out for the conquest of Carthage, and make themselves masters of all Africa and the sea, as far as the Pillars of Hercules.

It is related* that neither Socrates nor Meton the astronomer believed that this enterprise would be successful: the former, being inspired, as he insinuated, by his familiar spirit, who always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened; and the other, directed by his reason and good sense, which, pointing out what he had to apprehend in respect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occasion; and to demand, in consideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his son, and would dispense with his carrying arms.

SECTION VI.

Account of the several people who inhabited Sicily.

Before I enter on the relation of the war of Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it: Thucydides begins in the same manner.

It was first inhabited by the Lestrygones and the Cyclopes,† of whom we know nothing but what we are told by the poets. The most ancient, after these, were the Sicani, who called themselves the original inhabitants of this country, though they are thought to have come into it from the neighbourhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whose name they gave to the island, which before was called Trinacria: these people were afterwards confined to the western part of the island. Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and settled near them, and built Eryx and Egesta,‡ who all assumed the name of Elymæi; and were afterwards joined by some inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the siege of Troy. Those who are properly called Sicilians came from Italy in very great numbers; and having gained a considerable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their island, about 300 years before the arrival of the Greeks; and in Thucydides's time, they still inhabited the middle part of the island and the northern coast. From them the island was called Sicily. The Phœnicians also spread themselves along the coast, and in the little islands

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 199. In Nic. p. 532.
† Thucyd. l. vi. p. 410—413.
‡ It is called Segesta by the Romans.

which border upon it, for the convenience of trade; but after the Greeks began to settle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the rest. It was in this manner the Barbarians first settled in Sicily.

A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710. With regard to the Greeks, the first of them who crossed into Sicily were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles who founded Naxos. The year after, which, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was the third of the seventeenth Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian laid the foundations of Syracuse. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catana, after having driven out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara, a city of Achaia, about the same time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or simply Hybla, from Hyblon a Sicilian king, by whose permission they had settled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the ancients. A hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinus. Gela, built on a river of the same name, forty-five years after the founding of Syracuse, founded Agrigentum about 108 years after. Zancle, called afterwards Messana or Messene, by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, who was a native of Messene, a city of Peloponnesus, had several founders, and at different periods. The Zanclians built the city of Himera; the Syracusans built Acra, Casmene, and Camarina. These are most of the nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, who settled in Sicily.

SECTION VII.

The people of Egesta implore aid of the Athenians. Nicias opposes, but to no purpose, the war of Sicily. Alcibiades carries that point. They are both appointed generals with Lamachus.

A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Athens was in the disposition above related,* when ambassadors arrived from the people of Egesta, who, in quality of their allies, came to implore their aid against the inhabitants of Selinus, who were assisted by the Syracusans. It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. They represented, among other things, that should they be abandoned; the Syracusans, after seizing their city as they had done that of Leontium, would possess themselves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponnesians, who were their founders; and, that they might put them to as little charge as possible, they offered to pay the troops that should be sent to succour them. The Athenians, who had long waited for a favourable opportunity to declare themselves, sent deputies to Egesta to inquire into the state of affairs, and to see whether there was money enough in the treasury to defray the expenses of so great a war. The inhabitants of that

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 413—415. Diod. l. xii. p. 129, 130. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200. In Nic. p. 531.

city had been so artful, as to borrow from the neighbouring nations a great number of gold and silver vases, worth an immense sum of money; and of these they made a show when the Athenians ar-
A. M. 3589. rived. The deputies returned with those of Egesta,
Ant. J. C. 415. who carried threescore talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the sixty galleys which they demanded; and a promise of larger sums, which, they said, were ready both in the public treasury and in the temples. The people, struck with these fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themselves the leisure to examine; and seduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made, with the view of pleasing them, immediately granted the Egestans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, to command the fleet; with full power, not only to succour Egesta, and restore the inhabitants of Leontium to their city, but also to regulate the affairs of Sicily, in such a manner as might best suit the interests of the republic.

Nicias was appointed one of the generals to his very great regret; for, besides other motives which made him dread that command, he shunned it, because Alcibiades was to be his colleague. But the Athenians promised themselves greater success from this war, should they not resign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardour and audacity with the coolness and wisdom of Nicias.

Five days after,* to hasten the execution of the decree, and make the necessary preparations, a second assembly was held. Nicias, who had had time enough to reflect deliberately on the affair proposed, and was more and more convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would ensue from it, thought himself obliged to speak with some vehemence against a project, the consequences of which he foresaw might be very fatal to the republic. He said, *That it was surprising so important an affair should have been determined almost as soon as it was taken into deliberation: that without once inquiring into matters, they had given credit to whatever was told them by foreigners, who were very lavish of the most splendid promises as costing them nothing; and whose interest it was to offer mighty things, in order to extricate themselves from their imminent danger. After all, what advantage*, says he, *can accrue from thence to the republic? Have we so few enemies at our doors, that we need go in search of others at a distance from us? Will you act wisely, to hazard your present possessions, on the vain hopes of an uncertain advantage? to meditate new conquests before you have secured your ancient ones? to study nothing but the aggrandizing of your state, and quite neglect your own safety? Can you place any dependance on a truce, which you yourselves know is very precarious; which you are sensible has been infringed more than once; and which the least defeat on our side may suddenly change into an open*

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415—428.

war? You are not ignorant how the Lacedæmonians have always been, and still continue, disposed towards us. They detest our government as different from theirs; it is with grief and disdain they see us possessed of the empire of Greece; they consider our glory as their shame and confusion; and there is nothing they would not attempt, to humble a power which excites their jealousy, and keeps them perpetually in fear. These are our real enemies, and these are they whom we ought to guard against. Will it be a proper time to make these reflections, when (after having divided our troops, and while our arms will be employed elsewhere, and we shall be unable to resist them) we shall be attacked at once by all the forces of Peloponnesus? We do but just begin to breathe, after the calamities in which war and the plague had plunged us; and we are now going without the least necessity to plunge ourselves into greater danger. If we are ambitious of carrying our arms into distant countries, would it not be more expedient to march and reduce the rebels of Thrace, and other nations who are still wavering and unfixed in their allegiance, than to fly to the succour of the inhabitants of Egesta, about whose welfare we ought to be very indifferent? And will it suit our interest to attempt to revenge their injuries, at a time that we do not discover the least resentment for those we ourselves receive? Let us leave the Sicilians to themselves, and not engage in their quarrels, which it is their business to decide. As the inhabitants of Egesta undertook the war without us, let them extricate themselves from it without our interference. Should any of our generals advise you to this enterprise, from an ambitious or self-interested view; merely to make a vain parade of his splendid equipages, or to raise money to support his extravagance; be not guilty of so much imprudence as to sacrifice the interest of the republic to his, or permit him to involve it in the same ruin with himself. An enterprise of so much importance ought not to be committed wholly to the conduct of a young man. Remember it is prudence, not prejudice and passion, that gives success to affairs. Nicias concluded with declaring it his opinion, that it would be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent the fatal consequences with which their taking rash resolutions might be attended.

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enormous luxury was the object of his censure. And indeed he carried it to an incredible height; and lavished prodigious sums of money on horses, equipages, and furniture; not to mention the delicacy and sumptuousness of his table. He disputed the prize in the Olympic games with seven sets of chariot horses, which no private man had ever done before him; and he was crowned more than once on that occasion. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such luxury; and as avarice often serves as a resource to ambition, there were some grounds to believe, that Alcibiades was no less solicitous for the conquest of Sicily, and that of Carthage (which he pretended would immediately follow,) to enrich his

family, than to render it glorious. It is natural to suppose that Alcibiades did not let this speech of Nicias go unanswered.

This, says Alcibiades, *is not the first time that merit has excited jealousy, and glory been made the object of envy. That very thing which is imputed to me for a crime, reflects, I will presume to say it, honour on my country, and ought to gain me applause. The splendour in which I live; the great sums I expend, particularly in the public assemblies; besides their being just and lawful, at the same time give foreigners a greater idea of the glory of Athens; and show, that it is not in such want of money as our enemies imagine. But this is not our present business. Let the world form a judgment of me, not from passion and prejudice, but from my actions. Was it an inconsiderable service I did the republic, in bringing over (in one day) to its alliance, the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, that is, the chief strength of Peloponnesus? Make use, therefore, to aggrandize your empire, of Alcibiades's youth and folly (since his enemies give it that name,) as well as of the wisdom and experience of Nicias; and do not repent, from vain and idle fears, your engaging in an enterprise publicly resolved upon, which may redound infinitely both to your glory and advantage. The cities of Sicily, weary of the unjust and cruel government of their princes, and still more of the tyrannical authority which Syracuse exercises over them, wait only for a favourable opportunity to declare themselves; and are ready to open their gates to any one who shall offer to break the yoke under which they have so long groaned. Though the citizens of Egesta, as being your allies, should not have a right to your protection; yet the glory of Athens ought to engage you to support them. States aggrandize themselves by succouring the oppressed, and not by continuing inactive. In the present state of your affairs, the only way to dispirit your enemies, and show that you are not afraid of them, will be, to harass one nation, to check the progress of another, to keep them all employed, and carry your arms into distant countries. Athens was not formed for ease; and it was not by inactivity that your ancestors raised it to the height in which we now see it. For the rest, what hazards will you run by engaging in the enterprise in question? If it should be crowned with success, you will then possess yourselves of all Greece; and should it not answer your expectations, your fleet will give you an opportunity of retiring whenever you please. The Lacedæmonians indeed may make an incursion into our country; but, besides that it would not be in our power to prevent it, though we should not invade Sicily, we still shall preserve the empire of the sea, in spite of them; a circumstance which makes our enemies entirely despair of ever being able to conquer us. Be not therefore biassed by Nicias's reasons. The only tendency of them is to sow the seeds of discord between the old and young men, who can do nothing without one another; since it is wisdom and courage, counsel and execution, that give success to all enterprises: and this in which we are going to embark, cannot but turn to your glory and advantage.*

The Athenians,* flattered and pleased with Alcibiades's speech, persisted in their first opinion; Nicias, on the other side, did not depart from his; but at the same time did not dare to oppose Alcibiades any farther. Nicias was naturally of a mild and timid disposition. He was not, like Pericles, master of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down all things in its way. And indeed the latter, on several occasions and at several times, had never failed to check the impetuosity of the populace, who, even then, meditated the expedition into Sicily; because he was always inflexible, and never slackened the reins of that authority and kind of sovereignty which he had acquired over the minds of the people: whereas Nicias,† both by acting and speaking in an easy, gentle manner, so far from winning over the people, suffered himself to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away: and accordingly he at last yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foresaw would be attended with the most fatal consequences.

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatise, where, speaking of the qualities requisite in a statesman, he shows how very necessary eloquence and inflexible constancy and perseverance are to him.

Nicias, not daring to oppose Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavoured to do it indirectly, by starting a great number of difficulties, drawn especially from the great expense requisite for this expedition. He declared that, since they were resolved upon war, they ought to carry it on in such a manner as should be consistent with the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained: that a fleet was not sufficient to oppose so formidable a power as that of the Syracusans and their allies; that they must raise an army, composed of good horse and foot, if they desired to act in a manner worthy of so grand a design: that, besides their fleet, which was to make them masters at sea, they must have a great number of transports, to carry provisions perpetually to the army, which otherwise could not possibly subsist in an enemy's country: that they must carry vast sums of money with them, without waiting for that promised them by the citizens of Egesta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promise: that they ought to weigh and examine the disparity there was between themselves and their enemies with regard to the conveniences and wants of the army; the Syracusans being in their own country, in the midst of powerful allies, disposed by inclination, as well as engaged by interest, to assist them with men, arms, horses, and provisions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country possessed by their enemies, where, in the winter, news could not be brought them in less than four months' time; a

* Plut. in præc. de ger. rep. p. 802.

† Καθάπερ ἁμβλεῖ χαλινῷ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμενος ἀποστρέφειν τὴν δῆμον, οὐ κατέσχεν.

country, where all things would oppose the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms: that it would reflect the greatest ignominy on the Athenians, should they be forced to abandon their enterprise, and thereby become the scorn and contempt of their enemies, by having neglected to take all the precautions which so important a design required: that as for himself, he was determined not to go, unless he was provided with all things necessary for the expedition, because the safety of the whole army depended on that circumstance; and he would not suffer it to depend upon the caprice, or the precarious engagements of the allies.

Nicias had flattered himself,* that this speech would cool the ardour of the people, whereas it only inflamed it the more. Immediately the generals had full powers given them to raise as many troops, and fit out as many galleys, as they should judge necessary; and the levies were accordingly carried on in Athens and other places, with inexpressible activity.

SECTION VIII.

The Athenians prepare to set sail. Sinister omens. The statues of Mercury are mutilated. Alcibiades is accused, and insists upon his being tried, but his request is not granted. Triumphant departure of the fleet.

A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415. When all things were ready for their departure,† and they were preparing to sail, there happened several bad omens, which filled the minds of the people with trouble and disquietude. The women were at that time celebrating the festival of Adonis,‡ during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images representing dead persons and funeral processions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women who followed those statues with lamentations. Whence it was feared, that this gay and magnificent armament, would soon lose all its splendour and wither away like a flower.§

The general anxiety was increased by another accident. The statues of Mercury, which stood at the entrance of private houses and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face: and although a great reward was promised to any person who should discover the authors of so audacious a crime, no one was detected. The citizens could not forbear considering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen, but as a contrivance of some factious men, who harboured very ill designs. Some young people had already been accused of committing a nearly similar crime in the midst of a drunken frolic; and particularly of

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 134. † Thucyd. l. vi. p. 423. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200, 201.

‡ This superstitious rite had extended even to God's people: *And behold there sat women weeping for Tammuz*, Ezek. viii. 14. N. B. The Latin version of the Bible, which M. Rollin follows, says, *weeping for Adonis;* which is the same as Tammuz, the Hebrews calling Adonis by that name.

§ The historian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of Adonis's gardens.

having wantonly mimicked the mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine, with Alcibiades, who represented the high-priest, at their head. It highly concerns all those in exalted stations,* to be extremely careful of every step they take, and not to give the least opportunity to the most inveterate malice to censure them. They ought to call to mind, says Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-eyed on these occasions; that not only their outward actions pass the most severe scrutiny, but that they penetrate to their most private apartments, and there take the strictest notice of their conversation, their diversions, and their most secret transactions. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themistocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from most of those pleasures in which others indulged themselves.

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himself under any restraints; and accordingly, as his character was so notorious, people were easily persuaded that he very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertinism, and irreligion, gave an air of probability to this charge; and the accuser was not afraid of mentioning his name. This attack staggered the constancy and resolution of Alcibiades; but hearing the soldiers and sailors declare that they were induced to engage in this distant expedition beyond sea, by no other motive than their affection for Alcibiades; and that, should the least injury be done him, they would all immediately leave the service; he took heart, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpose. His enemies, upon pretence that it was necessary for the fleet to set sail, got the judgment postponed. It was to no purpose for Alcibiades to insist upon being tried, in case he was guilty, without waiting for his absence in order to ruin him; and to represent, that it would be the most shocking and barbarous injustice to oblige him to embark for so important an expedition, without first making due inquiry into the accusations and horrid slanders which were cast upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of these remonstrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to set out.

They accordingly prepared to set sail,† after having appointed Corcyra as the rendezvous for most of the allies, and such ships as were to carry the provisions and baggage. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by day-break to the port of Piræeus. The former attended their children, relations, friends, or companions, with a joy overcast with a little sorrow, upon their bidding adieu to persons that were as dear to them as life, who were setting out on a far distant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, though they flattered themselves with the hopes that the enter-

* Plut. n. præc. de rep. p. 800. † Thucyd. p. 430—432. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135.

prise would be successful. The forcigners came thither to feed their eyes with a sight which was highly worthy their curiosity; for no single city in the world had ever fitted out so gallant a fleet. Those indeed which had been sent against Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as considerable with regard to the number of the soldiers and ships; but then they were not equipped with so much magnificence, neither was their voyage so long, nor their enterprise so important. Here were seen a land and a naval army, equipped with the utmost care, and at the expense of private individuals as well as of the public, with all things necessary, on account of the length of the voyage, and the duration of the war. The city furnished 100 empty galleys, that is, threescore light ones, and forty to transport the soldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachma, or tenpence (French) for his pay, exclusively of what the captains of ships individually gave the rowers of the first bench.* Add to this the pomp and magnificence of the equipment: every one striving to eclipse the rest, and each captain endeavouring to make his ship the lightest, and at the same time the gayest, of the whole fleet. I shall not take notice of the choice in the soldiers and seamen, who were the flower of the Athenians; nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatness of their arms and equipage: any more than that of their officers, who had laid out considerable sums purely to distinguish themselves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their persons and circumstances; so that this sight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmost magnificence is displayed, rather than of a warlike expedition. But the boldness and greatness of the design still exceeded its expense and splendour.

When the ships were loaded, and the troops got on board, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up for the success of the expedition; gold and silver cups were filled every where with wine, and the accustomed libations were poured out; the people who lined the shore shouting at the same time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wish their fellow-citizens a good voyage and success. And now, the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the ships sailed one after another out of the harbour; after which they strove to outsail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina. From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the rest of the fleet.

SECTION IX.

Syracuse is alarmed. The Athenian fleet arrives in Sicily.

Advice of this expedition having been brought to Syracuse from all quarters,† it was thought so improbable, that at first nobody

* They were called Θρᾶνιται. They had longer oars than the rest, and consequently more trouble in rowing.

† Thucyd. l. vi. p. 432—445. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135, 136.

would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracusans began to think seriously of making the necessary preparations; and sent deputations to every part of the island, to ask assistance of some, and send succours to others. They garrisoned all the castles and forts in the country; reviewed all the soldiers and horses; examined the arms in the magazines; and settled and prepared all things, as if the enemy had been in their country.

In the mean time the fleet sailed in three squadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It consisted of 133 ships, 100 whereof belonged to Athens, and the rest to the allies. On board these ships were 5000 heavy-armed soldiers, 2200 of whom were Athenian citizens, *viz.* 1500 of those who had estates, and 700* who had none, but were equally citizens; the rest consisted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were eighty archers of Crete, and 400 of other countries; 700 Rhodian slingers, and 120 exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horse, consisting of thirty troopers, who had embarked on board a vessel proper for transporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land forces were afterwards increased considerably. Thirty vessels carried the provisions and sutlers, with masons, carpenters, and their several tools; the whole followed by 100 small vessels for the service, exclusive of merchant-ships, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had sailed together from Corcyra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris, they sailed with a favourable wind for Rhegium, where they made some stay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to succour those of Leontium who came originally from Chalcis as well as themselves: but these answered, that they were determined to stand neuter, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the rest of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was necessary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of those ships that had been sent out to make discoveries of a proper place for landing, and to inquire whether the citizens of Egesta had got their money ready. Upon their return they brought advice that they had but thirty talents in the treasury. This Nicias had foreseen, but no regard had been paid to his salutary counsels.

He did not fail,† the instant this news was brought, to expatiate on the counsel he had given in Athens; to show the wrong step they had taken in engaging in this war; and to exaggerate the fatal consequences which might be expected from it: in all which he acted very imprudently. It was extremely judicious in Nicias to oppose it in the beginning, and to set every engine at work to crush if possible this ill-fated project. But as the expedition was resolved, and he himself had accepted of the command, he ought not

* These were called Θῆτες. † Plut. in Nic. p. 532

to have been perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated incessantly, that this war had been undertaken in opposition to all the maxims of prudence; and by that means to cool the ardour of his two colleagues in the command, to dispirit the soldiers, and blunt that edge of confidence and ardour, which assures the success of great enterprises. He ought, on the contrary, to have advanced boldly towards the enemy; should have attacked them with vigour, and have spread a universal terror, by a sudden and unexpected descent.

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion, in the council of war, was, that they should sail for Selinus, which had been the first occasion of this expedition; and then, if the citizens of Egesta performed their promise, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward; or otherwise, to oblige them to furnish provisions for the sixty galleys they had demanded, and continue in that road till they should have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinus, either by force of arms or some other way. He said, that they afterwards should return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the assistance they gave their allies; unless they should have an opportunity of making some attempt in favour of the Leontines, or of bringing over some city into their alliance.

Alcibiades answered, that it would be inglorious, after sailing out with so noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they should first endeavour to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and Barbarians, in order to detach them from the Syracusans, and procure troops and provisions from them; and especially to send a deputation to Messina, which was as it were the key of Sicily, and its harbour capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared farther, that after seeing who were their friends and enemies, and strengthening themselves by the addition of a new reinforcement, they then should attack either Selinus or Syracuse; in case the one should refuse to conclude a peace with Egesta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the most prudent; that was, to sail directly for Syracuse, before its citizens had time to recover from their surprise, or prepare for their defence. He observed, that the sudden arrival of an armed force always strikes the greatest terror; and that when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it also revives their courage; whereas, when they are suddenly attacked, while still in confusion, they are generally overcome: that as they would be masters of the open country, they would not be in want of any thing, but, on the contrary, would oblige the Sicilians to declare for them: that at last they should settle in Megara, which was quite desert, and a near neighbour to Syracuse, and there lay up their fleet in safety. However, his counsel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades: accordingly they sailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catana by surprise.

SECTION X.

Alcibiades is recalled. He flies, and is sentenced to die for contumacy. He retires to Sparta. Flexibility of his genius and disposition.

This was the first and last exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition,* he being immediately recalled by the Athenians, in order to be tried upon the accusation laid against him. For, since the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country; and who, under the specious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkest designs, meditated nothing but satiating their hatred and revenge: his enemies, I say, taking advantage of his absence, had proceeded in the affair with greater rigour than ever. All those against whom informations were lodged, were thrown into prison, without so much as being suffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the most profligate and abandoned citizens; as if, says Thucydides, it was not as great a crime to punish the innocent, as to suffer the guilty to escape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words; having declared that he saw and knew one of the accused by moonlight; whereas it appeared, that there was no moon at that time. But notwithstanding this manifest perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ made them apprehensive of a similar attempt; and, strongly possessed with this fear, they would not give ear to any thing.

At last they sent out the Salaminian galley,† ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear of raising a tumult in the army; but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his presence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley; but the instant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on shore, he disappeared, and eluded the pursuit of those who sought after him. Being asked, whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might pass on him: *I would not*, says he, *rely on my mother, for fear she should inadvertently mistake a black bean for a white one.*‡ The galley of Salamis returned back without the commander, who was ashamed of his having suffered his prey to escape him in that manner. Alcibiades was sentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole estate was confiscated, and all the priests and priestesses were commanded to curse him. Among the latter was one, named Theano, who alone had the courage to oppose this decree, saying, *That she had been appointed priestess,§ not to curse but to bless.*

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 446—450. Plut. in Alcib. p. 202.

† This was a sacred vessel, appointed to fetch criminals.

‡ The judges made use of beans in giving their suffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.

§ Φάσκουσα εὐχῶν οὐ καταρῶν ἱέρειαν γεγονέναι.

Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, *I shall make them sensible*, said he, *that I am alive.*

Much about this time Diagoras the Melian was prosecuted at Athens.* He had settled himself in that city, where he taught atheism, and was brought to a trial for his poisonous doctrine. Diagoras escaped the punishment which would have been inflicted on him,† by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the sentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had so great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even set a price upon his head, and promised a reward of a talent to any man who should deliver him up dead or alive.

About twenty years before a similar process had been instituted against Protagoras,‡ for having only treated the same question by way of problem. He had said in the beginning of one of his books: *Whether the gods do or do not exist, is a question which I know not whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our understandings are too much clouded, and the life of man is too short, for the solution of so nice and difficult a point.* But the Athenians could not bear to have a subject of this nature made a doubt; and for this reason they ordered proclamation to be made by the public crier, for all persons who had any copies of this book, to bring them to the magistrates: after which they were burnt as infamous and impious pieces, and the author was banished for ever, from all the territories of the Athenians.

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the disciples of Democritus, who first invented the philosophy of atoms.

Since the departure of Alcibiades,§ Nicias had possessed the whole authority; for Lamachus, his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, possessed little influence, because of his extreme poverty, for which he was despised by the soldiers. But the Athenians were not always of this way of thinking; for we have seen that Aristides, poor as he was, was not less esteemed and respected on that account: but in this last expedition, the people in general had imbibed a passion for luxury and magnificence; the natural consequence of which is, a love of riches. As Nicias, therefore, governed solely, all his actions were of the same cast with his disposition, that is, timid and dilatory: he suffered every thing to languish, sometimes either by lying still and undertaking nothing, sometimes by only sailing along the coast, or losing time in consulting or deliberating; all which soon suppressed, on one side, the ardour and confidence the troops expressed at first; and on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been seized, at the sight of so formidable an armament. He besieged Hybla; and though it was but a small city, he was however obliged to

* Joseph. contr. App. Protag. Joseph. contr. App. Cic. l. i. de nat. deor. n. 62.

† Diod. . xiii. p. 137.

‡ Diod. Laert. in

§ Thucyd. p. 452, 453. Plut. in Nic. p. 533.

raise the siege some days after, which brought him into the highest contempt. He retired at last to Catana, after having performed but one exploit, viz. the ruining of Hyccara, a small town inhabited by Barbarians, from which place, it is said that Lais the courtesan, at that time very young, was sold with the rest of the captives, and carried to Peloponnesus.

In the mean time.* Alcibiades having left Thurium, arrived at Argos; and as he quite despaired of ever being recalled home, he sent a messenger to the Spartans, desiring leave to reside among them, under their guard and protection. He promised, in the most solemn manner, that if they would consider him as their friend, he would render greater services to their state, than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms; and soon after his arrival in their city he gained the love and esteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed, and even enchanted them, by his conforming in all respects to their way of living. Such people as saw Alcibiades shave himself to the skin, bathe in cold water, eat of the coarse, heavy cakes, which were their usual food, and be so well satisfied with their black broth, could not persuade themselves, that a man, who submitted so cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace; had used essences and perfumes; had worn the fine stuffs of Miletus; in a word, had hitherto lived in the midst of voluptuousness and profusion. But flexibility was the characteristic that chiefly distinguished Alcibiades. Cameleon-like, he could assume all shapes and colours, to win the favour of those among whom he resided. He immediately assumed their manners, and adapted himself to their taste, as if they had been natural in him; and though he inwardly had an aversion to them, he could however cover his disgust with an easy, simple, and unconstrained air. With some he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayest youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal, and austere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleness, and pleasure, made up his whole life, in Thrace, he was always on horseback or carousing; and when he resided with Tissaphernes, the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of Timæa, the wife of king Agis, that he had a son by her, who, in public, went by the name of Leotychides; though his mother, in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call him Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own Leotychides for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne.

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 230.

SECTION XI.

Description of Syracuse.

As the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history, the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to relate for that reason, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner in which the ancients formed the siege of a place, I judge it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give the reader a description and plan of the city of Syracuse; in which he will also find the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracusans, mentioned in this siege.

Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily.* Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its double harbour, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful, and most powerful among the Grecian cities. We are told,† its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, how cloudy soever it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.

A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. It was built by Archias the Corinthian,‡ a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the same coast.

When the Athenians besieged this city, it was divided into three parts, *viz.* the Island, Achradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only these three divisions. Two more, *viz.* Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The Island, situated to the south, was called Νῆσος (Nasos,) signifying, in Greek, an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge. It was in this island that the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel and the palace for their kings.§ This quarter of the city was of very great importance, because it might render those who possessed it master of the two ports which surrounded it. It was for this reason that the Romans, when they took Syracuse, would not suffer any Syracusan to inhabit the Island.

There was in this Island a very famous fountain,‖ called Arethusa. The ancients, or rather the poets, from reasons which have not the least shadow of probability, supposed that the Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponnesus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the sea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the fountain of Arethusa. It was this fiction which gave occasion to the following lines of Virgil:—

* Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117—119.

† Urbem Syracusas elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cœlique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magnâ turbulentâque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent. *Cic. Verr.* 7. n. 26.

‡ Strab. l. vi. p. 269. § Cic. Verr. 7. n. 97. ‖ Strab. l. vi. p. 270. Senec. Nat. Quæst. l. iii. c. 26

Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem.—
Sic tibi, cùm fluctus subterlabere Sicanos,
Doris amara suam non intermisceat undam. *Virg.* Eclog. 10.

Thy sacred succour, Arethusa, bring,
To crown my labour: 'tis the last I sing.—
So may thy silver streams beneath the tide,
Unmix'd with briny seas securely glide. *Dryden.*

Achradina, situated entirely on the sea-side towards the east, was the most spacious, the most beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city.

Tyche, so called from the temple of Fortune (Τύχη) which embellished that part of the city, extended along Achradina westward from the north towards the south, and was very well inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was situated to the north of the city.

Epipolæ was a hill without the city, which it commanded. It was situated between Hexapylum and the point of Euryelus, towards the north and west. It was exceedingly steep in several places, and for that reason of very difficult access. At the time of the siege in question, it was not surrounded with walls; and the Syracusans defended it with a body of troops, against the attacks of the enemy. Euryelus was the pass or entrance which led to Epipolæ. On the same hill of Epipolæ was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdaulum.

It was not till long after (under Dionysius the tyrant) that Epipolæ was surrounded with walls, and inclosed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth division had been added before, called Neapolis, that is, the New City, which covered Tyche.

The river Anapus ran at almost half a league distance from the city.* The space between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two fens, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lysimelia. This river emptied itself into the great harbour. Near its mouth, southward, was a kind of castle called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius standing there, and in which were great riches. It was 500 paces from the city.

Syracuse had two harbours, very near one another, and separated only by the Isle, *viz.* the great harbour, and the small one, called otherwise Lactus. According to the description which the Roman orator gives of them,† both were surrounded with the buildings of the city.

The great harbour was a little abov 5000 paces,‡ or two leagues in cir-umference. It had a gulf called Dascon. The entrance of this port was but 500 paces wide. It was formed, on one side, by the point of the island Ortygia; and on the other by the little island and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a castle of the same name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilus.

* Plut. in Dionys. vit. p. 970.

† Portus habet propè in ædificatione aspectuque urbis inclusos. *Cic Verr.* 6. n. 117

‡ According to Strabo, it is eighty stadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proof that this passage of Strabo is corrupt. *Cluver.* p. 167.

SECTION XII.

Nicias, after some engagements, besieges Syracuse. Lamachus is killed in a battle. The city is reduced to the greatest extremities.

Eighteenth year of the War.

At the end of the summer,* news was brought Nicias that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him. Already their cavalry advanced with an air of insolence to insult him even in his camp; and asked with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to settle in Catana. These severe reproaches roused him a little, so that he resolved to sail for Syracuse. The enterprise was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmost hazard, attempt to land in presence of an enemy who waited for him with the greatest resolution; and would not fail to charge him, the instant he should offer to make a descent. Nor was it safer for him to march his troops by land, because, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracusans, which was very numerous, upon the first advice they should have of his march, would fall upon him, and overpower him by the superiority of forces.

To extricate himself from this perplexity, and enable himself to seize without opposition upon an advantageous post, which a Syracusan exile had discovered to him, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. He caused a false piece of information to be given to the enemy, *viz.* that by means of a conspiracy, which was to take effect on a certain day, they might seize on his camp, and possess themselves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracusans, on this assurance, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition, and in the evening steered for Syracuse. They arrived by day-break in the great harbour; landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themselves. The enemy, finding themselves shamefully over-reached, returned immediately to Syracuse; and, in the greatest rage, drew up in battle array, some days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful; but a very heavy shower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, coming unexpectedly, the Syracusans, who were inexperienced, the greatest part of them having never carried arms before, were frighted at the tempest, whilst their enemies laughed at it, as the mere effect of the season; and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the storm. The Syracusans, after making a long and vigorous

Thucyd. l. vi p. 453—461. Plut. in Nic. p. 533, 534. Diod. l. xiii. p. 137, 138.

resistance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not pursue them far, because their horse, which was still in a body, and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracusans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia, to prevent its being plundered.

This temple stood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very desirous of taking it, because it abounded with gold and silver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had consecrated. Nicias having delayed sending troops to seize it, lost the opportunity, and gave the Syracusans time to throw into it, as was before observed, a detachment for its defence. It was thought he did this on purpose, and out of reverence to the gods; because, had the soldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himself alone would have been accused of the sacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuse, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana, to winter there, with design to return in the beginning of the next spring, and lay siege to the city. For this they wanted money, provisions, and particularly horse, of which they were absolutely destitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of these succours from the people of Sicily, who they supposed would join them, the instant they should hear of their victory; and at the same time they sent an express to Athens, to solicit the like aid. They also addressed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and sent deputies to some cities of Italy, situated on the coast of the Tuscan sea, which had promised to assist them.

The Syracusans were far from desponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was most distinguished for his valour, his judgment, and experience, represented to them, in order to raise their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage, but in conduct; that the enemies, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that the having a multitude of leaders (they were fifteen in number.) from which confusion and disobedience were inseparable, had done them prejudice; that it would be absolutely necessary for them to choose experienced generals, to keep the rest in their duty, and exercise their forces continually during the winter season. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they sent deputies to Corinth and Lacedæmon to renew the alliance, and at the same time to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recall their troops out of Sicily, or at least to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. Accordingly they took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche, descending westward towards the quarter of the city called

afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea-shore, where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the adjacent country.

The ambassadors of Syracuse being arrived among the Corinthians,* asked succour of them as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and at the same time they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, to which his resentment against Athens added new vigour. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily; and at the same time to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he induced them to fortify Decelia in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it not being able ever to recover that blow: for by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium, and of the revenues of their lands; nor could they be succoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the asylum of all the malcontents and partisans of Sparta.

A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414. Nicias had received some succours from Athens. These consisted of 250 troopers, who the Athenians supposed would be furnished with horses in Sicily (the troops bringing only the furniture,) and of thirty horse-archers, with 300 talents, that is, 300,000 French crowns † Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accused of often letting slip opportunities, by his losing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting measures; however, when once he entered upon action, he was as bold and vigorous in execution, as he before had been slow and timorous in undertaking, as he showed on the present occasion.

The Syracusans hearing that the Athenians had received a reinforcement of cavalry, and would soon march and lay siege to the city; and knowing they could not possibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unless they should possess themselves of the heights of Epipolæ, which commanded Syracuse, they resolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only pass by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inaccessible. Marching therefore down into the meadow, bordered by the river Anapus, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed 700 foot,

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 471—482. Plut. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. p. 534, 535. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138. † About 67,000*l.* sterling.

under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important post; with orders to repair to it, at the first signal which should be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had not time to do this. He sailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the least suspicion of his design. Being arrived at the port of Trogilus, near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (six or seven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land forces on shore, after which he retired with his fleet to Thapsus, a small peninsula near Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a staccado.

The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapus, at above a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the 700 soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confusion, but were easily defeated, and 300 of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipolæ, in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians 300 horse, to which some of their Sicilian allies added 100 more, which, with the 250 sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves with horses in Sicily, made a body of 650 horse.

The plan laid down by Nicias for taking Syracuse, was to surround all the city on the land side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea.

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up the city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus, situate on the sea-side. This work was carried on with such a rapidity, as terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely necessary to prevent the carrying on of this work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation (northward) was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a stop to their works, or at least to render them useless, by raising a wall to cut the line of that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined that in case they should be suffered

to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any farther progress in their work: or that, should they endeavour to prevent it, it would be sufficient for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible with strong palisades; and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardour, they began to raise a wall; and, in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper distances, to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans to carry on their works undisturbed, because, had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they had resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing that the Syracusan soldiers, who had been left to guard the wall, were very negligent in their duty; some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard, they detached 300 chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any succours from coming out of it. Accordingly, the 300 soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenites, where, pouring in indiscriminately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, pulled up the palisades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After the success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began, the very next day, a still more important work, and which would quite finish their inclosure of the city, *viz.* to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, westward, through the plain and the fens, as far as the great harbour. To prevent this, the besieged, beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallation as far as the sea: but the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus to the great harbour of Syracuse; for it had hitherto continued in that road; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provisions from Thapsus by land. The Athenians came down

therefore from Epipolæ into the plain before day-break; when, throwing planks and beams in that part where the fens were only slimy and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greatest part of the fossé lined with palisades, and then the rest, the after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right towards the city, and the rest towards river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the passage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the first battalions into disorder. Lamachus, perceiving this from the left wing where he commanded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed with five or six who had followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired.

At the same time their right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it. He had remained in this fort, in consequence of illness, and was at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Animated by the danger and the presence of the enemy, he struggles with his indisposition; rises up, and commands his servants to set fire immediately to all the timber lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. This unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time, the fleet was seen sailing into the great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the troops which were about to land, retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fossé lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time, the Athenians, who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea; *viz.* a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforward Nicias, who was now sole general, con-

ceived great hopes: for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard, on his passage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless; not with the view of defending Sicily, but only of preserving to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared, in all places, that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now (contrary to his natural disposition) confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success, persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate, did not regard Gylippus's approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy, in any manner, of his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus's landing, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair had been ended.

SECTION XIII.

The Syracusans resolve to capitulate, but Gylippus's arrival changes the face of affairs. Nicias is forced by his colleagues to engage in a sea-fight, and is overcome. His land forces are also defeated.

Nineteenth year of the War.

The fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed;* and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly, a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 485—489 Plut. in Nic. p. 535, 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138, 139.

order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion, that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.

It was at that very instant, and in the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongylus by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked round him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which were coming to their aid. The Syracusans, astonished, or rather stupified, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a fort in his way,* marched in order of battle directly for Epipolæ: and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without whilst the Syracusans should charge them, on their side, with the forces of Syracuse and his. The Athenians, exceedingly surprised at his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this proposal; and some of his soldiers bursting out a laughing, asked the herald, *Whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian cloak, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present state of the city?* Both sides, therefore, prepared for battle.

Gylippus stormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it sailed into the harbour. The besieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut (about the extremity of it) the single wall of the Athenians; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops that were posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city on the north side towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians, after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, one part that was weaker and lower than the rest, marched thither in the night with his troops; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire, upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They raised the wall higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it, after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchment.

Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straitened the mouth of the great harbour; and his design thereby was, to pro-

* Jeges.

cure provisions, and all other things he might want, the more easily; because the Athenians. by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracusans, and were the better able to observe their various motions; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbour; as they must have been, should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, since the arrival of Gylippus, had had no hopes left but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his fleet and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, sheltered by which his ships were enabled to lie at anchor; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much; for as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy's horse, the third part of which were posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from sallying, and were masters of the open country. Advice being brought to Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent twenty galleys against it; ordering them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time, Gylippus employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their own use, went on with the wall which the Syracusans had began to carry through Epipolæ; and drew up daily in battle array before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the spot lying between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with: and to declare publicly, that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat; because he had made them fight in too confined a spot of ground. However, he promised to give them soon an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his: and accordingly the very next day he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their wall beyond the wall of contravallation, to which they were already very near (because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory;) he therefore marched against the Syracusans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond the spot where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight and soon after defeated the right. We see here what the expe

rience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing: for Gylippus, with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them.

After this success,* the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived unperceived by that of the Athenians, resumed courage, armed several galleys, and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners They sent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth, to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person through all the cities of Sicily, to solicit them to join him; and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succours. Nicias, finding his troops lessen and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged; and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I shall repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations.

Athenians: I have already informed you, by several expresses, of what was passing here: but it is necessary you should know the present situation of affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in several engagements, and had almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonians and Sicilian troops; and, having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the second, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are in consequence shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, and unable to complete our works, through the superiority of the enemy's forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our forces in battle. Besides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines, by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to surround the city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that instead of besieging, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out, for fear of their horse.

Not contented with these advantages, they are bringing new succours from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them; and the rest to furnish them with men and ships, to attack us both by sea and land. I say by sea, which, though very surprising, is, however, but too true. For our fleet, which before was considerable, from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circumstances, and prodigiously weakened.

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 490—494. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 139.

Our galleys leak every where; because we cannot draw them on shore to careen them, for fear, lest those of the enemy, which are more numerous and in better condition than ours, should attack us on a sudden, which they seem to threaten every moment. Besides, we are under a necessity of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great distance, and bring along in the sight of the enemy; so that should we be ever so little negligent in this point, our army would be starved.

With regard to the ships' crews, they decrease sensibly every day; for as great numbers of them disperse to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to pieces by the enemy's horse. Our slaves, allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, desert very fast to it. The foreigners whom we forced into the service, disband daily; and such as have been raised with money, who came for plunder rather than fighting, finding themselves baulked, go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide themselves in Sicily, which they may easily do in so large an island. A great number of citizens, though long used to, and well skilled in, working of ships, by bribing the captains, have put others in their room, who are wholly unexperienced, and incapable of serving, and by that means have subverted all discipline. I am now writing to men perfectly well versed in naval affairs; and who are very sensible, that, when order is neglected, every thing grows worse and worse, and a fleet must inevitably be ruined.

But the most unhappy circumstance is, that, though I am invested with the authority of general, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For (Athenians) you are very sensible, that such is your disposition, that you do not easily brook restraint; besides, I do not know where to furnish myself with seamen, whilst the enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and should the cities of Italy, from whence we have our provisions (hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, and that you do not take the least care to send us any succour,) join the Syracusans, we are undone; and the enemy will have no occasion to fight us.

I could write of things which would be more agreeable, but of none that could be more proper to give you a just idea of the subjects on which you are to deliberate. I am sensible that you love to have such advices only sent you as are pleasing; but then I know on the other side, that when affairs turn out otherwise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who deceived you; which has induced me to give you a sincere and genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am to inform you, that no complaints can be justly made either against the officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well.

But now that the Sicilians are joining all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus, you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberations, that our present troops are not sufficient; and, therefore, we either must be recalled, or else a

land and naval force, equal to the first, must be sent us, with money in proportion. You must also think of appointing a person to succeed me; it being impossible for me, through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deserve this favour at your hands, on account of the services I have done you, in the several commands conferred upon me, so long as my health would permit me to act.

To conclude: whatever resolutions you may come to, the request I have to make, is, that you would execute it speedily, and in the very beginning of the spring. The succours which our enemies meet with in Sicily, are all ready; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you.

The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor; and only nominated two officers who were under him, *viz.* Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys, and some money,* about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him: during which, the latter was raising troops and contributions, in order to set sail early in the spring.

A. M. 3591. Ant J. C. 413. The Lacedæmonians,† on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island. Accordingly, they entered Attica early, under the command of king Agis; and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia; having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater despatch. This post is about 120 furlongs from Athens, that is, about six French leagues, and the same distance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually soliciting the Lacedæmonians; and could not be easy, till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all: for as hitherto the enemy had been accustomed to retire after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but since the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it was continually making incursions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town; for in the day-time, a guard was mounted at all the gates; and in the night, all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such vessels as brought provisions from the island of Eubœa, and which before had a much shorter passage by Decelia, were forced

* One hundred and twenty talents, Diod. l. xiii. p. 140.

† Thucyd. l. vii. p. 494—496, and 502—504

to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium; by which means provisions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer. To heighten the calamity, upwards of 20,000 slaves, the greatest part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious scarcity of money; so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to supply their usual subsidies.

In the mean time,* Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raise in the whole island, and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprise. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the seas. He observed, that the Athenians themselves had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it: that the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their natural disposition, and the situation of their city, which stood at a considerable distance from the sea: that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and intrepidity: that they ought to copy them; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land-forces in the night-time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five Syracusan galleys which were in the great harbour, and forty-five in the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to amaze the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time. The Athenians, at this news, went on board also; and, with twenty-five ships, sailed to fight the thirty-five Syracusan vessels which were sailing out against them from the great harbour; and opposed thirty-five more to the forty-five of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by day-break; and having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two were so terri-

Thucyd. l. vii. p. 497—500. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140.

fied, that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss: for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbour (after having forced the Athenians) ran foul of one another with much violence as they entered it in disorder; and by this means transferred the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and great numbers of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewise lost three, and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy in a little island that lay before Plemmyrium, and retired to the shelter of their camp.

The Syracusans also raised three trophies for their taking of the three forts; and after razing one of the smaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons in them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewise lost the stores and rigging of forty galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily; for, whilst the latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, these were procured securely and expeditiously; whereas, after that place was lost, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting; the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no provisions but from the point of their swords; which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great consternation.

There afterwards was a little skirmish in defending a staccado which the inhabitants had made in the sea,* at the entrance of the old harbour, to secure the shipping. The Athenians having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, made it advance as near as possible to the staccado, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships which carried military engines, with which they drew up the stakes by the help of pulleys and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in two; the besieged defending themselves from their harbour, and the enemies from their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in, level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers, however, being induced by large sums of money, succeeded in removing these also, and most of the stakes were torn up; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 500, 501.

One circumstance which the besieged considered of the greatest importance,* was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet, and other succours sent by the Athenians, should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea, profiting by the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter, and at the same time stronger and more solid than before. For this purpose, they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward, on each side of the prows; and to these pieces they joined beams by way of props. These beams extended to the length of six cubits on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention, that should the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to spread themselves nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art; nor to tack about, after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all these advantages, and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus therefore first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city; whilst the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys set sail.

Nicias was unwilling to venture a second battle, saying, that as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a strong reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment should he, as his troops were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command with Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some great exploit to bereave the one of his glory, and, if possible, eclipse that of the other. The pretence they alleged on this occasion was, the fame and reputation of Athens; and they asserted with so much vehemence, that it would be entirely destroyed should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it them, that they at last forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had seventy-five galleys, and the Syracusans eighty.

The first day the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging: and only a few skirmishes passed, after which both parties retired; and it was just the same with the land-forces. The Syracusans did not make the least movement

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 509—513. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140. 141.

the second day. Nicias, taking advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them with safety, in case of a defeat. On the morrow, the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not suppose they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly: but having refreshed themselves with great diligence, and returning on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ships, they entered them in great disorder, so that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle, and most of the sailors were fasting. Victory did not long continue in suspense. The Athenians, after making a short and slight resistance, retired behind their line of transports. The enemy pursued thither, and were stopped by the sailyards of those ships, to which were fixed dolphins of lead,* which, being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once. The Athenians lost seven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners.

This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation.† All the misfortunes he had met with, ever since the time he had first enjoyed the supreme command, came into his mind; and he now is involved in a greater than any of them, by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. Whilst he was revolving these gloomy ideas, Demosthenes's fleet was seen coming forward in great pomp, and with such an air as must fill the enemy with dread: it was now the day after the battle. This fleet consisted of seventy-three galleys, on board of which were 5000 fighting men, and about 3000 archers, slingers, and bowmen. All these galleys were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sound of clarions and trumpets; Demosthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purposely to strike terror into the enemy.

This gallant sight alarmed them indeed beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension, of their calamities; all they had hitherto done or suffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, since, though a hostile camp was intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to send a second army into Sicily, as considerable as the former; and their power, as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing, to increase daily?

* This engine, so violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.

† Thucyd. l vii. p. 513—518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Diod. p. 141, 142.

Demosthenes having made an exact inquiry into the state of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to lose time as Nicias had done, who, having spread a universal terror at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for having wintered in Catana, instead of going directly to Syracuse; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himself with the hopes, that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread in every part of it, and by that means should immediately put an end to the war: otherwise he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops by fighting battles never decisive; nor quite exhaust the city of Athens, by employing its treasures in needless expenses.

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be so hasty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their provisions as well as money were entirely exhausted; that their allies were going to abandon them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity, for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender, as they had before resolved; for there were certain persons in Syracuse who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, because the Syracusans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that should the necessity to which they were reduced be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion.

As Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare in express terms, that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. *Such*, said they, *are his usual protraction, delays, distrusts, and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the enemy; but, on the contrary, by deferring to attack them till his own forces were weakened and despised.* This made the rest of the generals and all the officers come over to Demosthenes's opinion, and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce with it.

Demosthenes, after having attacked to no purpose the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition that should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took provisions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing necessary for him to defend that post after he should possess himself of it. As there was no going up to it in the day-time undiscovered, he marched thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander; Nicias staying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryelus, as before,

unperceived by the sentinels; attack the first intrenchment, and storm it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his soldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his designs, marches forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, sustained by Gylippus, march under arms out of the intrenchments. Being siezed with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their surprise, they are stopped on a sudden by the Bœotians, who make a vigorous stand, and marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, repulse them with great shouts, and make a dreadful slaughter. This spreads a universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled either force along such as were advancing to their assistance, or else, mistaking them for enemies, turn their arms against them. They now were all mixed indiscriminately, it being impossible to discriminate objects in the horrors of a night, which was not so gloomy as entirely to make them imperceptible, nor yet light enough to distinguish those which were seen. The Athenians sought for one another to no purpose; and from their often asking the *word*, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard; which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because, by their being together and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued, threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who had escaped straggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse, who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

SECTION XIV

The consternation with which the Athenians are siezed. They again hazard a sea-fight, and are defeated. They resolve to retire by land. Being close pursued by the Syracusans, they surrender. Nicias and Demosthenes are sentenced to die, and executed. The effect which the news of the defeat of the army produces in Athens.

The Athenian generals,* after sustaining so great a loss, were greatly perplexed, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diseases of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near

Thucyd. l. vii. p. 518—520. Plut. in Nic. p. 538—542. Diod. p. 142

which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion, that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been so unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing: and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise their blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.

Nicias was sensible that the arguments his colleague used were very just, and he himself was of his opinion: but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their resolution to leave Sicily (the report of which would certainly reach the enemy,) should complete the ruin of their affairs, and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides, they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated that he would not quit Sicily, till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose; as he well knew that otherwise they would be highly displeased: that as those who were to judge them had not been eye-witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion; and, at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege: that knowing so well as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were not yet able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only good choice they could make would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former project, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to accede to that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay.

Gylippus,* after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sick-

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 521—543. Plut. in Nic. p. 538. Diod. l. xiii. p. 142—164.

ness; and they now began to repent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged were preparing to attack them both by sea and land. Besides, Nicias no longer opposed this resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail with the utmost expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to set sail (wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon,) the moon was suddenly eclipsed in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendour; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences of it. They then consulted the soothsayers; who being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phenomenon, only augmented their consternation. It was the custom, after such accidents had happened, to suspend their enterprise but for three days. The soothsayers pronounced, that he must not set sail till three times nine days were past (these are Thucydides's words,) which doubtless was a mysterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias, scrupulous to a fault, and full of a mistaken veneration for these blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon, and not return till the same day of the next month; as if he had not seen the planet very clearly the instant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the interposition of the earth's body.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being soon spread over the city, a resolution was taken to attack the besiegers both by sea and land. The Syracusans began the first day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a slight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a second attack; and at the same time sailed, with seventy-six galleys, against eighty-six of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having spread along the shore to surround them, this movement proved fatal to him: for as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracusans, after forcing their centre, attacked him, drove him vigorously into the gulf called Dascon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon lost his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chase to the rest of the galleys, and run them on shore. Gylippus, who commanded the land army, seeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their staccado, came down with part of his troops, in order to charge the soldiers, in case they should be forced to run ashore, and to give his friends the more room to tow such galleys as they should have taken. However, he was repulsed by the Tyrrhenians, who were posted on that side, and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to sustain them, to retire, with some loss, as far as the

marsh called Lysimelia, which lay near it. The latter saved most of their ships, eighteen excepted, which were taken by the Syracusans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, resolving to burn the rest, they filled an old vessel with combustible materials; and, having set fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind against the Athenians, who nevertheless extinguished the fire, and drove off the ship.

Each side erected trophies: the Syracusans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians, for their having driven part of the enemy into the marsh, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently disposed. The Syracusans, who had been thrown into the utmost consternation at the arrival of Demosthenes with his fleet, seeing themselves victorious in a naval engagement, resumed fresh hope, and assured themselves of a complete victory over their enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, frustrated of their only resource, and overcome by sea, so contrary to their expectations, entirely lost courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all resource and prevent their escaping, shut the mouth of the great harbour, which was about 500 paces wide, with galleys placed across, and other vessels fixed with anchors and iron chains, and at the same time made the requisite preparations for the battle, in case they should have courage to engage again. When the Athenians saw themselves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers assembled, in order to deliberate on the present state of affairs. They were in absolute want of provisions, which was owing to their having forbidden the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unless they were masters of the sea. This made them resolve to venture a sea-fight. With this view, they determined to leave their old camp and their walls, which extended to the temple of Hercules; and to intrench themselves on the shore, near their ships, in the smallest compass possible. Their design was, to leave some forces in that place to guard their baggage and the sick; and to fight with the rest on board all the ships they had remaining. They intended to retire to Catana, in case they should be victorious; otherwise, to set fire to their ships, and to march by land to the nearest city belonging to their allies.

This resolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled 110 galleys (the others having lost their oars) with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the rest of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on shore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracusan galleys, Nicias had provided harping-irons to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to close fight, as on shore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of

their galleys with leather, to prevent their being so easily laid hold of. The commanders on both sides had employed all their rhetoric to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from stronger motives; for the battle which was going to be fought, was to determine, not only their lives and liberties, but also the fate of their country.

The battle was very obstinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, easily took those ships which defended the entrance of it; but when they attempted to break the chain of the rest to widen the passage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near 200 galleys came rushing on each side, towards one narrow place, there must necessarily be a very great confusion; and the vessels could not easily advance forward, or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reason, did very little execution: but there were very furious and frequent discharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed with a shower of stones, which always did execution from what place soever they were thrown; whereas they defended themselves only by shooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ships from the agitation of the sea, could not be well aimed, and by that means the greatest part of them did little execution. Ariston the pilot had given the Syracusans this counsel. These discharges being over, the soldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ships in order to fight hand to hand: and it often happened, that whilst they were climbing up one side, their own ships were entered on the other; and two or three ships would be grappled to one, which occasioned a great perplexity and confusion. Farther, the noise of the ships that dashed one against the other, together with the different cries of the victors and vanquished, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a passage, whatever might be the consequence, to secure their return into their own country; and this the enemy employed their utmost efforts to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land armies, which were drawn up on the highest part of the shore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there, ran to the wall; whilst the rest, kneeling in the temples, were imploring Heaven to give success to their citizens: all these saw clearly, because of their little distance from the fleets, every thing that passed; and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and shuddering at, every movement, and the several changes which happened, they discovered the interest they took in the battle, by their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different gestures; stretching out their hands, sometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the succour and protection of the gods. At last, the Athenian fleet, after sustaining a long battle and a vigorous resistance, was put to flight and driven against the

snore. The Syracusans, who were spectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by a universal shout, the news of this victory. The victors, now masters of the sea, and sailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuse, erected a trophy; whilst the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not so much as request that their dead soldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last sad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to choose; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demosthenes proposed the former; but the sailors, in the deepest affliction, refused to obey, fully persuaded that it would be impossible for them to sustain a second engagement.

The second method was therefore resolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to set out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who suspected their design, was very sensible that it was of the utmost importance not to suffer so great a body of forces to escape; since they otherwise might fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. The Syracusans were at that time in the midst of their festivity and rejoicings; and thinking of nothing but how they might best divert themselves, after the toils they had sustained in fight. They were then solemnizing the festival of Hercules, which happened on that very day. To desire the Syracusans to take up arms again, in order to pursue the enemy; and to attempt to draw them from their diversions, either by force or persuasion, would have been to no purpose; for which reason another expedient was employed. Hermocrates sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for the friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud: *Tell Nicias not to retire till day-light: for the Syracusans lie in ambush for him, and have seized on the passes.* This false advice stopped Nicias at once; and he did not even set out the next day, in order that the soldiers might have more time to prepare for their departure; and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence, and abandon the rest.

The enemy had time enough for seizing the avenues. The next morning, early, they possessed themselves of the most difficult passes, fortified those places where the rivers were fordable, broke down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain; so that there was not one place through which the Athenians could pass without fighting. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with design to retire to Catana. The whole army was in an inexpressible consternation, at the sight of the dead or dying, some of whom were left exposed to wild beasts, and the rest to the cruelty of the enemy. Those who were sick and wounded conjured them with tears to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or else, dragging themselves after them, followed them as far as

their strength would permit: and, when this failed, they had recourse to tears, sighs, imprecations, and sending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, whilst every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were seized with the deepest melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguish, when they represented to themselves the greatness from which they were fallen, the extreme misery to which they were reduced, and the still greater evils from which they foresaw it would be impossible for them to escape. They could not bear the comparison, for ever present in their thoughts, of the triumphant state in which they had left Athens, in the midst of the good wishes and acclamations of the people; with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the most melancholy part of the spectacle, and that which most deserved compassion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illness; deprived of the most necessary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them most; pierced, not only with his private grief, but still more with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart; this great man, superior to all his misfortunes, thought of nothing but how he might best comfort his soldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned; that if they had offended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time; that fortune, after having so long favoured the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them; that their bravery and their numbers made them still formidable (being still near 40,000 strong;) that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they might think proper; that they had no more to do but take care severally of themselves, and march in good order; that by a prudent and good retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the first being commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced their passage, and afterwards were attacked by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several day's march; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy were unwilling to hazard a battle against an army which despair alone might render invincible; and the in-

stant the Athenians presented the Syracusans battle, the latter retired; but whenever the former proceeded on their march, they advanced and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it advisable to retire towards the sea, by a quite contrary way to that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, instead of proceeding to Catana, as they first intended. They set out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confusion and disorder, as generally happens to great armies during the gloomy horrors of the night, especially when the enemy is not far off. However, the van-guard, commanded by Nicias, went forward in good order; but above half of the rear-guard, with Demosthenes at their head, quitted the main body, and lost their way. On the next day the Syracusans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with extraordinary diligence, came up with him about noon; and having surrounded him with their horse, they drove him into a narrow place enclosed with a wall, where his soldiers fought like lions. Perceiving, at the close of the day, that they were oppressed with fatigue and covered with wounds, they gave the islanders leave to retire, which some of them accepted; and afterwards spared the lives of the rest, who surrendered at discretion with Demosthenes, after having stipulated that they should not be put to death, nor sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. About 6000 soldiers surrendered on these conditions.

Nicias arrived on the same evening at the river Erineus, and passing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and summoned him to surrender at discretion, as Demosthenes had done. Nicias could not persuade himself at first, that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore desired leave to send some horse for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demosthenes had really surrendered in that manner, Nicias offered to pay the expenses of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hostages, as he should be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this proposal with disdain and insolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in absolute want of all things, nevertheless sustained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Asinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracusans coming up to them, drove most of them into the stream; the rest having already plunged voluntarily into it to quench their thirst. Here the greatest and most bloody carnage was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the least pity as they were drinking. Nicias, finding all lost, and unable to bear this dismal spectacle, surrendered at discretion, upon condition

that Gylippus should discontinue the fight, and spare the rest of his army. A great number were killed, and more taken prisoners, so that all Sicily was filled with them. The Athenians seem to have been displeased with their general,* for surrendering in this manner at discretion; and for this reason his name was omitted in a public monument, on which were engraved the names of those commanders who had lost their lives in fighting for their country.

The victors adorned, with the arms taken from the prisoners, the finest and largest trees on the banks of the river, and made a kind of trophies of those trees; and crowning themselves with chaplets of flowers, dressing their horses in the richest caparisons and cropping the manes of those of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuse, after having happily terminated the most considerable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks; and won, by their strength and valour, a most signal and complete victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the prisoners. Dioeles, one of the leaders of the greatest authority among the people, proposed, that all the Athenians who were born of free parents, and all such Sicilians as had joined with them, should be imprisoned in the quarries, and only two measures of flour, and one of water, given them daily; that the slaves and all the allies should be publicly sold; and that the two Athenian generals should be first scourged with rods, and afterwards put to death.

This last article was exceedingly disliked by all wise and moderate Syracusans.† Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and justice, attempted to make some remonstrances to the people, but they would not hear him; and the shouts which echoed on all sides, prevented him from continuing his speech. At that instant, an ancient man,‡ venerable for his age and gravity, who in this war had lost two sons, the only heirs to his name and estate, made his servants carry him to the tribunal, and the instant he appeared a profound silence ensued. *You here behold*, says he, *an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan the fatal effects of this war, by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation, and were the only supports, of my old age. I cannot indeed forbear admiring their courage and felicity, in sacrificing to their country's welfare, a life which they would one day have been deprived of by the common course of nature: but then I cannot but be strongly affected with the cruel wound which their death has made in my heart; nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But, however, I cannot conceal one circumstance, which is, that I am less sensible to my private affliction, than to the honour of my country: and I see it ready to expose itself to eternal infamy, by the barbarous*

* Pausan. l. i. p. 56. † Diod. l. xiii. p. 149—161. ‡ Nicolaus.

advice which is now given you. The Athenians indeed merit the worst treatment, and every kind of punishment that can be inflicted on them, for so unjustly declaring war against us; but have not the gods, the avengers of crimes, punished them and revenged us sufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms and surrendered, did they not do this in the hopes of having their lives spared? And if we put them to death, will it be possible for us to avoid the just reproach, of our having violated the law of nations, and dishonoured our victory by the most barbarous cruelty? What! will you suffer your glory to be thus sullied in the face of the whole world; and have it said, that a nation, who first dedicated a temple in their city to Clemency, found not any in yours? Surely victories and triumphs do not give immortal glory to a city; but the exercising mercy towards a vanquished enemy, the using moderation in the greatest prosperity, and fearing to offend the gods by a haughty and insolent pride. You doubtless have not forgotten that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your cause in the assembly of the Athenians; and employed all his credit, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade his country from embarking in this war. Should you therefore pronounce sentence of death on this worthy general, would it be a just reward for the zeal he showed for your interest? With regard to myself, death would be less grievous to me than the sight of so horrid an injustice, committed by my countrymen and fellow-citizens.

The people seemed moved to compassion at this speech, especially as, when this venerable old man first ascended the tribunal, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on those who had brought all his calamities upon him, instead of suing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expatiated, with vehemence, on the unheard-of cruelties which their republic had exercised on several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies, the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have made it suffer, had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracusans, who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose manes could be appeased no other way than by the blood of their murderers; on these representations, the people returned to their sanguinary resolution, and followed Diocles's advice in every respect. Gylippus used his utmost endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes given up to him (especially as he had taken them,) in order to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wise and moderate men could not forbear shedding tears at the tragical fate of these two illustrious personages; and particularly for Nicias, who, of all men of his time, seemed least to merit so ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the speeches and remonstrances he had made to prevent this war;

and, on the other side, when they considered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion; the greatest part of them were tempted to exclaim against Providence, when they saw a man, who had ever shown the highest reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himself to the utmost for their honour and worship, so ill rewarded by them, and meeting with no better fate than the most abandoned wretched. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men should inspire the heathens with such thoughts, and make them murmur and despond; since they did not know the holiness of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The prisoners were shut up in the quarries (*the public prisons of Syracuse;*) where, crowded one upon the other, they suffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever exposed to the inclemencies of the weather; scorched in the daytime by the burning rays of the sun, or frozen in the night by the colds of autumn; poisoned by the stench of their own excrements, by the carcasses of those who died of their wounds and of sickness; in fine, worn out by hunger and thirst; for the daily allowance to each was but a small measure of water, and two of meal. Those who were taken out of this place two months after, in order to be sold as slaves (many of whom were citizens who had concealed their condition,) found a less rigorous fate. Their wisdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modesty, were of great advantage to them; for they were either soon restored to their liberty, or met with the kindest and most generous treatment from their masters. Several of them even owed the good usage they met with to Euripides, the finest scenes of whose tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them; so that when they returned to their own country, they went and saluted that poet as their deliverer; and informed him of the admirable effect wrought in their favour by his verses.

The news of the defeat being carried to Athens,* the citizens would not believe it at first; and were so far from giving credit to it, that they sentenced that man to death who had first published it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were seized with the utmost consternation; and, as if themselves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and resentment against the orators who had promoted the enterprise, as well as against the soothsayers, who, by their oracles of fictitious prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of success. They had never been reduced to so deplorable a condition as at present, having neither horse, foot, money, galleys, nor mariners; in a word, they were in the deepest despair, expecting every moment that the enemy, elate with so great a victory, and strengthened by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by sea and land, with all the forces

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 551—553. Plut. de Garrulit. p. 509.

of Peloponnesus. Cicero had reason to observe,* speaking of the battles in the harbour of Syracuse, that it was there that the troops of Athens, as well as their galleys, were ruined and sunk; and that, in this harbour, the power and glory of the Athenians were miserably shipwrecked.

The Athenians however did not suffer themselves to be wholly dejected, and resumed courage. They now resolved to raise money on all sides, and to import timber for building ships, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the island of Eubœa. They retrenched all superfluous expenses, and established a new council of ancient men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they should be proposed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of service in the present conjuncture; the alarm in which they were, and their common danger, obliging every individual to be attentive to the necessities of the state, and docile to all advice that might promote its interests.

CHAPTER II.

SECT. I. Consequences of the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily. Revolt of the allies. Alcibiades grows into great power with Tissaphernes.

Nineteenth and twentieth years of the War.

A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. THE defeat of the Athenians† before Syracuse was the cause of great movements throughout all Greece. The states, who had not yet joined either side, and waited to be determined by the event, resolved to declare against them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed, that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expenses of a war which lay very heavy upon them, by the speedy and final ruin of Athens. Those of the Athenians, who followed them only out of constraint, seeing no appearance of any future resource for that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it best to take advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for throwing off the yoke of dependance, and resuming their liberty. Dispositions of this kind inspired the Lacedæmonians with great views which were supported by the hopes they had conceived, that their Sicilian allies would join them in the spring with a naval army, augmented by the ruin of the Athenian fleet.

In fact,‡ the people of Eubœa, Chio, and Lesbos, with several others, gave the Lacedæmonians to understand, that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians if they would take them

* Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt: in hoc portu Atheniensium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur. *Cic in Verr* 7. n. 97.

† Thucyd. l. viii. p. 553. ‡ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 555—558.

under their protection. At the same time came deputies from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. The first was governor of Lydia and Ionia, the other of the Hellespont. Those viceroys of Darius wanted neither application nor zeal for the interest of their master. Tissaphernes, promising to furnish the Lacedæmonians with all the necessary expenses for their troops, pressed them to arm directly, and to join him; because the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the usual contributions in his province; and had put it out of his power to remit those of the preceding years to the king. He hoped besides with that powerful aid to get into his hands with more ease a certain nobleman who had revolted in Caria, and whom he had the king's orders to send to him dead or alive. This was Amorges, a bastard of Pissuthnes. Pharnabazus at the same time demanded ships to draw off the cities of the Hellespont from their subjection to the Athenians; who prevented him also from levying the tributes of his government.

The Lacedæmonians thought it proper to begin by satisfying Tissaphernes; and the influence of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that resolution. He embarked with Chalcidæus for Chio, which took up arms upon their arrival, and declared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt, the Athenians resolved to take the 1000 talents out of the treasury,* which had been deposited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited it. Miletus also revolted soon after. Tissaphernes, having joined his troops with those of Sparta, attacked and took the city of Iasus, in which Amorges had shut himself up,† who was taken alive and sent into Persia. That governor gave a month's pay to the whole army, at a drachma, or tenpence, a day to each soldier, observing that he had orders to give them only half that sum for the future.

It was at this time that Chalcidæus made a treaty with Tissaphernes in the name of the Lacedæmonians,‡ of which one of the principal articles was, that all the country which had been subject to the king or his predecessors should remain in his hands. It was renewed some time after by Theramenes, another general of the Lacedæmonians, with some small alterations. But when this treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found, that too great concessions had been made to the king of Persia, in giving up all the places held by himself or his ancestors, as this was to make him master of the greatest part of Greece, of Thessaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Bœotia, without mentioning the islands; from whence the Lacedæmonians would appear rather to have enslaved Greece, than re-established its liberty. It was therefore necessary to make farther alterations in it, with which Tissaphernes and the other governors made great difficulties to

* Three millions of livres. † Thucyd. l. viii. p. 568. ‡ Idem. p. 561—571, 572—576.

comply. A new treaty was however concluded, as we shall see in the sequel.

In the mean time, several cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much. Agis,* who was already his enemy in consequence of the injury he had received from him, could not endure the glory he had acquired; for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally said, that the success of all enterprises was owing to him. The most powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the same sentiments of jealousy, looked upon him with an evil eye, and at length, by their intrigues, obliged the principal magistrates to send orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades being secretly apprised of this order, did not discontinue his services to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himself so well upon his guard, that he avoided all the snares which were laid for him.

A. M. 3593. Ant. J. C. 411. For his better security he threw himself into the protection of Tissaphernes, the great king's governor at Sardis, and was not long without seeing himself in the highest degree of credit and authority in the court of the barbarian. For this Persian, who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and set no value upon simplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the versatility of Alcibiades, the ease with which he assumed all kind of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs. And indeed there was no heart so hard, or temper so untractable, as to hold out against the graces and charms of his conversation and intimacy. Even those, who feared and envied him most, enchanted in a manner by his affable air and engaging behaviour, could not dissemble the infinite satisfaction they felt in seeing and conversing with him.

Tissaphernes therefore, though otherwise very haughty and brutal, and the man who of all the Persians most hated the Greeks, was so much taken with the complaisance and insinuations of Alcibiades, that he gave himself wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him: insomuch that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the finest and most delightful of his gardens, as well from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the surprising beauty of its retreats and solitudes, which art and nature seemed to vie with each other in embellishing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was displayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any safety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the resentment of Agis, began to do them ill offices with Tissaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing the Persians into his views, which were conformable to his master's interests, and to

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 577—579. Plut. in Alcib. p. 204. Diod. p. 164, 165.

the orders he had received from him. For ever since the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Persia, not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other measures to ruin them. They endeavoured covertly to excite divisions amongst them, and to foment troubles by considerable sums of money, which they found means to convey sometimes to Athens, and sometimes to Sparta. They applied themselves so successfully to keep up a balance of power between those two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only slight aids, that could effect nothing decisive, in order to undermine them insensibly, and exhaust both parties gradually, by weakening them by the means of one another.

It is in this kind of conduct, that policy makes the ability of ministers consist; who from the recess of their cabinets, without noise or commotion, without any great expenses, or setting numerous armies on foot, succeed in weakening the states whose power gives them umbrage, either by sowing domestic divisions among them, or by promoting the jealousy of their neighbours, in order to set them at variance with each other.

We must confess, however, that this kind of policy gives us no very favourable idea of the kings of Persia. To reduce themselves, powerful as they were, to such mean, obscure, and indirect measures, was to confess their weakness, and their inability, as they believed, to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honourable means. Besides, is it consistent with justice to employ such methods towards states, against whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whose sole crime is the apprehension of their being one day in a condition to do hurt? Is it lawful by secret bribes, to lay snares for the fidelity of subjects, and to be the accomplice of their treasons, by putting arms into their hands against their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Persia have acquired, if, content with the vast and rich dominions which Providence had given them, they had employed their good offices, power, and even treasures, to reconcile the neighbouring states with each other, to remove their jealousies, to prevent injustice and oppression; and if, feared and honoured by them all, they had made themselves the mediators of their differences, the security of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties. Can any conquest, however great, be compared with such glory?

Tissaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Persians, their common enemy. He therefore entered freely into the views of Alcibiades, and at the same time that he declared himself openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to assist the Athenians underhand, and by a thousand secret methods, deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival

of the Phœnician ships, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occasion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendship and esteem, which rendered that general equally considerable to both parties. The Athenians, who had sadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their passing sentence of condemnation upon him. Alcibiades also on his side extremely sorry to see the Athenians in so mournful a situation, began to fear that if the city of Athens were to be entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans, who mortally hated him.

SECTION II.

The return of Alcibiades to Athens negotiated upon condition of establishing the aristocratical, in the room of the democratical government. Tissaphernes concludes a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians.

The Athenians were intent upon nothing so much as Samos,* where they had all their forces. From thence with their fleet they reduced all the cities that had abandoned them under their obedience, kept the rest in their duty, and found themselves still in a condition to make head against their enemies, over whom they had obtained several advantages. But they were afraid of Tissaphernes, and the 150 Phœnician ships which he hourly expected; and rightly perceived that, if so powerful a fleet should join the enemy, there was no longer any safety for their city. Alcibiades, who was well informed of all that passed among the Athenians, sent secretly to the principal of them at Samos, to sound their sentiments, and let them know, that he was not averse to returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful, and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, with design to concert with him the proper measures for the success of that undertaking. He promised to procure the Athenians not only the favour of Tissaphernes, but of the king himself, upon condition they would abolish the democracy or popular government; because the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility, than upon those of the inconstant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to these proposals, and conceived great hopes of exonerating themselves from part of the public impositions, because as they were the richest of the people, the burden lay heaviest upon them, and of making their country triumph after having possessed themselves of the government. At their return, they began by bringing over such as were most proper to share in their design; after which they caused a report to be spread amongst the troops, that the king was inclined to declare in favour of the Athenians, and to pay the army, upon condition that Alci-

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 579—587. Plut. in Alcib. p. 204—206.

biades were reinstated, and the popular government abolished That proposal surprised the soldiers, and was generally rejected at first; but the charm of gain, and the hope of change to their advantage, soon softened what was harsh and offensive in it, and even made them ardently desire the recall of Alcibiades.

Phrynicus, one of their generals, rightly judging that Alcibiades cared as little for an oligarchy, as he did for the democracy, and that in decrying the people's conduct, he had no other view than to acquire the favour and confidence of the nobility for his own re-establishment, had the boldness to oppose the resolutions which were about to take place. He represented, that the change they meditated might very probably excite a civil war to the ruin of the state; that it was very unlikely that the king of Persia would prefer the alliance of the Athenians to that of the Spartans, which was so much more advantageous to him; that this change would not retain the allies in their duty, nor bring over those who had renounced it, as they would persist in preferring their liberty; that the government of a small number of rich and powerful persons would not be more favourable to either the citizens or allies than that of the people, because ambition was the great cause of all misfortunes in a republic, and the rich were the sole promoters of all troubles for the aggrandizing of themselves; that a state suffered more oppressions and violences under the rule of the nobility than under that of the people, whose authority kept the former within due bounds, and was the asylum of such as they desired to oppress; that the allies were too well acquainted with these truths from their own experience, to want any lessons upon the subject.

These remonstrances, wise as they were, had no effect. Pisander was sent to Athens with some of the same faction, to propose the return of Alcibiades, an alliance with Tissaphernes, and the abolition of the democracy. They represented that, by changing the government, and recalling Alcibiades, Athens might obtain a powerful aid from the king of Persia, which would be a certain means to triumph over Sparta. Upon this proposal great numbers exclaimed against it, and especially the enemies of Alcibiades. They alleged, amongst other reasons, the imprecations pronounced by the priests, and all the other ministers of religion, against him, and even against such as should propose to recall him. But Pisander, advancing into the midst of the assembly, demanded, whether they knew any other means to save the republic in the deplorable condition to which it was reduced; and as it was admitted there were none, he added that the preservation of the state was the question, and not the authority of the laws, which might be provided for in the sequel; but at present there was no other method for the attainment of the king's friendship and that of Tissaphernes. Though this change was very offensive to the people, they gave their consent to it at length, with the hope of re-establishing the democracy hereafter, as Pisander had promised; and

they decreed that he should go with ten more deputies to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and that in the mean time Phrynicus should be recalled, and another general appointed to command the fleet in his stead.

The deputies did not find Tissaphernes in so good a disposition as they had been made to hope. He was afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but was unwilling to render the Athenians too powerful. It was his policy, by the advice of Alcibiades, to leave the two parties always at war, in order to weaken and consume them by each other. He therefore made great difficulties. He demanded at first, that the Athenians should abandon all Ionia to him, and afterwards insisted upon their adding the neighbouring islands. Those demands being complied with, he farther required, in a third interview, permission to fit out a fleet, and to cruise in the Grecian seas; which had been expressly provided against in the celebrated treaty concluded with Artaxerxes. The deputies thereupon broke up the conferences with indignation, and perceived that Alcibiades had imposed upon them.

Tissaphernes, without loss of time, concluded a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians; in which, what had displeased in the two preceding treaties was retrenched. The article which yielded to Persia the countries in general, that had been in the actual possession of the reigning king Darius, or his predecessors, was limited to the provinces of Asia. The king engaged to defray all expenses of the Lacedæmonian fleet, in the condition it then was, till the arrival of that of Persia; after which they were to support it themselves; unless they should choose that the king should pay it, to be reimbursed after the conclusion of the war. It was farther agreed, that they should unite their forces, and continue the war, or make peace, by common consent. Tissaphernes, to keep his promise, sent for the fleet of Phœnicia. This treaty was made in the eleventh year of Darius, and the twentieth of the Peloponnesian war.

SECTION III.

The whole authority of the Athenian government having been vested in 400 persons, they make a tyrannical abuse of their power, and are deposed. Alcibiades is recalled. After various accidents, and several considerable victories, he returns in triumph to Athens, and is appointed generalissimo. He causes the great mysteries to be celebrated, and departs with the fleet.

From the twenty-first to the twenty-fifth year of the War.

Pisander,* at his return to Athens, found the change he had proposed at his setting out much forwarded, to which he soon after put the last hand. To give a form to this new government, he caused ten commissioners, with absolute power, to be appointed,

* Thucyd. l. viii p 590. 591. Plut. in Alcib. p. 205.

who were however at a certain fixed time to give the people an account of what they had done. At the expiration of that term, the general assembly was summoned, wherein their first resolution was, that every one should be admitted to make such proposals as he thought fit, without being liable to any accusation of infringing the law, or to any penalty in consequence. It was afterwards decreed, that a new council should be formed, with full power to administer the public affairs, and to elect new magistrates. For this purpose five presidents were established, who nominated 100 persons, including themselves. Each of these chose and associated three more at his own pleasure, which made in all 400, in whom an absolute power was lodged. But to amuse the people, and to console them with a shadow of popular government, whilst they instituted a real oligarchy, it was said that the Four Hundred should call a council of 5000 citizens, to assist them when they should judge it necessary. The council and assemblies of the people were held as usual; nothing was done however but by the order of the Four Hundred. The people of Athens were deprived in this manner of their liberty, which they had enjoyed almost a hundred years, after having abolished the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ.

This decree being passed without opposition, after the separation of the assembly, the Four Hundred armed with daggers, and attended by 120 young men, whom they made use of when any execution required it, entered the senate, and compelled the senators to retire, after having paid them the arrears due upon their salaries. They elected new magistrates out of their own body, observing the usual ceremonies upon such occasions. They did not think proper to recall those who were banished, lest they should be obliged to authorize the return of Alcibiades, of whose uncontrollable spirit they were apprehensive, and who would soon have made himself master of the people. Abusing their power in a tyrannical manner, some they put to death, others they banished, confiscating their estates with impunity. All who ventured to oppose this change, or even to complain of it, were butchered upon false pretexts; and those would have met with a bad reception who demanded justice of the murderers. The Four Hundred, soon after their establishment, sent ten deputies to Samos to gain the concurrence of the army.

All that had passed at Athens was already known there,* and the news had enraged the soldiers to the highest degree. They deposed immediately several of their chiefs, whom they suspected, and put others into their places, of whom Thrasylus and Thrasybulus were the principal, and in highest credit. Alcibiades was recalled, and chosen generalissimo by the whole army. They were desirous to sail directly for the Piræeus to attack the tyrants

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 595—604. Plut. in Alcib. p. 205. Diod. p. 165.

But he opposed it, representing that it was necessary he should first have an interview with Tissaphernes, and that as they had chosen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He set out immediately for Miletus. His principal design was to show himself to that governor with all the power with which he had been invested, and to let him see that he was in a condition to do him much good or much harm. The consequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed Tissaphernes no less by the Athenians; and we shall see in the sequel that this interview was not unnecessary.

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at first. The deputies of the Four Hundred had arrived there during his absence, and had endeavoured in vain to justify the alteration made at Athens to the soldiery. Their discourses, which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, served only to exasperate them more, and they earnestly demanded to be led against the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occasion, as every body else would have done in consequence of having been raised to so high a dignity by the favour of the people: for he did not think himself obliged to an absolute and implicit compliance with their inclinations in every thing, though from an exile and fugitive, they had made him general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidable an army: but, as a statesman and great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault which must have been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens. For had they sailed thither at first, the enemy would have made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands, without resistance; whilst the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill-treated, and dismissed them; saying, that he did not object to the 5000 citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but that it was necessary to depose the Four Hundred, and to re-establish the senate.

During these commotions,* the Phœnician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and news came that it was arrived at Aspendus.† Tissaphernes went to meet it; nobody being able to divine the true cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of so powerful an aid, and to put a stop to their progress by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive; to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their soldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 604. 606. † A city of Pamphylia.

However this might be, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and of exhausting both parties by the length of the war. For it would have been very easy for him to have put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, which he alleged as the reason for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other motives for his conduct.

The return of the deputies without success,* who had been sent to Samos, and the answer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the Four Hundred. The tumult increased exceedingly when news was brought that the enemy, after having beaten the fleet which had been sent by the Four Hundred to the aid of Eubœa, had made themselves masters of the island. Athens was in the highest terror and consternation on this account. For neither the defeat in Sicily, nor any other preceding it, were of such importance as the loss of this island, from whence the city received considerable supplies, and almost all its provisions. If in the confusion in which Athens was at that time between two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indispensably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country; and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions. For the Hellespont, Ionia, and all the islands, seeing themselves abandoned, would have been reduced to choose a side, and go over to the Peloponnesians. But the enemy were not capable of such great designs; and this was not the first time that the Lacedæmonians had been observed to have lost their advantages by their natural slowness and procrastination.

Athens without delay deposed the Four Hundred, as the authors of all the troubles and divisions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous consent, and earnestly solicited to make all possible haste to the assistance of the city. But judging, that if he returned immediately to Athens, he should owe his recall to the compassion and favour of the people, he resolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deserve it by some considerable exploit. For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of ships, he cruised about the islands of Cos and Cnidos; and having learnt that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was sailing towards the Hellespont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in pursuit of him, he steered that way with the utmost diligence to support them, and arrived happily with his eighteen vessels, at the time that the fleets were engaged near Abydos in a battle, which lasted till night, without

A. M. 3595. Ant. J. C. 409.

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 607—614. Plut. in Alcib. p. 206—210. Diod. p. 171, 172, & 175, 177, & 189—192.

any advantage on either side. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at first, who believed him still their friend, and dispirited the Athenians. But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were strongest, and were vigorously pursuing the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them ashore; and, animated by his success, sunk their vessels, and made a great slaughter of the soldiers, who had thrown themselves into the sea to save themselves by swimming; though Pharnabazus spared no pains to assist them, and had advanced at the head of his troops to the coast, to favour their flight, and to save their ships. The Athenians, after having taken thirty of their galleys, and retaken those they had lost, erected a trophy.

A. M. 3596. Ant. J. C. 408. Alcibiades, vain of his success, had the ambition to desire to appear before Tissaphernes, in his triumphant equipage, and to make him rich presents, as well in his own, as in the name of the people of Athens. He went to him therefore with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of the Athenians. But he did not meet with the favourable reception he expected. For Tissaphenes, who knew he was accused by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would punish him at length for not having executed his orders, found Alcibiades presenting himself very opportunely, and caused him to be seized and sent prisoner to Sardis: to shelter himself by that injustice from the representations of the Lacedæmonians.

Thirty days after, Alcibiades, having found means to get a horse, escaped from his guards, and fled to Clazomenæ, where, to revenge himself on Tissaphernes, he gave out, that he had set him at liberty. From Clazomenæ, he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Theramenes with twenty ships from Macedonia, and by Thrasybulus with twenty more from Thasos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships, to the number of fourscore and six, being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum. He heard there, that Mindarus was at Cyzicum with Pharnabazus and his land army. He rested that whole day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and for making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating, at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should be apprized of his approach. Fortunately for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprise so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put to sea

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared, exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who was apprehensive that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make for the harbour, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only forty vessels, he advanced towards the enemy to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising his small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet come up, they immediately lost courage, and fled. Alcibiades, with twenty of his best ships, pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabazus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valour, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and whole fleet of the enemy, and by the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted, in which the latter, with a conciseness truly laconic, informed the Ephori of the blow they had received, in terms to this effect: *The flower of your army is cut off; Mindarus is dead; the rest of the troops are dying with hunger; and we neither know what to do nor what will become of us.*

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy at Athens than consternation at Sparta. They despatched ambassadors immediately to demand,* that an end should be put to a war equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the re-establishment of their ancient concord and amity, of which they had for many years experienced the salutary effects. The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion, that it was proper to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty, which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities, and remove all distrusts. But those who found their advantage in the troubles of the state, prevented so happy a disposition from taking effect. Cleophon,† amongst others, the orator in greatest repute at that time, animated the people from the tribunal, by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating, that their interests were betrayed by some who kept up a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had lately gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer. This Cleophon was a worthless fellow, a musical-instrument maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and had got himself fraudulently enrolled in the register of the citi-

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 177--179. † Æsch. in Orat. de fals. legat.

rens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians, puffed up with their present prosperity, forgetting their past misfortunes, and promising themselves all things from the valour and good fortune of Alcibiades, haughtily rejected all proposals of accommodation, without reflecting, that there is nothing so fluctuating and precarious as the success of war. The ambassadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride are generally the forerunners of some great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to take advantage of the victory he had gained, and presently after besieged Chalcedon, which had revolted from the Athenians and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. During this siege, he took another town, called Selymbria. Pharnabazus, terrified by the rapidity of his conquests, made a treaty with the Athenians to this effect; *That Pharnabazus should pay them a certain sum of money; that the Chalcedonians should return to their obedience and dependance upon the Athenians, and pay them tribute; and that the Athenians should commit no hostilities in the province of Pharnabazus, who engaged for the safe conduct of their ambassadors to the great king.* Byzantium and several other cities submitted to the Athenians.

A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407. Alcibiades, who desired with the utmost passion to see his country again, or rather to be seen by his country, after so many victories over their enemies, set out for Athens. The sides of his ships were covered with bucklers and all sorts of spoils, in form of trophies; and causing a great number of vessels to be towed after him by way of triumph, he displayed also the ensigns and ornaments of those he had burnt, which were more in number than the others; the whole amounting to about 200 ships. It is said, that reflecting on what had been done against him, upon approaching the port, he was struck with some terror, and was afraid to quit his vessel, till he saw from the deck a great number of his friends and relations, who were come to the shore to receive him, and earnestly entreated him to land.

The people came out of the city in crowds to meet him, and at his appearance set up incredible shouts of joy. In the midst of an infinite number of officers and soldiers, all eyes were fixed solely on him, whom they considered as Victory itself, descended from the skies: all thronging around him, caressed, blessed, and crowned him in emulation of each other. Those who could not approach him, were never tired with contemplating him at a distance, whilst the old men showed him to their children. They repeated with the highest praises all the great actions he had done for his country; nor could they refuse their admiration even to those which he had done against it during his banishment, of which they imputed the fault to themselves alone. This public joy was mingled with tears and regret, from the remembrance of past misfortunes, which

they could not avoid comparing with their present felicity. *We could not have failed*, said they, *of the conquest of Sicily; our other hopes could never have proved abortive, if we had intrusted all our affairs and forces to the disposal of Alcibiades alone. In what a condition was Athens when he took upon him our protection and defence! We had not only almost entirely lost our power at sea, but were scarce possessed of the suburbs of our city, and, to add to our misfortunes, were torn to pieces by a horrid civil war. He notwithstanding has raised the republic from its ruins; and not content with having reinstated it in the possession of the sovereignty of the sea, has rendered it universally victorious by land; as if the fate of Athens had been in his hands alone, either to ruin or restore it, and victory was annexed to his person, and obeyed his orders.*

This favourable reception of Alcibiades did not prevent his demanding an assembly of the people, in order to his justification before them; well knowing how necessary it was for his safety to be absolved in due form. He appeared therefore; and after having deplored his misfortunes, which he imputed very little to the people, and entirely ascribed to his ill fortune, and some demon envious of his prosperity, he represented to them the designs of the enemy, and exhorted them not to conceive other than great hopes. The Athenians, transported with hearing him speak, decreed him crowns of gold, appointed him general by sea and land with unlimited power, restored him all his fortunes, and ordered the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces* to absolve him from the curses they had pronounced against him by the order of the people; doing their utmost to make him amends for the injury and shame of his banishment by the glory of his recall, and to efface the remembrance of the imprecations themselves had decreed, by the vows and prayers which they made in his favour. Whilst all the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces were employed in revoking these imprecations, Theodorus, the principal of them, had the courage to say: *As for me, I have not cursed him, if he has done no evil to his country;* insinuating by that bold expression, that the maledictions, being conditional, could not fall upon the head of the innocent, nor be averted from the guilty.

In the midst of this glory and shining prosperity of Alcibiades, the majority of the people could not help being concerned, when they considered the time of his return. For it happened precisely upon the day when the Athenians celebrated a festival in honour of Minerva, adored under the name of Agraulis. The priests took off all the ornaments from the goddess's statue to wash it, from whence that feast was called Πλυντήρια, and afterwards covered it; and that day was accounted one of the most ominous and unfortunate. It was the 25th of the month Thargelion, which an-

* The Eumolpidæ and Ceryces were two families at Athens who had different functions in the mysteries of Ceres. They took their names from Eumolpus and Ceryx, the first who had exercised those offices. Perhaps the employment of the latter had some relation to that of heralds, Κήρυκες.

swers to the 2d of July. This circumstance displeased that superstitious people, because it seemed to imply, that the goddess, patroness, and protectress of Athens, did not receive Alcibiades agreeably and with a benign aspect, since she covered and concealed herself, as if she would keep him off and remove him from her.

All things having however succeeded according to his wish,* and the 100 ships he was to command being ready, he deferred his departure out of a laudable ambition to celebrate the great mysteries; for from the time the Lacedæmonians had fortified Decelia, and taken possession of all the ways from Athens to Eleusis, the feast had not been solemnized in all its pomp, and the procession had been obliged to go by sea. The particular ceremonies of this solemnity may be seen in the Introduction to the first volume, page 28.

Alcibiades believed it would be a most glorious action, and draw down upon him the blessings of the gods, and the praises of men, if he restored all its lustre and solemnity to this feast, in making the procession go by land escorted by his troops to defend it against the attacks of the enemy. For either Agis would suffer it to pass quietly, notwithstanding the numerous troops he had at Decelia, which would considerbly lessen the reputation of that king, and sully his glory; or, if he should choose to attack it, and oppose the march, he should then have the satisfaction to fight a sacred battle; a battle grateful to the gods, for the greatest and most venerable of all their mysteries, in the sight of his country and citizens, who would be witness of his valour and regard for religion. It is very likely, that by this public and ostentatious act of piety, which struck the people's view in so sensible a manner, and was so extremely to their taste, Alcibiades's principal design was to efface entirely from their minds the suspicions of impiety, to which the mutilation of the statues, and profanation of the mysteries, had given birth.

Having taken that resolution, he gave notice to the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces to hold themselves in readiness, posted sentinels upon the hills, sent out scouts at the break of day, and taking with him the priests, the initiated, and the probationers, with those who initiated them, he covered them with his army, and conducted the whole pomp with wonderful order and profound silence. Never was show, says Plutarch, more august, nor more worthy the majesty of the gods, than this warlike procession, and religious expedition; in which even those who envied the glory of Alcibiades, were obliged to own, that he was no less happy in discharging the functions of a high priest, than those of a general. No enemy dared to appear, or disturb that pompous march, and Alcibiades reconducted the sacred troops to Athens with entire safety. This success gave him new courage, and raised the valour and boldness of his army to such a degree, that they looked upon themselves as invincible whilst he commanded them.

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 210.

He acquired the affection of the poor, and the lower sort of people, so much, that they most ardently desired to have him for their king. Many of them openly declared themselves to that effect; and there were some who addressed themselves to him, and exhorted him to set himself above envy, and not to trouble himself about laws, decrees, or suffrages; to put down those wordy impertinent orators that disturbed the state with their vain harangues, to make himself absolute master of affairs, and to govern with entire authority without fearing accusers. For him, what his thoughts of the tyranny and his designs were, are unknown; but the most powerful citizens, apprehending the breaking out of a fire, of which they already saw the sparks, pressed him to depart without delay; granting whatever he demanded, and giving him for colleagues the generals most agreeable to him. He set sail accordingly with 100 ships, and steered for the island of Andros, that had revolted. His high reputation, and the good fortune that had attended him in all his enterprises, made nothing but what was great and extraordinary to be expected from him.

SECTION IV.

The Lacedæmonians appoint Lysander admiral. He acquires great influence with the younger Cyrus, who commanded in Asia. He beats the Athenian fleet near Ephesus in the absence of Alcibiades, who is deprived of the command. Ten generals are chosen in his stead. Callicratidas succeeds Lysander.

Twenty-sixth year of the War.

The Lacedæmonians,* justly alarmed at the return and success of Alcibiades, sufficiently perceived that such an enemy required to be opposed by an able general, capable of making head against him. For this reason they made choice of Lysander, and gave him the command of the fleet. When he arrived at Ephesus, he found the city very well disposed towards himself, and well affected to Sparta; but otherwise in a very unhappy situation. For it was in danger of becoming barbarous, by assuming the manners and customs of the Persians, who had great intercourse with it, as well from the neighbourhood of Lydia, as because the king's generals commonly took up their winter quarters there. An idle and voluptuous life, filled up with luxury and empty show, could not fail of disgusting infinitely a man like Lysander, who had been bred from his birth in the simplicity, poverty, and severe discipline of Sparta. Having brought his army to Ephesus, he gave orders for assembling ships of burden there from all parts, erecting an arsenal for building of galleys, made the ports free for merchants, gave up the squares and public places to artificers, put all arts in motion, and held them in honour; and by these means filled the city with

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. p. 440—442. Plut. in Lysand. p. 434, 435. Diod. l. xiii. p. 192-197.

riches, and laid the foundations of that grandeur and magnificence. to which it afterwards attained. So great a change can the application and ability of a single person occasion in a state!

Whilst he was making these dispositions, he received advice, that Cyrus, the king's youngest son, was arrived at Sardis. That prince could not be above sixteen years old at that time, being born after his father's accession to the throne, who was now in the seventeenth year of his reign. Parysatis, his mother, loved him to idolatry, and she had the entire ascendant over her husband. It was she that occasioned his having the command in chief of all the provinces of Asia Minor given him; a command that subjected all the provincial governors of the most important part of the empire to his authority. The view of Parysatis was, without doubt, to put this young prince into a condition to dispute the throne with his brother after the king's death; as we shall see he actually did. One of the principal instructions given him by his father upon sending him to his government, was to give effectual aid to the Lacedæmonians against Athens; an order very contrary to the measures observed till then by Tissaphernes, and the other governors of those provinces. It had always been their maxim, sometimes to assist one party, sometimes the other, in order to hold their power in such a balance that the one might never be able to crush the other entirely: from whence it followed, that both parties were kept weak by the war, and neither were in a condition to form any enterprises against the Persian empire.

Upon Lysander's being apprized, therefore, of the arrival of Cyrus at Sardis, he set out from Ephesus to make him a visit, and to complain of the delays and breach of faith of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the orders he had received to support the Lacedæmonians, and to drive the Athenians from the sea, had always covertly favoured the latter, out of regard for Alcibiades, to whom he was entirely devoted, and had been the sole cause of the loss of the fleet, by not supplying it with the necessary quantity of provisions. This discourse pleased Cyrus, who looked upon Tissaphernes as a very bad man, and his particular enemy. And he answered, that the king had given him orders to support the Lacedæmonians powerfully, and that he had received 500 talents for that purpose.* Lysander, contrary to the common character of the Spartans, was submissive and condescending, full of complaisance to the great, always ready to pay his court to them, and supporting, for the good of the service, all the weight of their haughtiness and vanity with incredible patience; in which behaviour some people make the chief address and principal merit of a courtier to consist.

He did not forget himself on this occasion, and setting at work all that the industry and art of a complete courtier could suggest

* Five hundred thousand crowns, about 112,500*l.* sterling

of flattery and insinuation; he perfectly gained the young prince's favour and good opinion. After having praised his generosity, magnificence, and zeal for the Lacedæmonians, he desired him to give each soldier and mariner a drachma* *per* day; in order to corrupt those of the enemy by that means, and thereby terminate the war the sooner. Cyrus very much approved the project; but said, he could make no change in the king's order, and that the treaty with them expressly settled only half a talent† to be paid monthly for each galley. The prince, however, at the end of the banquet, which he gave him before his departure, drinking to his health, and pressing him to ask something of him, Lysander desired that an obolus‡ a day might be added to the seamen's pay. This was granted, and he gave them four oboli, instead of three, which they received before, and paid them all the arrears due to them, with a month's advance; giving Lysander 10,000 daricks§ for that purpose; that is, 100,000 livres, or about 5000*l.* sterling.

This largess filled the whole fleet with ardour and alacrity, and almost unmanned the enemy's galleys; the greatest part of the mariners deserting to that side where the pay was best. The Athenians, in despair upon receiving this news, endeavoured to conciliate Cyrus by the interposition of Tissaphernes; but he would not hearken to them, notwithstanding that satrap represented, that it was not for the king's interest to aggrandize the Lacedæmonians, but to balance the power of one side with that of the other, in order to perpetuate the war, and to ruin both by their own divisions.

Though Lysander had considerably weakened the enemy by augmenting the mariners' pay, and thereby very much hurt their naval power, he dared not, however, hazard a battle with them, particularly dreading Alcibiades, who was a man of execution, had the greater number of ships, and had never been overthrown in any battle either by sea or land. But after Alcibiades had left Samos to go into Phocæa and Ionia, to raise money, of which he was in want, for the payment of his troops, and had given the command of his fleet to Antiochus, with express orders not to fight or attack the enemy in his absence; the new commander, to make a show of his courage, and to brave Lysander, entered the port of Ephesus with two galleys, and after having made a great noise, retired with loud laughter, and an air of contempt and insult. Lysander, enraged at their affront, immediately detached some galleys, and went himself in pursuit of him. But as the Athenians advanced to support Antiochus, he ordered other galleys of his side to come; till the whole fleet arrived by little and little, and the en-

* Ten-pence. † One thousand five hundred livres, about 112*l.* sterling.

‡ The drachma was six oboli, or ten-pence French; each obolus being something above three halfpence; so that the four oboli was six-pence halfpenny a day, instead of five pence or three oboli.

§ A darick is about a pistole.

gagement became general on both sides. Lysander gained the victory, and having taken fifteen of the Athenian galleys, he erected a trophy. Alcibiades, on his return to Samos, sailed even into the port to offer him battle; but Lysander was contented with his victory, and did not think proper to accept it; so that he retired without doing any thing.

A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406. Thrasybulus at the same time, the most dangerous enemy he had in his army, left the camp, and went to Athens to accuse him. To inflame his enemies in the city the more, he told the people in a full assembly, that Alcibiades had entirely ruined their affairs, and the navy, by the licence he had introduced; that he had given himself up to the most notorious debauchees and drunkards,* who, from having been common seamen, were now the only persons in credit about him; that he abandoned his whole authority to them, to be at leisure to enrich himself in the provinces, and to plunge himself there into intemperance and all other infamous excesses, to the disgrace of Athens, whilst his fleet was left neglected in the face of that of the enemy.

Another article of accusation against him was taken from the forts he had built near the city of Byzantium, for an asylum and retreat for himself; as neither being able nor willing to return any more to his country. The Athenians, a capricious, inconstant people, gave credit to all these imputations. The loss of the last battle, and his little success since his departure from Athens, instead of the great and wonderful actions expected from him, entirely sunk him in their opinions; and his own glory and reputation may be said to have occasioned his ruin. For he was suspected of not having been desirous to do what was not done, which they could not believe out of his power, because they were fully persuaded, that nothing he desired to do was impossible to him. They made it a crime in Alcibiades, that the rapidity of his conquests did not correspond with that of their imaginations; not considering, that he made war without money upon a people who had the great king for their treasurer, and that he was often obliged to quit his camp to go in quest of what was necessary for the payment and subsistence of his troops. However, Alcibiades was deposed, and ten generals nominated in his stead; of which, when he received advice, he retired in his galley to some castles which he had in the Thracian Chersonesus.

About this time died Plistonax,† one of the kings of Lacedæmonia, and was succeeded by Pausanias, who reigned fourteen years. The latter made a fine answer to one who asked, why it was not permitted to make any change in the ancient customs of

* Antiochus is pointed at in this place, a mean debauched man, who had acquired the favour of Alcibiades by catching a quail for him, which he had let fly.

† Diod. p. 196.

Sparta: *Because*, says he, *at Sparta the laws command men, and not men the laws.**

Lysander,† who intended to establish the government of the nobility in all the cities in the dependance of Sparta, that the governors of his choosing might be always at his disposal, from his having rendered them independent of their people, caused such persons as he knew to be the boldest, and most enterprising and ambitious among the principal men of the cities, to come to Ephesus. These he placed at the head of affairs, promoted to the greatest honours, and raised to the first employments of the army, thereby rendering himself, says Plutarch, the accomplice of all the crimes and oppressions they committed to advance and enrich themselves. For this reason they were always extremely attached to him, and regretted him infinitely, when Callicratidas came to succeed him, and took upon him the command of the fleet. He was not inferior to Lysander either in valour or military knowledge, and was infinitely above him in point of moral virtue. Alike severe to himself and others, inaccessible to flattery and sloth, the declared enemy of luxury, he retained the modesty, temperance, and austerity of the ancient Spartans; virtues that began to distinguish him particularly, as they were not too common in his time. His probity and justice were proof against all things; his simplicity and integrity abhorred all falsehood and fraud, to which were joined a truly Spartan nobleness and grandeur of soul. The great and powerful could not refrain from admiring his virtue; but they were better pleased with the affability and condescension of his predecessor, who was blind to the injustice and violence of their actions.

It was not without mortification and jealousy, that Lysander saw him arrive at Ephesus to take upon him the command, and out of a criminal baseness and treachery, not uncommon with those who hearken more to their private ambition than the good of the public, he did him all the ill offices in his power. Of the 10,000 daricks, which Cyrus had given him for the augmentation of the mariners' pay, he returned the remainder to that prince; telling Callicratidas, that he might apply to the king for the money, and that it depended on him to find means for the subsistence of the army. This conduct give him great trouble, and distressed him exceedingly. For he had brought no money with him from Sparta, and could not resolve to extort any from the cities, as he found them sufficiently rifled already.

In this urgent necessity,‡ a person having offered him fifty talents (that is to say, 50,000 crowns) to obtain a favour which he could not grant with justice, he refused them. Upon which

* Ὅτι τοὺς νόμους τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ τοὺς ἄνδρας τῶν νόμων κυρίους εἶναι δεῖ. Plut. in Apophth. p. 230.

† Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 442—444. Plut. in Lysand p. 435, 436. Diod. p. 197, 198. Plut. in Apoph. p. 222.

Clearider, one of his officers, said, *I would accept them, were I in your place.—And so would I*, replied the general, *were I in yours.*

He had no other resource therefore than to go, as Lysander had done, to ask money at the gates of the king's generals and lieutenants, for which he was the least proper of all mankind. Nurtured and educated in the love of liberty, full of great and noble sentiments, and infinitely remote from all flattery and baseness, he was convinced at heart, that it was a less evil and dishonour for Greeks to be overcome by Greeks, than infamously to make their court, and beg at the gates of barbarians, whose only merit consisted in their gold and silver. The whole nation were indeed disgraced by so mean a prostitution.

Cicero, in his offices, draws two very different characters of persons employed in the administration of government, and makes the application of them to the two generals of whom we speak. The one, says he,* zealous lovers of truth, and declared enemies of all fraud, pique themselves upon their simplicity and candour, and do not believe that it can ever be consistent with honour to lay snares or use artifice. The others, prepared to do or suffer every thing, and not ashamed of the meanest actions, provided from those unworthy methods they have reason to expect the success of their designs. Cicero places Callicratidas amongst the former, and Lysander amongst the latter, to whom he gives two epithets, not much to his honour, and hardly consistent with the Spartan character, when he calls him *very artful, and very patient*, or rather *very complaisant.*

Callicratidas, however, forced by necessity, went to Lydia, and repaired immediately to the palace of Cyrus, where he desired that prince might be told that the admiral of the Grecian fleet was come to speak with him. He was answered, that Cyrus was then at table, engaged in a party of pleasure;† to which he replied with a modest tone and air, that he was in no haste, and would wait till the prince came forth. The guards set up a laugh, wondering at the honest stranger's simplicity, who seemed so little acquainted with the world; and he was obliged to retire. He came thither the second time, and was again denied admittance. Upon which he returned to Ephesus, loaded those with curses and imprecations who had first made their court to barbarians, and by their flattery and submissions had taught them to make their riches a title and pretence for insulting the rest of mankind. Addressing himself at the same time to those about him, he swore that as soon as he returned to Sparta,

* Sunt his alii multùm dispares, simplices et aperti; qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex insidiis agendum putant; veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetianter, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedæmonium Lysandum accepimus, contràque Callicratidam. *Offic.* l. i n. 109.

† The Greek says literally that he was drinking, πίνει. The Persians valued themselves upon drinking a great deal, as an instance of their merit, as we shall see in Cyrus's letter to the Lacedæmonians.

he would use his utmost endeavours to reconcile the Greeks amongst themselves, that for the future they might become formidable to the barbarians, and have no farther occasion for their aid to invade and ruin each other. But that generous Spartan, whose thoughts were so noble, and so worthy the Lacedæmonian name, and whose justice, magnanimity, and valour, might rank him with all that Greece had ever produced of the most excellent and most consummate, had not the good fortune to return to his country, nor to apply himself to a work so great, and so worthy of him.

SECTION V.

Callicratidas is defeated by the Athenians near the Arginusæ. The Athenians pass sentence of death upon several of their generals for not having brought off the bodies of those who had been slain in battle. Socrates alone has the courage to oppose so unjust a sentence.

Callicratidas,* after having gained several victories over the Athenians, had at last pursued Conon, one of their generals, into the port of Mitylene, where he kept him blocked up. This was in the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. Conon seeing himself besieged by sea and land, without hope of aid, and in want of provisions, found means to apprise Athens of the extreme danger he was in. Extraordinary efforts were made to relieve him, and in less than a month's time a fleet of 110 sail were fitted out, on board of which were embarked all that were capable of bearing arms, as well slaves as freemen, with some horse. At Samos they were joined by the allies with forty galleys, and the collected armament steered for the Arginusæ, islands situate between Cumæ and Mitylene. Callicratidas, being informed of their course, left Eteonicus to continue the siege with fifty ships, and put to sea with 120 sail, with design to face the enemy, and prevent their relieving Conon. The right wing of the Athenians was commanded by Protomachus and Thrasylus, who had each fifteen galleys. They were supported by a second line, with a like number of ships, commanded by Lysias and Aristogenes. The left wing, like the other, drawn up in two lines, was under Aristocrates and Diomedon, supported by Erasinides and Pericles.† The main body, consisting of near thirty galleys, amongst which were the three Athenian admirals, was disposed in one line. They had strengthened each of their wings with a second line, because their galleys were neither so swift, nor so easy to manage, as those of the enemy; so that there was reason to fear their getting between two, and being charged on both sides at the same time. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, who perceived they were inferior in number to the enemy, contented themselves with drawing up in one line, in order to equal their front, and for the greater facility of running between the Athenian galleys, and

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 444—452. Diod. l xiii. p. 198, & 201, & 217—222.

† He was the son of the great Pericles.

turning nimbly round them. Callicratidas's pilot, daunted at the inequality, advised him not to hazard the battle, and to retire: but he replied, that he could not fly without shame, and that his death was of small importance to the republic. *Sparta*, said he, *does not depend upon one man.* He commanded the right wing, and Thrasondas the Theban the left.

It was a grand and awful sight to behold the sea covered with 300 galleys ready to engage. Never had more numerous naval armies of the Greeks fought against each other before. The ability, experience, and valour of the generals who commanded, left nothing to desire; so that there was reason to believe this battle would decide the fate of both people, and put an end to a war that had endured so long. When the signals were given, the two armies raised great shouts, and began to fight. Callicratidas, who from the answer of the augurs expected to fall in the battle, did amazing actions of valour. He attacked the enemy with incredible courage and boldness, sunk some of their ships, disabled others by breaking their oars and piercing their sides with the prow or beak of his galley. At length he attacked that of Pericles, and made a thousand holes in it; but the latter having hooked him fast with a grappling iron, he found it impossible to disengage himself, and was surrounded in an instant by several of the Athenian vessels. His own was immediately filled with the enemy, and after a dreadful slaughter, he fell dead, rather overwhelmed by their numbers than vanquished. The right wing, which he commanded, having lost its admiral, was put to flight. The left, composed of Bœotians and Eubœans, still made a long and vigorous resistance, from the urgent concern they were in, lest they should fall into the hands of the Athenians, against whom they had revolted; but they were at length obliged to give way, and retire in disorder. The Athenians erected a trophy in the Arginusæ. They lost twenty-five galleys in this battle, and the enemy more than seventy, of which number were nine of the ten furnished by the Lacedæmonians.

Plutarch* equals Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, for his justice, valour, and magnanimity, with all who had ever rendered themselves most worthy of admiration among the Greeks.

He blames him however exceedingly for hazarding the battle at the Arginusæ,† and observes, that to avoid the reproach of having retired out of fear, he had, through a mistaken sense of honour, failed in the essential duty of his function. For, says Plutarch, if (to use the comparison of Iphicrates‡) the light-armed infantry resemble the hands, the horse the feet, the main body the breast, and the general the head; the general, who abandons himself rashly to the impetuosity of his valour, does not so much neglect or expose his own life, as the lives of those whose safety depends upon his.

* Plut. in Lysand. p. 436. † Plut. in Pelop. p. 278. ‡ He was a famous general of the Athenians.

Our Lacedæmonian chief was therefore in the wrong, continues Plutarch, to answer the pilot, who advised him to retire, *Sparta does not depend upon one man.* For though it be true, that Callicratidas, fighting under the orders of another by sea or land, *was no more than one man*, yet, when commanding an army, all that obeyed his orders were collected in his person; and he in whom so many thousands might be lost, *was no longer one man.* Cicero* had passed the same judgment upon him before Plutarch. After having said, that there were many persons to be found, who were ready to sacrifice their fortunes, and even lives, for their country, but who out of a false delicacy in point of glory, would not hazard their reputation for it in the least; he cites the example of Callicratidas, who answered those that advised him to retreat from the Arginusæ, *That Sparta could fit out another fleet if this were lost; but for himself, he could not fly before the enemy without shame and infamy.*

I return to the sequel of the battle near the Arginusæ. The Athenian generals ordered Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and some other officers, to return with about fifty galleys to take up the wrecks and dead bodies, in order to their interment, whilst they sailed on with the rest against Eteonicus, who kept Conon besieged before Mitylene. But a violent tempest came on suddenly, and prevented the execution of this order. Eteonicus having received news of the defeat, and fearing it might occasion alarm and terror amongst the troops, sent back those who brought it, with orders to return with wreaths of flowers upon their heads, and to give out, that Callicratidas had gained the victory, and destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. Upon their return he offered sacrifices of thanksgiving, and having made his troops take some refreshment, he sent the galleys away directly, the wind being fair, and marched off the land army to Methymna, after having burnt the camp. Conon being delivered in this manner from the blockade, joined the victorious fleet, which returned forthwith to Samos. However, when it was known at Athens, that the dead bodies had been left without interment, the people were highly enraged, and caused the whole weight of their resentment to fall upon those whom they deemed guilty of that crime. The ancients held it a great one not to provide sepulture for the dead; and we may observe, that after all their battles, the first care of the conquered, notwithstanding the sense of their misfortune, and their great affliction for a bloody defeat, was to demand a suspension of arms from the victor, in order to pay the last duties to those who had

* Inventi multi sunt, qui non modò pecuniam, sed vitam etiam, profundere pro patriâ parati essent, iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republicâ quidem postulante: ut Callicratidas, qui, cùm Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaque fecisset egregiè vertit ad extremum omnia, cùm consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam, nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit Lacedæmonios, classe illâ amissâ, aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecòre non posse. *Offic.* l. i. n. 82.

fallen in battle; upon which they believed their happiness in another life depended. They had little or no idea of the resurrection of the body; but however, the Pagans, by the soul's concern for the body after death, the religious regard paid to it, and the zeal with which they rendered solemn honours to the dead, showed that they had some confused notion of a resurrection, which subsisted amongst all nations, and descended from the most ancient tradition, though they could not clearly distinguish it.

Hence arose the fury of the people of Athens. They immediately nominated new generals, retaining only Conon of the old ones, to whom they gave Adimantus and Philocles for colleagues. Of the eight others, two had withdrawn themselves, and only six returned to Athens. Theramenes, the tenth general, who returned before the rest of the fleet, accused the other chiefs before the people, making them responsible for not bringing off the dead after the battle; and to clear himself, read the letter they had written to the senate and the people, wherein they excused themselves from the violence of the storm, without charging any body. There was something detestably vile in this calumny, as it was making an unjust use of their reserve in not mentioning him in their letter, and in not laying a fault to his charge, of which he might have appeared the most guilty. The generals, at their return, not being able to prevail in obtaining the time necessary for making their defence, contented themselves with representing in few words the state of the affair, and appealed for the truth of what they said to the pilots, and all present when it happened. The people seemed to receive their excuse favourably, and several persons offered themselves for their sureties; but it was thought proper to adjourn the assembly, because of the night, and it being the people's custom to give their suffrages by lifting up of hands, their resolution could not be known, besides which the council were first to give their opinion upon the question to be proposed to the people.

The feast of Apaturia coming on, in which it was the custom to assemble by families, the relations of Theramenes posted several persons in mourning habits, with their heads shaved, in proper places, who said they were the kindred of those who had been slain in battle, and obliged Callixenes to accuse the generals in the senate. It was decreed in consequence, that as the accusation and defence had been heard in the last assembly, the people by their respective tribes should give their voices, and if the accused were found guilty they should be punished with death, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to the goddess.* Some senators opposed this decree as unjust, and contrary to the laws: but as the people, at the instigation of Callixenes, threatened to include the opposers in the same cause and crime with the generals,

* Minerva.

they were so mean as to desist from their opposition, and to sacrifice the innocent generals to their own safety, by consenting to the decree. Socrates (the celebrated philosopher) was the only one of the senators that stood firm, and persisted obstinately in opposing a decree so notoriously unjust, and so contrary to all laws. The orator who mounted the tribunal in defence of the generals, showed, *That they had failed in no part of their duty as they had given orders that the dead bodies should be taken up: that if any one were guilty, it was he who, being charged with these orders, had neglected to put them in execution; but that he accused nobody: and that the tempest, which came on unexpectedly at the very instant, was an unanswerable apology, and entirely discharged the accused from all guilt. He demanded, that a whole day should be allowed them to make their defence, a favour not denied to the most criminal, and that they should be tried separately. He represented, that they were not in the least obliged to precipitate a sentence, wherein the lives of the most illustrious of the citizens were concerned; that it was in some measure attacking the gods to make men responsible for the winds and weather;* and that they could not, without the most flagrant ingratitude and injustice, put the conquerors to death, to whom they ought to decree crowns and honours, or give up the defenders of their country to the rage of those who envied them; and if they did so, their unjust judgment would be followed with a sudden but vain repentance, which would leave in their hearts the sharpest remorse, and cover them with eternal shame and infamy.* The people seemed at first to be moved with these reasons; but being animated by the accusers, they pronounced sentence of death against the eight generals; and six of them, who were present, were seized in order to their being carried to execution. One of them, Diomedon, a person of great reputation for his valour and probity, demanded to be heard. *Athenians*, said he, *I wish the sentence you have passed upon us may not prove the misfortune of the republic; but I have one favour to ask of you in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is, to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourselves, as we are not in a condition to discharge them; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained by us over the enemy.* There was not one good citizen that did not melt into tears at this discourse, so full of mildness and religion, and admire with surprise the moderation of a person, who, seeing himself unjustly condemned, did not however vent the least harsh expression, or even complaint, against his judges, but was solely intent (in favour of an ungrateful country, which had doomed them to perish,) upon what it owed the gods in common with them for the victory they had lately obtained.

The six generals were hardly executed when the people opened

* Quem adeo iniquum, ut sceleri assignet, quod venti et fluctus deliquerint? *Tacit. Annal.* l. xiv c. 3.

their eyes, and perceived all the horror of that sentence; but their repentance could not restore the dead to life. Callixenes, their accuser, was put in prison, and was not allowed to be heard. Having found means to make his escape, he fled to Decelia to the enemy, from whence he returned some time after to Athens, where he died of hunger, universally detested and abhorred by all the world, as all false accusers and slanderers ought to be. Diodorus remarks, that the people themselves were justly punished for their crime by the gods, who abandoned them soon after, not to a single master, but to thirty tyrants, that treated them with the utmost rigour and cruelty.

The disposition of the populace is recognized in this account;* and Plato upon the same event, draws in few words their character with much spirit and resemblance. The populace,† says he, is an inconstant, ungrateful, cruel, suspicious animal, incapable of submitting to the government of reason; and this is no wonder, adds he, as it is commonly composed of the dregs of a city, and is a monstrous assemblage, without form or order, of all that is worst in it.

The same relation shows what effect fear can have upon the minds of men, even upon those who pass for the wisest, and how few there are who are capable of supporting inflexibly the view of present danger and disgrace. Though the justice of the accused generals' cause was perfectly known in the senate, at least by the greater part of it; as soon as the people's rage was mentioned, and the terrible menaces they murmured, those grave senators, most of whom had commanded armies, and who all had frequently exposed themselves to the greatest dangers of war, instantly changed sides, and came over to the most notorious calumny, and flagrant injustice, that ever had being: an evident proof, that there is a courage, though very rare, which infinitely transcends that valour, which induces so many thousands of men every day to confront the most terrible dangers in battle.

Amongst all the judges, one alone truly worthy of his reputation, the great Socrates, in this general treason and perfidy, stood firm and immoveable; and though he knew his suffrage and unaided voice would be of little or no consequence to the accused, he thought these an homage due to oppressed innocence, and that it was unworthy an honest man‡ to suffer himself, through a base fear, to be hurried away by the fury of a blind and frantic people. We see in this instance how far the cause of justice may be abandoned. We may conclude it was not better defended before the people. Of more than 3000 citizens, who composed the assembly, two only took upon them the defence of their generals, Euripto

* Plat. in Axioch. p. 368, 369.

† Δῆμος ἀχάριστον, ἄφικτον, ὠμὸν, βάσκανον, ἀπαίδευτον.

‡ Οὐ γὰρ ἐφαίνετο μοι σεμνὸν δήμῳ μαινομένῳ συνεξάρχειν

lemus and Axiochus. Plato has preserved their names, and given that of the latter to the dialogue, from whence part of these reflections are taken.

A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406. The same year that the battle of the Arginusæ was fought, Dionysius possessed himself of the tyranny in Sicily. I shall defer speaking of him till the ensuing volume, in which I shall relate the history of the tyrants of Syracuse at large.

SECTION VI.

Lysander commands the Lacedæmonian fleet. Cyrus is recalled to court by his father. Lysander gains a celebrated victory over the Athenians at Ægospotamos.

A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. After the defeat at Arginusæ,* the affairs of the Peloponnesians declining, the allies, supported by the credit of Cyrus, sent an embassy to Sparta, to demand that the command of the fleet should again be given to Lysander, with the promise of serving with more affection and courage if their request were granted. As it was contrary to the laws of Sparta that the same person should be twice admiral, the Lacedæmonians, to gratify the allies, gave the title of admiral to one Aracus, and sent Lysander with him, whom in appearance they commissioned only as vice-admiral, though in effect they invested him with all the authority of the supreme command.

All those who had the greatest share in the government of the cities, and possessed the most authority in them, saw him arrive with extreme joy; promising themselves, from his influence, the final subversion of the democratic power. His character of complaisance towards his friends, and indulgence to all their faults, suited much better their ambitious and injurious views, than the austere equity of Callicratidas. For Lysander was a man of the most corrupt heart, and gloried in having no principles on the score of virtue or the most sacred duties. He made no scruple to employ artifice and deceit on all occasions, and esteemed justice only as far as it served his measures. When it did not promote them, he never failed to prefer the useful, which with him was alone the laudable and excellent; from a persuasion that truth had in its own nature no advantage over falsehood, and that the value of both one and the other was to be appreciated by the convenience resulting from them. And as to those who represented to him, that it was unworthy the descendants of Hercules to make use of fraud and treachery, he laughed at them; *For*, said he, *where the lion's skin is not long enough, it is necessary to tack the fox's tail to it.*

An expression ascribed to him sufficiently denotes how small an account he made of perjury. He used to say, *Children are amused*

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 454. Plut. in Lys. l. ix. p. 435 437. Diod. l. xiii p. 223.

*with baubles, and men with oaths;** showing by so professed a want of religion, that he cared less for the gods than his enemies. For he who deceives with a false oath, plainly declares, in so doing that he fears his enemies, but that he despises God.

Here ends the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war.† In this year it was, that the younger Cyrus, dazzled with the splendour of supreme authority, to which he had been little accustomed, and jealous of the least omission in point of ceremonial homage, discovered by a remarkable action the secret of his heart. Brought up from his infancy among the reigning family, nurtured under the shade of the throne, amidst the submissions and prostrations of the courtiers, entertained long by the discourses of an ambitious mother that idolized him, in the desire and hope of empire, he began already to exert the rights of sovereignty, and to exact the honours paid to it with surprising haughtiness and rigour. Two Persians of the royal family, his cousin-germans by their mother, sister of his father Darius, had omitted to cover their hands with their sleeves in his presence, according to a ceremonial observed only towards the king of Persia. Cyrus, resenting that neglect as a capital crime, condemned them both to die, and caused them to be executed at Sardis without mercy. Darius, at whose feet their relations threw themselves to demand justice, was very much affected with the tragical end of his two nephews, and looked upon this action of his son's as an attempt upon himself, to whom alone that honour was due. He resolved therefore to take his government from him, and ordered him to court upon the pretext of being sick, and having a desire to see him.

Cyrus, before his departure, sent for Lysander to Sardis, and put into his hands great sums of money for the payment of his fleet, promising him still more for the future. And, with the ostentation of a young man, to let him see how much he desired to oblige him he assured him, that though the king his father should cease to afford him any supplies, he would furnish him the more willingly out of his own coffers. and that rather than he should want the necessary provisions, he would even cause the throne of massy gold and silver, upon which he sat to administer justice, to be melted down. At length, when he was upon the point of setting out, he empowered him to receive the tributes and revenues of the cities, confined the government of his provinces to him, and embracing him, conjured him not to give battle in his absence, unless superior in force; because the king neither wanted the will nor the power to give him that superiority over the enemy; promising at the same time, with the strongest assurances of affection, to bring him a great number of ships from Phœnicia and Cilicia.

* The Greek text admits of another sense, which is perhaps equally good: *Children may use art, and cheat one another in their games, and men in their oaths.* Ἐκέλευε τοὺς μὲν παίδας ἀστραγάλοις, τοὺς δ' ἀνδρας ὅρκοις ἐξαπατᾶν.

† Xenophon. Hellen. l. ii. p. 451.

After that prince's departure,* Lysander sailed towards the Hellespont, and laid siege to Lampsacus; Thorax, having marched thither, with his land-forces at the same time, assaulted the city on his side. The place was carried by storm,† and abandoned by Lysander to the soldiers. The Athenians, who followed him close, came to an anchor in the port of Eleontum in the Chersonesus, with 180 galleys. But upon the news of the taking of Lampsacus, they immediately steered for Sestos, and after having taken in provisions, they stood away from thence, sailing along the coast to a place called Ægospotamos,‡ where they halted over against the enemy, who were then at anchor before Lampsacus. The Hellespont is not above 2000 paces broad in that place. The two armies, seeing themselves so near each other, expected only to rest that day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on the next.

But Lysander had another design in view. He commanded the seamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themselves in readiness, and to wait his orders with profound silence. He ordered the land-army in like manner to draw up in battle upon the coast, and to wait the day without any noise. On the morrow, as soon as the sun was risen, the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lysander, though his ships were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay still without making any movement. In the evening, when the Athenians withdrew, he did not suffer his soldiers to go ashore, till two or three galleys, which he had sent out to observe them, were returned with advice, that they had seen the enemy land. The next day passed in the same manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued reserve and apprehension, extremely augmented the security and boldness of the Athenians, and inspired them with a sovereign contempt for an army, which fear, in their opinion, prevented from showing themselves, and attempting any thing.

Whilst this passed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horse, and came to the Athenian generals; to whom he represented, that they kept upon a very disadvantageous coast, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighbourhood; that they were obliged to bring their provisions from Sestos with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to suffer the soldiers and mariners of the fleet, as soon as they were ashore, to straggle and disperse themselves wherever they pleased, whilst they saw an enemy's fleet facing them, accustomed to execute the orders of their general with instant obedience, and upon the slightest signal. He offered also to attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian troops, and to force them to a battle. The generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their com-

* Xenophon. Hellen. l. ii. p. 455—458. Alcib. p. 212. Diod. l. xiii. p. 225, 226.

† Plut. in Lys. p. 437 & 440. Id. in

‡ The river of the Goa

mand, did not content themselves with refusing his offers, from the opinion, that if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall on them, and if favourable, that Alcibiades would engross the honour of it; but rejected also with insult his wise and salutary counsel, as if a man in disgrace lost his sense and abilities with the favour of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day the Athenians presented themselves again, and offered him battle; retiring in the evening according to custom with more insulting airs than the days before. Lysander, as usual, detached some galleys to observe them, with orders to return with the utmost diligence, as soon as they saw the Athenians landed, and to put a brazen buckler at each ship's head as soon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himself in the mean time ran through the whole line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the seamen and soldiers in readiness to row and fight on the first signal.

As soon as the bucklers were put up in the ships' heads, and the admiral galley had given the signal by the sound of trumpet, the whole fleet set forwards in good order. The land-army at the same time made all possible haste to the top of the promontory to see the battle. The strait that separates the two continents in this place, is about fifteen stadia,* or three quarters of a league in breadth, which space was presently cleared through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general, was the first who perceived, from the shore, the enemy's fleet advancing in good order to attack him; upon which he immediately cried out for the troops to embark. In the height of sorrow and perplexity, some he called to by their names, some he conjured, and others he forced to go on board their galleys; but all his endeavours and emotion were ineffectual, the soldiers being dispersed on all sides. For they were no sooner come on shore, than some ran to the suttlers, some to walk in the country, some to sleep in their tents, and others had begun to dress their suppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in their generals, who, not suspecting the least danger, indulged themselves in taking their repose, and gave their soldiers the same liberty.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries and a great noise of their oars, when Conon, disengaging himself with nine galleys, of which number was the sacred ship called the *Paralian*, stood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponnesians, falling upon the rest of the fleet, took immediately the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavour to get on board, or, flying on shore, were cut to pieces by the enemy, who landed in pursuit of them. Lysander took 3000 prisoners, with all the gene-

* 1875 paces

rals and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampsacus, amidst the sounds of flutes and songs of triumph. He had the glory of achieving one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history, with little or no loss, and of terminating in the small space of an hour, a war which had already lasted seven-and-twenty years, and which perhaps, without him, would have been of much longer continuance. Lysander immediately sent despatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The 3000 prisoners, taken in this battle, having been condemned to die, Lysander called upon Philocles, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them for handling the pike, and that they might be fit only to serve at the oar. Lysander therefore caused him to be brought forth, and asked him what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to pass that cruel decree. Philocles, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer, *Accuse not people of crimes who have no judges; but as you are victor, use your right, and do by us as we would have done by you, if we had conquered.* At the same instant he went into a bath, put on afterwards a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword, except Adimantus, who had opposed the decree.

After this expedition, Lysander went with his fleet to all the maritime cities, and gave orders for all Athenians in them to withdraw as soon as possible to Athens, without permitting them to take any other route; declaring, that after a certain time fixed, all such should be punished with death, as should be found out of Athens. This he did as an able politician, to reduce the city by famine the more easily, and to render it incapable of sustaining a long siege. He afterwards busied himself in subjecting democracy, and all other forms of government, throughout the cities; leaving in each of them a Lacedæmonian governor, called *harmostes*, and ten archons, or magistrates, whom he chose out of the societies he had established in them. He thereby in some measure secured to himself universal authority, and a kind of sovereignty over all Greece; putting none into power but such as were entirely devoted to his service.

SECTION VII.

Athens, besieged by Lysander, capitulates and surrenders. Lysander changes the form of government, and establishes thirty commanders in it. He sends Gylippus before him to Sparta with all the gold and silver taken from the enemy. Decree of Sparta upon the use to be made of it. The Peloponnesian war ends in this manner. Death of Darius Nothus.

A. M 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. When the news of the entire defeat of the army came to Athens by a ship,* which arrived in the night at the Piræeus, the city was in universal consternation. Nothing was heard but cries of sorrow and despair in every part of it. They imagined the enemy already at their gates. They represented to themselves the miseries of a long siege, a cruel famine, the ruin and burning of their city, the insolence of a proud victor, and the shameful slavery they were upon the point of experiencing, more afflicting and insupportable to them than the most severe punishments and death itself. The next day the assembly was summoned, wherein it was resolved to shut up all the ports, one only excepted; to repair the breaches in the walls; and mount guard to prepare against a siege.

In fact, Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced towards Athens with all their troops. Lysander soon after arrived at the Piræeus with 150 sail, and prevented all ships from going in or coming out. The Athenians, besieged by sea and land, without provisions, ships, hope of relief, or any resource, reinstated all persons who had been attainted by any decree, without however speaking of a capitulation, though many already died of the famine. But when their corn was entirely consumed, they sent deputies to Agis, to propose a treaty with Sparta, upon condition of abandoning all their possessions, the city and port only excepted. He referred the deputies to Lacedæmon, as not being empowered to treat with them. When they arrived at Selasia, upon the frontier of Sparta, and had made known their commission to the Ephori, they were ordered to retire, and to come with other proposals, if they expected peace. The Ephori had demanded, that 1200 paces of the wall on each side of the Piræeus should be demolished: but an Athenian, for venturing to advise a compliance, was sent to prison, and prohibition made against proposing any thing of that kind for the future.

In this deplorable condition, Theramenes declared in the assembly, that if he were sent to Lysander, he would know whether the proposal made by the Lacedæmonians for dismantling the city, was intended to facilitate its ruin, or to prevent a revolt. The Athenians having deputed him accordingly, he was more than three months absent; no doubt with the view of reducing them by famine to accept any conditions that should be offered. On his re-

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 458—462. Plut. in Lysand. p. 440, 441.

turn he told them, that Lysander had detained him all that time, and that at last he had given him to understand, that he might apply to the Ephori. He was therefore sent back with nine others to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a treaty. When they arrived there, the Ephori gave them audience in the general assembly, where the Corinthians and several other allies, especially the Thebans, insisted that it was absolutely necessary to destroy the city without hearkening any farther to a treaty. But the Lacedæmonians, preferring the glory and safety of Greece to their own grandeur, made answer, that they never would be reproached with having destroyed a city that had rendered such great services to all Greece; the remembrance of which ought to have much greater weight with the allies than the resentment of private injuries received from it. The peace was therefore concluded upon these conditions: *That the fortifications of the Piræeus, with the long wall that joined that port to the city, should be demolished; that the Athenians should deliver up all their galleys, twelve only excepted; that they should abandon all the cities they had seized, and content themselves with their own lands and country; that they should recall their exiles, and make a league offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, under whom they should march wherever they thought fit to lead them.*

The deputies on their return were surrounded with an innumerable throng of people, who were apprehensive that nothing had been concluded, for they were not able to hold out any longer, such multitudes dying every day of famine. The next day they reported the success of their negotiation; the treaty was ratified, notwithstanding the opposition of some persons; and Lysander, followed by the exiles, entered the port. It was upon the very day that the Athenians had formerly gained the famous naval battle of Salamis. He caused the walls to be demolished to the sound of flutes and trumpets, and with all the exterior marks of triumph and rejoicing, as if all Greece had that day regained its liberty. Thus ended the Peloponnesian war, after having continued during the space of twenty-seven years.

Lysander, without giving the Athenians time to look about them, changed the form of their government entirely, established thirty archons, or rather tyrants, over the city, put a strong garrison into the citadel, and left the Spartan Callibius *harmostes*, or governor. Agis dismissed his troops. Lysander, before he disbanded his, advanced against Samos, which he pressed so warmly, that it was at last obliged to capitulate. After having established its ancient inhabitants in it, he proposed to return to Sparta with the Lacedæmonian galleys, those of the Piræeus, and the beaks of those he had taken.

He had sent Gylippus, who had commanded the army in Sicily, before him, to carry the money and spoils, which were the fruit of his glorious campaigns, to Lacedæmon. The money, without

reckoning the innumerable crowns of gold given him by the cities, amounted to 1500 talents, that is to say, 1,500,000 crowns.* Gylippus, who carried this considerable sum, could not resist the temptation of converting some part of it to his own use. The bags were sealed up carefully, and did not seem to leave any room for theft. He unsewed them at the bottom; and after having taken out of each of them what money he thought fit, to the amount of 300 talents, he sewed them up again very neatly, and thought himself perfectly safe. But when he arrived at Sparta, the accounts, which had been put up in each bag, discovered him. To avoid punishment, he banished himself from his country, carrying along with him in all places the disgrace of having sullied, by so base and sordid an avarice, the glory of all his great actions.

From this unhappy example, the wisest and most judicious of the Spartans, apprehending the all-powerful effects of money, which enslaved not only the vulgar, but even the greatest of men, extremely blamed Lysander for having acted so contradictorily to the fundamental laws of Sparta, and warmly represented to the Ephori, how incumbent it was upon them to banish all that gold and silver from the republic,† and to lay the heaviest of curses and imprecations upon it, as the fatal bane of all other states, introduced only to corrupt the wholesome constitution of the Spartan government, which had supported itself for so many ages with vigour and prosperity. The Ephori immediately passed a decree to proscribe that money, and ordained that none should be current, except the usual iron coin. But Lysander's friends opposed this decree, and sparing no pains to retain the gold and silver in Sparta, the affair was referred to farther deliberation. There naturally seemed only two plans to be proposed; which were, either to make the gold and silver coin current, or to cry them down and prohibit them absolutely. The men of address and policy found out a third expedient, which, in their opinion, reconciled both the others with great success: this was wisely to choose the mean between the vicious extremes of too much rigour and too much remissness. It was therefore resolved, that the new coin of gold and silver should be solely employed by the public treasury; that it should only pass in the occasions and uses of the state; and that every private person, in whose possession it should be found, should be immediately put to death.

A strange expedient! says Plutarch; as if Lycurgus had feared the specie of gold and silver, and not the avarice they occasion; an avarice less to be extinguished by prohibiting individuals from possessing it, than inflamed by permitting the state to amass and make use of it for the service of the public. For it was impossible,

* About 337,000*l.* sterling.

† Ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι πᾶν τὸ ἀργύριον καὶ τὸ χρυσίον, ὥσπερ κῆρας εταγωγιμούς.

whilst that money was held in honour and esteem with the public, that it should be despised in private as useless, and that the people should look upon that as of no value in their domestic affairs, which the state prized, and was so anxious to have for its occasions; bad usages, authorized by the practice and example of the public, being a thousand times more dangerous to individuals than the vices of individuals to the public. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, continues Plutarch, in punishing those with death who should make use of the new money in private, were so blind and imprudent as to imagine, that the placing of the law, and the terror of punishment, as a guard at the door, was sufficient to prevent gold and silver from entering the house: whilst they left the hearts of their citizens open to the desire and admiration of riches, and introduced themselves a violent passion for amassing treasure, in causing it to be deemed a great and honourable thing to become rich.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. It was about the end of the Peloponnesian war, that Darius Nothus, king of Persia, died, after a reign of nineteen years. Cyrus had arrived at the court before his death, and Parysatis, his mother, whose idol he was, not contented with having made his peace, notwithstanding the faults he had committed in his government, pressed the old king to declare him his successor also, after the example of Darius the First, who gave Xerxes the preference before all his brothers, because he had been born, as Cyrus was, after his father's succession to the throne. But Darius did not carry his complaisance for her so far. He gave the crown to Arsaces, his eldest son by Parysatis also, whom Plutarch calls Arsicas, and bequeathed to Cyrus only the provinces he had already.

BOOK IX.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS:

CONTINUED,

DURING THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON.

CHAPTER I.

SECT. I. Coronation of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Cyrus attempts to assassinate his brother, and is sent into Asia Minor. Cruel revenge of Statira, wife of Artaxerxes, upon the authors and accomplices in the murder of her brother. Death of Alcibiades His character.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. ARSACES, upon ascending the throne, assumed the name of Artaxerxes: he it is to whom the Greeks gave the surname of MNEMON,* from his prodigious memory. Being near his father's bed when he was dying,† he asked him, a few moments before he expired, what had been the rule of his conduct during so long and so happy a reign as his, that he might make it his example. *It has been*, replied he, *to do always what justice and religion required of me:* memorable words, and well worthy of being set up in letters of gold in the palaces of kings, to keep them perpetually in mind of what ought to be the guide and rule of all their actions. It is not uncommon for princes to give excellent instructions to their children on their death-beds, which would be more efficacious, if preceded by their own example and practice without which they are as weak and impotent as the sick man who gives them, and seldom survive him long.

Soon after Darius's death,‡ the new king set out from his capital for the city of Pasargada,§ in order to his coronation, according to

* Which word signifies in the Greek, one of a good memory.
† Athen. l. xii. p. 548. ‡ Plut. in Artax. p. 1012.
§ A city of Persia built by Cyrus the Great.

custom, by the priests of Persia. There was in that city a temple of the goddess who presided over war, in which the coronation of their kings was solemnized. It was attended with very singular ceremonies, which no doubt had some mysterious sense; though Plutarch does not explain it. The prince, at his consecration, took off his robe in the temple, and put on that worn by the ancient Cyrus before he came to the throne, which was preserved in that place with great veneration. After that he ate a dry fig, chewed some leaves of the turpentine-tree, and drank a draught composed of milk and vinegar. Was this to signify, that the sweets of sovereign power are mingled with the bitterness of care and disquiet, and that, if the throne be surrounded with pleasures and honours, it is also attended with pains and anxieties? It seems sufficiently evident, that the design in putting the robes of Cyrus upon the new king, was to make him understand, that he should also clothe his mind with the great qualities and exalted virtues of that prince.

Young Cyrus, corroded by ambition, was in despair upon being for ever frustrated in his hopes of ascending a throne with which his mother had inspired him, and on seeing the sceptre, which he thought his right, transferred into the hands of his brother. The blackest crimes cost the ambitious nothing. Cyrus resolved to assassinate Artaxerxes in the temple itself, and in the presence of the whole court, just when he was about to take off his own robe, to put on that of Cyrus. Artaxerxes was apprized of this design by the priest himself, who had educated his brother, to whom he had imparted it. Cyrus was seized and condemned to die, when his mother Parysatis, almost out of her senses, flew to the place, clasped him in her arms, tied herself to him with the tresses of her hair, fastened her neck to his, and by her shrieks, and tears, and prayers, prevailed so far as to obtain his pardon, and that he should be sent back to his government of the maritime provinces. He carried thither with him an ambition no less ardent than before, and animated besides with resentment of the disgrace he had received, and the warm desire of revenge, and armed with an absolute unbounded power. Artaxerxes upon this occasion acted contrary to the most common rules of policy, which do not admit the nourishing and inflaming,* by extraordinary honours, the pride and haughtiness of a bold and enterprising young prince like Cyrus, who had carried his personal enmity to his brother so far, as to have resolved to assassinate him with his own hand, and whose ambition for empire was so great, as to employ the most criminal methods for the attainment of its end.

Artaxerxes had espoused Statira.† Scarce had her husband ascended the throne, when she employed the power her beauty gave her over him, to avenge the death of her brother Teriteuch

* Ne quis mobiles adolescentium animos præmaturis honoribus ad superbiam extolleret. *Tacit. Annal.* l. iv. c 17. † Ctes c. li. iv.

mes. History has not a more tragical scene, nor a more monstrous complication of adultery, incest, and murder; which, after having occasioned great disorders in the royal family, terminated at length in the most fatal manner to all who had any share in it. But it is necessary for the reader's knowledge of the fact to trace it from the beginning.

Hidarnes, Statira's father, a Persian of very high quality, was governor of one of the principal provinces of the empire. Statira was a lady of extraordinary beauty, which induced Artaxerxes to marry her: he was then called Arsaces. At the same time Teriteuchmes, Statira's brother, married Hamestrias, Arsaces's sister, one of the daughters of Darius and Parysatis; in favour of which marriage, Teriteuchmes, upon his father's death, had his government given him. There was at the same time another sister in his family, name Roxana, no less beautiful than Statira, and who besides excelled in the arts of shooting with the bow, and throwing the dart. Teriteuchmes her brother conceived a criminal passion for her, and to gratify it, resolved to set himself at liberty by killing Hamestrias, whom he had espoused. Darius, having been informed of this project, by the force of presents and promises, engaged Udiastes, Teriteuchmes's intimate friend and confidant, to prevent so black a design, by assassinating him. He obeyed, and had for his reward the government of him he had put to death with his own hands.

Among Teriteuchmes's guards was a son of Udiastes, called Mithridates, very much attached to his master. The young gentleman, upon hearing that his father had committed this murder in person, uttered all manner of imprecations against him, and full of horror for so infamous and vile an action, seized on the city of Zaris, and openly revolting, declared for the establishment of Teriteuchmes's son. But that young man could not hold out long against Darius. He was blocked up in the place with the son of Teriteuchmes, whom he had with him; and all the rest of the family of Hidarnes were put in prison, and delivered to Parysatis, to do with them as that mother, exasperated to the last excess by the treatment either done or intended against her daughter Hamestris, should think fit. That cruel princess began by causing Roxana, whose beauty had been the occasion of all this evil, to be sawed in two, and ordered all the rest to be put to death, except Statira, whose life she granted to the tears and the most tender and ardent solicitations of Arsaces; whose love for his wife made him spare no pains for her preservation, though Darius, his father, believed it necessary, even for his own good, that she should share the same fate with the rest of her family. Such was the state of the affair at the death of Darius.

Statira, as soon as her husband was upon the throne, causes Udiastes to be delivered into her hands. She ordered his tongue to be torn out, and made him die in the most exquisite torments

she could invent, to punish the crime which had occasioned the ruin of her family. She gave his government to Mithridates, in recompense for his attachment to the interests of her family. Parysatis on her side took her revenge on the son of Teriteuchmes, whom she caused to be poisoned; and we shall see that Statira's turn was not very remote.

We see here the terrible effects of female revenge, and in general of what excesses they are capable, who find themselves above all laws, and have no other rule for their actions than their will and passions.

A. M. 3601. Ant. J. C. 403. Cyrus, having resolved to dethrone his brother, employed Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general, to raise a body of Grecian troops, under pretence of a war which that Spartan proposed to carry into Thrace. I shall defer speaking of this famous expedition, and also of the death of Socrates, which happened about the same time; as I intend to treat those two great events in all the extent they deserve. It was without doubt with the same view,* that Cyrus presented to Lysander a galley of two cubits in length made of ivory and gold, to congratulate him upon his naval victory. That galley was consecrated to Apollo in the temple of Delphi. Lysander went soon afterwards to Sardis, charged with magnificent presents for Cyrus from the allies.

It was upon that occasion Cyrus had the celebrated conversation with Lysander related by Xenophon,† and which Cicero after him has applied so beautifully. That young prince,‡ who piqued himself more upon his affability and politeness than nobility and grandeur, pleased himself with conducting in person so illustrious a guest through his gardens, and with making him observe the various beauties of them. Lysander, struck with so fine a prospect, admired the manner in which the several parts were laid out, the height of the trees, the neatness and disposition of the walks; the abundance of fruit-trees, planted checkerwise, with an art which had known how to unite the useful with the agreeable; the beauty of the parterres, and the glowing variety of flowers, exhaling odours universally throughout the delightful scene. *Every thing charms and transports we in this place*, said Lysander, addressing himself to Cyrus; *but what strikes me most, is the exquisite taste and elegant industry of the person who drew the plan of the several parts of this*

* Plut. in Lys. p. 443.

† Xenophon. Œcon. p. 830.

‡ Narrat Socrates in eo libro Cyrum minorem, regem Persarum, præstantem ingenio atque imperii gloriâ, cùm Lysander Lacedæmonius, vir summæ virtutis, venisset ad eum Sardis, eique dona à sociis attulissit, et cæteris in rebus comem erga Lysandrum atque humanum fuisse, et ei quemdam conseptum agrum diligenter consitum ostendisse. Cùm autem admiraretur Lysander et proceritates arborum, et directos in quincuncem ordines, et humum subactam atque puram, et suavitatem odorum qui efflarentur è floribus; tum eum dixisse, mirari se non modò diligentiam, sed etiam soleritiam ejus, à quo essent illa dimensa atque descripta. Et ei Cyrum respondisse: Atqui ego ista sum dimensus, mei sunt ordines, mea descriptio, multæ etiam istarum arborum meâ manu sunt satæ. Tum Lysandrum, intuentem ejus purpuram et nitorem corporis, ornatumque Persicum multo auro multisque gemmis, dixisse: Rectè verò te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta est. *Cic de Senec.* n. 59.

garden, and gave it the fine order, wonderful disposition, and happiness of symmetry, which I cannot sufficiently admire. Cyrus, infinitely pleased with this discourse, replied, *It was I that drew the plan, and entirely marked it out; and many of the trees, which you see, were planted with my own hands. What!* replied Lysander, considering him from head to foot, *is it possible with these purple robes and splendid vestments, those strings of jewels and bracelets of gold, those buskins so richly embroidered, that you could play the gardener, and employ your royal hands in planting trees!—Does that surprise you?* said Cyrus, *I swear by the god Mithras,* that when my health admits, I never sit down to table without having made myself sweat with some fatigue or other, either in military exercise, rural labour, or some other toilsome employment, to which I apply with pleasure, and without sparing myself.* Lysander was amazed at this discourse, and pressing him by the hand; *Cyrus,*† said he, *you are truly happy, and deserve your high fortune; because in you it is united with virtue.*

Alcibiades without any trouble discovered the mystery of the levies made by Cyrus, and went into the province of Pharnabazus, with a design to proceed to the court of Persia, and to apprize Artaxerxes of the scheme laid against him. Had he arrived there, a discovery of such importance would have infallibly procured him the favour of that prince, and the assistance he wanted for the re-establishment of his country. But the Lacedæmonian partisans at Athens, that is to say, the thirty tyrants, apprehended the intrigues of so superior a genius as his, and represented to their masters, that they were inevitably ruined if they did not find means to rid themselves of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians thereupon wrote to Pharnabazus, and with an abject meanness not to be excused, and which showed how much Sparta had degenerated from her ancient manners, pressed him with great earnestness to deliver them at any rate from so formidable an enemy. The satrap complied with their wish. Alcibiades was then in a small town of Phrygia, where he lived with his concubine Timandra.‡ Those who were sent to kill him, not daring to enter his house, contented themselves with surrounding it and setting it on fire. Alcibiades, having quitted it through the flames sword in hand, the Barbarians were afraid to stay to come to blows with him, but flying and retreating as he advanced, they poured their darts and arrows upon him, and he fell dead upon the spot. Timandra took up his body, and having adorned and covered it with the finest robes she had, she made as magnificent a funeral for it as her present condition would admit.

* The Persians adored the sun under that name, who was their principal god.

† Δικαίως, ὦ Κῦρε, εὐδαιμονεῖς· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὢν εὐδαιμονεῖς. Rectè verò te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta est.

‡ It was said that Lais, the famous courtezan, called the Corinthian, was the daughter of this Timandra.

Such was the end of Alcibiades, whose great virtues were stifled and suppressed by still greater vices. It is not easy, to say,* whether his good or bad qualities were most pernicious to his country; for with the one he deceived, and with the other he oppressed it. In him distinguished valour was united with nobility of blood. His person was beautiful and finely made; he was eloquent, of great ability in business, insinuating, and formed for charming all mankind. He loved glory, but without prejudice to his inclination for pleasure; nor was he so fond of pleasure as to neglect his glory for it. He knew how to give into, or abstract himself from it, according to the situation of his affairs. Never was there ductility of genius equal to his. He metamorphosed himself with incredible facility, like Proteus, into the most contrary forms, and supported them all with as much ease and grace, as if each had been natural to him.

This convertibility of character, according as circumstances, the customs of countries, and his own interests required, discovers a heart void of principles, without either truth or justice. He did not confine himself either to religion, virtue, laws, duties, or his country. His sole rule of action was his private ambition, to which he referred every thing. His aim was to please, to dazzle, and be beloved; but at the same time to subject those he soothed. He favoured them only as they served his purposes; and made his correspondence and society a means for engrossing every thing to himself.

His life was a perpetual mixture of good and evil. His sallies into virtue were ill sustained, and quickly degenerated into vices and crimes, very little to the honour of the instructions of that great philosopher, who took no small pains to cultivate him into a man of worth. His actions were glorious; but without rule or principle. His character was elevated and grand; but without connexion and consistency. He was successively the support and terror of the Lacedæmonians and Persians. He was either the misfortune or refuge of his own country, according as he declared for or against it. In fine, he was the author of a destructive war through the whole of Greece, from the sole motive of commanding, by inducing the Athenians to besiege Syracuse; much less from the hope of conquering Sicily, and afterwards Africa, than with the design of keeping Athens in dependence upon himself; convinced, that having to deal with an inconstant, suspicious, ungrateful, jealous people, averse to those that governed, it was necessary to engage them continually in some great affair, in order to make his services always necessary to them, and that they might not be at leisure to examine, censure, and condemn his conduct.

He had the fate generally experienced by persons of his character, and of which they cannot reasonably complain. He never loved

* Cujus nescio utrùm bona an vitia patriæ perniciosiora fuerint: illis enim cives suos decepit, his afflixit. *Val. Max.* l. iii. c. 1.

any one, himself being his sole motive: nor ever found a friend He made it his merit and glory to cajole all men, and consequently nobody confided in, or adhered to, him. His sole view was to live with splendour, and to domineer universally; and he perished miserably, abandoned by the whole world, and obliged at his death to the feeble services and impotent zeal of one only woman, for the last honours rendered to his remains.

About this time died Democritus the philosopher.

SECTION II.

The Thirty exercise the most horrid cruelties at Athens. They put Theramenes, one of their colleagues, to death. Socrates takes his defence upon himself. Thrasybulus attacks the tyrants, makes himself master of Athens, and restores its liberty.

The council of Thirty,* established at Athens by Lysander, committed the most execrable cruelties. Upon pretence of restraining the multitude within their duty, and of preventing seditions, they had caused guards to be assigned them, and armed 3000 of the citizens for that service, and at the same time disarmed all the rest. The whole city was in the utmost terror and dismay. Whoever opposed their injustice and violence became the victims of them. Riches were a crime that never failed of drawing a sentence upon their owners, always followed with death, and the confiscation of estates, which the thirty tyrants divided amongst themselves. They put more people to death, says Xenophon, in eight months of peace, than the enemies had done in a war of thirty years.

The two most considerable persons of the Thirty were Critias and Theramenes, who at first lived in great union, and always acted in concert with each other. The latter had some honour, and loved his country. When he saw with what an excess of violence and cruelty his colleagues behaved, he declared openly against them, and thereby drew their resentment upon him. Critias became his most mortal enemy, and acted as informer against him before the senate, accusing him of disturbing the tranquillity of the state, and of designing to subvert the present government. As he perceived that the defence of Theramenes was heard with silence and approbation, he was afraid, that if the affair was left to the decision of the senate, they would acquit him. Having therefore caused a band of young men, whom he had armed with poniards, to advance to the bar, he said that he thought it the duty of a supreme magistrate to prevent justice from being abused, and that he should act conformably upon this occasion. *But*, continued he, *as the law does not permit, that any of the* 3000 *should be put to death without the consent of the senate, I exclude Theramenes from that number, and condemn him to die in virtue of my own and my colleagues' authority.* Theramenes, at these words, leaping upon the altar; *I demand*, said he, *Athenians, that I may be tried according*

* Xenoph. Hist. l. ii. p 462—479. Diod l. xiv. p. 235—238. Justin. l. v c. 8. 10.

to the laws; which cannot be refused me without manifest injustice. Not that I imagine, that the goodness of my cause will avail me any thing, or the sanction of altars protect me; but I would show at least, that my enemies respect neither the gods nor men. What most astonishes me is, that persons of your wisdom do not see, that your own names may as easily be struck out of the list of citizens, as that of Theramenes. Critias upon this ordered the officers of justice to pull him down from the altar. A universal silence and terror ensued upon the sight of the armed soldiers, that surrounded the senate. Of all the senators, Socrates alone, whose disciple Theramenes had been, took upon him his defence, and opposed the officers of justice. But his weak endeavours could not deliver Theramenes, who was led to the place of execution, notwithstanding all he could do, through crowds of the citizens, who saw with tears, in the fate of a man equally considerable for his love of liberty and the great services he had done his country, what they had to fear for themselves. When they presented him the hemlock, that is, the poison (which was the manner of putting the citizens at Athens to death,) he took it with an intrepid air, and after having drunk it, he poured the bottom upon the table, after the usual manner observed in feasts or public rejoicings, saying, *This for the noble Critias.* Xenophon relates this circumstance, inconsiderable in itself, to show, says he, the tranquillity of Theramenes in his last moments.

The tyrants, delivered from a colleague whose presence alone was a continued reproach to them, no longer observed any measures. Nothing passed throughout the city but imprisonments and murders.* Every body trembled for themselves or their friends. The general desolation had no remedy, nor was there any hope of regaining their liberty. Where had they then as many Harmodiuses,† as they had tyrants? Terror had taken entire possession of their minds, whilst the whole city deplored in secret their loss of liberty, without having one amongst them generous enough to attempt breaking its chains. The Athenian people seemed to have lost their valour, which till then had made them awful and terrible to their neighbours and enemies. They seemed to have lost the very use of speech; not daring to vent the least complaint, lest it should be made a capital crime in them. Socrates alone continued intrepid. He consoled the afflicted senate, animated the despondng citizens, and set all men an admirable example of courage and resolution; preserving his liberty, and sustaining his part in the

* Poteratne civitas illa conquiescere, in quâ tot tyranni erant, quot satellites essent? Ne spes quidem ulla recipiendæ libertatis animis poterat offerri, nec ullí remedio locus apparebat contra tantum vim malorum. Unde enim miseræ civitati tot Harmodios? Socrates tamen in medio erat, et ingentes patres consolabatur, et desperantes de republicâ exhortabatur—et imitari volentibus magnum circumferebat exemplar, cum inter triginta dominos liber incederet. *Senec. de tranquil. anim.* c. iii.

† Harmodius formed a conspiracy for the deliverance of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ

midst of thirty tyrants, who made all else tremble, but could never shake the constancy of Socrates with their menaces. Critias,* who had been his pupil, was the first to declare most openly against him, taking offence at the free and bold discourses which he held against the government of the Thirty. He went so far as to prohibit his instructing the youth; but Socrates, who neither acknowledged his authority, nor feared the violent effects of it, paid no regard to so unjust an order.

All the citizens of any consideration in Athens, and who still retained a love of liberty, quitted a place reduced to so harsh and shameful a slavery, and sought elsewhere an asylum and retreat, where they might live in safety. At the head of these was Thrasybulus, a person of extraordinary merit, who beheld with the most lively affliction the miseries of his country. The Lacedæmonians had the inhumanity to endeavour to deprive those unhappy fugitives of this last resource. They published an edict to prohibit the cities of Greece from giving them refuge, decreed that they should be delivered up to the thirty tyrants, and condemned all such as should contravene the execution of this edict, to pay a fine of five talents. Only two cities rejected with disdain so unjust an ordinance, Megara and Thebes; the latter of which made a decree to punish all persons whatsoever, that should see an Athenian attacked by his enemies without doing his utmost to assist him. Lysias, an orator of Syracuse, who had been banished by the Thirty, raised 500 soldiers at his own expense,† and sent them to the aid of the common country of eloquence.

Thrasybulus lost no time. After having taken Phyla, a small fort in Attica, he marched to the Piræus, of which he made himself master. The Thirty flew thither with their troops, and a warm battle ensued. But as the soldiers on one side fought with valour and vigour for their liberty, and on the other with indolence and indifference for the power of others, the success was not doubtful, but followed the better cause. The tyrants were overthrown. Critias was killed upon the spot. And as the rest of the army were taking to flight, Thrasybulus cried out; *Wherefore do you fly from me as from a victor, rather than assist me as the avenger of your liberty? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; nor have we declared war against the city, but against the Thirty tyrants.* He bade them remember, that they had the same origin, country, laws, and religion; he exhorted them to compassionate their exiled brethren, to restore their country to them, and resume their liberty themselves. This discourse made a due impression. The army, upon their return to Athens, expelled the Thirty, and substituted ten persons to govern in their room, whose conduct proved no better than that of the former.

It is a matter of surprise, that so sudden, so universal, so tenacious, and so uniform a conspiracy against the public good, should

* Xenoph. memorab. l. i. p. 716, 717.

† Quingentos milites, stipendio suo instructos, in auxilium patriæ communis eloquentiæ misit. *Justin* l. v. c. 9.

always actuate the several bodies of persons established in the administration of this government. This we have seen in the Four Hundred formerly chosen at Athens; again in the Thirty, and now in the Ten. And what augments our wonder is, that this passion for tyranny should so immediately possess republicans, born in the bosom of Liberty, accustomed to equality of condition on which it is founded, and nurtured from their earliest infancy in an abhorrence of all subjection and dependancy. There must be,* on the one side, in power and authority some violent impulse, to actuate in this manner so many persons, of whom many, no doubt, were not without sentiments of virtue and honour; and to banish so suddenly the principles and manners natural to them: and on the other an excessive propensity in the mind of man to subject his equals, and to rule over them imperiously, to carry him on to the last extremities of oppression and cruelty, and to make him forget at once all the laws of nature and religon.

The Thirty being fallen from their power and hopes, sent deputies to Lacedæmon to demand aid. It was not Lysander's fault, who was sent to them with troops, that the tyrants were not re-established. But king Pausanias, who likewise marched against Athens, moved with compassion for the deplorable condition to which a city, once so flourishing, was reduced, had the generosity to favour the Athenians in secret, and at length obtained a peace for them. It was sealed with the blood of the tyrants, who, having taken arms to reinstate themselves in the government, and being present at a parley for that purpose, were all put to the sword, and left Athens in the full possession of its liberty. All the exiles were recalled. Thrasybulus at that time proposed the celebrated amnesty, by which the citizens engaged upon oath that all past transactions should be buried in oblivion. The government was re-established upon its ancient foundation, the laws restored to their pristine vigour, and magistrates elected with their usual forms.

I cannot forbear observing in this place the wisdom and moderation of Thrasybulus, so salutary and essential after so long a continuance of domestic troubles. This is one of the finest events in ancient history, worthy of the Athenian lenity and benevolence, and has served as a model to successive ages in good governments.

Never had tyranny been more cruel and bloody than that which the Athenians had just thrown off. Every house was in mourning; every family bewailed the loss of some relation. It had been a series of public robbery and rapine, in which licence and impunity had authorized all manner of crimes. Private individuals seemed to have a right to demand the blood of all accomplices in such notorious malversations, and even the interest of the state appeared to authorize such a claim, that by exemplary severities such enormous

* Vi dominationis convulsus. *Tacit.*

crimes might be prevented for the future. But Thrasybulus rising above those sentiments, from the superiority of his more extensive genius, and the views of a more discerning and profound policy foresaw, that by acquiescing in the punishment of the guilty, eternal seeds of discord and enmity would remain, to weaken, by domestic divisions, the strength of the republic, which it was necessary to unite against the common enemy, and occasion the loss to the state of a great number of citizens, who might render it important services with the very view of making amends for past misbehaviour.

Such a conduct after great troubles in a state has always seemed, to the ablest politicians, the most certain and ready means to restore the public peace and tranquillity. Cicero,* when Rome was divided into two factions upon the occasion of Cæsar's death, who had been killed by the conspirators, calling to mind this celebrated amnesty, proposed, after the example of the Athenians, to bury all that had passed in eternal oblivion. Cardinal Mazarin† observed to Don Lewis de Haro, prime minister of Spain, that this gentle and humane conduct in France had prevented the troubles and revolts of that kingdom from having any fatal consequences, and *that the king had not lost a foot of land by them to that day* whereas the inflexible severity of the Spaniards *was the occasion, that the subjects of that monarchy, whenever they threw off the mask, never returned to their obedience but by the force of arms; which sufficiently appears*, says he, *in the example of the Hollanders, who are in the peaceable possession of many provinces, that not an age ago were the patrimony of the king of Spain.*

Diodorus Siculus takes occasion, from the thirty tyrants of Athens,‡ whose immoderate ambition induced them to treat their country with the most excessive cruelties, to observe how unfortunate it is for persons in power to want a sense of honour,§ and to disregard either the present opinion, or the judgment which posterity will form of their conduct: for from the contempt of reputation the transition is too common to that of virtue itself. They may perhaps, by the dread of their power, suppress for some time the public voice, and impose a forced silence upon censure; but the

* In ædem Telluris convocati sumus; in quo templo, quantum in me fuit, feci fundamentum pacis. Atheniensiumque renovavi vetus exemplum, Græcum etiam†† verbum usurpavi, quod tum in sedandis discordiis usurpaverat civitas illa; atque omnem memoriam discordiarum oblivione sempiternâ delendam censui. *Philip.* i. n. i.

† Let. XV. of Card. Maz. ‡ Diod. l. xiv. p. 234.

§ Cætera principibus statim adesse: unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam; nam contemptâ famâ, contemni virtutes—Quò magis socordiam eorum inridere libet, qui præsenti potentiâ credunt extingui posse etiam sequentis ævi memoriam—suum cuique decus posteritas rependit. *Tacit. Annal.* l. iv. c. 30. & 35.

†† Some believe that word was ἀμνηστία; but as it is not found in the historians who have treated this fact, it is more likely that it was μὴ μνησικακήσειν, which has the same sense, and is used by them all.

more constraint they lay upon it during their lives, the more liberal will it be after their deaths of complaints and reproaches, and the more infamy and imputation will be affixed to their memories. The power of the Thirty, says he, was of a very short duration, but their infamy will be immortal; their memory will be held in abhorrence throughout all ages, whilst their names will be recorded in history only to render them odious, and to make their crimes detestable. He applies the same reflection to the Lacedæmonians; who, after having made themselves masters of Greece by a wise and moderate conduct, fell from that glory, through the severity, haughtiness, and injustice, with which they treated their allies. There is doubtless no reader, whom their abject and cruel jealousy in regard to Athens enslaved and humbled, has not prejudiced against them; nor do we recognise in such behaviour the greatness of mind and noble generosity of ancient Sparta; so much power have the lust of dominion and prosperity over even virtuous men. Diodorus concludes his reflection with a maxim very true, though very little known: *The greatness and majesty of princes*, says he, (and the same may be said of all persons in high authority,) *can be supported only by humanity and justice with regard to their subjects; as, on the contrary, they are ruined and destroyed by a cruel and oppressive government, which never fails to draw upon them the hatred of their people.*

SECTION III.

Lysander abuses his power in an extraordinary manner. He is recalled to Sparta upon the complaint of Pharnabazus.

As Lysander had had the greatest share in the celebrated exploits,* which had raised the glory of the Lacedæmonians to so high a pitch; so had he acquired a degree of power and authority of which there had been no example before in Sparta; but he suffered himself to be carried away by a presumption and vanity still greater than his power. He permitted the Grecian cities to dedicate altars to him as to a god, and to offer sacrifices, and sing hymns and odes in honour of him. The Samians ordained by a public decree, that the feasts celebrated in honour of Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess, should be called *the feasts of Lysander*. He had always a crowd of poets about him (who are often a tribe of venal flatterers,) that vied with each other in singing his great exploits, for which they were magnificently paid. Praise is undoubtedly due to noble deeds; but it diminishes their lustre when either extravagant or purchased.

This sort of vanity and ambition, had he stopped there, would have hurt only himself, by exposing him to envy and contempt; but a natural consequence of it was, that through his arrogance

* Plut. in Lys. p. 443—445

and pride, in conjunction with the incessant flatteries of those around him, he carried the spirit of command and authority to an insupportable excess, and observed no longer any measures either in rewarding or punishing. The absolute government of cities with tyrannic power were the fruits of his friendship, or of the ties of hospitality with him; and only the death of those he hated, could put an end to his resentment and displeasure, without its being possible to escape his vengeance. What Sylla caused to be inscribed upon his tomb, might with equal propriety have been engraved upon Lysander's: that no man had ever surpassed him in doing good to his friends, or evil to his enemies.

Treachery and perjury cost him nothing whenever they promoted his designs; nor was he less cruel than revengeful; of which, what he did at Miletus was a sufficient proof. Apprehending that the leaders of the popular party would escape him, he swore not to do them any hurt. Those unfortunate persons gave credit to his oath, and no sooner appeared in public, than they were put to the sword with his consent, by the nobility, who killed them all, though no less than 800. The number of those on the side of the people, whom he caused to be massacred in the other cities, is incredible; for he did not only destroy to satiate his own individual resentments, but to serve in all places the enmity, malice, and avarice of his friends, whom he supported in gratifying their passions by the death of their enemies.

There was no kind of injustice and violence which the people did not suffer under the government of Lysander; whilst the Lacedæmonians, who were sufficiently informed of his conduct, gave themselves no trouble to correct it. It is too common for those in power to be little affected with the vexations and oppressions laid upon persons of low condition and credit, and to turn a deaf ear to their just complaints; though authority is principally confided to them for the defence of the weak and poor, who have no other protectors. But if such remonstrances are made by a great or powerful person, from whom they may have any thing to hope or fear, the same authority that was slow and drowsy, becomes immediately active and officious; a certain proof that it is not the love of justice that actuates it: this appears here in the conduct of the Lacedæmonian magistrates. Pharnabazus, weary of Lysander's repeated enormities, who ravaged and pillaged the provinces under his command, having sent ambassadors to Sparta, to complain of the wrongs he had received from that general, the Ephori recalled him. Lysander was at that time in the Hellespont. The letter of the Ephori threw him into great consternation. As he principally feared the complaints and accusations of Pharnabazus, he made all the haste he could to come to an explanation with him from the hope of softening him, and making his peace. He went for that purpose to him, and desired, that he would write another letter to the Ephori, intimating that he was

satisfied with his conduct. But Lysander, says Plutarch, in such an application to Pharnabazus, forgot the proverb,* *Set a thief to catch a thief.* The satrap promised all he desired, and accordingly wrote such a letter in Lysander's presence as he had requested, but he had prepared another to a quite different effect. When he was to seal it, as both letters were of the same size and form, he dexterously put that he had written in secret into the place of the other, without being observed, which he sealed and gave him.

Lysander departed well satisfied, and being arrived at Sparta, alighted at the palace where the senate was assembled, and delivered Pharnabazus's letter to the Ephori. But he was strangely surprised when he heard the contents, and withdrew in extreme confusion and disorder. Some days after he returned to the senate, and told the Ephori, that he was obliged to go to the temple of Ammon to acquit himself of the sacrifices he had vowed to that god before his battles. That pilgrimage was no more than a pretence to conceal the pain it gave him to live as a private person in Sparta; and to submit to the yoke of obeying, he, who till then had always governed. Accustomed long to commanding armies, and to the flattering distinctions of a kind of sovereignty exercised by him in Asia, he could not endure that mortifying equality which put him on a level with the multitude, nor reduce himself to the simplicity of a private life. Having obtained permission, not without great difficulties, he embarked.

As soon as he was gone, the kings, reflecting that he held all the cities, in dependance upon himself, by the means of the governors and magistrates who had been established by him, and who were also indebted to him for their unlimited authority, and that he was thereoy effectually lord and master of all Greece, applied themselves vigorously to restore the government of the people, and to depose all his creatures and friends from any share in it. This alteration occasioned great tumults at first. About the same time, Lysander, being apprised of the design of Thrasybulus to re-establish the liberty of his country, returned with the utmost diligence to Sparta, and endeavoured to engage the Lacedæmonians to support the party of the nobility at Athens. We have before observed, that Pausanias, from a more noble spirit of equity and generosity, gave peace to Athens, and by that means, says Plutarch, clipped the wings of Lysander's ambition.

* The Greek word is, *Cretan against Cretan*, as the people of Crete passed for the greatest cheats and liars in the world.

CHAPTER II.

The younger Cyrus, with the aid of the Grecian troops, endeavours to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes. He is killed in battle. Famous retreat of the Ten Thousand

ANTIQUITY has few events so memorable as those I am about to relate in this place. We see on one side a young prince, in other respects abounding with excellent qualities, but abandoned to his violent ambition, carrying war from a distance against his brother and sovereign, and going to attack him almost in his own palace, with the view of depriving him at once of his crown and life; we see him, I say, fall dead in the battle at the feet of that brother, and terminate by so unhappy a fate, an enterprise equally glaring and criminal. On the other hand, the Greeks who follow him,* destitute of all succour after the loss of their chief, without allies, provisions, money, cavalry, or archers, reduced to less than 10,000 men, with no resource but in their own persons and valour, supported solely by the ardent desire of preserving their liberty, and of returning to their native countries; these Greeks, with bold and intrepid resolution, make their retreat before a victorious army of 1,000,000 of men, traverse five or six hundred leagues, notwithstanding vast rivers and innumerable defiles, and arrive at last in their own country through a thousand fierce and barbarous nations, victorious over all obstacles in their way, and over all the dangers which either concealed fraud or open force reduce them to undergo.

This retreat, in the opinion of the best judges and most experienced military men, is the boldest and best conducted exploit to be found in ancient history, and is deemed a perfect model in its kind. Happily for us it is described with the utmost minuteness by an historian, who was not only eye-witness of the facts he relates, but the first mover, the soul of this great enterprise. I shall only abridge his history, and abstract its most material circumstances; but I cannot omit advising young persons who make arms their profession, to consult the original, of which there is a good translation extant, though far short of the admirable beauties of the text. It is very difficult to meet with a more able master than Xenophon in the art of war, to whom may be well applied here what Homer says of Phœnix, the governor of Achilles,† *That he was equally capable of forming his pupil for eloquence or arms*—

Μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι, πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.

* Post mortem Cyri, neque armis à tanto exercitu vinci, neque dolo capi potuerunt; revertentesque inter tot indomitas nationes et barbaras gentes, per tanta itineris spatia virtute se usque terminos patriæ defenderunt. *Justin.* l. v. c. 11.

† Iliad. l. v. 443.

SECTION I.

Cyrus raises troops secretly against his brother Artaxerxes. Thirteen thousand Greeks join him. He sets out from Sardis, and arrives at Babylonia after a march of more than six months.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. We have already said,* that young Cyrus, son of Darius Nothus and Parysatis, saw with pain his elder brother Artaxerxes upon the throne, and that at the very time the latter was taking possession of it, he had attempted to deprive him of his crown and life together. Artaxerxes was not insensible of what he had to fear from a brother of his enterprising and ambitious spirit, but could not refuse pardoning him to the prayers and tears of his mother Parysatis, who doted upon this youngest son. He sent him therefore into Asia to his government; confiding to him, contrary to all the rules of policy, an absolute authority over the provinces left him by the will of the king his father.

A. M. 3601. Ant. J. C. 403. As soon as he arrived there, his thoughts were solely intent upon revenging the affront he supposed he had received from his brother, and to dethrone him. He received all that came from the court with great favour and affability, to induce them insensibly to quit the king's party and adhere to him. He gained also the hearts of the Barbarians under his government; familiarizing himself with them, and mingling with the common soldiery, though without forgetting the dignity of the general; and these he formed by various exercises for service in war. He applied particularly to raise secretly in several places, and upon different pretexts, a body of Grecian troops, upon whom he relied much more than upon those of the Barbarians. Clearchus retired to his court after having been banished from Sparta, and was of great service to him, being an able, experienced, and valiant captain. At

A. M. 3602. Ant. J. C. 402. the same time several cities in the provinces under the government of Tissaphernes revolted from their obedience, and placed themselves under the jurisdiction of Cyrus. This incident, which was not an effect of chance, but of the secret intrigues of that prince, gave birth to a war between them. Cyrus, under the pretence of arming against Tissaphernes, assembled troops with less reserve; and to amuse the court the more speciously, sent grievous complaints to the king against that governor, demanded his protection and aid in the most submissive manner. Artaxerxes was deceived by these appearances, and believed that all Cyrus's preparations were directed against Tissaphernes alone, and continued quiet, from the assurance of having nothing to apprehend for himself.

Cyrus knew well how to take advantage of the imprudent security

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 213—249, and 252. Justin [illegible] Xenoph. de Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 243—248.

and indolence of his brother,* which some people conceived the effect of his goodness and humanity. And indeed in the beginning of his reign he seemed to imitate the virtues of the first Artaxerxes, whose name he bore. For he demeaned himself with great mildness and affability to such as approached him; he honoured and rewarded magnificently all those whose services had merited favour; when he passed sentence of punishment, it was without either outrage or insult; and when he made presents, it was with a gracious air, and such engaging manners, as infinitely exalted their value, and implied, that he was never better pleased than when he had an opportunity of doing good to his subjects. To all these excellent qualities he ought to have added one no less royal, and which would have put him upon his guard against the enterprises of a brother, whose character he ought to have known; I mean a wise foresight, that penetrates the future, and renders a prince attentive to prevent or frustrate whatever may disturb the tranquillity of the state.

The emissaries of Cyrus at the court were perpetually dispersing reports and opinions amongst the people, to prepare their minds for the intended change and revolt. They said that the state required a king of Cyrus's character; a king, magnificent, liberal, who loved war, and showed his favours upon those that served him; and that it was necessary for the grandeur of the empire to have a prince upon the throne fired with ambition and valour, for the support and augmentation of its glory.

A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401. The young prince lost no time on his side, and hastened the execution of his great design. He was then only twenty-three years old at most. After the important services he had done the Lacedæmonians, without which they had never obtained the victories that had made them masters of Greece, he thought he might safely open himself to them. He therefore imparted to them the present situation of his affairs, and the end he had in view; convinced that such a confidence could not but incline them the more in his favour.

In the letter he wrote them, he spoke of himself in very magnificent terms. He told them he had a greater and more royal heart than his brother; that he was better versed in the philosophy and the knowledge of the Magi,† and that he could drink more wine without being disordered in his senses; a very meritorious quality amongst the Barbarians, but not so proper to recommend him to the good opinion of those to whom he was writing. The Lacedæmonians sent orders to their fleet to join that of the prince immediately, and to obey the commands of Tamos his admiral in all things, but without the least mention of Artaxerxes, or seeming in any manner privy to his design. They thought that precaution

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1013.

† By the knowledge of the Magi, amongst the Persians, was meant the science of religion and government.

necessary for their justification with Artaxerxes,* in case affairs should happen to terminate in his favour.

The troops of Cyrus, according to the review afterwards made, consisted of 13,000 Greeks, which were the flower and chief force of his army, and of 100,000 regular troops of the barbarous nations. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates of Achaia for their leader. The Bœotians were under Proxenus the Theban, and the Thessalians under Menon. The Barbarians had Persian generals,† of whom the chief was Ariæus. The fleet consisted of thirty five ships under Pythagoras the Lacedæmonian, and twenty-five commanded by Tamos the Ægyptian, admiral of the whole fleet. It followed the land army, coasting along near the shore.

Cyrus had opened his design to Clearchus alone of all the Greeks, foreseeing aright that the length and boldness of the enterprise could not fail of discouraging and dismaying the officers, as well as soldiers. He made it his sole application to gain their affections during the march, by treating them with kindness and humanity, conversing freely with them, and giving effectual orders that they should want for nothing. Proxenus, between whose family and Xenophon's an ancient friendship subsisted, presented that young Athenian to Cyrus, who received him very favourably,‡ and gave him an employment in his army amongst the Greeks. He set out from Sardis at length, and marched towards the upper provinces of Asia. The troops knew neither the occasion of the war, nor into what countries they were going. Cyrus had only caused it to be given out, that he was carrying his arms against the Pisidians, who had infested his province by their incursions.

Tissaphernes,§ rightly judging that all these preparations were too great for so insignificant an enterprise as against Pisidia, had set out post from Miletus to give the king an account of them. This news occasioned great trouble at court. Parysatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, was looked upon as the principal cause of this war; and all persons in her service and interest were suspected of holding intelligence with Cyrus. Statira especially, the reigning queen, reproached her incessantly in the most violent terms. *Where is now*, said she to her, *that faith you have so often engaged for your son's behaviour? Where those ardent prayers you employed to preserve from death that conspirator against his king and brother? It is your unhappy fondness that has kindled this war, and plunged us into an abyss of misfortunes.* The antipathy and hatred of the two queens for each other were already very great, and were still more inflamed by such warm reproaches. We shall see what the consequences were. Artaxerxes assembled a numerous army to receive his brother.

* Quærentes apud Cyrum gratiam; et apud Artaxerxem, si vicisset, veniæ patrocinia, cùm nihil adversùs eum apertè decrevissent. *Justin.* l. v. c. 11.

† Xenoph. Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 252. ‡ Xenoph. l. iii. p. 294. § Plut. in Artax. p. 1014.

Cyrus advanced continually by long marches.* What troubled him most on the way was the pass of Cilicia, which was a narrow defile between very high and steep mountains, that would admit no more than one carriage to pass at a time. Syennesis, king of the country, was preparing to dispute this pass with him, and would infallibly have succeeded, but for the diversion made by Tamos with his fleet, in conjunction with that of the Lacedæmonians. To defend the coasts against the insults of the fleet, Syennesis abandoned that important post, which a small body of troops might have made good against the greatest army.

When they arrived at Tarsus, the Grecks refused to advance any farther, rightly suspecting that they were marching against the king, and loudly exclaiming that they had not entered into the service upon that condition. Clearchus, who commanded them, had occasion for all his address and ability to stifle this commotion in its birth. At first he made use of authority and force, but with very ill success, and desisted therefore from an open opposition to their sentiments: he even affected to enter into their views, and to support them with his approbation and influence. He declared publicly, that he would not separate himself from them, and advised them to depute persons to the prince, to know from his own mouth against whom they were to be led, that they might follow him voluntarily if they approved his measures; if not, that they might demand his permission to withdraw. By this artful evasion he appeased the tumult, and made them easy, and they chose him and some other officers for their deputies. Cyrus, whom he had secretly apprized of every thing, made answer, that he was going to attack Abrocomas† his enemy, who was encamped at twelve days' march from thence upon the Euphrates. When this answer was repeated to them, though they plainly saw against whom they were going, they resolved to proceed, and only demanded an augmentation of their pay. Cyrus, instead of one darick‡ a month to each soldier, promised to give them one and a half.

Some time after, Cyrus was informed that two of the principal officers, upon account of a private quarrel with Clearchus, had deserted with part of their equipage on board a merchant ship. Many were of opinion, that it was proper to send some galleys after them, which might be done with great ease; and that when they were brought back, they should be made an example, by suffering death in the sight of the whole army. Cyrus, convinced that favour was the most certain means to obtain affection,§ and that punishments, like violent remedies, ought never to be used but in extreme necessity, declared publicly that he would not suffer it to be said, that he had detained any one in his service by force, and

* Xenoph. l. i. p. 248—261.

† It is not said where he commanded. It appears to be upon the Euphrates. He marched with 300,000 men to join the king's army, but did not arrive till after the battle

‡ The darick was worth ten livres.

§ Beneficiis potiùs quam remediis ingenio experiri placuit. *Plin. in Traj.*

added, that he would send them their wives and children, whom they had left as hostages in his hands.

An answer displaying so much wisdom and generosity had a surprising effect; and made even those his firm adherents, who were before inclined to retire. This is an excellent lesson for all who govern. There is in the mind of man a fund of natural generosity, which it is necessary to know and to put in play. Threats exasperate them, and chastisement makes them revolt, when endeavours are used to force them to do their duty against their will. They desire a certain degree of confidence in their honour,* and that the glory of discharging their duty through choice be left in their power: to show that you believe men faithful, is often the best means to make them so.

Cyrus soon after declared, that he was marching against Artaxerxes. Upon which some murmuring was heard at first, but it soon gave place to the expressions of joy and satisfaction, occasioned by that prince's magnificent promises to the army.

As Cyrus advanced by long marches,† he was informed from all parts, that the king did not intend to come directly to a battle, but had resolved to wait in the heart of Persia till all his forces were assembled; and that, to stop his enemies, he had ordered to be dug in the plains of Babylonia, a ditch of five fathoms broad, and three deep, extending the space of twelve parasangas‡ or leagues, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the fossé a way had been left of twenty feet in breadth, by which Cyrus passed with his whole army, which he had reviewed the day before. The king had neglected to dispute this pass with him, and suffered him to continue his march towards Babylon. It was Tiribasus who made him resolve not to fly in such a manner before an enemy, over whom he had infinite advantages, as well from the number of his troops as the valour of his generals. He resolved therefore to advance against the enemy.

SECTION II.

The battle of Cunaxa. The Greeks are victorious on their side, Artaxerxes on his. Cyrus is killed.

The place where the battle was fought,§ was called Cunaxa, about twenty-five leagues‖ from Babylon. The army of Cyrus consisted of 13,000 Greeks, 100,000 Barbarians, and twenty cha-

* Nescio an plus moribus conferet princeps, quibonos esse patitur, quàm qui cogit. *Plin. ibid.*

Plerumque habita fides ipsam obligat fidem. *Liv.*

† Plut. in Artax. p. 1014. Xenoph. l. i. p. 261—266.

‡ The parasanga is a road measure peculiar to the Persians. It was commonly thirty stadia, which make about a league and a half French. Some were from twenty to sixty stadia. In the march of Cyrus's army, I suppose the parasanga only twenty stadia, or one league, for reasons I shall give hereafter.

§ Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 263—266. Diod. l. xiv. p. 253, 254. Plut. p 1014—1017. ‖ Five hundred stadia.

riots armed with scythes. That of the enemy in horse and foot might amount to about 1,200,000 under four generals, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, Arbaces, and Abrocomas, without including 6000 chosen horse, that fought where the king was present, and never quitted his person. But Abrocomas, who had the command of 300,000 men, did not arrive till five days after the battle. In the king's army were only 150 chariots armed with scythes.

Cyrus believed, from the enemy's not having defended the pass at the fossé, that there would be no battle; so that the next day the army marched with great negligence. But on the third, Cyrus being in his chariot, with few soldiers in their ranks before him, and the rest marching without any order, or having their arms carried for them, a horseman came in full speed, crying out as he passed, that the enemy were approaching in order of battle. Upon this, great confusion ensued, from the apprehension that they should not have time to draw up the army. Cyrus, leaping from his chariot, put on his arms immediately, and getting on horseback with his javelin in his hand, he gave orders universally to the troops to stand to their arms, and fall into their ranks; which was executed with so much expedition, that the troops had not time to refresh themselves.

Cyrus posted upon his right 1000 Paphlagonian horse, supported by the Euphrates, and the light-armed infantry of the Greeks; and next them, Clearchus, Proxenus, and the rest of the general officers to Menon, at the head of their several corps. The left wing, composed of Lydians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic nations, was commanded by Ariæus, who had 1000 horse. Cyrus placed himself in the centre, where the chosen troops of the Persians and other Barbarians were posted. He had around him 600 horsemen, armed at all points, as were their horses, with frontlets and breastplates. The prince's head was uncovered, as were those of all the Persians, whose custom it was to give battle in that manner; the arms of all his people were red, and those of Artaxerxes were white.

A little before the onset, Clearchus advised Cyrus not to charge in person, but to cover himself in the rear of the Grecian battalions. *What is it you say?* replied Cyrus; *at the time I am endeavouring to make myself king, would you have me show myself unworthy of being so?* That wise and generous answer proves, that he knew the duty of a general, especially on a day of battle. Had he withdrawn when his presence was most necessary, it would have argued his want of courage, and intimidated others. It is necessary always, however, preserving the due distinction between the leader and the troops, that their danger should be common, and no one exempt from it; lest the latter should be alarmed by a different conduct. Courage in an army depends upon example, upon the desire of being distinguished, the fear of dishonour, the incapacity of doing otherwise than the rest, and the equality of danger. If Cyrus had retired, it would have either ruined, or greatly weakened, all these potent motives, by discouraging the officers as well as sol-

diers of his army. He thought, that being their general, it was incumbent upon him to discharge all the functions of that office, and to show himself worthy to be the leader and soul of such a number of valiant men, ready to shed their blood for his service.

It was now noon, and the enemy did not yet appear. But about three of the clock a great dust like a white cloud arose, followed soon after with a blackness that overspread the whole plain; after which was seen the glittering of armour, lances, and standards. Tissaphernes commanded the left, which consisted of cavalry armed with white cuirasses, and of light-armed infantry; in the centre was the heavy-armed foot, a great part of which had bucklers made of wood which covered the soldier entirely (these were Egyptians.) The rest of the light-armed infantry and of the horse formed the right wing. The foot were drawn up by nations, with as much depth as front, and in that order composed square battalions. The king had posted himself in the main body with the flower of the whole army, and had 6000 horse for his guard, commanded by Artagerses. Though he was in the centre, he was beyond the left wing of Cyrus's army, so much did the front of his own exceed that of the enemy in extent. A hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes were placed in the front of the army at some distance from one another. The scythes were fixed to the axle downwards and aslant, so as to cut down, and overthrow all before them.

As Cyrus relied very much upon the valour and experience of the Greeks, he bade Clearchus, as soon as he had beaten the enemies in his front, to take care to incline to his left, and fall upon the centre, where the king was posted; the success of the battle depending upon that attack. But Clearchus, finding it very difficult to make his way through so great a body of troops, replied, that he need be in no pain, and that he would take care to do what was necessary.

The enemy in the mean time advanced slowly in good order. Cyrus marched in the space between the two armies, though nearest to his own, and considered both of them with great attention. Xenophon, perceiving him, spurred directly up to him, to know whether he had any farther orders to give. He called out to him, that the sacrifices were favourable, and that he should tell the troops so. He then hastened through the ranks to give his orders, and showed himself to the soldiers with such a joy and serenity in his countenance, as inspired them with new courage, and at the same time with an air of kindness and familiarity, that excited their zeal and affection. It is not easy to comprehend what great effects are produced by a word, a kind air, or a look of a general, upon a day of action; and with what ardour a common man will rush into danger, when he believes himself not unknown to his general, and thinks his valour will oblige him.

Artaxerxes moved on continually, though with a slow pace, and

without noise and confusion. That good order and exact discipline extremely surprised the Greeks, who expected to see much hurry and tumult in so great a multitude, and to hear confused cries, as Cyrus had foretold them.

The armies were not distant above four or five hundred paces, when the Greeks began to sing the hymn of battle, and to march on, slowly at first, and with silence. When they came near the enemy, they set up great cries, striking their darts upon their shields to frighten the horse, and then moving all together, they sprung forwards, upon the barbarians with all their force, who did not wait their charge, but took to their heels, and fled universally except Tissaphernes, who stood his ground with a small part of his troops.

Cyrus saw with pleasure the enemy routed by the Greeks, and was proclaimed king by those around him. But he did not give himself up to a vain joy, nor as yet reckon himself victor. He perceived, that Artaxerxes was wheeling his right to attack him in flank, and marched directly against him with his 600 horse. He killed Artagerses, who commanded the king's guard of 6000 horse, with his own hand, and put the whole body to flight. Discovering his brother, he cried out, his eyes sparkling with rage, *I see him*, and spurred against him, followed only by his principal officers; for his troops had quitted their ranks to follow the runaways, which was an essential fault.

The battle then became a single combat,* in some measure, between Artaxerxes and Cyrus, and the two brothers were seen transported with rage and fury, endeavouring, like Eteocles and Polynices, to plunge their swords into each other's hearts, and to assure themselves of the throne by the death of their rival.

Cyrus having opened his way through those who were drawn up in battle before Artaxerxes, joined him, and killed his horse, that fell with him to the ground. He rose, and was remounted upon another, when Cyrus attacked him again, gave him a second wound, and was preparing to give him a third, in hopes that it would prove his last. The king, like a lion wounded by the hunters, only the more furious from the smart, sprung forwards, impetuously pushing his horse against Cyrus, who running headlong and without regard to his person, threw himself into the midst of a flight of darts aimed at him from all sides, and received a wound from the king's javelin, at the instant all the rest discharged their weapons against him. Cyrus fell dead: some say that it was from the wound given him by the king; others affirm that he was killed by a Carian soldier. Mithridates, a young Persian nobleman, asserted, that he had given him the mortal stroke with a javelin, which entered his temple, and pierced his head quite through. The greatest persons of the court, resolving not to survive so good a

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 254

master, were all killed around his body; a certain proof, says Xenophon, that he well knew how to choose his friends, and that he was truly beloved by them. Ariæus, who ought to have been the firmest of all his adherents, fled with the left wing, as soon as he heard of his death.

Artaxerxes, after having caused the head and right hand of his brother to be cut off by the eunuch Mesabates, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus had not stopped there, but having passed through it, continued his retreat to the place where the army had encamped the day before, which was about four leagues distant.

Tissaphernes, after the defeat of the greatest part of his left wing by the Greeks, led on the rest against them, and by the side of the river passed through the light-armed infantry of the Greeks, who opened to give him passage, and made their discharge upon him as he passed, without losing a man. They were commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, who was esteemed an able captain. Tissaphernes kept on without returning to the charge, because he perceived he was too weak, and went forward to Cyrus's camp, where he found the king, who was plundering it; but had not been able to force the quarter defended by the Greeks left to guard it, who saved their baggage.

The Greeks on their side, and Artaxerxes on his, who did not know what was going on elsewhere, believed each of them that they had gained the victory; the first, because they had put the enemy to flight, and pursued them; and the king, because he had killed his brother, beaten the troops who had opposed him, and plundered their camp. The event was soon cleared up on both sides. Tissaphernes, upon his arrival at the camp, informed the king, that the Greeks had defeated his left wing, and pursued it with great vigour; and the Greeks, on their side learned, that the king, in pursuing Cyrus's left, had penetrated into the camp. Upon this advice, the king rallied his troops, and marched in quest of the enemy; and Clearchus, being returned from pursuing the Persians, advanced to support the camp.

The two armies were soon very near each other, when, by a movement made by the king, he seemed to intend to charge the Greeks by their left, who, fearing to be surrounded on all sides, wheeled, about, and halted with the river on their backs, to prevent their being taken in the rear. Upon seeing that, the king changed his form of battle also, drew up his army in front of them, and marched on to the attack. As soon as the Greeks saw him approach, they began to sing the hymn of battle, and advanced against the enemy even with more ardour than in the first action.

The barbarians again took to their heels, as at first, ran farther than before, and were pursued to a village at the foot of a hill, upon which their horse halted. The king's standard was observed to be there, which was a golden eagle upon the top of a pike, having its wings displayed. The Greeks preparing to pursue

them, they abandoned also the hill, fled precipitately, and all their troops broke, and were in the utmost disorder and confusion. Clearchus, having drawn up the Greeks at the bottom of the hill, ordered Lycias, the Syracusan, and another to go up it, and observe what passed in the plain. They returned with an account that the enemies fled on all sides, and that their whole army was routed.

As it was almost night, the Greeks laid down their arms to rest themselves, much surprised, that neither Cyrus, nor any one from him, appeared; and imagining that he was either engaged in the pursuit of the enemy, or was making haste to possess himself of some important place; for they were still ignorant of his death, and the defeat of the rest of his army. They determined therefore to return to their camp, where they arrived about night-fall, and found the greatest part of the baggage taken, with all the provisions, and 400 wagons laden with corn and wine, which Cyrus had expressly caused to be carried along with the army for the Greeks, in case of any pressing necessity. They passed the night in the camp, the greatest part of them without any refreshment, concluding that Cyrus was alive and victorious.

The success of this battle shows the superiority of valour and military knowledge over the greatest numbers without them. The small army of the Greeks did not amount to more than twelve or 13,000 men; but they were seasoned and disciplined troops, inured to fatigues, accustomed to confront dangers, sensible to glory, and who, during the long Peloponnesian war, had not wanted either time or means to acquire, and perfect themselves in the art of war. On Artaxerxes' side were reckoned nearly 1,000,000 of men; but they were soldiers only in name, without force, courage, discipline, experience, or any sentiment of honour. Hence it was, that as soon as the Greeks appeared, terror and disorder ensued amongst the enemy; and in the second action, Artaxerxes himself did not dare to wait their attack, but shamefully betook himself to flight.

Plutarch here blames Clearchus the general of the Greeks very much, and imputes to him as an unpardonable neglect, his not having followed Cyrus's order, who recommended to him above all things to fall upon that body where Artaxexes commanded in person. This reproach seems groundless. It is not easy to conceive, how it was possible for that captain, who was posted on the right wing, to attack Artaxerxes immediately, who, in the centre of his own army, lay beyond the utmost extent of the enemy's left, as has been said before. It seems that Cyrus, depending as he did with great reason upon the valour of the Greeks, and desiring they should charge Artaxerxes in his post, ought to have placed them in the left wing which answered directly to the part where the king was, that is to the main body, and not in the right, which was very remote from it.

Clearchus may indeed be reproached with having followed the pursuit too warmly and too long. If, after having put the left wing which opposed him into disorder, he had charged the rest of the enemy in flank, and had opened his way to the centre, where Artaxerxes was, it is highly probable, that he would have gained a complete victory, and placed Cyrus upon the throne. The 600 horse of that prince's guard committed the same fault, and by pursuing the body of troops they had put to flight too eagerly, left their master almost alone, and abandoned to the mercy of the enemy: without considering, that they were chosen from the whole army for the immediate guard of his person, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Too much ardour is often prejudicial in a battle, and it is the duty of an able general to know how to restrain and direct it.

Cyrus himself erred highly in this respect, and abandoned himself too much to his blind passion for glory and revenge. In running headlong to attack his brother, he forgot that there is a wide difference between a general and a private soldier. He ought not to have exposed himself, but as became a prince: as the head, not as the hand; as the person who was to give orders, and not as those who were to execute them.

In these remarks I only adopt those which have been made by able judges in the art of war, and would not choose to advance my own opinion upon points which I am not competent to decide.

SECTION III.

Eulogy of Cyrus.

Xenophon gives us a magnificent character of Cyrus,* and that not merely from the report of others, but from what he saw and knew of him in his own person. He was, says he, in the opinion of all that were acquainted with him, next to Cyrus the Great, a prince the most worthy of the supreme authority, and one who had the most noble, and most truly royal soul. From his infancy he surpassed all of his own age in every exercise, whether it were in managing the horse, drawing the bow, throwing the dart, or in the chase, in which he distinguished himself once by fighting and killing a bear that attacked him. Those advantages were enhanced in him by the nobleness of his air, an engaging aspect, and by all the graces of nature, that conduce to recommend merit.

When his father had made him satrap of Lydia, and the neighbouring provinces,† his chief care was to make the people sensible that he had nothing so much at heart as to keep his word inviolably, not only with regard to public treaties, but the most minute of his promises; a quality very rare amongst princes, which

* De Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 266, 267. † Great Phrygia and Cappadocia.

however is the basis of all good government, and the source of their own, as well as their people's happiness. Not only the places under his authority, but the enemy themselves, reposed an entire confidence in him.

Whether good or ill were done him, he always desired to return it twofold, and wished that he might live no longer (as he said himself,) than whilst he surpassed his friends in benefits, and his enemies in vengeance. (It would have been more glorious for him to have overcome the latter by the force of favour and benevolence.) Nor was there ever a prince, whom people were more afraid to offend, nor for whose sake they were more ready to hazard their possessions, lives, and fortunes.

Less intent upon being feared than beloved, his study was to make his greatness appear only where it was useful and beneficial, and to extinguish all other sentiments, but those which flow from gratitude and affection. He was careful to seize every occasion of doing good, to confer his favours with judgment and in season, and to show, that he thought himself rich, powerful, and happy, only as he made others sensible of his being so by his benevolence and liberality. But he took care not to exhaust the means by an imprudent profusion. He did not lavish,* but distribute his favours. He chose rather to make his liberalities the rewards of merit, than mere donations, and that they should be subservient in promoting virtue, and not in supporting the soft and abject sloth of vice.

He was particularly pleased with conferring his favours upon valiant men, and governments and rewards were bestowed only on those who had distinguished themselves by their actions. He never granted any honour or dignity to favour, intrigue, or faction, but to merit alone; upon which depends not only the glory but the prosperity of governments By that means he soon made virtue estimable, and rendered vice contemptible. The provinces, animated with a noble emulation, furnished him in a very short time with a considerable number of excellent subjects of every kind; who under a different government would have remained unknown, obscure, and useless.

Never did any one know how to confer an obligation with a better grace, or to win the hearts of those who could serve him with a more engaging behaviour. As he was fully sensible that he stood in need of the assistance of others for the execution of his designs, he thought justice and gratitude required that he should render his adherents all the services in his power. All the presents made him, whether of splendid arms, or rich apparel, he distributed among his friends, according to their several tastes or occasions, and used to say, that the brightest ornament, and most exalted riches of a

* Habebat sinum facilem, non perforatum: ex quo multa exeant, nihil excidat. *Senec. de vit. beat.* cxxiii.

prince, consisted in adorning and enriching those who served him well. In fact, says Xenophon, to do good to one's friends, and to excel them in liberality, does not seem so worthy of admiration in so high a fortune; but to transcend them in goodness of heart and sentiments of friendship and affection, and to take more pleasure in conferring, than receiving obligations; this is what I find in Cyrus truly worthy of esteem and admiration. The first of these advantages he derives from his rank; the other from himself and his intrinsic merit.

By these extraordinary qualities, he acquired the universal esteem and affection as well of the Greeks as Barbarians. A great proof of what Xenophon here says, is, that none ever quitted the service of Cyrus for the king's; whereas great numbers went over every day to him from the king's party after the war was declared, and even of such as had most credit at the court; because they were all convinced, that Cyrus knew best how to distinguish and reward their services.

It is most certain that young Cyrus was endowed with great virtues, and a superior merit; but I am surprised, that Xenophon, in drawing his character, has described only the most beautiful features, and such as are calculated to excite our admiration of him, without saying the least word of his defects, and especially of that immoderate ambition, which was the soul of all his actions, and which at length put arms into his hands, against his elder brother and king. Is it allowable in an historian, whose chief duty is to paint virtue and vice in their proper colours, to relate at large an enterprise of such a nature, without intimating the least dislike or reprobation of it? But with the Pagans, ambition was so far from being considered as a vice, that it often passed for a virtue.

SECTION IV.

The king wishes to compel the Greeks to deliver up their arms. They resolve to die rather than surrender themselves. A treaty is made with them. Tissaphernes takes upon him to conduct them back to their own country. He treacherously seizes Clearchus and four other generals, who are all put to death.

The Greeks,* having learned, the day after the battle, that Cyrus was dead, sent deputies to Ariæus, the general of the Barbarians, who had retired with his troops to the place from whence they had marched the day before the action, to offer him, as victors, the crown of Persia in the room of Cyrus. At the same time arrived Persian heralds at arms from the king, to summon them to deliver up their arms; to whom they answered with a haughty air, that such messages were not to be sent to conquerors; that if the king would have their arms, he might come and take them; but that they would die before they would part with them; that if he

* Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 272—292. Diod. l. xiv. p. 255—257

would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve him with fidelity and valour;* but if he imagined to reduce them to slavery as conquered, he might know, they had wherewithal to defend themselves, and were determined to lose their lives and liberty together. The heralds added, that they had orders to tell them that if they continued in the place where they were, they would be allowed a suspension of arms; but if they advanced or retired, that they would be treated as enemies. The Greeks agreed, but were asked by the heralds what answer they should take back. *Peace in continuing here, or war in marching*, replied Clearchus, without explaining himself farther; in order to keep the king always in suspense and uncertainty.

The answer of Ariæus to the Grecian deputies was, that there were many Persians more considerable than himself, who would not suffer him upon the throne, and that he should set out early the next day to return into Ionia; that, if they would march thither with him, they might join him in the night. Clearchus, with the advice of the officers, prepared to depart. He commanded from thenceforth, as being the sole person of sufficient capacity; for he had not been actually elected general-in-chief.

When the night came, Miltocythes the Thracian, who commanded forty horse, and about 300 foot of his own country, went and surrendered himself to the king; and the rest of the Greeks began their march under the conduct of Clearchus, and arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus. After they had drawn up in battle, the principal officers went to wait on him in his tent, where they swore alliance with him; and the Barbarian engaged to conduct the army without fraud. In confirmation of the treaty, they sacrificed a wolf, a ram, a boar, and a bull; the Greeks dipped their swords, and the Barbarians the points of their javelins, in the blood of the victims.

Ariæus did not think it proper to return by the same route they had come, because, as they had found nothing for their subsistence during the last seventeen days of their march, they must have suffered much more, had they taken the same way back again. He therefore took another; exhorting them only to make long marches at first, in order to evade the king's pursuit; but this, however, they could not effect. Towards the evening, when they were not far from some villages where they proposed to halt, the scouts came in with advice, that they had seen several equipages and convoys, which made it reasonable to judge, that the enemy were not far off. Upon which they stood their ground, and waited their coming up; and the next day, before sunrising, drew up in the same order as in the preceding battle. So bold an appearance terrified the king, who sent heralds, not to demand, as before, the surrender of their arms, but to propose peace and a

* Sin ut victis servitum inferceretur, esse sibi ferrum et juventutem, et promptum liber tati aut ad mortem animum. *Tacit. Annal.* l. iv. c. 46.

treaty. Clearchus, who was informed of their arrival, whilst he was busy in drawing up his troops, gave orders to bid them wait and to tell them, that he was not yet at leisure to hear them. He assumed purposely an air of haughtiness and grandeur, to denote his intrepidity, and at the same time to show the fine appearance and good condition of his phalanx. When he advanced with the most gallant of his officers, expressly chosen for the occasion, and had heard what the heralds had to propose; he made answer, that they must begin with giving battle, because the army, being in want of provisions, had no time to lose. The heralds having carried back this answer to their master, returned shortly after; which showed that the king, or whoever spoke in his name, was not very distant. They said, they had orders to conduct them to villages, where they would find provisions in abundance, and conducted them thither accordingly.

The army staid there three days, during which, Tissaphernes arrived from the king, with the queen's brother and three other Persian grandees, attended by a great number of officers and domestics. After having saluted the generals, who advanced to receive him, he told them by his interpreter, that being a neighbour of Greece, and seeing them engaged in dangers, out of which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, he had used his good offices with the king, to obtain permission to reconduct them into their own country; being convinced, that neither themselves, nor their cities, would ever be unmindful of that favour: that the king, without having declared himself positively upon that head, had commanded him to come to them, to know for what cause they had taken arms against him; and he advised them to make the king such an answer, as might not give any offence, and might enable him to do them service. *We call the gods to witness*, replied Clearchus, *that we did not enlist ourselves to make war with the king, or to march against him. Cyrus, concealing his true motives under different pretexts, brought us almost hither without explaining himself, the better to surprise you. And when we saw him surrounded with dangers, we thought it infamous to abandon him, after the favours we had received from him. But as he is dead, we are released from our engagement, and neither desire to contest the crown with Artaxerxes, nor to ravage his country, nor to give him the least disquiet, provided he does not oppose our return. However, if we are attacked, we shall endeavour, with the assistance of the gods, to make a good defence; and shall not be ungrateful towards those who render us any service.* Tissaphernes replied, that he would let the king know what they said, and return with his answer. But his not coming the next day gave the Greeks some anxiety: he however arrived on the third, and told them, that after much controversy, he had at length obtained the king's pardon for them: for that it had been represented to the king, that he ought not to suffer people to return with impunity into their country, who had been so

insolent as to come thither to make war upon him. *In fine*, said he, *you may now assure yourselves of not finding any obstacle to your return, and of being supplied with provisions, or suffered to buy them; and you shall swear on your part, that you will pass without committing any disorders in your march, and that you will take only what is necessary; provided you are not furnished with it.* These conditions were sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes and the queen's brother gave their hands to the colonels and captains in token of amity. After which Tissaphernes withdrew to arrange his affairs, promising to return shortly in order to go back with them into his government.

The Greeks waited for him above twenty days, continuing encamped near Ariæus, who received frequent visits from his brothers, and other relations, as did the officers of his army from the Persians of the different party; who assured them from the king of an entire oblivion of the past: so that the friendship of Ariæus for the Greeks appeared to cool every day more and more. This change gave them some uneasiness. Several of the officers went to Clearchus and the other generals, and said to them, *What do we here any longer? Are we not sensible, that the king desires to see us all perish, that others may be terrified by our example? Perhaps he keeps us waiting here, till he re-assembles his dispersed troops, or sends to seize the passes in our way; for he will never suffer us to return into Greece to divulge our own glory and his shame.* Clearchus made answer to this discourse, that to depart without consulting the king, was to break with him, and to declare war by violating the treaty; that they should remain without a conductor in a strange country, where nobody would supply them with provisions; that Ariæus would abandon them; and that even their friends would become their enemies; that he did not know, but there might be other rivers to pass, but that, were the Euphrates the only one, they could not get over it, were the passage ever so little disputed. That if it were necessary to come to a battle, they should find themselves without cavalry against an enemy that had a very numerous and excellent body of horse; so that if they gained the victory, they could make no great advantage of it, and if they were overcome, they were utterly and irretrievably lost. *Besides, why should the king, who has so many other means to destroy us, engage his word only to violate it, and thereby render himself execrable in the sight of the gods and men?*

Tissaphernes, however, arrived with his troops, in order to return into his government, and they set forward all together under the conduct of that satrap, who supplied them with provisions. Ariæus with his troops encamped with the Barbarians, and the Greeks separately at some distance, which kept up a continual distrust amongst them. Besides which, there happened frequent quarrels for wood or forage, that augmented their aversion for each other. After three days' march, they arrived at the wall of

Media, which is a hundred feet high, twenty broad, and twenty leagues* in extent, all built with bricks, cemented with bitumen, like the walls of Babylon, from which it was not very distant at one of its extremities. When they had passed it, they marched eight leagues in two days, and came to the river Tigris, after having crossed two of its canals, cut expressly for watering the country. They then passed the Tigris† upon a bridge of twenty-seven boats, near Sitace, a very great and populous city. After four days' march, they arrived at another city, very opulent also, called Opis. They found there a bastard brother of Artaxerxes with a very considerable body of troops, which he was bringing from Susa and Ecbatana to his aid. He admired the fine order of the Greeks. From thence, having passed the deserts of Media, they came after a march of six days to a place called the lands of Parysatis; the revenues of which appertained to that princess. Tissaphernes, to insult the memory of her son Cyrus, so dearly beloved by her, gave up the villages to be plundered by the Greeks. Continuing their march through the desert on the one side of the Tigris, which they had on their left, they arrived at Cænæ, a very great and rich city, and from thence at the river Zabates.

The occasions of distrust increased every day between the Greeks and Barbarians. Clearchus thought it incumbent on him to come to an explanation once for all with Tissaphernes. He began with observing upon the sacred and inviolable nature of the treaties subsisting between them. *Can a man*, said he, *conscious of the guilt of perjury, be capable of living at ease. How would he shun the wrath of the gods, who are the witnesses of treaties, and escape their vengeance, whose power is universal?* He added afterwards many things to prove, that the Greeks were obliged by their own interest to continue faithful to him, and that, by renouncing his alliance, they must first inevitably renounce not only all religion, but reason and common sense. Tissaphernes seemed to relish this discourse, and spoke to him with all the appearance of the most perfect sincerity; insinuating, at the same time, that some persons had done him bad offices with him. *If you will bring your officers hither*, said he, *I will show you those who have wronged you by their representations.* He kept him to supper, and professed more friendship for him than ever.

The next day Clearchus proposed in the assembly, to go with the several commanders of the troops to Tissaphernes. He suspected Menon in particular, whom he knew to have had a secret conference with the satrap in the presence of Ariæus; besides which, they had already differed several times with each other.

* Twenty parasangas.

† The march of the Greeks and the rest of the army, from the day after the battle till the passing of the Tigris, abounds in the text of Xenophon, with very great obscurities, to explain which fully, would require a long dissertation. My plan does not permit me enter into such discussions, which I must therefore refer to those who are more able than myself.

Some objected, that it was not proper that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes, and that it was not consistent with prudence to rely implicitly upon the professions of a Barbarian. But Clearchus continued to insist upon his proposal, till it was agreed that the four other commanders, with twenty captains and about 200 soldiers, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp, where there was a market, should be sent along with him. When they came to the tent of Tissaphernes, the five commanders, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were suffered to enter, but the captains remained without at the door. Immediately, on a certain signal before agreed on, those within were seized, and the others put to the sword. Some Persian horse afterwards scoured the country, and killed all the Greeks they met, whether freemen or slaves. Clearchus, with the other generals, was sent to the king, who ordered their heads to be struck off. Xenophon describes with sufficient extent the characters of those officers.

Clearchus was valiant, bold, intrepid, and of a capacity for forming great enterprises. His courage was not rash, but directed by prudence; and he retained all the coolness of his temper and presence of mind in the midst of the greatest dangers. He loved the troops, and let them want for nothing. He knew how to make them obey him; but out of fear. His mien was awful and severe; his language rough; his punishments instant and rigorous: he gave way sometimes to passion, but presently came to himself, and always chastised with justice. His great maxim was, that nothing could be done in an army without severe discipline; and from him came the saying, that a soldier ought to fear his general more than the enemy. The troops esteemed his valour,* and did justice to his merit; but they were afraid of his temper, and did not love to serve under him. In a word, says Xenophon, the soldiers feared him as scholars do a severe pedagogue. We may say of him with Tacitus, that by an excess of severity he made, what had other wise been well done by him, unamiable; *Cupidine severitatis in his etiam, quæ rite faceret, acerbus.*†

Proxenus was of Bœotia. From his infancy he aspired at great things, and was industrious to make himself capable of them. He spared no means for the attainment of instruction, and was the disciple of Gorgias, the Leontine, a celebrated rhetorician, who sold his lectures at a very high price. When he found himself capable of commanding, and of doing good to his friends, as well as of being served by them, he entered into Cyrus's service with the view of advancing himself. He did not want ambition, but would take no other path to glory than that of virtue. He would have been a perfect captain, had he had to do with none but brave and disciplined men, and had it been only necessary to make him-

* Manebat admiratio viri et fama; sed oderant. *Tacit Histor* l. ii. c. 68.
† Tacit. Annal. c. lxxv.

self beloved. He was more apprehensive of being upon bad terms with his soldiers, than his soldiers with him. He thought it sufficient for a commander to praise good actions, without punishing bad ones; for which reason he was beloved by the worthy; but those of a different character abused his easiness. He died at thirty years of age.

Could the two great persons,* whose portrait we have here drawn after Xenophon, have moulded into one, something perfect might have been made of them; by retrenching their several defects, and retaining only their virtues; but it rarely happens, that the same man, as Tacitus† says of Agricola, behaves, according to the exigency of times and circumstances, sometimes with gentleness and sometimes with severity, without lessening his authority by the former, or the people's affection by the latter.

Menon was a Thessalian, avaricious and ambitious, but ambitious only to satiate his avarice, pursuing honour and estimation for the mere lucre of money. He courted the friendship of the great, and of persons in authority, that he might have it in his power to commit injustice and oppression with impunity. To obtain his ends, falsehood, fraud, perjury, cost him nothing; whilst sincerity and integrity of heart, were in his opinion merely weakness and stupidity. He loved nobody; and if he professed friendship, it was only to deceive. As others make their glory consist in religion, probity, and honour, he valued himself upon injustice, deceit, and treachery. He gained the favour of the great by false reports, whispering, and calumny: and that of the soldiery by licence and impunity. In fine, he endeavoured to render himself terrible by the mischief it was in his power to do, and imagined he favoured those to whom he did none.

I had thoughts of retrenching these characters, which interrupt the thread of the history. But as men, in all times, are the same, I thought retaining them would neither be useless nor disagreeable to the reader.

SECTION V.

Retreat of the 10,000 Greeks from the province of Babylon, as far as Trebisond.

The generals of the Greeks having been seized,‡ and the officers who attended them massacred, the troops were in the highest consternation. They were five or 600 leagues from Greece, surrounded with great rivers and hostile nations, without a guide or any supplies of provisions. In this state of general dejection, they could not think of taking either nourishment or repose. In the

* Egregium principatûs temperamentum, si, demptis utriusque vitiis solæ virtutes miscerentur. *Tacit. Histor.* l. ii. c. 5.

† Pro variis temporibus ac negotiis severus et comis—nec illi, quod est rarissimum, aut facilitas auctoritatem, aut severitas amorem, deminuit. *Tacit. in Agric.* c. ix.

‡ Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. iii. & iv.

middle of the night, Xenophon, a young Athenian, but of prudence and capacity superior to his years, went to some of the officers, and represented to them, that they had no time to lose; that it was of the utmost importance to prevent the bad designs of the enemy; that, however small their number, they would render themselves formidable, if they behaved with boldness and resolution; that valour and not multitude determines the success of arms; and that it was necessary above all things to nominate generals immediately; because an army without commanders is like a body without a soul. A council was immediately held, at which 100 officers were present; and Xenophon, being desired to speak, enforced the reasons at large, which he had at first but lightly touched upon; and by his advice commanders were appointed. These were, Timasion in the room of Clearchus, Xanthicles for Socrates, Cleanor for Agias, Philesius for Menon, and Xenophon for Proxenus.

Before the break of day they assembled the army. The generals made speeches to animate the troops, and Xenophon amongst the rest. *Fellow-soldiers*, said he, *the loss of so many brave men by vile treachery, and the being abandoned by our friends, is very deplorable: but we must not sink under our misfortunes; and if we cannot conquer, let us choose rather to perish gloriously, than to fall into the hands of Barbarians, who would inflict upon us the greatest miseries. Let us call to mind the glorious battles of Platæa, Thermopylæ, Salamis, and so many others, wherein our ancestors, though with a small number, have fought and defeated the innumerable armies of the Persians, and thereby rendered the name alone of Greek for ever formidable. It is to their invincible valour we owe the honour we possess, of acknowledging no masters upon earth but the gods, nor any happiness but what is consistent with liberty. Those gods, the avengers of perjury, and witnesses of the enemy's perfidy, will be favourable to us; and as they are attacked in the violation of treaties, and take pleasure in humbling the proud and exalting the low, they will also follow us to battle and combat for us. For the rest, fellow-soldiers, as we have no refuge but in victory, which must be our sole resource, and will make us ample amends for whatever it costs to attain it; I should believe, if it were your opinion, that in order to make a more expeditious and less difficult retreat, it would be very proper to rid ourselves of all the useless baggage, and to keep only what is absolutely necessary in our march.* All the soldiers that moment lifted up their hands to signify their approbation and consent to all that had been said, and without loss of time set fire to their tents and carriages; such of them as had too much equipage giving it to others who had too little, and destroying the rest.

It was resolved to march the army without tumult or violence, if their return was not opposed; but otherwise to open themselves a passage, sword in hand, through the enemy. They therefore began their march in the form of a great hollow square, with the baggage in the centre. Chirisophus the Lacedæmonian had the

vanguard; two of the oldest captains the right and left; and Timasion with Xenophon were posted in the rear as the youngest officers. The first day was distressing; because having neither horse nor slingers, they were extremely harassed by a detachment sent against them; but they provided against that inconvenience by following Xenophon's advice. They chose 200 men out of the Rhodians among the troops, whom they armed with slings, and augmented their pay for their encouragement. They could throw as far again as the Persians, because they discharged balls of lead, and the others made use only of large flints. They mounted also a squadron of fifty men upon the horses intended for the baggage, and supplied their places with other beasts of burden. By the means of this supply, a second detachment of the enemy were very severely handled.

After some days march, Tissaphernes appeared with all his forces. He contented himself at first with harassing the Greeks, who moved on continually. The latter observing the difficulty of retreating in a hollow square in the face of the enemy, from the unevenness of the ground, hedges, and other obstacles, which might oblige them to break it, changed their order of battle, and marched in two columns, with the little baggage they had in the space between them. They formed a body of reserve of 600 chosen men, whom they divided into six companies, and subdivided by fifties and tens, to facilitate their motions, according as occasion might require. When the columns came close to each other, they either remained in the rear, or filed off upon the flanks on both sides, to avoid disorder; and when they opened, they fell into the void space in the rear between the two columns. Upon any occasion of attack, they immediately ran where it was necessary. The Greeks stood several charges, but they were neither considerable, nor attended with much loss.

They arrived at the river Tigris. As its depth would not admit them to repass it without boats, they were obliged to cross the Carduchian mountains, because there was no other way; and the prisoners reported, that from thence they would enter Armenia, where they might pass the Tigris, at its source, and afterwards the Euphrates, not very distant from it. To gain those defiles before the enemy could seize them, it was thought proper to set forwards in the night, in order to arrive at the foot of the mountains by the break of day; which was done accordingly. Chirisophus continued at the head of the advanced guard, with the troops armed with missive weapons, besides his ordinary corps; and Xenophon in the rear, with only the heavy-armed soldiers, because at that time there was nothing to fear on that side. The inhabitants of the country had taken possession of several of the heights, from whence it was necessary to dislodge them, which could not be done without great danger and difficulty.

The officers, having held a council of war, were of opinion, that

it was proper to leave behind them all the beasts of burden not absolutely necessary, with all the slaves taken; because both the one and the other would retard their march too much in the great defiles they had to pass; besides which, it required a greater quantity of provisions to support them, and those who had the care of the beasts were useless in fight. That regulation was executed without delay, and they continued their march, sometimes fighting, sometimes halting. The passing of the mountains, which took up seven days, fatigued the troops exceedingly, and occasioned some loss; but at length they arrived at villages, where they found provisions in abundance, and rested some days, to recover the severe fatigues the army had undergone, in comparison with which all they had suffered in Persia was trivial.

But they found themselves soon after exposed to new danger. Almost at the foot of the mountains they came to a river 200 feet in breadth, called Centrites, which stopped their march. They had to defend themselves both against the enemy, who pursued them in the rear, and the Armenians, the soldiers of the country, who lined the opposite side of the river. They attempted in vain to pass it in a place where the water came up to their arm-pits, and were carried away by the rapidity of the current, which the weight of their arms made them unable to resist. By good fortune they discovered another place not so deep, where some soldiers had seen the people of the country pass. It required abundance of address, diligence, and valour, to keep off the enemy on both sides of them. The army however passed the river at length without much loss.

They marched afterwards with less interruption: passed the source of the Tigris, and arrived at the little river Teleboa, which is very beautiful, and has many villages on its banks. Here began the western Armenia; which was governed by Tiribasus, a satrap much beloved by the king, who had the honour to help him to mount on horseback when at the court:* he offered to let the army pass, and to suffer the soldiers to take all they wanted, upon condition that they should commit no ravages in their march; which proposal was accepted and ratified on each side. Tiribasus kept always a flying camp at a small distance from the army. There fell a great quantity of snow, which gave the troops some inconvenience; and they learned from a prisoner, that Tiribasus designed to attack the Greeks in their passage over the mountains, in a defile, through which they must necessarily march. They prevented him by seizing that post, after having put the enemy to flight. After some days' march through deserts, they passed the Euphrates near its source, not having the water above their waist.

They suffered exceedingly afterwards from a north wind, which blew in their faces, and obstructed respiration; so that it was thought necessary to sacrifice to the wind, upon which it seemed

* The French translator of Xenophon says, *he held the king's stirrup when he got on horseback*, without considering that the ancients used none.

to abate. They marched on in snow five or six feet deep, which killed several servants and beasts of burden, besides thirty soldiers. They made several fires during the night, for they found plenty of wood. All the next day, they continued their march through the snow, where many of them, worn down with hunger, which was followed with languor or fainting, continued lying upon the ground, through weakness and want of spirits. When something had been given them to eat, they found themselves relieved, and continued their march.

The enemy still pursued them. Many, overtaken by the night, remained on the road without fire or provisions, so that several died of their hardships, and the enemy who followed them took some baggage. Some soldiers were also left behind, that had lost their sight, and others their toes, by the snow. Against the first evil the remedy was to wear something black before the eyes; and against the other to keep the legs always in motion, and to bare the feet at night. Arriving at a more commodious place, they dispersed themselves into the neighbouring villages, to recover and repose after their fatigues. The houses were built under ground, with an opening at top, like a well, through which the descent was by a ladder: but there was another entrance for cattle. They found there sheep, cows, goats, poultry; with wheat, barley, and pulse: and for drink, there was beer, which was very strong, when not mingled with water, but was agreeable to those who were used to it. They drank this with a reed out of the vessels that held the beer, upon which they saw the barley swim. The master of the house, where Xenophon lay, received him very kindly, and even showed him where some wine was concealed; besides which he made him a present of several horses. He taught him also to fasten a kind of hurdles to their feet, and to do the same to the other beasts of burden, to prevent their sinking in the snow; without which they would have been up to the girth in it at every step. The army, after having rested seven days in these villages, resumed their route.

After a march of seven days, they arrived at the river Araxes, called also the Phasis, which is about 100 feet in breadth. Two days after they discovered the Phasians, the Chalybes, and the Taochians, who kept the pass of the mountains, to prevent their descending into the plain. They saw it was impossible to avoid coming to a battle with them, and resolved to engage the same day. Xenophon, who observed that the enemy defended only the ordinary passage, and that the mountain was three leagues in extent, proposed the sending of a detachment to take possession of the heights that commanded the enemy; which would not be difficult, as they might prevent all suspicion of their design by a march in the night, and by making a false attack by the main road, to amuse the barbarians. This was accordingly executed, the enemy put to flight, and the pass cleared.

They crossed the country of the Chalybes, who are the most valiant of all the barbarians in those parts. When they killed an enemy, they cut off his head, and carried it about in triumph, singing and dancing. They kept themselves close shut up in their cities, and when the army marched, fell suddenly upon the rear, after having carried every thing of value in the country into places of safety. After twelve or fifteen days' march, they arrived at a very high mountain, called Teches, from whence they descried the sea. The first who perceived it, raised great shouts of joy for a considerable time; which made Xenophon imagine that the vanguard was attacked, and go with haste to support it. As he approached nearer, the cry of *The sea! the sea!* was heard distinctly, and the alarm changed into joy and gaiety: but when they came to the top, nothing was heard but a confused noise of the whole army crying together, *The sea! the sea!* whilst they could not refrain from tears, nor from embracing their generals and officers. And then, without waiting for orders, they heaped up a pile of stones and erected a trophy with broken bucklers and shattered arms.

From thence they advanced to the mountains of Colchis, one of which was higher than the rest, and of that the people of the country had possessed themselves. The Greeks drew up in battle at the bottom of it to ascend, for the access was not impracticable. Xenophon did not judge it proper to march in line of battle, but by files: because the soldiers could not keep their ranks, from the inequality of the ground, that in some places was easy, and in others difficult, to climb, which might discourage them. That advice was approved, and the army formed according to it. The heavy-armed troops amounted to fourscore files, each consisting of about 100 men, with 1800 light-armed soldiers, divided into three bodies, one of which was posted on the right, another on the left, and a third in the centre. After having encouraged his troops, by representing to them that this was the last obstacle they had to surmount, and implored the assistance of the gods, the army began to ascend the hill. The enemy were not able to support their charge, and dispersed. They passed the mountain, and encamped in villages, where they found provisions in abundance.

A very strange accident happened there to the army, which put them in great consternation. For the soldiers, finding abundance of bee-hives in that place, and eating the honey, they were seized with violent vomiting and fluxes, attended with delirious fits; so that those who were least ill, seemed like drunken men, and the rest, either furiously mad or dying. The earth was strewed with their bodies as after a defeat; however, none of them died, and the distemper ceased the next day about the same time it had seized them. The third or fourth day the soldiers got up, but in the condition in which people are after taking a violent medicine.

Two days after, the army arrived near Trebisond, a Greek colony of Sinopians, situate upon the Euxine or Black Sea, in the province

of Colchis. Here they lay encamped for thirty days, and acquitted themselves of the vows they had made to Jupiter, Hercules, and the other deities, to obtain a happy return into their own country. They also celebrated the games of the horse and foot races, wrestling, boxing, the pancratium; the whole attended with the greatest joy and solemnity.

SECTION VI.

The Greeks, after having undergone excessive fatigues, and surmounted many dangers, arrive upon the sea-coast opposite to Byzantium. They pass the strait, and engage in the service of Seuthes, prince of Thrace. Xenophon afterwards repasses the sea with his troops, advances to Pagamus, and joins Thimbron, general of the Lacedæmonians, who was marching against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

After having offered sacrifices to the several divinities,* and celebrated the games, they deliberated upon the proper measures for their return into Greece. They concluded upon going thither by sea, and for that purpose Chirisophus offered to go to Anaxibius, the admiral of Sparta, who was his friend, in hopes of being able to obtain ships of him. He set out directly, and Xenophon regulated the order it was necessary to observe, and the precautions to be taken for the security of the camp, provisions, and forage. He believed it also proper to make sure of some vessels, besides those that were expected, and made some expeditions against the neighbouring people.

As Chirisophus did not return so soon as was expected, and provisions began to be wanting, it was resolved to proceed by land; because there was not a sufficient number of ships to transport the whole army; and those which the precaution of Xenophon had procured, were allotted to carry the women, the old and sick men, with all the unnecessary baggage. The army continued its march, and lay ten days at Cerasus,† where there was a general review of the troops, who were found to amount to 8,600 men, out of about 10,000; the rest having died in the retreat, of their wounds, fatigues, or diseases.

In the short time that the Greeks continued in these parts, several disputes arose, as well with the inhabitants of the country, as with some of the officers who were jealous of Xenophon's authority, and endeavoured to render him odious to the army. But his prudence and moderation put a stop to those disorders; having made the soldiers sensible, that their safety depended upon preserving union and a good understanding amongst themselves, and obedience to their generals.

From Cerasus they went to Cotyora, which is not very remote from it. They there deliberated again upon the proper measures

* Xenoph. l. vi.

† This city of Cerasus became famous for the cherry-trees which Lucullus first brought into Italy and which from thence have been dispersed all over the western world.

for their return. The inhabitants of the country represented the almost insuperable difficulties of going by land, from the defiles and rivers they had to pass, and offered to supply the Greeks with ships This seemed the best expedient, and the army embarked accordingly. They arrived the next day at Synope, a city of Paphlagonia, and a colony of the Milesians. Chirisophus repaired thither with galleys, but without money, though the troops expected to receive some. He assured them that the army should be paid as soon as they were out of the Euxine sea; and that their retreat was universally celebrated, and the subject of the discourse and admiration of all Greece.

The soldiers, finding themselves near enough to Greece, desired to make some booty before they arrived there, and with that view resolved to nominate a general with full authority; whereas, till then, all affairs were determined in the council of war by the plurality of voices. They cast their eyes upon Xenophon, and caused him to be desired to accept that office. He was not insensible to the honour of commanding in chief; but he foresaw the consequences, and desired time to consider. After having expressed his high sense of gratitude for an office so much to his honour, he represented, that, to avoid jealousy and division, the success of affairs, and the interest of the army, seemed to require that they should choose a Lacedæmonian for their general, as the Spartan state at that time was actually mistress of Greece, and in consideration of that choice, would be better disposed to support them. This reason was not relished, and they objected, that they were far from intending to depend servilely upon Sparta, or to submit to regulate their enterprises by the pleasure or dislike of that state; and pressed him again to accept the command. He was then obliged to explain himself plainly, and without evasion; and declared, that having consulted the gods by sacrifice upon the offer they made him, they had manifested their will by evident signs, from whence it appeared that they did not approve their choice. It was surprising to see the impression which the sole mention of the gods made upon the soldiers, otherwise very warm and tenacious; and who besides are commonly little affected with the motives of religion. Their great ardour abated immediately, and without making any reply, they proceeded to elect Chirisophus, though a Lacedæmonian, for their general.

His authority was of no long continuance. Discord, as Xenophon had foreseen, arose amongst the troops, who were angry that their general prevented their plundering the Grecian cities through which they passed. This disturbance was principally excited by the Peloponnesians, who composed one half of the army, and could not see Xenophon, an Athenian, in authority, without pain. Different measures were proposed; but nothing being concluded, the troops divided themselves into three bodies, of which the Achaians and Arcadians, that is, the Peloponnesians, were the principal amount.

ing to 4,500 heavy-armed foot, with Lycon and Callimachus for their generals. Chirisophus commanded another party of about 1400 men, besides 700 light-armed infantry. Xenophon had the third, almost the same in number, of which 300 were light-armed soldiers, with about 40 horse, which were all the cavalry of the army. The first having obtained ships from the people of Heraclea,* to whom they had sent to demand them, set out before the rest to make some booty, and made a descent in the port of Calpe. Chirisophus, who was sick, marched by land; but without quitting the coast. Xenophon landed at Heraclea, and entered into the heart of the country.

New divisions arose. The imprudence of the troops and their leaders had involved them in several difficulties, not without loss, from whence the address of Xenophon extricated them more than once. Being all reunited again, after various success, they arrived by land at Chrysopolis of Chalcedon, facing Byzantium, whither they repaired some days after, having passed the small arm of the sea which separates the two continents. They were upon the point of plundering that rich and powerful city, to revenge a fraud and injury which had been done them, and from the hope of enriching themselves once for all, when Xenophon made all possible haste thither. He admitted the justice of their revenge, but he made them sensible of the fatal consequences which would attend it. *After your plundering this city, and destroying the Lacedæmonians established in it, you will be deemed the mortal enemies of their republic, and of all their allies. Athens, my country, that had 400 galleys at sea and in the arsenals, when it took up arms against them, great sums of money in its treasury, a revenue of 1000 talents, and was in possession of all the isles of Greece, and of many cities in Europe and Asia, of which this was one, has nevertheless been reduced to yield to their power, and submit to their sway. And can you hope, who are but a handful of men, without generals, provisions, allies, or any resource, either from Tissaphernes, who has betrayed you, or the king of Persia, whom you have attempted to dethrone; can you hope, I say, in such condition to make head against the Lacedæmonians? Let us demand satisfaction from the Byzantines, and not avenge their fault by a much greater of our own, which must draw upon us inevitable ruin.* He was believed, and the affair accommodated.

From thence he led them to Salmydessa,† to serve Seuthes, prince of Thrace, who had before solicited him by his envoys, to bring troops to his aid, in order to his re-establishment in his father's dominions, of which his enemies had deprived him. He had made Xenophon great promises for himself and his troops, but when he had done him the service he wanted, he was so far from keeping his word, that he did not give him the pay agreed upon.

* A city of Pontus. † Xenoph. l. vii.

Xenophon keenly reproached him with this breach of faith; imputing his perfidy to his minister Heraclides, who thought to make his court to his master, by saving him a sum of money at the expense of justice, faith, and honesty; qualities which ought to be dearer than all others to a prince, as they contribute the most to his reputation, as well as to the success of affairs, and the security of a state. But that treacherous minister, who looked upon honour, probity, and justice, as mere chimeras, and that there was nothing real but the possession of much money, thought only of enriching himself by any means whatsoever, and robbed his master first with impunity, and all his subjects along with him. *However*, continues Xenophon, *every wise man, especially if vested with authority and command, ought to regard justice, probity, and the faith of engagements, as the most precious treasure he can possess; and as an assured resource, and an infallible support in all the events that can happen.* Heraclides was the more in the wrong for acting in this manner towards the troops, as he was a native of Greece, and not a Thracian; but avarice had extinguished all sense of honour in him.

Whilst the dispute between Seuthes and Xenophon was warmest, Charminus and Polynices arrived as ambassadors from Lacedæmon, and brought advice, that the republic had declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; that Thimbron had already embarked with troops, and promised a darick a month to every soldier, two to each officer, and four to the colonels, who should engage in the service. Xenophon accepted the offer; and having obtained from Seuthes, by the mediation of the ambassadors, part of the pay due to him, he went by sea to Lampsacus with the army, which amounted at that time to almost 6000 men. From thence he advanced to Pergamus, a city in the Troad. Having met near Parthenia, where ended the expedition of the Greeks, a great nobleman returning into Persia, he took him, his wife and children, with all his equipage, and by that means found himself in a condition to bestow great largesses upon the soldiers, and to make them a satisfactory amends for all the losses they had sustained. Thimbron at length arrived, who took upon him the command of the troops, and having joined them with his own, marched against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

Such was the event of Cyrus's expedition. Xenophon reckons,* from the first setting out of that prince's army from the city of Ephesus to their arrival where the battle was fought, 530 parasangas or leagues, and ninety-three days' march;† and in their return from the place of battle to Cotyora, a city upon the coast of the Euxine or Black sea, 620 parasangas or leagues, and 122 days' march. And adding both together, he says, the way, going and coming, was 1155 parasangas or leagues,‡ and 215 days

* Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 276. † Ibid. l. v. p. 355.
‡ I add, *five*, which are left out in the text, to make the total agree with the two parts.

march;* and that the whole time the army took to perform that journey, including the days of rest, was fifteen months.

It appears by this calculation, that the army of Cyrus marched daily, one day with another, almost six parasangas or leagues, in going,† and only five in their return. It was natural, that Cyrus, who desired to surprise his brother, should use all possible diligence for that purpose.

This retreat of the 10,000 Greeks has always passed amongst judges in the art of war, as I have already observed, for a perfect model in its kind, which has never had a parallel. Indeed, no enterprise could be formed with more valour and bravery, nor conducted with more prudence, nor executed with more success. Ten thousand men, five or six hundred leagues from their own country, who had lost their generals and best officers, and find themselves in the heart of the enemy's vast empire, undertake, in the sight of a victorious and numerous army, with the king at the head of it, to retire through the seat of his empire, and in a manner from the gates of his palace, and to traverse a vast extent of unknown countries, almost all in arms against them, without being dismayed by the prospect of the innumerable obstacles and dangers to which they were every moment exposed; the passage of rivers, of mountains, and defiles; open attacks, or secret ambuscades from the people upon their route; famine, almost inevitable in vast and desert regions; and above all, the treachery they had to fear from the troops, who seemed to be employed in escorting them, but in reality had orders to destroy them. For Artaxerxes, who was sensible how much the return of those Greeks into their country would cover him with disgrace, and discredit the majesty of the empire in the opinion of all nations, had left nothing undone to prevent it; and he desired their destruction, says Plutarch, more passionately than to conquer Cyrus himself, or to preserve his dominions. Those 10,000 men, however, notwithstanding so many obstacles, carried their point, and arrived, through a thousand dangers, victorious and triumphant in their own country. Antony, long after,‡ when pursued by the Parthians, almost in the same country, finding himself in like danger, cried out in admiration of their invincible valour, *Oh the retreat of the ten thousand!*

* Xenoph. l. vii. p. 427.

† The parasanga is a road measure peculiar to the Persians, and consists of thirty stadia. The stadium is a Grecian measure, and contains, according to the most received opinion, 125 geometrical paces; twenty of which, in consequence, are required to the common French league, which consists of 2500 paces. And this has been my rule hitherto, according to which the parasanga is a league and a half.

But I observe here a great difficulty. According to this calculation we should find, the ordinary days' marches of Cyrus, with an army of more than 100,000 men, would have been, one day with another, nine leagues, during so long a time, which, according to the judges in military affairs, is absolutely impossible. This is what has determined me to compute the parasanga at no more than a league. Several authors have remarked, and indeed it is not to be doubted, that the stadium, and all the other road measures of the ancients, have differed widely according to times and places, as they still do among us.

‡ Plut. in Anton. p. 937. Ὦ μύριοι.

And it was the good success of this famous retreat, which filled the people of Greece with contempt for Artaxerxes, by demonstrating to them, that gold, silver, luxury, voluptuousness, and a numerous seraglio of women, were the sole merit of the Great King; but that, as to the rest, his opulence and all his boasted power were only pride and vain ostentation. It was this prejudice, more universal than ever in Greece after this celebrated expedition, that gave birth to those bold enterprises of the Greeks, of which we shall soon treat, that made Artaxerxes tremble upon his throne, and brought the Persian empire to the very brink of destruction.

SECTION VII.

Consequences of Cyrus's death in the court of Artaxerxes. Cruelty and jealousy of Parysatis. Statira poisoned.

I return to what passed after the battle of Cunaxa, in the court of Artaxerxes.* As he believed that he had killed Cyrus with his own hand, and looked upon that action as the most glorious of his life, he desired that all the world should think the same; as it was wounding him in the most tender part, to dispute that honour, or endeavour to share it, with him. The Carian soldier, whom we mentioned before, not contented with the great presents the king had made him upon a different pretext, perpetually declared to all that would hear him, that none but himself had killed Cyrus, and that the king did him great injustice in depriving him of the glory due to him. The prince, upon being informed of that insolence, conceived a jealousy equally base and cruel, and had the weakness to cause him to be delivered to Parysatis, who had sworn the destruction of all those that had any share in the death of her son. Animated by a barbarous spirit of vengeance, she commanded the executioners to take that unfortunate wretch, and to make him suffer the most exquisite tortures during ten days; then after they had torn out his eyes, to pour melted brass into his ears, till he expired in that cruel agony; which was accordingly executed.

Mithridates, also, having boasted in an entertainment where he had heated his brain with wine, that it was he who gave Cyrus his mortal wound, paid very dear for that absurd and imprudent vanity. He was condemned to suffer the punishment of the troughs,† one of the most cruel that was ever invented, and after having languished in torment seventeen days, died at last in exquisite misery.

There only remained, for the final execution of Parysatis's project, and fully to satiate her vengeance, the punishment of the king's eunuch Mesabates, who, by his master's order, had cut off the head and hand of Cyrus. But as there was nothing to take hold of in his conduct, Parysatis laid this snare for him. She was a

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1013—1021.

† See the description of this torture, as before given in this volume.

woman of great address, had abundance of wit, and excelled in playing at a certain game with dice. After the war, she had been reconciled with the king, played often with him, was of all his parties, had an unbounded complaisance for him, and far from contradicting him in any thing, anticipated his desires, did not blush at indulging his passions, and even at supplying him with the means of gratifying them. But she took especial care never to lose sight of him, and to leave Statira as little alone with him as she could, desiring to gain an absolute aseendant over her son.

One day seeing the king entirely unemployed, and with no thoughts but of diverting himself, she proposed playing at dice with him for 1000 daricks,* to which he readily consented. She suffered him to win, and paid down the money. But affecting regret and vexation, she pressed him to begin again, and to play with her for a eunuch. The king, who suspected nothing, complied, and they agreed to except five of the favourite eunuchs on each side, that the winner should take their choice out of the rest, and the loser be bound to deliver him. Having made these conditions, they sat down to play. The queen was all attention to the game, and made use of all her skill and address in it; besides which the dice favoured her. She won, and chose Mesabates, for he was not one of those that had been excepted. As soon as she got him into her hands, before the king could have the least suspicion of the revenge she meditated, she delivered him to the executioners, and she commanded them to flay him alive, to lay him afterwards upon three cross bars,† and to stretch his skin before his eyes upon stakes prepared for that purpose; which was performed accordingly. When the king knew this, he was very sorry for it, and violently angry with his mother. But without giving herself any farther trouble about it, she told him with a smile, and in a jesting way, *Really, you are a great loser, and must be highly in the right, to be so much out of humour for a decrepit wretch of a eunuch, when I, who lost* 1000 *good daricks, and paid them down upon the spot, don't say a word, and am satisfied.*

All these cruelties seem to have been only essays and preparations for a greater crime which Parysatis meditated. She had long retained in her heart a violent hatred for queen Statira, marks of which she had suffered to escape her upon many occasions. She perceived plainly, that her influence with the king her son, was only the effect of his respect and consideration for her as his mother; whereas that for Statira was founded in love and confidence, which rendered that influence much more secure. Of what is not the jealousy of an ambitious woman capable! She resolved to rid herself, whatever it cost her, of so formidable a rival.

For the more certain attainment of her ends, she feigned a reconciliation with her daughter-in-law, and treated her with all the ex-

* The darick was worth ten livres.

† Plutarch explains this circumstance no farther.

terior marks of sincere friendship and real confidence. The two queens, appearing therefore to have forgotten their former suspicions and quarrels, lived upon good terms together, saw one another as before, and ate at each other's apartments. But as both of them well knew what reliance was to be placed upon the friendships and caresses of the court, especially amongst the women, they were neither of them the dupe of the other; and as the same fears always subsisted, they kept upon their guard, and never ate but of the same dishes and pieces. Could one believe it possible to deceive so attentive and cautious a vigilance? Parysatis one day, when her daughter-in-law was at table with her, took an extremely exquisite bird that had been served up, cut it in two parts, gave one half to Statira, and ate the other herself. Statira soon after was seized with sharp pains, and having quitted the table, died in the most horrible convulsions, not without inspiring the king with the most violent suspicions of his mother, of whose cruelty, and implacable and revengeful spirit, he was sufficiently sensible before. He made the strictest inquiry into the crime. All his mother's officers and domestics were seized and put to the torture; when Gygis, one of Parysatis's women, and the confidant of all her secrets, confessed the whole. She had caused one side of a knife to be rubbed with poison, so that Parysatis, having cut the bird in two, put the sound part into her own mouth directly, and gave Statira the other that was poisoned. Gygis was put to death after the manner that the Persians punished poisoners, which is thus: They lay their heads upon a great and very broad stone, and beat upon it with another until they are entirely crushed, and have no remains of their former figure. As for Parysatis, the king contented himself with confining her to Babylon, whither she demanded to retire, and told her, that he would never set his foot within it whilst she was there.

CHAPTER III.

SECT. I. The Grecian cities of Ionia implore aid of the Lacedæmonians against Artaxerxes. Rare prudence of a lady continued in her husband's government after his death. Agesilaus elected king of Sparta. His character.

The cities of Ionia,* that had followed the party of Cyrus, apprehending the resentment of Tissaphernes, had applied to the Lacedæmonians as the deliverers of Greece, requesting that they would support them in the possession of the liberty they enjoyed, and prevent their country from being ravaged. We have already said that Thimbron was sent thither, to whose troops Xenophon had
A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399. joined his, after their return from Persia. Thimbron was soon recalled upon some discontent, and had for

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 479- 487.

his successor Dercyllidas, surnamed Sisyphus, from his industry in finding resources, and his ability in inventing machines of war. He took upon him the command of the army at Ephesus. When he arrived there, he was apprised, that there was a dispute between the two satraps, who commanded in the country.

The provinces of the Persian monarchy, of which several, situate at the extremity of the empire, required too much application to be governed immediately by the prince, were confided to the care of the great lords commonly called satraps. They had each of them in their government an almost sovereign authority, and were, properly speaking, not unlike the viceroys we see in our days in some neighbouring states. They were supplied with a number of troops sufficient for the defence of the country. They appointed all officers, disposed of the governments of cities, and were charged with levying and remitting the tributes to the prince. They had power to raise troops, to treat with neighbouring states, and even with the generals of the enemy; in a word, to do every thing necessary to maintain good order and tranquillity in their governments. They were independent of one another; and though they served the same master, and it was their duty to concur to the same ends, nevertheless, each being more interested in the particular advantage of his own province than in the general good of the empire, they often differed amongst themselves, formed opposite designs, refused aid to their colleagues in necessity, and sometimes even acted entirely against them. The remoteness of the court, and the absence of the prince, gave room for these dissensions; and perhaps a secret policy contributed to keep them up, to elude or prevent conspiracies, which too good an understanding amongst the governors might have excited.

Dercyllidas having heard, therefore, that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were at variance, made a truce with the former, that he might not have them both upon his hands at the same time, entered Pharnabazus's province, and advanced as far as Æolia.

Zenis, the Dardanian, had governed that province under that satrap's authority; and as after his death it was to have been given to another, Mania, his widow, went to Pharnabazus with troops and presents, and told him, that having been the wife of a man who had rendered him great services, she desired him not to deprive her of her husband's reward; that she would serve him with the same zeal and fidelity; and that, if she failed in either, he was always at liberty to take her government from her. She was continued in it by this means, and acquitted herself with all the judgment and ability that could have been expected from the most consummate master in the art of ruling. To the ordinary tributes which her husband had paid, she added presents of extraordinary magnificence; and when Pharnabazus came into her province, she entertained him more splendidly than any of the other governors. She was not contented with the conservation of the cities committed to her

care, she made new conquests, and took Larissa,* Amaxita, and Colona.

Hence we may observe, that prudence, good sense, and courage, are of all sexes. She was present in all expeditions in a chariot, and in person decreed rewards and punishments. None of the neighbouring provinces had a finer army than hers, in which she had a great number of Greek soldiers in her pay. She even attended Pharnabazus in all his enterprizes, and was of no common support to him. So that the satrap, who knew all the value of so extraordinary a merit, did more honour to this lady than to all the other governors. He even admitted her into his council, and treated her with such a distinction as might have excited jealousy, if the modesty and affability of that lady had not prevented bad effects, by throwing in a manner a veil over all her perfections, which softened their lustre, and let them only occasionally appear as objects of admiration.

She had no enemies but in her own family. Midias, her son-in-law, stung with the reproach of suffering a woman to command in his place, and abusing the entire confidence she reposed in him, which gave him access to her at all times, strangled her with her son. After her death, he seized two fortresses, wherein she had secured her treasures; the other cities declared against him. He did not long enjoy the fruits of his crime. Dercyllidas happily arrived at this juncture. All the fortresses of Æolia, either voluntarily or by force, surrendered to him, and Midias was deprived of the possessions he had so unjustly acquired. The Lacedæmonian general having granted Pharnabazus a truce, took up his winter-quarters in Bithynia, to avoid being chargeable to his allies.

A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C. 393. The next year,† being continued in the command, he crossed over into Thrace, and arrived in the Chersonesus. He knew that the deputies of the country had been at Sparta, to represent the necessity of fortifying the isthmus with a good wall, against the frequent incursions of the Barbarians, which prevented the cultivation of the lands. Having measured the space, which is more than a league in breadth, he distributed the work among the soldiers, and the wall was finished in the autumn of the same year. Within this space were enclosed eleven cities, several ports, a great number of arable lands, and plantations, with pastures of all kinds. The work being finished, he returned into Asia, where he reviewed the cities, and found them all in good condition.

Conon the Athenian,‡ after losing the battle of Ægospotamos, having condemned himself to a voluntary banishment, continued in the isle of Cyprus, with king Evagoras, not only for the safety of his person, but also in expectation of a change of affairs; like one, says Plutarch, who waits the return of the tide before he embarks. He had always in view the re-establishment of the

* From the Mysians and Pisidians. † Xenoph. p. 487, 488. ‡ Plut. in Artax. p. 1021.

Athenian power, to which his defeat had given a mortal wound: and full of fidelity and zeal for his country, though little favourable to him, perpetually meditated the means of raising it from its ruins, and restoring it to its ancient splendour.

This Athenian general, knowing that, in order to succeed in his views, he had occasion for a powerful support, wrote to Artaxerxes to explain his projects to him, and ordered the person who carried his letter to apply to Ctesias, who would give it into the king's own hands. It was accordingly delivered to that physician, who, it is said, though he did not approve the contents of it, added to what Conon had written, *that he desired the king would send Ctesias to him, being a person very capable of doing him service, especially in maritime affairs.* Pharnabazus,* in concert with Conon, was gone to court to complain against the conduct of Tissaphernes, as too avowedly in favour of the Lacedæmonians. At the urgent solicitations of Pharnabazus, the king ordered 500 talents† to be paid to him for the equipment of a fleet, with instructions to give Conon the command of it. He sent Ctesias into Greece, who, after having visited Cnidos, his native country, went to Sparta.

This Ctesias had at first been in the service of Cyrus,‡ whom he had followed in his expedition. He was taken prisoner in the battle wherein Cyrus was killed, and was made use of to dress the wounds Artaxerxes had received, of which he acquitted himself so well, that the king retained him in his service, and made him his first physician. He passed several years in his service in that quality. Whilst he was there, the Greeks, in all their business at the court, applied themselves to him; as Conon did on the present occasion. His long residence in Persia, and at the court, had given him the necessary time and means for his information in the history of the country, which he wrote in three-and-twenty books. The first six contained the history of the Assyrians and Babylonians, from Ninus and Semiramis, down to Cyrus. The other seventeen treated of the Persian affairs from the beginning of Cyrus's reign to the third year of the 95th Olympiad, which agrees with the 398th year before Jesus Christ. He wrote also a history of India. Photius has given us several extracts of both these histories, and these extracts are all that remain of the works of Ctesias. He often contradicts Herodotus, and differs sometimes also from Xenophon. He was not much esteemed by the ancients, who speak of him as of a very vain man, whose veracity is not to be relied on, and who has inserted fables, and sometimes even lies, in his history.

A. M. 3607. Ant. J. C. 397. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,§ though secretly each other's enemies, had upon the king's orders united their troops, to oppose the enterprises of Dercyllidas, who had

* Diod. l. xiv. p. 207. Justin. l. vi. c. 1. † 500,000 crowns, or about 112,000l. sterling. ‡ Strab. l. xiv. p. 656. Plut. in Artax. p. 1014—1017—1020. Diod. . xiv p. 273. Arist. de Hist. Anim. l. viii. c. 28. Phot. Cod. LXII. § Xenoph. Hist. Græc. ¶ ill. p. 489, 490. Diod. i. xiv. p. 267.

marched into Caria. They had reduced him to post himself so disadvantageously, that he must inevitably have perished, had they charged him immediately, without giving him time to look about him. Pharnabazus was of this opinion; but Tissaphernes, dreading the valour of the Greeks who had followed Cyrus, which he had experienced, and whom he conceived all the others resembled, proposed an interview, which was accepted. Dercyllidas having demanded, that the Grecian cities should continue free, and Tissaphernes, that the army and generals of Lacedæmon should retire they made a truce, till the answers of their respective masters should be known.

Whilst these things were passing in Asia,* the Lacedæmonians resolved to chastise the insolence of the people of Elis, who, not content with having entered into an alliance with their enemies in the Peloponnesian war, prevented their disputing the prizes in the Olympic games. Upon pretence of the non-payment of a fine by Sparta, they had insulted one of their citizens during the games, and hindered Agis from sacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympius. That king was charged with this expedition, which did not terminate till the third year after. He could have taken their city Olympia, which had no works, but contented himself with plundering the suburbs, and the places for the exercises, which were very fine. They demanded peace, which was granted, and were suffered to retain the superintendency of the temple of Jupiter Olympius, to which they had not much right, but were more worthy of that honour than those who disputed it with them.

Agis on his return fell sick,† and died upon arriving at Sparta. Almost divine honours were paid to his memory; and after the expiration of some days, according to custom, Leotychides and Agesilaus, one the son and the other the brother of the deceased, disputed the crown. The latter maintained, that his competitor was not the son of Agis, and supported his assertion by the confession of the queen herself, who knew best, and who had often, as well as her husband, acknowledged as much. In fact, there was a current report, that she had him by Alcibiades,‡ as has been related in its place, and that the Athenian general had corrupted her by a present of 1000 daricks.§ Agis protested the contrary at his death. Leotychides having thrown himself at his feet all bathed in tears, he could not refuse the favour he implored of him, and owned him for his son before all that were present.

Most of the Spartans, charmed with the virtue and great merit of Agesilaus, and deeming it an extraordinary advantage to have a person for their king, who had been educated among them, and had passed like them through all the rigour of the Spartan education, supported him with their whole power. An ancient oracle, that advised Sparta to beware of *a lame reign*, was urged against him.

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 492. † Xenoph. p. 493. Plut. in Lys. p. 445. In Agesil. p. 597. ‡ Athen. l. xii. p. 534. § 1000 pistoles.

Lysander only made a jest of it, and turned its sense against Leotychides himself; endeavouring to prove, that as a bastard, he was the lame king whom the oracle intended to caution them against. Agesilaus, as well by his own great qualities as the powerful support of Lysander, carried it against his nephew, and was declared king.

As by the laws the kingdom had devolved to Agis, his brother Agesilaus, who seemed to be destined to pass his life as a private person, had been educated like other children in the Spartan discipline, which as to the mode of life was very rough, and full of laborious exercise, but taught youth obedience perfectly well.* The law dispensed with this education only to such children as were designed for the throne. Agesilaus therefore had this peculiar advantage, that he did not arrive at commanding, till he had first learned perfectly well how to obey. From thence it was, that of all the kings of Sparta, he best knew how to make his subjects love and esteem him,† because that prince, to the great qualities with which nature had endowed him for command and sovereignty, had united by his education the advantage of being humane and popular.

It is surprising that Sparta, a city so renowned in point of education and policy, should have conceived it proper to abate any thing of its severity and discipline in favour of the princes who were to reign; they having most need of being early habituated to the yoke of obedience, in order to their being the better qualified to command.

Plutarch‡ observes, that from his infancy Agesilaus was remarkable for uniting qualities in himself, which are generally incompatible; a vivacity of temper, a vehemence, a resolution invincible in appearance, an ardent passion for being first and surpassing all others, with a gentleness, submission, and docility that complied at a single word, and made him infinitely sensible of the slightest reprimand, so that every thing might be obtained of him from mouves of honour, but nothing by fear or violence.

He was lame, but that defect was covered by the gracefulness of his person, and still more by the gaiety with which he supported and rallied it first himself. It may even be said, that this infirmity of his body set his valour and passion for glory in a stronger light: there being no labour nor enterprise, however difficult, that he would refuse upon account of that inconvenience.

Praise,§ without any air of truth and sincerity, was so far from

* Hence it was, that the poet Simonides called Sparta *the tamer of men*, δαμασίμβροτον, as that of the Grecian cities which rendered its inhabitants by good habits the most active and vigorous, and at the same time the most obedient to the laws, of any: ὡς μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν τοὺς πολίτας τοῖς νομοῖς πειθομένους καὶ χειροήθεις ποιοῦσαν.

† Τῷ φύσει ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ βασιλικῷ προσπεπσάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ δημότικον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ‡ In Agesil. 596. § Plut. in Moral. p. 55.

giving him pleasure, that it offended him, and was never received by him as such, but when it came from the mouths of those, who upon other occasions had represented his failings to him with freedom. He would never suffer his picture to be drawn during his life, and even when dying, expressly forbade any image to be made of him, either in colours or relievo. His reason was,* that his great actions, if he had done any, would supply the place of monuments; without which, all the statues in the world would do him no manner of honour. We only know, that he was of small stature, which the Spartans did not like in their kings; and Theophrastus affirms, that the Ephori laid a fine upon their king Archidamus, the father of him we speak of, for having espoused a very little woman: *For*, said they, *she'll give us puppets instead of kings.*†

It has been remarked,‡ that Agesilaus, in his way of living with the Spartans, behaved better with regard to his enemies than his friends; for he never did the least wrong to the former, and often violated justice in favour of the latter. He would have been ashamed not to have honoured and rewarded his enemies, when their actions deserved it; and was not able to reprove his friends when they committed faults. He would even support them when they were in the wrong,§ and upon such occasions looked upon zeal for justice as a vain pretence to cover the refusal of serving them. And in proof of this, a short letter is cited, written by him to a judge in recommendation of a friend; the words are: *If Nicias be not guilty, acquit him for his innocence; if he be, acquit him for my sake; but however it be, acquit him.*

It is understanding the rights and privileges of friendship very ill, to be capable of rendering it in this manner the accomplice of crimes, and the protectress of bad actions. The fundamental law of friendship, says Cicero, is never to ask of, or grant any thing to friends that is not consistent with justice and honour. *Hæc prima lex in amicitiâ sanciatur; ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati.*‖

Agesilaus was not so delicate in this point, at least in the beginning, and omitted no occasion of gratifying his friends, and even his enemies. By this officious and obliging conduct, supported by his extraordinary merit, he acquired great credit, and almost absolute power in the city, which ran so high as to render him suspected by his country. The Ephori, to prevent its effects, and give a check to his ambition, laid a fine upon him; alleging as their sole reason,¶ that he attached the hearts of the citizens to himself alone, which were the right of the republic, and ought not to be possessed but in common.

When he was declared king, he was put in possession of the whole

* Plut. in Moral. p. 191.
† Οὐ γὰρ βασιλεῖς, ἔφασαν, ἄμμιν, ἀλλὰ βασιλείδια γεννάσει.
‡ Plut. in Agesil. p. 598. § Ibid. 603. ‖ De amicit. n. 40.
¶ Ὅτι τοὺς κοινοὺς πολίτας, ἰδίους κτᾶται.

estate of his brother Agis, of which Leotychides was deprived as a bastard. But seeing the relations of that prince, on the side of his mother Lampito, were all very poor, though persons of much worth, he divided the whole inheritance with them, and by that act of generosity acquired great reputation, and the good will of all the world, instead of the envy and hatred which he might have drawn upon himself by the inheritance. These sort of sacrifices are glorious, though rare, and can never be sufficiently esteemed.

Never was king of Sparta so powerful as Agesilaus; and it was only, as Xenophon says, by obeying his country in every thing, that he acquired so great an authority; which seems a kind of paradox thus explained by Plutarch. The greatest power was vested at that time in the Ephori and senate. The office of the Ephori subsisted only one year; they were instituted to limit the too great power of the kings, and to serve as a barrier against it, as we have observed elsewhere. For this reason the kings of Sparta, from their earliest establishment, had always retained a kind of hereditary aversion for them, and continually opposed their measures Agesilaus, took a quite contrary method. Instead of being perpetually at war with them, and clashing upon all occasions with their measures, he made it his business to cultivate their good opinion, treated them always with the utmost deference and regard, never entered upon the least enterprise, without having first communicated it to them, and upon their summons quitted every thing, and repaired to the senate with the utmost promptitude and resignation. Whenever he set upon his throne to administer justice, if the Ephori entered, he never failed to rise up to do them honour. By all these instances of respect, he seemed to add new dignity to their office, whilst in reality he augmented his own power, without its being observed, and added to the sovereignty a grandeur by so much the more solid and permanent, as it was the effect of the people's good will and esteem for him. The greatest of the Roman emperors, as Augustus, Trajan, and Marcus Antonius, were convinced, that the utmost a prince could do to honour and exalt the dignity of the principal magistrates, was only adding to his own power, and strengthening his authority, which neither should, nor can be founded in any thing but justice.

Such was Agesilaus, of whom much will be said hereafter, and whose character it was therefore necessary to develope.

SECTION II.

Agesilaus sets out for Asia. Lysander falls out with him, and returns to Sparta. His ambitious designs to alter the succession to the throne.

A. M. 3608. Ant. J. C. 396. Agesilaus had scarce ascended the throne,* when accounts came from Asia that the king of Persia was

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 495, 496. Id. de Agisil. p. 652. Plut. in Agesil. p. 598, and in Lysand. p. 446.

fitting out a great fleet in Phœnicia, with intent to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the empire of the sea. Conon's letters, seconded by the remonstrances of Pharnabazus, who had in concert represented to Artaxerxes the power of Sparta as formidable, had made a strong impression upon that prince. From that time he had it seriously in his thoughts to humble that proud republic, by raising up its rival, and by that means re-establishing the ancient balance between them, which could alone assure his safety, by keeping them perpetually employed against each other, and thereby prevented from uniting their forces against him.

Lysander, who desired to be sent into Asia, in order to re-establish his creatures and friends in the government of the cities, from which Sparta had removed them, strongly inclined Agesilaus to take upon himself the charge of the war, and to anticipate the Barbarian king, by attacking him at a great distance from Greece, before he should have finished his preparations. The republic having made this proposal to him, he could not refuse it, and charged himself with the expedition against Artaxerxes, upon condition that thirty Spartan captains should be granted him, to assist him and compose his council, with 2000 new citizens to be chosen out of the helots who had been lately made freemen, and 600 troops of the allies, which was immediately resolved. Lysander was placed at the head of the thirty Spartans, not only on account of his great reputation, and the authority he had acquired, but for the particular friendship between him and Agesilaus, who was indebted to him for the throne, as well as for the honour which had been lately conferred upon him of being elected generalissimo.

The glorious return of the Greeks who had followed Cyrus, whom the whole power of Persia had not been able to prevent from retreating into their own country, had inspired all Greece with a wonderful confidence in her own strength, and a supreme contempt for the Barbarians. In this disposition of the public mind, the Lacedæmonians conceived it would be a reproach to them, not to take advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for delivering the Greeks in Asia from their subjection to those Barbarians, and for putting an end to the outrages and violences with which they were continually oppressing them. They had already attempted this by their generals Thimbron and Dercyllidas; but all their endeavours having hitherto proved ineffectual, they referred the conduct of this war to the care of Agesilaus. He promised them either to conclude a glorious peace with the Persians, or to employ them so effectually, as should leave them neither leisure nor inclination to carry the war into Greece. The king had great views, and thought of no less than attacking Artaxerxes in Persia itself.

When he arrived at Ephesus,* Tissaphernes sent to demand what reason had induced him to come into Asia, and why he had

* Xenoph. p. 496 & 652.

taken up arms. He replied, that he came to aid the Greeks who inhabited there, and to re-establish them in their ancient liberty. The satrap, who was not yet prepared, made use of art in the place of force, and assured him that his master would give the Grecian cities of Asia their liberty, provided he committed no acts of hostility till the return of the couriers. Agesilaus agreed, and the truce was sworn to on both sides. Tissaphernes, who laid no great stress upon an oath, took advantage of this delay to assemble troops on all sides. The Lacedæmonian general was apprised of it, but however kept his word; being convinced, that in affairs of state the breach of faith can have but a very short and precarious success; whereas a reputation established upon inviolable fidelity in the observance of engagements, which even the perfidy of other contracting parties has not power to alter, will establish a credit and confidence equally useful and glorious. In fact, Xenophon remarks, that this religious observation of treaties gained him the universal esteem and opinion of the cities; whilst the contrary conduct of Tissaphernes entirely lost him their favour.

A. M. 3609. Ant. J. C. 395. Agesilaus made use of this interval in acquiring an exact knowledge of the state of the cities, and in making suitable regulations. He found great disorder every where, their government being neither democratical, as under the Athenians, nor aristocratical, as Lysander had established it. The people of the country had had no communication with Agesilaus,* nor had ever known him; for which reason they made no court to him, conceiving, that he had the title of general for form sake only, and that the whole power was really vested in Lysander. As no governor had ever done so much good to his friends or hurt to his enemies, it is not wonderful that he was so much beloved by the one and feared by the other. All therefore were eager to pay their homage to him, were every day in crowds at his door, and made his train very numerous when he went abroad; whilst Agesilaus remained almost alone. Such a conduct could not fail of offending a general and king extremely sensible and delicate in what regarded his authority, though otherwise not jealous of any one's merit, but, on the contrary, much inclined to distinguish it with his favour. He did not dissemble his disgust. He no longer paid regard to Lysander's recommendations, and ceased to employ him himself. Lysander presently perceived this alteration towards him. He discontinued his applications for his friends to the king, desired them not to visit him any more, nor attach themselves to him but to address themselves directly to the king, to cultivate the favour of those who in the present times had power to serve and advance their creatures. The greatest part of them gave over importuning him with their affairs, but did not cease to pay their court to him. On the contrary, they were only more assiduous than

* Plut. in Agesil. p 599, 600 In Lysand. p. 446, 447.

ever about his person, attended him in throngs when he took the air abroad, and regularly assisted at all his exercises. Lysander, naturally vain, and long accustomed to the homage and submission that attended on absolute power, did not take sufficient care to remove the busy crowd from his person, that continually made their addresses to him with more application than ever.

This ridiculous affectation of authority and grandeur grew still more and more offensive to Agesilaus, and seemed as if intended to insult him. He resented it so highly, that having given the most considerable commands and best governments to private officers, he appointed Lysander commissary of the stores, and distributor of provisions; and afterwards, to insult and deride the Ionians, he told them, *that they might now go and consult his master-butcher.*

Lysander then thought it incumbent upon him to speak, and to come to an explanation with him. Their conversation was brief and laconic. *Certainly, my lord*, said Lysander, *you very well know how to depress your friends.—Yes, when they would set themselves above me; but when they study to exalt my dignity, I know also how to let them share it.—But perhaps, my lord,* replied Lysander, *I have been injured by false reports, and things I never did have been imputed to me. I must beg, therefore, if it be only upon account of the strangers, who have all of them their eyes upon us, that you should give me an employment in your army, wherein you shall think me least capable of displeasing, and most of serving you effectually.*

The result of this conversation was, that Agesilaus gave him the lieutenancy of the Hellespont. In this employment he retained all his resentment, without however neglecting any part of his duty, or omitting any step that might conduce to the success of affairs. Some short time after he returned to Sparta, without any marks of honour or distinction, extremely incensed against Agesilaus, and trusting to make him feel his resentment very sensibly.

It must be allowed that Lysander's conduct, as we have here represented it, denotes a vanity and narrowness of mind on his side, highly unworthy of his reputation. Perhaps Agesilaus carried too far his sensibility and delicacy on the point of honour, and was a little too severe upon a friend and benefactor, whom a secret reproach, attended with frankness and expressions of kindness, might have reclaimed to his duty. But, brilliant as Lysander's merit, and considerable as the services he had rendered Agesilaus, might be, they could not all of them give him a right, not only to an equality with his king and general, but to the superiority he affected, which in some measure tended to make the other insignificant. He ought to have remembered, that it is never allowable for an inferior to forget himself, and to exceed the bounds of a just subordination.

Upon his return to Sparta* he had it seriously in his thoughts to

* Plut. in Lysand. p. 417, 418. Diod. l. xiv. p. 244, 245.

execute a project, which he had many years revolved in his mind. At Sparta there were only two families, or rather branches, of the posterity of Hercules, who had a right to the throne. When Lysander had attained to that high degree of power which his great actions had acquired him, he began to see with pain a city whose glory had been so much augmented by his exploits, under the government of princes to whom he was inferior neither in valour nor birth; for he was descended, as well as themselves, from Hercules. He therefore sought means to deprive those two houses of the sole succession to the crown, and to extend that right to all the other branches of the Heraclidæ, and even, according to some, to all the natives of Sparta; flattering himself, that if his design took effect, no Spartan could be capable of disputing that honour with him, and that he should have the preference over all others.

This ambitious project of Lysander shows, that the greatest captains are often those from whom a republic has most to apprehend. Those haughty, valiant spirits, accustomed to absolute power in armies, bring back with victory a daring loftiness of mind, always to be dreaded in a free state. Sparta, in giving Lysander unlimited power, and leaving it for so many years in his hands, did not sufficiently consider, that nothing is more dangerous than to confide to persons of superior merit and abilities employments which confer supreme authority, which naturally exposes them to the temptation of rendering themselves independent, and retaining in their own hands absolute power. Lysander was not proof against it, and practised secretly to open himself a way to the throne.

The undertaking was bold, and required long preparations. He thought it impossible to succeed without he could first, through fear of the divinity and the terrors of superstition, amaze and subdue the citizens into a more easy disposition to receive what he wanted to have them understand; for he knew that at Sparta, as well as throughout all Greece, nothing of the least importance was determined, without the oracles being previously consulted. He strove by great presents to influence the priests and priestesses of Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon, though ineffectually at that time; and the latter even sent ambassadors to Sparta, to accuse him of impiety and sacrilege; but he extricated himself from that difficulty by his credit and address.

It was necessary to set other engines at work. A woman in the kingdom of Pontus, affirming that she was with child by Apollo, had been delivered some years before of a son, to whom the name of Silenus was given, and the greatest persons of that nation had contended with eagerness for the honour of nursing and educating him. Lysander, taking this wondrous birth for the commencement, and in a manner the groundwork, of the plot he was meditating, supplied the rest himself, by employing a good number of persons, and those of no inconsiderable station, to spread abroad, by way of prologue to the piece, the miraculous birth of this infant; and,

as they did this without the appearance of any affectation, people were disposed to believe it. This being done, they brought certain rumours from Delphi to Sparta, which were industriously spread abroad every where, that the priests of the temple had in their custody some books of very ancient oracles, which they kept concealed from all the world, and of which it was not permitted, either for them or any other persons whatsoever, to have any knowledge; and that only a son of Apollo, who was to come in process of time, after having given undoubted proofs of his birth to those who had the books in their keeping, was to take and carry them away.

All this being well arranged, Silenus was to present himself to the priests, and to demand those oracles as the son of Apollo; and the priests, who were in the secret, as actors well prepared and fully instructed in their parts, were on their side to make the most exact and circumstantial inquiry into every thing, not without affecting great difficulty, and asking endless questions for the full proof of his birth. At length, as absolutely convinced that this Silenus was the real son of Apollo, they were to produce the books, and deliver them to him; after which, this son of Apollo was to read the prophecies contained in them, in the presence of all the world; and particularly that for which the whole contrivance had been fabricated. The purport of this prediction was, *That it was more expedient and advantageous for the Spartans to elect no king for the future, but the most worthy of their citizens.* Lysander, in consequence was to mount the tribunal, to harangue the citizens, and induce them to make this alteration. Cleon of Halicarnassus, a celebrated rhetorician, had composed a very eloquent discourse for him upon the subject, which he had got by heart.

Silenus, when grown up, having repaired to Greece, in order to play his part, Lysander had the mortification to see his piece miscarry, by the timidity and desertion of one of his principal actors, who broke his word, and disappeared at the very instant it was to have been performed. Though this intrigue had been carried on a great while, it was transacted with so much secrecy to the very time that it was to have made its appearance, that nothing of it was known during the life of Lysander. How it came to light after his death, we shall soon relate, but must at present return to Tissaphernes.

SECTION III.

Expedition of Agesilaus in Asia. Disgrace and death of Tissaphernes. Sparta gives Agesilaus the command of its armies, by sea and land. He deputes Pisander to command the fleet. Interview of Agesilaus and Pharnabazus.

When Tissaphernes* had received the troops sent to him by the king, and drawn together all his forces, he sent to command Agesi-

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 497—502. Idem de Agesil. p. 652—656. Plut. in Agesil. p. 600.

him to retire out of Asia, and declared war against him in case of a refusal. His officers were all alarmed, not believing him in a condition to oppose the great army of the Persian king. For himself, he heard Tissaphernes's heralds with a gay and easy countenance, and bade them tell their master, that he was under a very great obligation to him *for having made the gods, by his perjury, the enemies of Persia, and the friends of Greece.* He promised himself great things from this expedition, and would have thought it an exceeding disgrace for him, that 10,000 Greeks, under the command of Xenophon, should have passed through the heart of Asia to the Grecian sea, and beaten the king of Persia as often as he appeared against them; and that he who commanded the Lacedæmonians, whose empire extended all over Greece, by sea and land, should not execute some brilliant exploit worthy of remembrance.

At first, therefore, to take vengeance for the perfidy of Tissaphernes by a just and allowable deceit, he made a feint of marching his army into Caria, the residence of that satrap; and as soon as the Barbarian had caused all his troops to march that way, he turned short, and fell upon Phrygia, where he took many towns, and amassed immense treasures, which he distributed among the officers and soldiers; letting his friends see, says Plutarch, that to break a treaty and violate an oath, is to despise the gods themselves; and that, on the contrary, to deceive an enemy by the stratagems of war, is not only just and glorious, but a sensible delight attended with the greatest advantages.

The spring being come, he assembled all his forces at Ephesus, and to exercise his soldiers, he proposed prizes both for the horse and foot. This small inducement set every thing in motion. The place for exercises was perpetually full of all kinds of troops, and the city of Ephesus seemed only a palæstra, and a school of war. The whole market-place was filled with horses and arms, and the shops with different kinds of military equipages. Agesilaus was seen returning from the exercises, followed by a crowd of officers and soldiers, all of them crowned with wreaths, which they were going to deposit in the temple of Diana, to the great admiration and delight of every one. For, says Xenophon, where piety and discipline are seen to flourish, the best hopes must be conceived.

To give his soldiers new valour by inspiring them with contempt for their enemies, he made use of this contrivance. He one day ordered the commissaries, who had charge of the booty, to strip the prisoners and expose them to sale. There were abundance who were ready to buy their habits; but as to the prisoners, their bodies were so soft, white, and delicate, having been nurtured and brought up in the shade, that they laughed at them, as of neither service nor value. Agesilaus took this occasion to approach and say to his soldiers, pointing to the men, *See there against whom you fight;* and showing them their rich spoils, *and there for what you fight.*

When the season for taking the field returned, Agesilaus gave out that he would march into Lydia. Tissaphernes, who had not forgotten the first stratagem he had used in regard to him, and was not willing to be deceived a second time, made his troops march directly for Caria; not doubting but at this time Agesilaus would turn his arms that way; the rather because it was natural for him, as he wanted cavalry, to endeavour to make a rough and difficult country the seat of action, which might render the horse of an enemy useless and unserviceable. But he deceived himself. Agesilaus entered Lydia, and approached Sardis. Tissaphernes hastened thither with his horse, with intent to relieve the place. Agesilaus, knowing that his infantry could not yet have had time to arrive, thought proper to take the advantage of so favourable an opportunity to give him battle, before he had reassembled all his troops. He drew up his army in two lines; the first he formed of his squadrons, whose intervals he filled up with platoons of the light-armed foot, and ordered them to begin the charge; whilst he followed with the second line, composed of his heavy-armed infantry. The Barbarians did not sustain the first shock, but took to their heels immediately. The Greeks pursued them, and forced their camp, where they made a great slaughter, and a still greater booty.

After this battle* the troops of Agesilaus were at entire liberty to plunder and ravage the whole country of the Great King, and at the same time had the satisfaction to see that prince inflict an exemplary punishment upon Tissaphernes, who was a very wicked man, and the most dangerous enemy of the Greeks. The king had already received abundance of complaints against his conduct.† Upon this occasion he was accused of treason, as not having done his duty in the battle. Queen Parysatis, always actuated in her hatred and revenge against those who had any share in the death of her son Cyrus, did not a little contribute to the death of Tissaphernes, by aggravating with all her power the charges against him; for she had been entirely restored to favour by the king her son.

As Tissaphernes had great authority in Asia, the king was afraid to attack him openly, but thought it necessary to take suitable precautions, in order to secure so powerful an officer, who might prove a dangerous enemy. He charged Tithraustes with that important commission, and gave him two letters at the same time. The first was for Tissaphernes, and contained the king's order in regard to the war with the Greeks, with full power to act as was requisite. The second was addressed to Ariæus, governor of Larissa; by which the king commanded him to assist Tithraustes with his advice and all his forces in seizing Tissaphernes. He lost no time, and sent to desire Tissaphernes would come to him, that

* Xenoph. p. 501, and 657. Plut. in Artax. p. 1022, and in Agesil. p. 601.
† Diod. l. xiv. p. 299. Polyæn. Stratag. l. vii

they might confer together upon the operations of the ensuing campaign. Tissaphernes, who suspected nothing, went to him with only a guard of 300 men. Whilst he was in a bath, without sabre or other arms, he was seized, and put into the hands of Tithraustes, who caused his head to be struck off, and sent it immediately to Persia. The king gave it to Parysatis; an agreeable present to a princess of her violent and vindictive temper. Though this conduct of Artaxerxes seems little worthy of a king, nobody lamented the death of that satrap, who had no veneration for the gods, nor any regard for men; who looked upon probity and honour as empty names; who made a jest of the most sacred oaths, and believed the whole ability and policy of a statesman consisted in knowing how to deceive others by hypocrisy, fraud, perfidy, and perjury.

Tithraustes had a third letter from the king, whereby he was appointed to command the armies in the room of Tissaphernes. After having executed his commission,* he sent great presents to Agesilaus, to induce him to enter more readily into his views and interests; and ordered him to be told, that as the cause of the war was now removed, and the author of all these commotions put to death, nothing opposed an accommodation; that the king of Persia consented that the cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, paying him the customary tribute, provided he would withdraw his troops and return into Greece. Agesilaus replied, that he could conclude nothing without the orders of Sparta, upon whom alone depended the peace; that as for him, he was better pleased with enriching his soldiers than himself: that the Greeks besides thought it more glorious and honourable to take spoils from their enemies, than to accept their presents. However, as he was not unwilling to give Tithraustes the satisfaction of removing out of his province, and of expressing his gratitude to him for having punished the common enemy of the Grecks, he marched into Phrygia, which was the province of Pharnabazus. Tithraustes had himself proposed that expedition to him, and paid him thirty talents for the charges of his journey.

Upon his march he received a letter from the magistrates of Sparta, with orders to take upon him the command of the naval army, and liberty to depute whom he thought fit in his stead. By these new powers he saw himself absolute commander of all the troops of that state in Asia both by sea and land. This resolution was taken, in order that all operations being directed by one and the same head, and the two armies acting in concert, the plans for the service might be executed with more uniformity, and every thing conspire to the same end. Sparta till then had never conferred this honour upon any of her generals, of intrusting to him at the same time the command of the armies by sea and land. So that all the world agreed, that he was the greatest personage of his

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 501. Plut. in Agesil. p. 601.

time, and best sustained the high reputation he enjoyed. But he was a man, and had his failings.

The first thing he did was to establish Pisander his lieutenant in the fleet; in which he seemed to have committed a considerable fault; because, as he had about him many older and more experienced captains, yet without regard to the service of the public, to do honour to a relation, and to please his wife, who was Pisander's sister, he intrusted him with the command of the fleet; an employment much above his abilities, though he was not without his merit.

This is the common temptation of persons in power, who believe they possess it only for themselves and their families; as if the advantage of relation to them was a sufficient title and qualification for posts which require great abilities. They do not reflect, that they not only expose the affairs of a state to ruin by their private views, but sacrifice besides the interests of their own glory, which cannot be maintained but by successes which it were inconsistent to expect from instruments so ill chosen.

A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Agesilaus continued with his army in Phrygia,* upon the lands of Pharnabazus's government, where he lived in abundance of all things, and amassed great sums of money. From thence, advancing as far as Paphlagonia, he made an alliance with king Cotys, who earnestly desired his amity, from the sense he entertained of his faith in the observance of treaties, and his other virtues. The same motive had already induced Spithridates, one of the king's principal officers, to quit the service of Pharnabazus, and go over to Agesilaus, to whom, since his revolt, he had rendered great services; for he had a great body of troops, and was very brave. This officer having entered Phrygia, had laid waste the whole country under Pharnabazus, who never dared to appear in the field against him, nor even to trust himself to his fortresses: but carrying away whatever was most valuable and dear to him, he kept flying continually before him, and retired from one place to another, changing his camp every day. Spithridates, at length, taking with him some Spartan troops, with Herippidas (the chief of the new council of thirty sent by the republic to Agesilaus the second year,) watched him one day so closely, and attacked him so successfully, that he made himself master of his camp, and of all the rich spoils with which it abounded. Herippidas, injudiciously setting himself up as an inexorable comptroller, was for bringing the booty that had been secreted to an account; forced even the soldiers of Spithridates to restore what they had taken, and by visiting their tents, and searching them with an unseasonable exactitude and severity, affronted Spithridates to such a degree, that he withdrew directly to Sardis with his Paphlagonians.

It is said, that in this whole expedition nothing so sensibly

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 507—510.

affected Agesilaus as the retreat of Spithridates. For, besides his being very sorry for the loss of so good an officer and so good troops, he apprehended being reproached with mean and sordid avarice; a vice equally dishonourable to himself and his country, and the slightest suspicion of which he had taken pains to avoid during his whole life. He did not think it consistent with the duty of his office to shut his eyes, through slothful ease and indolence, against all the malversations that were committed under him; but e knew, at the same time, that there is an exactitude and severity, hich, by being carried too far, degenerates into minuteness and etulancy, and which, through an extreme affectation of virtue, becomes a real and dangerous vice.

Some time after, Pharnabazus,* who saw his whole country ravaged, demanded an interview with Agesilaus, which was negotiated by a common friend of them both. Agesilaus arrived first, with his friends, at the place agreed on; and while waiting for Pharnabazus, sat down upon the turf under the shade of a tree. When Pharnabazus arrived, his people spread skins upon the ground, of exceeding softness, from the length of their hair, with rich carpets of various colours, and magnificent cushions. But when he saw Agesilaus sitting merely upon the ground, without any preparation, he was ashamed of his effeminacy, and sat down also upon the grass. On this occasion the Persian pride was seen to pay homage to the Spartan modesty and simplicity.

After reciprocal salutations, Pharnabazus spoke to this effect: That he had served the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian war, to the utmost of his power, fought several battles for them, and supported their naval army, without giving any room to reproach him with fraud or treachery, as Tissaphernes had done: that he was surprised at their coming to attack him in his government; burning the towns, cutting down the trees, and laying waste the whole country: that if it was the custom with the Greeks, who made profession of honour and virtue, to treat their friends and benefactors in such a manner, he did not know what they might mean by just and equitable. These complaints were not entirely without foundation, and were uttered with a modest, but pathetic air and tone of voice. The Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, not seeing how they could be answered, cast down their eyes, and kept a profound silence. Agesilaus, who observed it, replied almost in these terms: *Lord Pharnabazus, you are not ignorant that war often arms the best friends against each other for the defence of their country. Whilst we were such to the king your master, we treated him as a friend; but as we are now become his enemies, we make open war against him, as it is just we should, and endeavour to hurt him by the injuries we do you. However, from the instant you shall think fit to throw off the ignominious yoke of*

* Xenoph. Hist Græc. l. iv. p. 510, 511. Plut. in Agesil. p. 602.

bondage, and prefer being called the friend and ally of the Greeks, before the name of the king of Persia's slave, you may reckon that all the troops you see before your eyes, our arms, our ships, our persons to the last man of us, are only here to defend your possessions and secure your liberty, which of all blessings is the most precious and desirable.

Pharnabazus answered, that if the king sent another general in his place, and subjected him to the new-comer, he should very willingly accept his offer; that otherwise he would not depart from the faith he had sworn to him, nor quit his service. Agesilaus then taking him by the hand, and rising with him, replied, *Would it were the pleasure of the gods, lord Pharnabazus, that with such noble sentiments, you were rather our friend than our enemy!* He promised to withdraw from his government, and never return into it, whilst he could subsist elsewhere.

SECTION IV.

League against the Lacedæmonians. Agesilaus recalled by the Ephori to defend his country, obeys directly Lysander's death. Victory of the Lacedæmonians near Nemæa. Their fleet is beaten by Conon, off Cnidos. Battle gained by the Lacedæmonians at Coronæa.

A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394. Agesilaus* had been two years at the head of the army, and had already made the provinces of Upper Asia tremble at his name, and resound with the fame of his great wisdom, disinterestedness, moderation, intrepid valour in the greatest dangers, and invincible patience in supporting the rudest fatigues. Of so many thousand soldiers under his command, not one was worse provided, or lay harder than himself. He was so indifferent as to heat or cold, that he alone seemed formed to support the most rigorous seasons,† and such as it pleased God to send These are Plutarch's express words.

The most agreeable of all sights to the Greeks settled in Asia, was to see the lieutenants of the great king, his satraps, and other great lords, who were formerly so haughty and morose, soften their note in the presence of a man, meanly clad, and at his single word, however short and laconic, change their language and conduct, and in a manner transform themselves into different creatures. Deputies from all parts were sent by the people, to form alliances with him, and his army increased every day by the troops of the Barbarians that came to join him.

All Asia was already in motion, and most of the provinces ready to revolt. Agesilaus had already restored order and tranquillity in in all the cities, had reinstated them in the possession of their liberty under reasonable modifications, not only without shedding of blood, but without even banishing a single person. Not con-

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 603, 604. Xenoph. in Agesil. p. 657.

† Ὥσπερ μόνος ἀεὶ χρῆσθαι ταῖς ὑπὸ θεοῦ κεκραμέναις ὥραις πεφυκώς

tent with such a progress, he had formed the design of attacking the king of Persia, in the heart of his dominions, to put him in fear for his own person and the tranquillity he enjoyed in Ecbatana and Susa, and to find him so much business as should make it impracticable for him to embroil all Greece from his cabinet, by corrupting the orators and persons of greatest authority in its cities with his presents.

Tithraustes,* who commanded for the king in Asia, seeing the tendency of Agesilaus's designs, and desiring to prevent their effects, had sent Timocrates of Rhodes into Greece, with great sums of money to corrupt the principal persons in the cities, and by their means occasion commotions against Sparta. He knew that the haughtiness of the Lacedæmonians (for all their generals did not resemble Agesilaus,) and the imperious manner with which they treated their neighbours and allies, especially since they considered themselves as the masters of Greece, had universally disgusted the people, and excited a jealousy that waited only an occasion to break out against them. This severity of governing had a natural cause in their education. Accustomed from their infancy to obey without delay or reply, first their tutors, and afterwards their magistrates, they exacted a like submission from the cities dependant upon them, were easily incensed by the least opposition, and by this punctilious and excessive severity rendered themselves insupportable.

Tithraustes therefore did not find it difficult, to draw off the allies from their party. Thebes, Argos, Corinth, entered into his measures; the deputy did not go to Athens. These three cities, influenced by those that governed them, made a league against the Lacedæmonians, who on their side prepared vigorously for the war. The Thebans at the same time sent deputies to the Athenians, to implore their aid, and to induce them to enter into the alliance. The deputies, after having slightly passed over their ancient divisions, insisted strongly upon the considerable service they had rendered Athens in refusing to join its enemies when they endeavoured its final destruction. They represented to them the favourable opportunity that offered for reinstating themselves in their ancient power, and for depriving the Lacedæmonians of the empire of Greece: that all the allies of Sparta, either without or within Greece, were weary of their severe and unjust sway, and waited only the signal to revolt: that the moment the Athenians should declare themselves, all the cities would rouse up at the sound of their arms; and that the king of Persia, who had sworn the ruin of Sparta, would aid them with all his forces both by sea and land.

Thrasybulus, whom the Thebans had supplied with arms and money, when he undertook the re-establishment of the Athenian

* Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iii. p. 502—507. Plut in Lysand. p. 449—451

liberty seconded their demand with great vigour, and the aid was unanimously resolved. The Lacedæmonians on their side took the field without loss of time, and entered Phocis. Lysander wrote to Pausanias, who commanded one of the two armies, to give him notice to march early the next day to Haliartus, which he designed to besiege, and that he should be there himself at sun-rise. The letter was intercepted. Lysander, after having waited his coming up a great while, was obliged to engage, and was killed in the battle. Pausanius received this bad news on his way; but, however, continued his march to Haliartus, and called a council of war to consider upon a second battle. He did not think it consistent with prudence to hazard it, and contented himself with making a truce, to remove the bodies of those who had fallen in the former fight. Upon his return to Sparta, he was cited to give an account of his conduct; and, refusing to appear, was condemned to die. But he avoided the execution of that sentence by flight, and retired to Tegæa, where he passed the remainder of his life under the shelter and protection of Minerva, to whom he had rendered himself a suppliant, and died of disease.

Lysander's poverty having been discovered after his death, did great honour to his memory; when it was known, that of all the gold and riches which had passed through his hands, of a power so extensive as his had been, of so many cities under his government, and which made their court to him; in a word, of that kind of dominion and sovereignty always exercised by him, he had made no manner of advantage for the advancement and enriching of his house.

Some days before his death, two of the principal citizens of Sparta had contracted themselves to his two daughters; but when they knew in what condition he had left his affairs, they refused to marry them. The republic did not suffer so sordid a baseness to go unpunished, nor permit Lysander's poverty, which was the strongest proof of his justice and virtue, to be treated as an obstacle to an alliance into his family. They were fined in a great sum, publicly disgraced, and exposed to the contempt of all persons of honour. For at Sparta there were penalties established, not only for such as refused to marry, or married too late, but also for those who married amiss: and those especially were reckoned of this number, who, instead of forming alliances with virtuous families, and with their own relations, had no motive but wealth and lucre in marriage:—an admirable law, tending to perpetuate probity and honour in families, which an impure mixture of blood and manners seldom fails to alter and efface!

It must be owned, that a generous disinterestedness in the midst of all that could inflame and gratify the lust of gain, is very rare, and well worthy of admiration; but in Lysander it was attended with great defects, which sullied its lustre. Without speaking of his imprudence in introducing gold and silver into Sparta, which

he despised himself, though he rendered it an object of esteem to his countrymen, and thereby occasioned their ruin; what opinion can we have of a man, brave indeed, capable of conciliating the affections, skilful in affairs, and of great ability in the arts of government, and what is commonly called politics, but who regards probity and justice as nothing; to whom falsehood, fraud, and perfidy, appear legitimate methods for the attainment of his ends; who does not fear, for the advancement of his friends and the augmenting the number of his creatures, to commit the most flagrant injustice and oppressions, and is not ashamed to profane whatever is most sacred in religion, even to the bribing of priests and forging of oracles, to satiate the empty ambition of being equal to a king, and of ascending the throne?

When Agesilaus was upon the point of leading his troops into Persia,* the Spartan Epicydidas arrived to let him know that Sparta was threatened with a furious war; that the Ephori recalled him and ordered him to return immediately for the defence of his country. Agesilaus did not deliberate a moment, but returned this answer immediately to the Ephori, which Plutarch† has transmitted to us, *Agesilaus, to the Ephori, greeting. We have reduced part of Asia, put the Barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for war in Ionia; but as you order me to return, I am not far behind this letter, and would anticipate it if possible. I received the command not for myself, but my country and its allies. I know that a general does not deserve, or really fulfil, the duties of that name, but when he suffers himself to be guided by the laws and the Ephori, and obeys the magistrates.*

This ready obedience of Agesilaus has been much admired and applauded, and not without reason. Hannibal, though depressed with misfortunes, and driven almost entirely out of Italy, obeyed his citizens with great reluctance, when they recalled him to deliver Carthage from the dangers that threatened it. Here a victorious prince, ready to enter the enemy's country, and to attack the king of Persia even upon his throne, almost assured of the success of his arms, on the first order of the Ephori renounces these flattering hopes and most exalted expectations. He demonstrates the truth of what was said, *That at Sparta the laws ruled men, and not men the laws.*

On his departure he said, *that thirty thousand of the king's archers drove him out of Asia;* alluding in those words to a species of Persian coin, which had on one side the figure of an archer, 30,000 of which pieces of money had been dispersed in Greece to corrupt the orators and persons of greatest power in the cities.

Agesilaus,‡ on quitting Asia, where he was regretted as the common father of the people, appointed Euxenes his lieutenant,

* Xenoph. Hist Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Idem. in Agesil. p. 667. Plut. in Agesil. p. 603, 604.
† Plut. in Apoph. Laconic. p. 211. ‡ Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 513. Xenoph. de Exped. Cyr. lv. p. 350

and gave him 4000 men for the defence of the country. Xenophon went with him. He left at Ephesus, with Magabyzus, the guardian of Diana's temple, half the gold he had brought with him from his expedition in Persia with Cyrus, to keep it for him in trust, and in case of death to consecrate it to the goddess.

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians had raised an army,* and given the command of it to Aristodemus, guardian to king Agesipolis, then an infant. Their enemies assembled to concert the operations of the war. Timolaus of Corinth said, that the Lacedæmonians were like a river that grew larger in proportion as it was more distant from its source; or to a swarm of bees, which it is easy to burn in their hive, but which disperse themselves a great way when they fly abroad, and become formidable by their stings. He was therefore of opinion, that it was proper to attack them in their capital; which was approved and resolved. But the Lacedæmonians did not give them time. They took the field, and found the enemy near Nemæa, a city not very remote from Corinth, where an obstinate battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians had the advantage, which was very considerable. Agesilaus having received this news at Amphipolis, as he was hastening to the relief of his country, sent it directly to the cities of Asia for their encouragement, and gave them hopes of his speedy return, if the success of affairs would admit it.

When the approach of Agesilaus was known at Sparta,† the Lacedæmonians that remained in the city, to do him honour for the ready obedience he had paid to their orders, caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet, that all young persons who were willing to aid their king, might come and list themselves for that purpose. Not one of them failed to enter himself immediately with the utmost joy. But the Ephori chose only fifty of the bravest and most robust, whom they sent him, and desired that he would enter Bœotia with the utmost expedition: which he did accordingly.

About the same time the two fleets came up with each other near Cnidos,‡ a city of Caria: that of the Lacedæmonians was commanded by Pisander, Agesilaus's brother-in-law, and that of the Persians by Pharnabazus and Conon the Athenian. The latter, observing that the king of Persia's supplies came slowly, and occasioned the loss of many favourable opportunities, had resolved to go in person to the court, to solicit the king's assistance. As he would not prostrate himself before him, according to the Persian custom, he could not explain himself but by the intervention of others. He represented to him, with a force and spirit seldom pardoned in those who treat with princes, that it was equally shameful and astonishing, that his ministers, contrary to his intention, should suffer his affairs to be disconcerted and ruined by a disgraceful parsimony; that the richest king in the world should give

* Xenoph. p. 514—517. † Plut. in Agesil. p. 605. ‡ Xenoph. Hist. Græc l iv. p 518. Diod. l. xiv. p. 302. Justin. l. vi. c. 2, 3.

place to his enemies in the very point in which he was so infinitely superior to them; that is, in riches: and that, for want of remitting to his generals the sums his service required, all their designs were rendered abortive. These remonstrances were free, but just and solid. The king received them perfectly well, and showed, by his example, that truth may often be spoken to princes with success, if courage were not wanting. Conon obtained all he demanded, and the king made him admiral of his fleet.

It was composed of more than fourscore and ten galleys: that of the enemy was somewhat inferior in number. They came in view of each other near Cnidos, a maritime city of Asia Minor. Conon, who had in some measure occasioned the taking of Athens by the loss of the sea-fight near Ægospotamos, used extraordinary efforts in this to retrieve his misfortune, and to obliterate by a glorious victory the disgrace of his former defeat. He had this advantage,* that in the battle he was going to fight, the Persians would be at the whole expense, and bear all the loss themselves; whereas the entire fruits of the victory would accrue to the Athenians, without hazarding any thing of their own. Pisander had also strong motives to show his valour upon this occasion, that he might not degenerate from the glory of his brother-in-law, and justify the choice he had made in appointing him admiral. In fact, he behaved with extreme valour, and had at first some advantage; but the battle growing warm, and the allies of Sparta betaking themselves to flight, he could not resolve to follow them, and died sword in hand. Conon took fifty galleys, and the rest escaped to Cnidos. The consequence of this victory was the revolt of almost all the allies of Sparta; several of whom declared for the Athenians, and the rest resumed their ancient liberty. After this battle the affairs of the Lacedæmonians daily declined. All their actions in Asia were no more than the feeble efforts of an expiring power, till the defeats of Leuctra and Mantinæa completed their downfall.

Isocrates makes a very just reflection upon the revolutions of Sparta and Athens,† which had always their source and origin in the insolent prosperity of both these republics. The Lacedæmonians, who were at first acknowledged masters of Greece without opposition, fell from their authority only in consequence of their enormous abuse of it. The Athenians succeeded them in power, and at the same time in pride; and we have seen into what an abyss of misfortunes it precipitated them. Sparta, having regained the superiority by the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily and the taking of their city, ought to have improved in her measures from the double experience of the past; as well in regard to what had befallen herself, as from the recent example of her rival: but the most striking examples and events seldom or ever occasion a people to change

* Eò speciosiùs, quòd ne ipsorum quidem Atheniensium, sed alieni imperii viribus dimicet, pugnaturus periculo regis, victurus præmio patriæ. *Justin.*

† Isocrat. in Orat Areop. p. 278—280

their conduct. Sparta became as haughty and untractable as before, and so experienced the same destiny again.

To warn the Athenians against this misfortune, Isocrates puts them in mind of the past, while he addresses them at a time wherein they were successful in every thing. *You imagine*, says he, *that as you are provided with a numerous fleet, absolute masters at sea, and supported by powerful allies always ready to give you aid, you have nothing to fear, and may enjoy in repose and tranquillity the fruits of your victories:—for my part, suffer me to speak with truth and freedom, I think quite otherwise. The cause of my apprehension is, my having observed, that the decline of the greatest republics has always commenced at the time they believed themselves most powerful; and that their very security has prepared the precipice into which they have fallen. The reason of this is evident. Prosperity and adversity never come alone, but have each their train of very different effects. The first is attended with vain-glory, pride, and insolence, which dazzle the mind, and inspire rash and extravagant measures: on the contrary, the companions of adversity, are modesty, self-diffidence, and circumspection, which naturally render men prudent, and apt to derive advantage from their own failings. So that it is hard to judge which of the two conditions we ought to desire for a city; as that which appears unhappy is an almost certain path to prosperity; and the other, so flattering and splendid, generally leads on to the greatest misfortunes.* The blow which the Lacedæmonians received at the battle of Cnidos is a mournful proof of what he says.

Agesilaus was in Bœotia, and upon the point of giving battle,* when this bad news was brought him. Apprehending that it might discourage and deter his troops, he caused it to be reported in the army that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea; and appearing in public with a wreath of flowers upon his head, he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the good news, and sent part of it in presents to his officers. The two armies,† almost equal in strength, were in view of each other upon the plains of Coronæa, and they drew up in battle. Agesilaus gave the left wing to the Orchomenians, and took the right himself. On the other side, the Thebans were upon the right, and the Argives on the left. Xenophon says, that this was the most furious battle of any that had been fought in his time: and we may believe him, as he was present in it, and fought near the person of Agesilaus, with whom he had returned from Asia.

The first charge was not very obstinate, nor of long continuance. The Thebans soon put the Orchomenians to flight, and Agesilaus overthrew and routed the Argives. But both parties, having learned that their left wing had been severely handled and had fled, returned immediately; Agesilaus to oppose the Thebans and to

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 605. † Ibid. Xenoph. Hist Græc p. 518—520, and in Agesil. p. 659, 660.

wrest the victory out of their hands, and the Thebans to follow their left wing that was retired to Helicon. Agesilaus at that moment might have assured himself of a complete victory, if he would have let the Thebans pass on, and had afterwards charged them in the rear; but carried away by the ardour of his courage, he resolved to stop them with an attack in front, and to beat them by pure force. In which, says Xenophon, he showed more valour than prudence.

The Thebans, seeing Agesilaus advance against them, drew all their foot immediately into one body, formed a hollow square, and waited his coming up in good order. The engagement was sharp and bloody on all sides, but particularly where Agesilaus fought at the head of the fifty young Spartans, who had been sent him by the city. The valour and emulation of those young men were of great service to Agesilaus, and may be said to have saved his life; for they fought around him with exceeding ardour, and exposed themselves foremost in all dangers for the safety of his person. They could not however prevent his receiving several wounds through his armour from pikes and swords. Notwithstanding, with the utmost efforts, they brought him off alive from the enemy; and making their bodies a rampart for him, sacrificed a great number of Thebans in his defence; and many of those young men were left also upon the field. At length, finding it too difficult to break the Thebans in front, they were forced to have recourse to what they had at first rejected. They opened their phalanx to let them pass; which when they had done, as they marched afterwards in more disorder, they charged them again upon the flanks and rear. They could, however, neither break them nor put them to flight. Those brave Thebans made their retreat continually fighting, and gained Helicon, elated with the success of the battle, wherein, on their side they had always remained invincible.

Agesilaus, though very much weakened by the great number of his wounds, and the quantity of blood he had lost, would not retire to his tent till he had been carried to the place where his phalanx was drawn up, and had seen all the dead bodies removed even upon their own arms. He was informed there, that many of the enemy had taken refuge in the temple of the Itonian Minerva, which was not very distant from the field of battle, and asked what he would have done with them. As he was full of veneration for the gods, he gave orders to let them go, and even sent them a guard to escort them in safety wherever they thought fit.

The next morning, Agesilaus, to try whether the Thebans would have the courage to renew the battle, commanded his troops to crown themselves with flowers, and the music of the army to play, whilst a trophy was erected and adorned in honour of his victory. At the same instant the enemy sent heralds to demand his permission to bury their dead; which he granted with a truce; and having confirmed his victory by that act of a conqueror, he caused

himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian games were then celebrated. He made there a solemn procession, which was followed by a sacrifice, and consecrated to the god the tenth part of the booty taken in Asia, which amounted to a hundred talents.* These great men, no less religious than brave, never failed to express by presents their gratitude to the gods for their successes in arms; declaring, by that public homage, that they believed themselves indebted to their protection for their victories.

SECTION V.

Agesilaus returns victorious to Sparta. He always retains his simplicity and ancient manners. Conon rebuilds the walls of Athens. A peace, disgraceful to the Greeks, concluded by Antalcidas the Lacedæmonian.

After the festival,† Agesilaus returned to Sparta. His citizens received him with all the marks of the most real joy, and beheld him with admiration, when they observed the simplicity of his manners and the constant frugality and temperance of his life. At his return from foreign countries, where pomp, luxury, sloth, and the love of pleasures prevailed, he was not infected with the manners of the Barbarians, as most of the other generals had been: he made no alteration in his diet, baths, equipage of his wife, ornaments of his arms, or furniture of his house. In the midst of so brilliant a reputation, and the universal applause, always the same, or rather more modest than before, he distinguished himself from the rest of the citizens, only by a greater submission to the laws, and a more inviolable attachment to the customs of his country; convinced, that he was king, only to be the brighter example of those virtues to others.

He made greatness consist in virtue only.‡ Hearing of the Great King (so the kings of Persia used to call themselves) spoken of in magnificent terms, and his power extremely extolled: *I cannot conceive*, said he, *wherein he is greater than I, unless he be more virtuous.* §

There were at Sparta some citizens, who, vitiated by the prevailing taste of Greece, made their merit and glory consist in keeping a great number of horses for the race. He persuaded his sister Cynisca to dispute the prize in the Olympic games, in order to show the Greeks that those victories, on which they set so high a value, were not the effects of valour and bravery, but of riches and expense. She was the first of her sex who shared in this honour. He had not the same opinion of the exercises which contribute to render the body more robust, and inure it to labour and fatigue; and, to place them in greater estimation, would often honour them with his presence.

* One hundred thousand crowns, or about 22,500*l.* sterling. † Plut. in Agesil. p. 606.
‡ Plut. de sui. laud. p. 555.
§ Τί δ' ἐμοῦ μείζων ἐκεῖνος, εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος.

Some time after Lysander's death, he discovered the conspiracy formed by that captain against the two kings, which till then had not been heard of, and came to light by a kind of accident, in the following manner: Upon some affairs,* which related to the government, it was necessary to consult Lysander's papers, and Agesilaus went to his house for that purpose. In running them over, he fell upon the sheets which contained at large the harangue of Cleon, which had been prepared to recommend the new method of proceeding in the election of kings. Surprised at perusing it, he gave over his search, and went away abruptly to communicate that oration to the citizens, and to let them see what manner of man Lysander was, and how much they had been deceived in regard to him. But Lacratidas, a wise and prudent person, who was president of the Ephori, interposed, by telling him, that it was highly improper to raise Lysander from the dead: on the contrary, that it was necessary to bury his harangue in the same grave with him, as a production of dangerous tendency, from the great art with which it was composed, and the force of persuasion that universally prevailed in it, which it might prove no easy matter to resist. Agesilaus was of the same opinion; and the piece was consigned to silence and oblivion, as the best use that could be made of it.

As his credit was very high in the city,† he caused Teleutias, his brother by the mother's side, to be declared admiral of the fleet. It were to be wished, that history, to justify this choice, had mentioned some other qualities in that commander than his nearness of blood to the king. Agesilaus soon after set out with his land army to besiege Corinth, and took the long walls, as they were called, whilst his brother Teleutias attacked it by sea. He did several other exploits against the people of Greece at war with Sparta, which always indeed evince the valour and experience of the general, but are neither very important nor decisive, and which we thought, for that reason, might be omitted.

A. M. 3611. Ant. J. C. 393. At the same time,‡ Pharnabazus and Conon, having made themselves masters at sea, ravaged the whole coast of Laconia. That satrap, returning to his government of Phrygia, left Conon the command of the naval army, with very considerable sums for the re-establishment of Athens. Conon, victorious and crowned with glory, repaired thither, where he was received with universal applause. The sad prospect of a city, formerly so flourishing, and at that time reduced to so melancholy a condition, gave him more grief than he felt joy in seeing his beloved country again, after so many years' absence. He lost no time, but fell immediately to work, employing, besides masons and the usual artisans, the soldiers, mariners, citizens, allies, in a word, all that were well inclined to Athens; Providence decreeing, that this city, formerly destroyed by the Persians, should be rebuilt by their

* Plut. in Agesil. p. 606. † Ibid. p. 607. ‡ Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 534-537. Diod. l. xiv. p. 303. Justin. l. vi. c. 5.

own hands; and that having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, it should be reinstated at their own cost, and by the spoils taken from them. What a vicissitude and alteration was this! Athens at this time had those for its allies, who had formerly been its most violent enemies; and for enemies, those with whom before it had contracted the most strict and closest union. Conon, seconded by the zeal of the Thebans, soon rebuilt the walls of Athens, restored the city to its ancient splendour, and rendered it more formidable than ever to its enemies. After having offered to the gods a whole hecatomb,* that is to say, a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, as a thanksgiving for the happy re-establishment of Athens, he made a feast, to which all the citizens, without exception, were invited.

Sparta could not see without extreme affliction so glorious a revolution.† It looked upon the grandeur and power of a city, its ancient rival and almost continual enemy, as its own ruin. This made the Lacedæmonians take the mean resolution of avenging themselves at once upon Athens, and Conon, its restorer, by making peace with the king of Persia. With this view they despatched Antalcidas to Tiribazus. His commission consisted of two principal articles. The first was, to accuse Conon to that satrap of having defrauded the king of the money which he had employed in the re-establishment of Athens; and of having formed the design of depriving the Persians of Æolia and Ionia, in order to subject them anew to the republic of Athens, upon which they had formerly depended. By the second, he had orders to make the most advantageous proposals to Tiribazus that his master could desire. Without giving himself any manner of trouble in regard to Asia, he stipulated only, that all the islands, and other cities, should enjoy their laws and liberty. The Lacedæmonians thus gave up to the king, with the greatest injustice and the utmost baseness, all the Greeks settled in Asia, for whose liberty Agesilaus had so long fought. It is true, he had no share in this most infamous negotiation; the whole reproach of which ought to fall on Antalcidas, who, being the sworn enemy of the king of Sparta, hastened the peace by all manner of means, because the war augmented the authority, glory, and reputation, of Agesilaus.

The most considerable cities of Greece had sent deputies at the same time to Tiribazus, and Conon was at the head of those from Athens. All of them were unanimous in rejecting such proposals. Without speaking of the interest of the Greeks of Asia, with which they were extremely affected, they saw themselves exposed by this treaty; the Athenians, to the loss of the isles of Lamnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans, to abandon the cities of Bœotia, of which they were in possession, and which would thereby regain their independance; and the Argives, to re-

* Athen. l. i. p. 3. † Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. iv. p. 537, 538. Plut. in Agesil. p. 603.

nounce Corinth, with the loss of which that of Argos itself would soon, in all probability, be attended. The deputies therefore withdrew without concluding any thing.

Tiribazus seized Conon, and put him in prison. Not daring to declare openly to the Lacedæmonians without an express order to that purpose, he contented himself with supplying them underhand with considerable sums of money for fitting out a fleet, in order that the other cities of Greece might not be in a condition to oppose them. After having taken these precautions, he set out directly for the court, to give the king an account of the state of his negotiation. That prince was well satisfied with it, and directed him in the strongest terms to put the last hand to it. Tiribazus also laid before him the Lacedæmonians' accusation of Conon. Some authors, according to Cornelius Nepos, have affirmed that he was carried to Susa, and there executed by the king's order. The silence of Xenophon, who was his contemporary, in regard to his death, makes it doubtful, whether he escaped from prison, or suffered as has been said.

Whilst this treaty was negotiating, several actions of little consequence passed between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. It was also at the same time that Evagoras extended his conquests in the island of Cyprus, of which we shall soon treat.

A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 387. Tiribazus at length * upon his return, summoned the deputies of the Grecian cities to be present at the reading of the treaty. It imported, that all the Grecian cities of Asia should remain dependant on the king, and that the rest, as well small as great, should have full possession of their liberty. The king farther reserved to himself the isles of Cyprus and Clazomenæ, and left those of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, to the Athenians, to whom they had long appertained. By the same treaty he engaged to join with such states as acceded to it, in order to make war by sea and land against all that should refuse to agree to it. We have already said it was Sparta itself who had proposed these conditions.

All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However, as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces upon those who should refuse to accede to this agreement, they were obliged against their will to comply with it; except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned.

Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and which was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing considerable sums of

* Xenoph. l. v. p. 548—551.

money among the several states; invincible by arms and by the sword, but not by the gold and presents of the Persians; so remote were they in this respect from the character of the ancient Grecks their forefathers.

To comprehend aright how much Sparta and Athens differed now from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon, the Athenian, under Artaxerxes Longimanus, above sixty years before, and the latter by Antalcidas, the Lacedæmonian, under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first,* Greece, victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives the law to the Persians, imposes what conditions she pleases, and prescribes to them their bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days' march, or to appear with ships of war in any of the seas between the Cyanæan and Chelidonian islands; that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphylia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with the single stroke of a pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves in their turn within the narrow bounds of Greece.

From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interests? No doubt there are: but they are not the same men; or rather, they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recall to mind those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the East. What was it that rendered these two cities invincible, and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissension between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contest between them, but that of honour, glory, and the love of their country.

To so laudable a union may be added an irreconcilable hatred for the Persians, which became, if I may so say, natural to the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. It was a capital crime,† and punished with death, only to mention peace, or propose any accommodation with them: and an Athenian mother was seen to throw the first stone at her son, who had dared to make such a motion, and to set others the example of stoning him.

This strict union of the two states, and this declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were for a long time the potent barriers of

* Diod. l. xii. p. 74, 75. † Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 143.

their security, rendered them invincible, and may be said to have been the source and principle of all the glorious successes that raised the reputation of Greece to so high a pitch. But by a misfortune common to the most flourishing states, those very successes became the cause of its ruin, and prepared the way for the disgraces which it experienced in the sequel.

These two states,* which might have carried their victorious arms into the heart of Persia, and have attacked in their turn the great king upon his throne itself; instead of forming in concert such an enterprise, which would at once have crowned them with glory and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy in repose, to embroil themselves with each other upon trivial points of honour and interests of little importance, and to exhaust those forces to no purpose against themselves, which ought to have been employed solely against the barbarians, that could not have resisted them. For it is worthy of remark, that the Persians never gained any advantage over the Athenians or Lacedæmonians whilst they were united with each other, and that it was their own divisions alone which supplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.

These divisions induced them to take such measures as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever otherwise have been capable of. We see both the one and the other dishonour themselves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Persia, but even of his satraps; pay their court to them, earnestly solicit their favour, cringe to them, and even suffer their ill humour; and all this to obtain some aid of troops or money: forgetting that the Persians, haughty and insolent to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and little to those who had the courage to despise them. But, in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty, which gave occasion for these reflections, and will for ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens.

SECTION VII.

War of Artaxerxes against Evagoras, king of Salamis. Eulogy and character of that prince. Tiribasus falsely accused. His accuser punished.

What I have just said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies, will be more evident if we consider, on one side, the diversity of the nations, and the extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians; and on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of supporting the weight of so much business and application. At the court every thing was determined by the intrigues of women and the cabals of favourites, whose whole merit often consisted in flattering their

* Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 132—137. In Panath. p. 521 525.

prince, and soothing his passions. It was through their influence that officers were chosen, and the first dignities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governors, the discontent and consequent revolt of the best officers, and the ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed.

Artaxerxes, freed from the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigour, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way.

Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamis,* the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from Teucer of Salamis,† who at his return from Troy built the city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time; but a stranger from Phœnicia, having dispossessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation, had filled the city with barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia.

Under this tyrant Evagoras was born, and great care was taken of his education. He was distinguished amongst the youth by the beauty of his aspect, the vigour of his body, and still more by the modesty and innocence of his manners,‡ which are the greatest ornaments of that age. As he advanced in years, the greatest virtues, valour, wisdom, and justice, were observed to shine forth in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height, as to give jealousy to those that were at the head of the government; who conceived justly that so brilliant a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition: but his modesty, probity, and integrity, reassured them; and they reposed an entire confidence in him, which he always repaid by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery.

A more justifiable means conducted him to it, Divine Providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and intended to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince, escaping his pursuit, retired to Soli, a city of Cilicia. His banishment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with fifty followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamis, and expelled the usurper, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having re-established him-

* Isocrat. in Evag. p 380.

† This Teucer was of Salamis, a little island near Athens, celebrated for the famous sea-fight under Xerxes.

‡ Et, qui oruat ætatem, pudor. *Cic.*

self in Salamis, he soon rendered his little kingdom very flourishing, by his great care in relieving his subjects, and by protecting them in every respect; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of their lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He trained them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers.

A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405 He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon the Athenian general, after his defeat at Ægospotamos, took refuge with him; not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself,* nor a more powerful support of his country. The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. Conon possessed great influence at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias his physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.

A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 399

Evagoras and Conon, engaged in the great design of subverting or at least of reducing, the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption; a privilege which great services and zeal for that republic had merited

A. M 3606. Ant. J. C. 398 The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties from not being in a condition to make head against them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he contributed not a little, through the influence he still had with the king of Persia, to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet. The

A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. 394 celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.

The Athenians,† in acknowledgement of the important services which Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected statues in honour of them.

Evagoras,‡ on his side, extending his conquests from city to city, endeavoured to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, the effects of which he apprehended, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island's falling into the hands of an enemy, which was so favourably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised them an immediate and powerful support, without declaring openly, however, against Evagoras.

* Isocrat. in Evag p. 393 395. † Pausan. l. i. p. 5. ‡ Diod l. xiv. p. 311.

A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 390. Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs,* he could not keep his word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. That war of Cyprus continued six years, and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the minds of the Greeks, all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy. It is true, the succours sent by Artaxerxes, till then, were inconsiderable, as they were also the two following years. During all this time, it was less a real war, than a preparation for war: but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks,† he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.

A. M. 3618. Ant. J. C. 386.

The land army, commanded by Orontes, his son-in-law, consisted of 300,000 men, and the fleet of 300 galleys; of which Tiribazus, a Persian of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral. Gaos, his son-in-law, commanded under him. Evagoras, on his side, assembled as many troops and ships as he could; but they were a handful, in comparison with the formidable preparations of the Persians. His fleet was composed of only fourscore and ten galleys, and his army scarce amounted to 20,000 men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine among the Persians, and gave rise to violent seditions, which could only be appeased by the arrival of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with sixty galleys which he caused to be built, and fifty sent him by Achoris king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for.

Evagoras, with his land-forces, attacked immediately a part of the enemy's army, which was separate from the rest, and entirely routed it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamis was immediately besieged by sea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his son Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and sailed for Egypt, to engage the king to support him vigorously against the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expected. At his return he found the city in exceeding distress; and finding himself without resource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The proposals made to him were, that he should abandon all the cities of Cyprus except Salamis, where he should content himself to reign; that he should pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him as a servant to a master. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they were; but he

* Isocrat. in Paneg. p. 135, 136. † Diod. l. xv. p. 328—332.

could never resolve to comply with the last, and persisted always in declaring, that he could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribazus, who commanded the siege, would abate nothing of his pretensions.

Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had written secretly to court against him, accusing him, among other things, of forming designs against the king, and assigned in support of his accusation, his continuing to hold a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifest endeavours to attach to himself the chiefs of the army, by force of presents, promises, and an obliging demeanour, not natural to him. Artaxerxes, upon these letters, believed he had no time to lose in stifling a conspiracy which he considered as ready to break out. He despatched orders immediately to Orontes, to seize Tiribazus, and send him to court in chains, which was immediately put in execution. Tiribazus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to trial in form; that the heads of the accusation should be communicated to him, and the proofs and witnesses produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leisure at that time to take cognizance of the affair.

Orontes, in the mean time, seeing that the besieged made a vigorous defence, and that the soldiers of the army, discontented with the removal of Tiribazus, quitted the service, and refused to obey him, was afraid affairs would take a bad turn with regard to himself. He therefore caused Evagoras to be spoken to underhand: the negotiation was resumed, the offers made at first by the latter, were accepted, and the mortifying article, which had prevented the conclusion of the treaty, retrenched. The siege was raised in consequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamis, only, and engaged to pay an annual tribute.

A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 385.

It appears that this prince lived twelve or thirteen years after the conclusion of the treaty, for his death is dated in the year of the world 3632. His old age was attended with happiness and tranquillity, never interrupted with sickness or disease, the usual effect of a sober and temperate life. Nicocles, his eldest son, succeeded him, and inherited his virtues as well as throne. He celebrated his funeral with the utmost magnificence. The discourse, entitled *Evagoras*, composed by Isocrates, to inspire the young king with the desire of treading in the steps of his father, and from which I have extracted the subsequent eulogium, served for his funeral oration. He also addressed another tract to Nicocles, which bears his name, wherein he gives him admirable precepts for governing well. I shall, perhaps, have occasion to speak farther of them in the ensuing volume.

Eulogy and character of Evagoras.

Though Evagoras was only king of a little state,* Isocrates, who was well able to judge of virtue and merit, compares him with

* Isocrat. in Evag.

the most powerful monarchs, and proposes him as the perfect model of a good king, convinced that it is not the extent of territory, but extent of mind and greatness of soul, that constitute great princes. In fact, he points out to us many qualities truly royal in him, and which ought to give us a very high idea of his merit.

Evagoras was not of the number of those princes who believe, that to reign, it is sufficient to be of the blood-royal; and that the birth which gives a right to the crown, gives also the merit and qualities necessary for wearing it with honour. He did not fancy that it could be supposed, since every other condition and station of life made a kind of apprenticeship necessary to succeed therein, that the art of reigning, the most difficult and important of all, should require no pains and preparation for its attainment. He came into the world with the most happy dispositions; a great fund of genius, a ready comprehension, a lively and quick penetration which nothing escaped, a solidity of judgment that immediately perceived what was necessary to be done; qualities which might seem to dispense with all study and application: and yet, as if he had been born without talents, and found himself obliged to supply by study what he might want by nature, he neglected no means for the embellishment of his mind, and devoted a considerable part of his time in instructing himself,* in reflecting, meditating, and consulting the judgment and experience of others.

When he ascended the throne, his greatest care and application was to know mankind, in which the ability of a prince, and of those who are at the head of affairs, principally consists. He had, no doubt, prepared himself for that science, by the study of history, which gives prudence by anticipation, supplies the place of experience, and teaches us what the men are with whom we live, by what they have been in other ages. But we study men quite differently in themselves; by their manners, characters, conduct, and actions. The love of the commonwealth, rendered him attentive to all persons who were capable of serving or hurting it. He applied himself to the discovery of their most secret inclinations and principles of action, and to the knowledge of their different talents and degrees of capacity, in order to assign to each his proper post, to bestow authority in proportion to merit, and to make the private and public good promote each other. He neither rewarded nor punished his subjects, says Isocrates, from the report of others, but solely upon his own knowledge and experience of them; and neither the virtues of the good, nor the vices of the bad, escaped his inquiry and penetration.

He had one quality very seldom found in those who possess the first rank, especially when they believe themselves capable of governing alone; I mean, a wonderful docility and attention to the

* Ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν, καὶ φροντίζειν, καὶ βουλεύεσθαι, τὸν πλεῖστον χρόνον διέτριβεν.

opinion of others, which arose from a diffidence in his own abilities. With his great penetration, it did not seem necessary for him to have recourse to the counsel of others; yet he nevertheless made no resolution, and formed no enterprise, without having first consulted the wise persons he had placed about him in his court: instead of which, pride and presumption, the latent poison of sovereign power, incline the greatest part of those who arrive at thrones, either to ask no counsel at all, or not to follow it when they do.

Intent upon discovering what was excellent in every form of government and private condition of life, he proposed the uniting of all their best qualities and advantages in himself: affable and popular as in a republican state; grave and serious as in the council of the elders and senators; steady and decisive, after mature deliberation, as in a monarchy; a profound politician by the extent and rectitude of his views; an accomplished warrior, from intrepid valour in battle directed by a wise moderation; a good father, a good relation, a good friend, and, what crowns his eulogy, in every circumstance of his character,* always great, and always a king.

He supported his dignity and rank, not by an air of pride and haughtiness, but by a serenity of aspect, and a mild and easy majesty, resulting from innate virtue, and the testimony of a good conscience. He won the hearts of his friends by his liberality, and conquered others by a greatness of soul, to which they could not refuse their esteem and admiration.

But what was most royal in him, and attracted the entire confidence of his subjects, neighbours, and even enemies, was his sincerity, faith, and regard to all his engagements; and his hatred, or rather detestation, for all disguise, falsehood, and fraud. A single word from him had as much regard paid to it as the most sacred oath; and it was universally known, that nothing was capable of inducing him to violate it in the least circumstance whatever.

It was by all these excellent qualities that he effectually reformed the city of Salamis, and entirely changed its appearance in a very short time. He found it gross, savage, and barbarous, without any taste either for learning, commerce, or arms. What cannot a prince do that loves his people, and is beloved by them; who believes himself great and powerful only to render them happy; and knows how to set a just value upon, and do honour to, their labours, industry, and merit of every kind! He had not been many years upon the throne, before arts, sciences, commerce, navigation, and military discipline, were seen to flourish at Salamis; insomuch that that city did not give place to the most opulent of Greece.

Isocrates often repeats, that in the praises which he gives Eva

* Τυγάννικος δὲ τῷ πᾶσι τούτοις διαφέρειν.

goras, of which I have only extracted a part, far from exaggerating any thing, he always falls short of truth. To what can we attribute a reign so wise, so just, so moderate, so constantly employed in rendering his subjects happy, and in promoting the public good? The condition of Evagoras before he came to govern, seems to me to have contributed very much to it. The being born a prince, and the never having experienced any other condition than that of master and sovereign, are, in my opinion, great obstacles to the knowledge and practice of the duties of that high station. Evagoras, who came into the world under a tyrant, had long obeyed before he commanded. He had borne in a private and dependant life the yoke of an absolute and despotic power. He had seen himself exposed to envy and calumny, and had been in danger on account of his merit and virtue. Such a prince had only to be told, upon his ascending the throne, what was said to a great emperor :* *You have not always been what you now are. Adversity has prepared you to make a good use of power. You have lived long amongst us, and like us. You have been in danger under bad princes. You have trembled for yourself, and known by experience how virtue and innocence have been treated.*† What he had personally suffered, what he had feared for himself or others, what he had seen unjust and unreasonable in the conduct of his predecessors, had opened his eyes, and taught him all his duty. It sufficed to tell him, what the emperor Galba told Piso, when he adopted him his associate in the empire : *Remember what you condemned or applauded in princes, when you were a private man. You have only to consult the judgment you then passed upon them, and to act conformably to it, in order to acquire full instruction in the art of reigning well.*‡

Trial of Tiribazus.

We have already said, that Tiribazus,§ having been accused by Orontos of forming a conspiracy against the king, had been sent to court in chains. Gaos, admiral of the fleet, who had married his daughter, apprehending that Artaxerxes would involve him in the affair with his father-in-law, and cause him to be put to death upon mere suspicion, conceived he had no other means for his security than open revolt. He was very well beloved by the soldiers, and all the officers of the fleet were particularly attached to him Without loss of time he sent deputies to Achoris king of Egypt, and concluded a league with him against the king of Persia. On the other side, he warmly solicited the Lacedæmonians to come

* Trajan.

† Quam utile est ad usum secundorum per adversa venisse! Vixisti nobiscum, periclitatus es, timuisti. Quæ tunc erat innocentium vita scis, et expertus es. *Plin. in Panegyr.*

‡ Utilissimus quidem ac brevisimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris. *Tacit. Hist.* l. i. c. 16.

§ Diod. l. xv. p. 334, 335.

into that league, with assurances of making them masters of all Greece, and of establishing universally their form of government, at which they had long seemed to aspire. They hearkened favourably to these proposals, and embraced with joy this occasion of taking arms against Artaxerxes; the rather because the peace which they had a short time before concluded with him, by which they had given up to the Greeks of Asia, had covered them with shame.

As soon as Artaxerxes had put an end to the war of Cyprus,* he thought of concluding also the affair of Tiribazus. He had the justice to appoint for that purpose, as commissioners, three of the greatest noblemen of Persia, of distinguished probity, and of the highest reputation in his court. The affair came to an examination and a hearing on both sides. For so considerable a crime, as that of having conspired against the king's person, no other proofs were produced than the letter of Orontes; that is to say, of a declared enemy, studious to supplant his rival. Orontes was in hopes, from his credit at court, that the affair would not have been discussed in the usual forms, and that upon the memorial sent by him, the accused would have been condemned without farther examination. But this was not the custom with the Persians. By an anciently established regulation, to which, amongst other privileges, they had a right by birth, no person was ever to be condemned, without being first heard and confronted with his accusers. This was granted to Tiribazus, who answered to all the articles of the letter. As to his connivance with Evagoras, the very treaty concluded by Orontes was his apology; as it was absolutely the same as that prince had proposed to him, except one condition, which would have done honour to his master. As to his intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, the glorious treaty he had made them sign sufficiently explained, whether his own or the king's interests were his motive for it. He did not deny his credit in the army; but how long, he inquired, had it been a crime to be beloved by the officers and soldiers? and he concluded his defence, by representing the long services he had rendered the king with inviolable fidelity, and especially his good fortune in having formerly saved his life, when he was hunting, and in great danger of being devoured by two lions. The three commissioners were unanimous in declaring Tiribazus innocent. The king restored him to his former favour, and, justly enraged at the black design of Orontes, let the whole weight of his indignation fall upon him. A single example of this kind against informers convicted of falsehood, would for ever shut the door against calumny. How many innocents have been destroyed for want of observing this rule, which even the Pagans considered as the basis of all justice, and the guardian of the public tranquillity.

* Diodorus postpones the decision of this affair till after the war with the Cadusians, of which we shall soon speak. This seems very improbable.

SECTION VII.

The expedition of Artaxerxes against the Cadusians. History of Datames the Carian.

When Artaxerxes had terminated the Cyprian war,* he entered upon another against the Cadusians, who it is probable had revolted, and refused to pay the customary tribute; for authors say nothing as to the occasion of this war. Those people inhabited part of the mountains situate between the Euxine and Caspian seas, in the north of Media. The soil is there so ungrateful, and so little proper for cultivation, that no corn is sowed upon it. The people subsisted almost entirely upon apples, pears, and other fruits of that kind. Inured from their infancy to a hard and laborious life, they looked upon dangers and fatigues as nothing; and for that reason were well calculated for soldiers. The king marched against them in person at the head of an army of 300,000 foot and 10,000 horse. Tiribazus attended him in this expedition.

Artaxerxes had not advanced far into the country when his army suffered extremely by famine. The troops could find nothing to subsist upon; and it was impossible to bring provisions from other places, as the roads were difficult and impracticable. The whole camp were reduced to eat their beasts of burden; and these soon became so scarce, that an ass's head was valued at sixty drachmas,† and was very hard to be got at that price. The king's table itself began to fall short, and only a few horses remained, the rest having been entirely consumed.

In this melancholy conjuncture, Tiribazus contrived a stratagem which saved the king and army. The Cadusians had two kings, who were encamped separately with their troops. Tiribazus, who took care to be informed of all that passed, had been apprised that there was some misunderstanding between them, and that their jealousy of each other prevented their acting in concert, as they ought to have done. After having communicated his design to Artaxerxes, he went himself to one of the kings, and despatched his son to the other. They each of them informed the king to whom they applied, that the other had sent ambassadors to treat with Artaxerxes privately, and advised him to lose no time, but to make his peace directly, in order that the condition of it might be the more advantageous; promising to assist them with their whole credit. The fraud succeeded. The Pagans thought it might allowably be used with enemies.‡ Ambassadors set out from both princes respectively, from the one with Tiribazus, and from the other with his son.

As this double negotiation lasted some time, Artaxerxes began to suspect Tiribazus; and his enemies, taking that opportunity, forgot nothing to his prejudice that might ruin him in the king's

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1023, 1024. † Thirty livres.
‡ Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat? *Virgil.*

opinion. That prince already repented the confidence he had reposed in him, and thereby gave room for those who envied him to vent their calumnies and invectives. Upon what does the fortune of the most faithful subjects depend with a credulous and suspicious prince! Whilst this passed, arrived Tiribazus on his side, and his son on the other, each with ambassadors from the Cadusians. The treaty being concluded with both parties, and the peace made, Tiribazus became more powerful than ever in his master's favour, and returned with him.

The king's behaviour in this march was much admired. Neither the gold with which he was covered, nor his purple robes, nor the jewels that glittered all over him, and were worth 36,000,000 of livres,* prevented his taking an equal share in the whole fatigue with the meanest soldier. He was seen, with his quiver at his back and his shield on his arms, to dismount from his horse, and march foremost in those rugged and difficult roads. The soldiers, observing his patience and fortitude, and animated by his example, became so light, that they seemed rather to fly than walk. At length he arrived at one of his palaces, where the gardens were kept in admirable order, and there was a park of great extent and well planted, which was the more surprising, as the whole country about it was entirely naked, and bore no kind of trees. As it was the depth of winter, and the cold was excessive, he gave the soldiers permission to cut down the wood in this park, without sparing the finest trees, either pines or cypresses. But the soldiers not being able to resolve to fell timber of such exceeding beauty and stateliness, the king took an axe, and began by cutting the finest and largest tree himself; after which the troops had no farther scruples, but cut down all the wood they wanted, and kindled as many fires as were necessary to enable them to pass the night without any inconvenience. When we reflect how much value noblemen generally set upon their gardens and houses of pleasure, we must feel pleased with Artaxerxes's generosity in making this sacrifice, which argued great goodness of heart, and a sensibility for the distresses and sufferings of his soldiers. But he did not always support that character.

The king had lost in this enterprise a great number of his best troops, and almost all his horses: and as he imagined that he was despised upon that account and the ill success of his expedition, he became very much out of humour with the grandees of his court, and put to death a great number of them in the emotions of his wrath, and more out of distrust, and the fear of their attempting something against him. For fear in a suspicious prince is a very destructive and bloody passion; whereas true courage is gentle, humane, and averse to all jealousy and suspicion.

One of the principal officers that perished in this expedition

* Twelve thousand talents.

against the Cadusians,* was Camisares, by nation a Carian, and governor of Leuco-Syria, a province enclosed between Cilicia and Cappadocia. His son Datames succeeded him in that government, which was given him in consideration of the good services he had also rendered the king in the same expedition. He was the greatest captain of his time; and Cornelius Nepos, who has given us his life, prefers Amilcar and Hannibal alone to him among the barbarians. It appears from this life, that no one ever excelled him in boldness, valour, and ability in inventing schemes and stratagems, in activity in the execution of his designs, in presence of mind to decide instantly, and to find resources upon the most desperate occasions; in a word, in every thing that regards the science of war. It seems that nothing was wanting to his having acquired a more illustrious name, than a more spacious theatre, and perhaps an historian who would have given a more minute narrative of his exploits. For Cornelius Nepos, according to his general plan, could not relate them otherwise than in a very succinct manner.

He began to distinguish himself particularly by the execution of a commission that was given him to reduce Thyus, a very powerful prince, and governor of Paphlagonia, who had revolted against the king. As he was his near relation, he thought it incumbent upon him at first to try the methods of lenity and conciliation, which almost cost him his life, through the treachery of Thyus, by the ambuscades he laid for him. Having escaped so great a danger, he attacked him with open force; though he saw himself abandoned by Ariobarzanes, satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and all Phrygia, whom jealousy prevented from giving him aid. He took his enemy prisoner, with his wife and children; and knowing with what joy the king would receive the news, he endeavoured to make it the more sensibly felt by the pleasure of a surprise. He set out with his illustrious prisoner, without giving the court any advice, and made long marches, to prevent its being known by report before his arrival. When he came to Susa, he equipped Thyus in a very singular manner. He was a man of a very tall stature, of a haggard and terrible aspect, a black complexion, with the hair of his head and beard very long. He dressed him in a magnificent habit, put a collar and bracelets of gold about his neck and arms, and added to this equipage all the ornaments of a king, as in fact he was. For himself, in the coarse habit of a peasant, and clad like a hunter, armed with a club in his right hand, he led Thyus in his left in a leash, like a wild beast that had been taken in the toils. The novelty of the sight drew the whole city after it; but nobody was so much surprised and pleased as the king, when he saw them approach in that pleasant masquerade. The rebellion of a prince, very powerful in his country, had given Artaxerxes great and just alarm, and he did not expect to have seen him so soon in his hands.

‡ Corn. Nep. in vit. Datamis.

So sudden and successful an execution gave him a higher opinion than ever of the merit of Datames.

To express his sense of it, he gave him an equal share in the command of the army designed against Egypt, with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes, the two principal persons in the state, and even appointed him general in chief when he recalled Pharnabazus.

When he was upon the point of setting out for that expedition, Artaxerxes ordered him to march directly against Aspis, who had made the country where he commanded, in the neighbourhood of Cappadocia, revolt. The commission was of little importance for an officer who had been appointed general, and besides very dangerous, because it was necessary to go in quest of the enemy in a very remote country. The king soon perceived his error, and countermanded him; but Datames had set out directly with a handful of men, and marched night and day; judging that diligence alone, and not a great number of troops, was all that was necessary to surprise and vanquish the enemy. It happened according to his expectation, and the couriers despatched by the king, met Aspis, in chains, upon the road to Susa.

Nothing was talked of at the court but Datames. No one knew which to admire most, his ready obedience, his wise and enterprising bravery, or his extraordinary success. So glorious a reputation gave offence to the courtiers in power. Enemies in secret to each other, and divided by a contrariety of interests, and a competition in their pretensions, they united together against a superior merit which reproached their defects, and was therefore a crime in their acceptation. They conspired to ruin him in the king's opinion, and succeeded but too well. As they besieged him perpetually, and he was not upon his guard against persons who appeared so well affected to his service, they inspired him with jealousy and suspicion against the most zealous and faithful of his officers.

An intimate friend of Datames, who held one of the highest posts at the court, apprised him of what was passing, and of the conspiracy which had been formed against him, and had already rendered the king disaffected towards him. He represented to him,* that if the Egyptian expedition, with which he was charged, should take a bad turn, he would find himself exposed to great dangers: that it was the custom of kings to attribute good successes to themselves and their auspicious fortune only, and to impute the bad to the faults of their generals, and to make them responsible for these at the peril of their heads: that he ran the greater risk, as all that were about the king's person, and had

* Docet eum magno fore in periculo, siquid, illo imperante, in Ægypto adversi accidisset. Namque eam esse consuetudinem regum, ut casus adversos hominibus, tribuant secundos fortunæ suæ; quo facilè fieri, ut impellantur ad eorum pernicieni, quorum ductu res malè gestæ nuncientur. Illum hoc majore fore in discrimine, quòd, quibus rex maximè obediat, eos habeat inimicissimos. *Cor. Nep.*

any ascendant over him, were his declared enemies, and had sworn his destruction.

Upon this advice, Datames resolved to quit the king's service, though without doing any thing hitherto contrary to the fidelity which he owed to him. He left the command of the army to Mandrocles, of Magnesia, departed with his own troops for Cappadocia, seized Paphlagonia, which joined it, allied himself secretly with Ariobarzanes, raised troops, took possession of the fortresses, and put good garrisons in them. He received advice, that the Pisidians were arming against him. He did not wait their attack, but made his army march thither, under the command of his youngest son, who had the misfortune to be killed in a battle. However lively the father's affliction might be upon that occasion, he concealed his death, lest the bad news should discourage his troops. When he approached near the enemy, his first care was to take possession of an advantageous post. Mithrobarzanes,* his father-in-law, who commanded the horse, believing his son entirely ruined, determined to go over to the enemy. Datames, without concern or emotion, caused a rumour to be spread throughout the army, that it was only a feint concerted between him and his father-in-law, and followed him close, as if he designed to put his troops into a disposition for charging the enemy in two different quarters. The stratagem had all the success he expected from it. When they joined battle, Mithrobarzanes was treated as an enemy on both sides, and cut to pieces with his troops. The army of the Pisidians was put to flight, and left Datames master of the field, and of all the rich booty found in the camp of the conquered.

Datames had not till then declared openly against the king; the actions we have related being only against governors, with whom he might have particular differences, which, as we have observed before, was common enough. His own eldest son, called Scismas, made himself his accuser, and discovered his whole designs to the king. Artaxerxes was highly alarmed. He knew all the merit of this new enemy, and that he did not engage in any enterprise without having maturely considered all its consequences, and taken the necessary measures to secure its success; and that hitherto the execution had always corresponded with the wisdom of his projects. He sent an army against him into Cappadocia, of almost 200,000 men, of which 20,000 were horse, all commanded by Autophradates. The troops of Datames did not amount to the twentieth part of the king's; so that he had no resource but in himself, the valour of his soldiers, and the happy situation of the post he had chosen. For in that consisted his chief excellence; never captain having better known how to take his advantages, and choose his ground, when he was to draw up an army in battle.

His army, as I have observed, was far inferior to that of the

* Diod. l. xv. p. 399.

enemy. He had posted himself in a situation where they could not surround him; where, upon the least movement they made, he could attack them with very considerable advantage; and where, had they resolved to fight, their odds in number would have been absolutely useless to them. Autophradates well knew, that according to all the rules of war, he ought not to hazard a battle in such a conjuncture: but he observed at the same time, that it would be disgraceful for him, with so numerous an army, to retreat, or to continue any longer in inaction before a handful of enemies. He therefore gave the signal. The first attack was rude; but the troops of Autophradates soon gave way, and were entirely routed. The victor pursued them for some time, with great slaughter There were only 1000 men killed on the side of Datames.

Several battles, or rather skirmishes, were fought afterwards, in which the latter was always victorious; because, perfectly knowing the country, and succeeding especially in stratagems of war, he always posted himself advantageously, and engaged the enemy in difficult ground, from whence they could not extricate themselves without loss. Autophradates seeing all his endeavours ineffectual, and his supplies entirely exhausted, and despairing of ever being able to subject by force so artful and valiant an enemy, suggested an accommodation, and proposed to him the being restored to the king's favour, upon honourable conditions. Datames was not ignorant that there was little security for him in such a choice, because princes are seldom reconciled in earnest with a subject who has failed in his obedience, and to whom they see themselves in some sort obliged to submit. However, as despair alone had hurried him into the revolt, and he had always retained at heart sentiments of zeal and affection for his prince, he joyfully accepted offers which would put an end to the violent condition in which his misfortune had engaged him, and afford him the means of returning to his duty, and of employing his talents for the service of the prince, to whom they were due. He promised to send deputies to the king; upon which ensued a cessation of arms, and Autophradates retired into Phrygia, which was his government.

Datames was not deceived. Artaxerxes, furiously enraged against him, had changed the esteem and affection which he formerly professed for him, into an implacable hatred. Finding himself incapable of conquering him by force of arms, he was not ashamed to employ artifice and treachery; means unworthy every man of honour, and how much more so of a prince! He hired several murderers to assassinate him; but Datames was so happy as to escape their ambuscades. At length Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzanes, to whom the king had made magnificent promises, if he could deliver him from so formidable an enemy, having insinuated himself into his friendship, and having long treated him with all the marks of the most entire fidelity, in order to acquire his confidence, took the advantage of a favourable opportunity when he was alone,

and stabbed him with his sword before he was in a condition to defend himself.

Thus fell this great captain in the snares of a pretended friendship,* who had always made it a point of honour to observe the most inviolable fidelity towards those with whom he had any engagements. Happy had he always piqued himself also upon being as faithful a subject as he was a true friend; and if he had not, in the latter part of his life, sullied the lustre of his heroic qualities by the ill use he made of them; which neither the fear of disgrace, the injustice of those who envied him, the ingratitude of his master for the services he had rendered him, nor any other pretext, could sufficiently authorize.

I am surprised that, worthy as he was, from his uncommon virtues, of being compared to the greatest persons of antiquity, his merit has remained in a manner buried in silence and oblivion. His great actions and exploits are however worthy of being preserved in history. For it is in such small bodies of troops as those of Datames, where every energy is exerted, where prudence directs, and where chance has no share, that the abilities of a general appear in their full light.

* Ita vir, qui multos consilio, neminem perfidiâ ceperat, simulatâ captus est ami. *Cor. Nep.*

END OF VOL. III.